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ABSTRACT 
 
This phenomenological study explores the person’s experience of end stage renal 
disease (ESRD) and haemodialysis therapy. In-depth, qualitative interviews are 
conducted with sixteen participants on hospital-based haemodialysis therapy in Ireland. 
Using a hermeneutical approach to data analysis, the experience of waiting is 
formulated as an overarching pattern in the study. This pattern is constituted by three 
themes titled Lost Time, Waiting for a Kidney Transplant, and Communicating with 
Nurses: Myth versus Reality.  
 
The participants indicate that they spend a substantial amount of time waiting when they 
attend haemodialysis therapy. The time spent waiting prevents them from engaging in 
everyday activities, and is interpreted as lost time. The theme Lost Time consists of two 
sub themes: (1) Killing Time, and (2) Wasting Time.   
 
Because of the distressing experience of waiting, the participants look forward to 
receiving a kidney transplant. A successful kidney transplant offers the participants the 
possibility of freedom from the restrictions of the haemodialysis treatment regime. 
However, the shortage of donor organs means the waiting time for a transplant is 
excessive for many participants. The theme Waiting for a Kidney Transplant is 
composed of three sub themes: (1) Living in Hope, (2) Uncertainty, and (3) Being on 
Hold.     
 
The lack of nurse-patient communication on the haemodialysis unit means the 
participants’ experience of waiting is neither recognised nor addressed. Instead, the 
nurses seem to concentrate on the technical and physical aspects of patient care. The 
participants’ descriptions of the superficial level of nurse-patient communication are 
discussed in the third and final theme in the study titled: Communicating with Nurses: 
Myth versus Reality. It is suggested that the technologically focused context of care on 
the haemodialysis unit may have contributed to the superficial levels of nurse-patient 
communication and interaction. Therefore, the need to move towards a model of 
supportive care using a continuous quality improvement (CQI) framework is 
recommended to enhance the quality of patient care.   
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
End stage renal disease (ESRD) is a chronic and life-threatening illness. It implies that 
the kidneys are permanently damaged and the person can no longer survive 
independently without renal replacement therapy. Renal replacement therapy involves 
either dialysis or a kidney transplant. The waiting process for a kidney transplant can 
take a substantial amount of time because there are a limited number of organs 
available. Therefore, while the person with ESRD waits for a kidney transplant, s/he 
must remain on dialysis therapy.   
 
1.1 ESRD AS A HEALTHCARE ISSUE IN IRELAND 
 
According to the unpublished National Renal Strategy Review (2006), 180,000 people 
in Ireland have some form of significant renal disease. Of these individuals, 3,000 are 
currently receiving renal replacement therapy. However, as the population ages, and the 
prevalence of diabetes rises, this number is expected to increase dramatically over the 
coming years. In particular, the review estimates that by the year 2011, the number of 
patients on haemodialysis therapy in Ireland will have doubled. It emphasises that renal 
transplantation in Ireland has not kept pace with the increasing number of dialysis 
patients. Hence, the development of a living-donor transplant programme is urgently 
needed in Ireland. While this expansion is being developed, the National Renal Strategy 
Review recommends an increase in haemodialysis stations to address the current 
overcrowding that exists on these units in Ireland.   
 
These findings indicate that ESRD and dialysis therapy is a significant healthcare issue 
in Ireland, which will continue to intensify over the coming years. The spiralling 
demand for renal services and specifically for haemodialysis therapy may have 
profound implications on the person’s experience of their illness and treatment. 
Therefore, it is an appropriate time for a study, which explores the illness experience of 
this patient group in Ireland.   
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1.2 OVERALL AIM OF THE STUDY  
 
The overall aim of this study is to provide an accurate, detailed, and in-depth 
description of the person’s experience of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy. The study is 
divided into six chapters. The following section presents an overview of each of these 
chapters.   
 
1.3 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTERS IN THE STUDY  
 
Chapter two discusses the existing literature relating to the person’s experience of 
ESRD and dialysis therapy. The findings indicate that the research in this area is 
predominantly based on an empirical psychological framework, which encapsulates a 
Cartesian dualistic world-view of the person. From this perspective, the person or self is 
understood as a cognitive or psychological “subject”. Therefore, this research explores 
the person’s experience of ESRD in terms of psychological concepts, theories, and 
ideas.  
 
It primarily employs quantitative research designs to assess topics, such as depression, 
quality of life, and coping. Most of the studies employ questionnaires, which are 
structured and closed-ended. Thus, the important contextual and background features, 
which form the basis of the person’s experience of ESRD, are not incorporated within 
this research. 
 
There are a number of qualitative research studies, which offer some interesting 
contextual and background information on the person’s experience of ESRD and 
dialysis. However, these studies are also predominantly grounded within a 
psychological framework. For instance, they adapt concepts, theories, and attributes, 
which are psychologically or cognitively based, to explore the person’s experience of 
ESRD and dialysis. It is suggested that the Cartesian dualistic world-view of the person 
is also embedded within this research. In other words, these studies implicitly retain a 
cognitive perspective of the self as “subject”.   
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This is not to suggest that there is anything inherently flawed with this research. Rather, 
it is proposed that by continuously interpreting the person from this psychological 
perspective, the existing research may have effectively concealed other equally 
significant interpretations of the person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis.  Therefore, 
based on the findings of the literature review, the need for an alternative approach to 
explore the person’s experience of ESRD is recommended. 
 
In particular, it is proposed that a hermeneutical phenomenological methodology, based 
on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger allows this alternative perspective to be 
provided. Heidegger’s philosophy offers a way to overcome the primarily psychological 
interpretation of the person’s experience that is contained in the existing literature. It 
facilitates a move away from the dualistic thinking of Descartes, and presents a 
radicalised approach to understanding the person, as being-in-the-world. Therefore, this 
study employs a hermeneutical phenomenological methodology to explore the person’s 
experience of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy.  
 
Chapter three presents a detailed account of the research methodology employed in the 
study. The chapter begins with an in-depth account of the philosophical perspective of 
the study. It provides a general overview of phenomenology, and then specifically 
focuses on the hermeneutical approach to phenomenology, presented by Heidegger 
(1962). In particular, Heidegger’s notion of time or temporality is discussed in detail, 
since it provides the fundamental basis of his philosophical interpretation of the human 
being.  
 
This philosophical perspective also provides the background to the research methods 
incorporated in the study. For instance, a purposive sampling strategy is used to select 
participants who provide a rich and in-depth description of their experience of ESRD 
and haemodialysis therapy. Data are collected using qualitative, in-depth interviews, 
which incorporate a conversational style. The data are analysed using a hermeneutical 
approach by Diekelmann, Allen & Tanner (1989), which is specifically formulated for 
use in Heideggerian hermeneutical studies.  
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Chapter four provides a discussion on the findings gleaned from the hermeneutical 
analysis of the interview data.  The experience of waiting is presented as a constitutive 
or overarching pattern in the study. This pattern consists of three themes: Lost Time; 
Waiting for a Kidney Transplant, and Communicating with Nurses: Myth versus Reality.  
 
The theme Lost Time refers to the participants’ experience of waiting when they attend 
haemodialysis therapy. The excessive time spent waiting prevents the participants from 
engaging in normal everyday activities. Therefore, it is interpreted as time lost out of 
their everyday lives. The theme Lost Time is composed of two sub themes: Killing Time 
and Wasting Time.  
 
The distress caused by the participants’ experience of waiting means they look forward 
to receiving a kidney transplant. They believe a successful kidney transplant will free 
them from the restrictions of haemodialysis therapy. However, in order to receive a 
transplant, the participants have to wait until a suitable donor match becomes available.  
 
The experience of Waiting for a Kidney Transplant is created as a theme in the study. 
This theme consists of three sub-themes: Living in Hope, Uncertainty, and Being on 
Hold. The participants describe their experience of living in hope, while they wait for a 
kidney transplant. The hope of receiving a transplant offers them the possibility of a 
normal life in the future. However, as the time spent waiting continues indefinitely, they 
become uncertain.  
 
As a result of the experience of uncertainty, the participants are unable to contemplate 
possibilities for their futures. Moreover, the disruptions caused by the dialysis treatment 
regime limits their ability to participate in the lifestyle they took for granted in the past. 
Therefore, they convey their experience of being on hold, while they wait for a kidney 
transplant.  
 
It is suggested that the participants’ experience of waiting, illustrated in both themes, 
culminates in the existential moods of anxiety and boredom, advanced by Heidegger 
(1962, 1995). While the participants continue to endure the relentless experience of 
waiting, they attend the hospital for haemodialysis therapy three times each week. 
During this time, the nurses on the haemodialysis unit are the primary health care 
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provider for these patients. However, the participants’ accounts emphasise that these 
nurses rarely communicate with them during their treatment. Instead, they confine their 
attention to the technical and physical aspects of care.  
 
This superficial level of nurse-patient communication means the participants’ 
experience of waiting is neither recognised nor addressed by the nurses. Moreover, the 
moods of anxiety and boredom that are embedded within their experience of waiting are 
also overlooked. The participants’ experience of communicating with the nurses during 
haemodialysis is presented in the third and final theme in the study, labelled: 
Communicating with Nurses: Myth versus Reality.  
 
Chapter five provides an overall discussion of the findings of the study. The existential 
moods of anxiety and boredom, depicted within the participants’ accounts of waiting, 
are emphasised within the discussion. For instance, specific characteristics of these 
existential moods epitomise the concept of “enduring”, advanced by Morse (2001). 
However, the psychological perspective of emotion retained within the concept of 
enduring is replaced with Heidegger’s interpretation of mood, to make it more 
characteristic of the participants’ experience of waiting. Therefore, in the second section 
of chapter five, a new “Model of Enduring” is proposed. This model combines specific 
features of Morse’s concept of enduring, with Heidegger’s existential account of mood.  
 
According to Morse (2001), in order to recognise and respond to the experience of 
enduring, the nurse must take time to interact and communicate with the patient. 
However, as the participants’ accounts reveal, the nurses on the haemodialysis unit 
spend very little time communicating with them during dialysis therapy. Instead, they 
concentrate almost entirely on the technical and physiological acts of care. The 
technologically focused context of care on the haemodialysis unit is discussed in the 
third and final section of this chapter.  
 
Chapter six offers recommendations nursing and healthcare. In particular, it proposes 
the need to alter the current technologically focused context of care on the 
haemodialysis unit in order to provide supportive care for these patients. This chapter 
also provides the limitations and conclusion of the study.  
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews the literature concerning the person’s experience of end stage renal 
disease (ESRD) and dialysis therapy. The aims of the review are threefold: (1) to 
conduct a hermeneutical analysis of the existing research literature related to the 
person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis therapy;  (2) to identify shortcomings in this 
research literature, and  (3) to propose an alternative approach that may address the 
shortcomings identified in the literature.     
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
 
The existing literature signified that the onset of a chronic illness created many losses 
and disruptions in the person’s life. For instance, Chesla (2005) indicated that chronic 
illness caused the person to lose confidence in their ability to function in work, social 
life, and family relationships. The losses experienced by these individuals represented a 
breakdown in their everyday life and was a fundamental source of suffering (Chesla, 
2005). Correspondingly, a study by Bury (1982) also highlighted the losses associated 
with chronic illness, including the loss of bodily functions, the loss of an autonomous 
life, and the loss of relationships and roles. The study explored the subjective 
experience of chronic illness and described it as a disruptive event, where the structures 
of everyday life had disintegrated. Hence, the participants were required to re-structure 
their biography and self-concept in order to adapt to the illness.  
 
Various authors claimed that the subjective experience of illness was influenced by the 
socio-cultural orientations of the individual and vice versa (Kleinmann, 1991; Frank, 
1995; Toombs, 1995). This literature signified that the various ways individuals think, 
act, and behave in the lived world were shaped by these orientations. However, when 
faced with a chronic illness, the link between the self and his/her socio-cultural 
networks were challenged. Hence, the result was a breakdown of the person’s everyday 
activities, roles, and relationships (Kleinmann, 1991; Frank, 1995; Toombs, 1995).  
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According to a study by Charmaz (1983), the lifestyle disruptions imposed by chronic 
illness were so profound that the participants suffered a loss of their self-image. The 
participants in the study had various chronic illnesses including renal disease, 
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancer, and multiple sclerosis. The participants 
indicated that the demands of the treatment regime of chronic illness resulted in a 
restricted life, where the illness was their primary focus. The restrictions in living 
culminated in a loss of activity, loss of employment, loss of financial status, loss of 
family relationships, and loss of social engagements for the participants. From the 
author’s perspective, the participants watched their normal self-images prior to illness 
disintegrate without the replacement of equally valued new ones. This loss of the 
familiar self-image was a fundamental source of suffering for the participants in the 
study (Charmaz, 1983).  
 
Similarly, Curtin et al (2002) stated that many of the lifestyle alterations caused by 
chronic illness were irreversible. Hence, the person was required to re-structure their 
self-identity to adapt to the changed life circumstances. However, the ability to adapt 
relied primarily on the severity of the illness and the accompanying treatment regime. 
According to Curtin et al (2002), the need for treatment with dialysis therapy provided 
ESRD with unique characteristics that made it particularly difficult for the individual. 
 
2.2 END STAGE RENAL DISEASE  
 
ESRD is a chronic and debilitating disease. In order to survive, the person must 
commence renal replacement therapy. There are three modalities of renal replacement 
therapy including kidney transplantation, haemodialysis therapy, and peritoneal dialysis 
therapy. A kidney transplant offers the person the possibility of regaining the lost renal 
function caused by ESRD. However, a suitable tissue match between the donor and 
recipient is required to ensure the success of a kidney transplant. Therefore, patients are 
placed on a transplant waiting list until a suitable donor match is located.  
 
The waiting time for a kidney transplant can be excessive because there are a limited 
number of organs available. While the person waits for a kidney transplant, s/he must 
commence dialysis therapy.  Moreover, kidney transplantation is not an option for 
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everyone. It may be contraindicated in individuals with additional co-morbid 
conditions, malignancy, or infectious complications. For these individuals, dialysis is 
the only treatment available for ESRD.  
 
2.3 DIALYSIS THERAPY 
 
There are two types of dialysis therapy: peritoneal dialysis and haemodialysis. 
Peritoneal dialysis is a treatment that uses the peritoneal membrane as a natural filter to 
remove toxic substances and fluid from the blood.1 There are two main types of 
peritoneal dialysis: continuous ambulatory peritoneal dialysis (CAPD) and automated 
peritoneal dialysis (APD). CAPD is a manual procedure, which is performed 
independently by the person at home. It involves the instillation of a dialysis solution 
into the peritoneal cavity via a peritoneal catheter.2 The dialysis solution is left to dwell 
in the peritoneum for about 4-6 hours, allowing dialysis to take place. The dialysis fluid 
is then drained away with the excess toxins and fluid from the person’s blood. The 
person on CAPD repeats the same process up to four times a day.  
 
APD requires a machine, which repeatedly inserts and drains the dialysis solution to and 
from the peritoneal cavity. This treatment is usually carried out at home while the 
person sleeps. Both forms of peritoneal dialysis require the person to be independent 
and self-caring with the management of their dialysis treatment regime.  
 
During haemodialysis therapy, high volumes of the person’s blood are continuously 
filtered through a dialyser (artificial kidney), where the blood is purified and returned to 
the patient via the venous blood system. The person undergoing haemodialysis therapy 
in the Republic of Ireland attends hospital three times per week for treatment sessions 
lasting approximately four hours.3 The need to regularly attend the hospital makes 
                                                 
1 The peritoneum is a membrane lining the abdominal wall, the liver, stomach, and intestines. The 
peritoneal cavity, which exists within this membrane, can accommodate large volumes of fluid making it 
ideal for dialysis.  
2 A peritoneal catheter is surgically created through the person’s abdomen to allow the instillation of the 
dialysis solution. A proportion of the catheter tubing lies outside the person’s abdomen allowing for 
connection/disconnection of the dialysis solution to the catheter.  
3 Unlike some other countries, the Republic of Ireland does not currently offer home haemodialysis 
therapy to individuals with ESRD. In the past, the waiting time for a transplant was so short that it was 
not deemed necessary to offer home haemodialysis therapy. However, in view of the longer waiting times 
for a transplant and the increasing patient numbers for dialysis, this might change in the future.  
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haemodialysis therapy a more restrictive treatment than peritoneal dialysis. Although 
these individuals are dependent on the dialysis machine and the nurses for their 
treatment, they are encouraged to be independent and live a normal life in between.    
 
Access to the person’s circulatory system is required during haemodialysis therapy. 
This allows the passage of the person’s blood through the dialyser (artificial kidney) for 
purification. Arteriovenous fistulae (AVF) are the preferred mode of vascular access 
because they provide a more long-term form of access.4 However, it is not possible to 
create an AVF in all individuals. Hence, a prosthetic arteriovenous graft (AVG) may be 
considered for those who cannot have an AVF.5 In the event that both an AVF and 
AVG are contraindicated, then a central venous catheter is inserted to allow access to 
the patient’s bloodstream for dialysis.6 A central venous dialysis catheter is a dual 
lumen catheter, which is inserted percutaneously into a central vein.7 
 
It is important to reiterate that ESRD is a progressive and incurable disease. Dialysis 
and transplantation are merely treatments for the disease, but not cures. While the 
person waits for a kidney transplant, s/he has to continuously undergo dialysis therapy. 
Although kidney transplantation offers freedom from dialysis, it is not a permanent 
treatment. Kidney transplants do not last forever and the person eventually returns to 
dialysis therapy (Terrill, 2002). According to Kidney Research UK (2006), the survival 
rates for cadaveric kidney transplants is 85-90% at 1 year, 70% at 5 years, and 50% at 
15 years, while the survival rates for live donor kidney transplants is 90-95% at 1 year, 
80% at 5 years, and 60% at 15 years.   
 
 
 
                                                 
4 An AVF involves the surgical anastomosis (joining) of an artery to a vein. This allows arterial blood to 
flow through the vein, causing it to enlarge and expand. Once the fistula is given time to mature (about 6-
8 weeks), two large bore needles can be inserted, allowing the person’s blood to be circulated through the 
dialyser for purification during treatment.  
5 A prosthetic AVG involves the implantation of a small piece of synthetic tubing (e.g. PTFE 
polytetrafluoroethene or Dacron) between an artery and a vein. Once the graft is given time to heal (about 
6 weeks), wide bore needles are inserted into the graft, allowing access to the person’s circulation during 
haemodialysis therapy.  
6 Contraindications include peripheral vascular disease, chronic and intradialytic hypotension, heart 
disease, morbid obesity, infections, skin problems, and hypercoagulable states.   
7 The percutaneous insertion of a central venous cathether refers to the procedure where access to a 
central vein (subclavian, femoral, internal jugular ) is performed via needle-puncture of the skin.  
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2.4 THE APPROACH OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature was reviewed intermittently throughout the full course of this study using 
electronic databases, such as Healthsource Nursing-Academic Edition, MEDLINE, 
CINAHL, Blackwell Synergy, SwetsWise, SpringerLink, PsychINFO, PsycARTICLES, 
Science Direct, BMJ Journals, SAGE journals, and Web of Science.  A search of the 
literature was performed using the terms ‘experience’ AND ‘renal’ OR ‘kidney’ OR 
‘dialysis’ OR ‘haemodialysis’ OR ‘hemodialysis’ OR ‘peritoneal dialysis’. Only articles 
in the English language were accessed. A search of the Cochrane Library’s Reviews of 
relevant areas was also conducted. In addition, manual searching of relevant textbooks, 
journals, and “grey literature” was performed. Key nursing PhD theses were studied, 
which specifically focused on various aspects of the person’s experience of living with 
ESRD, such as Sloan (1996) and Polaschek (2000).  
 
The literature review was conducted using a hermeneutical analysis of studies related to 
the person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis. I was introduced to this approach at the 
Institute for Heideggerian Hermeneutical research, which I attended twice in the USA. 
This institute provided an advanced level of training for researchers using a 
Heideggerian Hermeneutical methodology to explore healthcare issues. Based on the 
knowledge I developed at this institute, I realised that a Heideggerian hermeneutical 
methodology does not merely apply to the research methodology section of a study. 
Instead, the interpretive nature of this approach forms the core of all stages of the 
research process, including the literature review. The hermeneutical analysis of the 
literature used in this study was based on an approach used by Scheckel (2005) in her 
Heideggerian hermeneutical study, which sought to understand the common practices 
used to reform nursing education.8  
 
The studies were read in their entirety to obtain an overall understanding of the findings. 
Interpretive summaries of the relevant studies were written up with a list of the key 
findings. Using a process of reading, writing, and thinking about the findings in the 
literature, an extensive list of common themes were developed, which were used to 
describe the experiences of people with ESRD. These themes included the unpleasant 
                                                 
8 Martha Scheckel PhD, RN is Assistant Professor in Nursing at Viterbo University, Wisconsin, USA. I 
met Martha at the Institute for Heideggerian Hermeneutical research. She kindly e-mailed me her PhD 
thesis and shared her knowledge and skills on how to conduct a hermeneutic analysis of the literature.  
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physical symptoms of ESRD and dialysis, distressing emotional reactions and 
responses, loss, grief, suffering, restrictions of dialysis therapy, disruptions in lifestyle, 
the time consuming nature of dialysis, adjustment, transformation, coping, quality of 
life, embodiment, hope (specifically the hope of a transplant), self care, self-efficacy, 
autonomy, independence/dependence, the impact of technology, social support, and 
relationships with healthcare staff.  
 
After conducting the interpretive analysis of the interview data and some initial 
discussion of the findings, I returned to the existing themes identified from the review 
of the literature. At this stage in the research, I had developed new perspectives and 
interpretations of the person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis based on the data 
analysis stage. Hence, I brought this new interpretive lens to bear on the themes already 
identified within the literature. By using this interpretive approach, the literature review 
became more than a summing up of research findings. It involved a level of analysis, 
interpretation, and synthesis that offered novel interpretations of the findings from the 
studies related to the person’s experience of ESRD. The primary objective of this 
interpretive process was to formulate constitutive or overarching patterns from the 
existing literature. These patterns constituted the research priorities that needed to be 
addressed in my study and included:  
 
1. The predominantly psychological perspective, which was embedded 
within the existing literature related to the person’s experience of ESRD. 
2. The lack of contextual or background information about the person’s 
experience of ESRD and dialysis, which existed in the quantitative 
literature on this topic.  
 
These two constitutive patterns were emphasised throughout the literature review. They 
provided the overarching “interpretive” perspective or lens through which the literature 
was critiqued and presented.  
 
The existing literature on the experience of ESRD predominantly evolved from a 
psychological perspective, which examined the person’s experience of ESRD using a 
quantitative approach incorporating questionnaires. It is suggested that this research 
lacked important contextual information about the effects of the illness on the person’s 
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life. Therefore, the literature review begins with a critical review of this literature, 
highlighting the potential limitations in its approach.   
 
This discussion leads onto the review of the qualitative literature that pertained to the 
person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis. Although there were a number of qualitative 
studies, which explored various aspects of the person’s experience of ESRD, these 
studies were also based on a predominantly psychological framework. Hence, 
psychological concepts, theories, and emotions were often incorporated within these 
studies to describe the person’s experience of ESRD.  
 
The qualitative literature highlighted that the losses and lifestyle disruptions caused by a 
chronic illness, such as ESRD culminated in a loss of self. The loss of self was 
identified as a prominent source of suffering and initiated distressing emotional 
responses in the person, such as anxiety and uncertainty. Based on the findings of these 
studies, it seemed that people oscillated between the release and suppression of these 
distressing emotional responses. These features of the person’s experience depicted 
certain characteristics of the model of suffering, formulated by Morse (2001). Hence, 
Morse’s work on suffering was interwoven throughout the review of the qualitative 
literature to ensure an in-depth discussion of this literature was provided.  
 
2.5 THE EXPERIENCE OF ESRD: A POSITIVISTIC PERSPECTIVE  
 
The existing research related to the person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis was 
predominantly based on an empirical psychological framework. This research used 
quantitative approaches to assess the person’s subjective experience of quality of life, 
depression, coping, and adjustment, using questionnaires. It is proposed, that this 
psychological approach emanated from a positivistic paradigm, which failed to 
incorporate the significant contextual factors that constituted the person’s experience of 
living with ESRD and dialysis therapy.  
 
Positivism was a term used to describe an approach, which applied scientific methods to 
examine human experiences. It was a product of the Cartesian dualistic perspective of 
the human being, which existed at the time of its inception. Descartes was a 
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philosopher, natural scientist, and mathematician.  According to his philosophy, the 
objects in nature had their properties identified in mathematical physics, such as shape, 
number, mass and motion (Hollis, 1994). Therefore, the material world consisted 
entirely of mathematical bodies (Fjelland & Gjengedal, 1994). Based on this 
philosophy, the human body, like any other body contained within the world, was also 
governed by the laws of mechanics (Hollis, 1994).   
 
However, Descartes viewed the mind or soul as an immaterial substance, which was 
detached from the material world and subsequently not governed by natural laws 
(Hollis, 1994). He signified that we accrue all knowledge about the objects in the world 
through our five senses. From this perspective, consciousness was understood as a 
bubble or an enclosed cabinet; a circle of ideas and experiences where impressions 
occurred (Sokolowski, 2000). Our awareness was directed towards this circle of ideas 
and not directly toward the things outside. From this point of view, we were not in any 
direct contact with the objects in the world. Rather, we got to things only by reasoning 
from our mental or psychic impressions, which were contained in consciousness 
(Sokolowski, 2000). Thus, as Hollis (1994) pointed out, when we reported seeing a red 
rose, we were merely “reporting an effect on our consciousness brought about by a 
particular wavelength of light” (p29-30).   
 
The philosophy of Descartes led to thinking in terms of two worlds: one “outer” world, 
which was independent of the perceiver, and one “inner” world, which consisted of 
mental or cognitive processes (Hollis, 1994). This notion of reason led to the modern 
divorce of mind and body, which was known as Cartesian dualism or the subject/object 
dichotomy. Positivism evolved from the Cartesian dualistic paradigm and was 
sometimes referred to as the philosophy of positive science. However, in modern 
thought, the term positivism is used to refer to a broadly empiricist approach to 
knowledge (Hollis, 1994). Positivists believed that this knowledge was obtained 
through a process of observation, induction, and experimentation known as empiricism.  
 
Empiricism involved using the senses (in particular observation) to advance knowledge 
through a process of induction (Hollis, 1994). The approach prevented the contextual 
factors in the world of the individual from contaminating the empiricist’s ability to get 
at the “pure” subjective experience. By observing the subjective experience of the 
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object under study (i.e. the person), the empiricist was able to generate knowledge 
through inductive processes. The categories, which constituted this knowledge, were 
then tested deductively through the use of experiments (Hollis, 1994). These 
experiments served to validate the knowledge and develop theories.  
 
According to Heidegger, all of the variations of modern psychology were held beneath 
this approach of the scientific method (Aho, 2007). This method reduced human 
behaviour to causal interactions and viewed emotional suffering from the perspective of 
detached objectivity. It is proposed that most of the research associated with the 
person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis therapy emanated from an empirical 
psychological perspective. This was represented in the large body of research on 
depression, quality of life, coping, and adjustment, in relation to the person with ESRD. 
Some of these studies are discussed later.   
 
Scott (2006) emphasised that patients presented to healthcare professionals with unique 
concerns about the potential impact of their illness on their everyday lives, their future, 
their families, and loved ones. These contextual factors formed the basis of their 
experience of illness and treatment. Therefore, it was imperative that healthcare 
professionals recognised and responded to these contextual factors, in order to provide 
care that was patient-centred and effective (Scott, 2006).  
 
It is suggested that the existing psychological research largely overlooked these 
important contextual features, which constituted the person’s experience of living with 
ESRD and dialysis therapy. This was emphasised in the research that assessed 
depression within this patient group. The majority of this research identified increased 
levels of depression in the person with ESRD. However, it is important to point out that 
many of the symptoms of ESRD are similar to depression. These include tiredness, 
sleep disturbance, loss of appetite, anorexia, weight loss, and loss of interest in sex. 
Therefore, it is suggested that without contextual information about the effect of the 
illness on the person’s life, this research may be overestimating the levels of depression 
within this patient group.  
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The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck et al., 1979) was a questionnaire 
commonly used to assess the level of depression in the person with ESRD. For instance, 
Elal & Krespi (1999) used the Beck Depression Inventory to assess depression in 200 
haemodialysis patients in Turkey. The findings signified that 42% of the participants 
were clinically depressed, 33% were moderately depressed, and 25% were not 
depressed. According to the researchers, the population sample consisted mostly of 
unemployed individuals and this may have contributed to the high levels of depression 
reported in the study. 
 
Watnick et al (2003) also used the Beck Depression Inventory to investigate the 
prevalence and treatment of depression among patients starting dialysis in the USA. The 
sample consisted of 123 patients with ESRD who had stated dialysis within ten days. 
The findings indicated that the prevalence of depression within the sample was 44%.  
 
Similarly, McDade-Montez et al (2006) investigated the role of depression in 
withdrawal from haemodialysis in 240 patients with ESRD in the USA. The participants 
were followed for an average of four years after depression symptom assessment using 
the Beck Depression Inventory. The findings indicated that the high level of depression 
within the sample was a unique and significant predictive risk factor for the decision to 
withdraw from haemodialysis therapy.  
 
Other researchers have also employed the Beck Depression Inventory to assess the level 
of depression in the person with ESRD (e.g. McGee et al., 1998; Wuerth et al., 2001; 
Davison & Jhangri, 2005; Kimmel & Peterson, 2006; Kalender et al., 2007). According 
to Beck et al. (1979), the inventory was based on a cognitive model of depression, 
which was developed from systematic clinical observations and experimental testing of 
patients with depression. The authors stated that by using this rigorous and scientific 
approach, they were able to determine broad categories, which constituted the 
subjective experience of depression. These categories made up the Beck Depression 
Inventory and included measurements of the person’s perception of both the cognitive 
and somatic features of depression.  
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The cognitive features of depression contained on the questionnaire included feeling 
sad, feeling discouraged about the future, feeling worried, feeling guilty, feeling 
disappointed, having suicidal thoughts, and crying, while the somatic features included 
gastrointestinal disorders, loss of appetite, sleep disturbance, fatigue, aches and pain, 
and sexual dysfunction. Some, or all of these factors also appeared on other 
questionnaires that were commonly used to measure the subjective experience of 
depression in the person with ESRD e.g. the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression 
(HRSD) (Hamilton, 1960).  
 
For instance, Soykan et al (2004) sought to assess the frequency of psychiatric disorders 
in 50 patients with ESRD on haemodialysis therapy in Turkey. The findings highlighted 
that depression was the most common diagnosis occurring in 24% of the participants. 
Depression was assessed using the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression. After six 
months, 14 participants were followed up and the level of depression remained 
unchanged.  
 
A study by Wuerth, Finkelstein & Finkelstein (2005) aimed to identify and treat 
depression in patients maintained on peritoneal dialysis. The researchers screened 380 
patients for depression using the Beck Depression Inventory. Forty-nine percent were 
deemed to have depression and were invited to pursue further assessment and treatment 
of their depression. Forty-five percent of the patients eligible for treatment agreed to 
further assessment and intervention. These patients were screened for depression using 
the Hamilton Rating Scale and eighty-four percent were identified as having major 
depression.    
 
Similarly, Yucedal et al (2003) employed the Hamilton Rating Scale to assess the level 
of depression in dialysis patients in Turkey. The sample included 52 patients on 
haemodialysis and 26 patients on peritoneal dialysis. The findings indicated that the 
majority of patients in the haemodialysis group were diagnosed as having depression in 
various degrees. For instance, major depression was identified in 11 patients, moderate 
depression was identified in 10 patients, mild depression was identified in 21 patients, 
and no depression was identified in 10 patients. In contrast, fifty percent of the 
peritoneal dialysis group had depression. For example, major depression was identified 
in 2 patients, moderate depression was identified in 3 patients, mild depression was 
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identified in 8 patients, and no depression was identified in 13 patients. However, as the 
sample of patients on peritoneal dialysis was half the size of the haemodialysis patient 
group, it may be difficult to make accurate comparisons.  
 
Yeh et al (2004) compared levels of depression in kidney transplant patients and chronic 
dialysis patients. Subjects included 102 patients on chronic dialysis (60 haemodialysis 
patients and 42 peritoneal dialysis patients) and 58 patients with a kidney transplant. 
Depression symptoms were assessed using the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale. The 
findings indicated that depression symptoms in the chronic haemodialysis patients were 
more severe than those of the kidney transplant group. This study primarily assessed 
adjustment in these patient groups. Therefore, a more detailed account of the study will 
be provided in the upcoming discussion on the literature related to adjustment.   
 
As mentioned previously, the symptoms of ESRD are similar to the symptoms of 
depression. Therefore, many of the somatic features contained in the scales used to 
measure depression in the person with ESRD i.e. Beck Depression Inventory and 
Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression, were similar to the physiological symptoms of 
ESRD. This overlap illustrated a potential weakness in these scales to accurately 
measure depression in the person with ESRD. Moreover, it posed the question as to how 
researchers using these scales ascertained whether the somatic symptoms selected by 
the participants were actually related to depression, or merely a physiological symptom 
of their illness.  
 
Indeed, Kimmel & Peterson (2006) acknowledged this overlap between the somatic 
features of depression and the physiological symptoms of ESRD, as a limitation of 
depression scales. The researchers addressed this problem by separating the somatic 
from the cognitive features of depression in the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). By 
doing this, they were able to assess the cognitive features of depression in isolation of 
the somatic features. Consequently, they were able to limit the confounding influence of 
the symptoms of ESRD on their objective measure of depression.  
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The notion that the person’s subjective experience of the somatic and cognitive features 
of depression could be separated, and assessed in isolation, epitomised the positivistic 
paradigm embedded within the psychological framework. To appropriately assess 
whether the somatic symptoms experienced by the person evolved from either ESRD or 
depression, additional contextual and background information from the patient was 
required. However, the collection of contextual information was not appropriate with 
the BDI, or indeed with many other psychologically based questionnaires used to 
measure the subjective experience of ESRD. Therefore, depression was repeatedly 
described as the most common psychiatric disorder within this patient group (Wuerth et 
al., 2001; Soykan et al., 2004; Wuerth, Finkelstein & Finkelstein, 2005; Kimmel & 
Peterson, 2006). 
 
Darbyshire, Oster & Henning (2006) emphasised how the positivistic approach of 
psychology created a fragmented perspective of the patient’s experience of illness. As a 
result, the constitutive parts of the person’s experience were observed in isolation from 
the “supposedly contaminating influence of contextual features” (p755). The authors 
continued to suggest that this positivistic approach valued objectivity, measurement, 
and quantification. Therefore, the use of standardised tools to measure the psychological 
and social functioning of the individual was deemed most appropriate. However, the 
ability of the person to provide contextual data about his/her level of functioning in 
everyday life was limited by the closed-ended structure of these questionnaires.  
 
Rose (1998) claimed that psychology should be understood as a technology. From the 
author’s perspective, technologies consisted of an accumulation of knowledge, 
instruments, and systems of judgement, which had certain presuppositions and 
objectives about human beings. The technologies that Rose referred to were concerned 
with Foucault’s view of governmentality. According to Foucault, technologies were 
invented for the regulation of conduct and the exercise of power over others (Irving, 
2001). Hence, from Rose’s (1998) perspective, psychology was a technology because it 
took the experience of the human being as its object. It ordered the experience, 
segmented it, and created relationships between elements, to convince us that existence 
was amenable to be viewed in terms of psychological truths (Rose, 1998).   
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The segmentation of the person’s experience presented by Rose was conveyed in the 
research that pertained to health related quality of life (HRQL) in the person with 
ESRD. This research generally classified and segmented the person’s quality of life into 
specific domains and categories. These categories/domains consisted of the individual’s 
perceptions of his/her physical, psychological, and social wellbeing. For instance, 
Lamping (2004) pointed out that HRQL referred to a person’s subjective perceptions of 
his/her illness and treatment and specifically “includes the impact of health on well-
being in the core areas of physical and mental health, social and role functioning, and 
general health perceptions” (p63). 
 
The Short-Form-36 (SF-36) (Ware & Gandek, 1998) was a widely used measure of 
HRQL in the research related to the person with ESRD. This 36-item generic 
measurement assesses health related quality of life by focusing on eight dimensions. 
These dimensions are the most frequently measured in health surveys and most affected 
by disease and treatment. There are 36 items addressed in the questionnaire. Thirty-five 
of the 36 items are reduced into eight scales representing physical functioning, social 
functioning, role functioning-physical, role functioning-emotional, mental health, 
vitality, bodily pain, and general health perceptions. The one remaining question is used 
to estimate the change in health status over time and is not counted in the eight items.  
 
The questionnaire also addresses whether limitations in these areas are because of 
physical or mental health issues. Therefore, the eight scales of the questionnaire are 
further summarised into two summary scores: Physical Component Summary (PCS) 
and Mental Component Summary (MCS). The PCS measure is primarily comprised of 
the physical functioning, role functioning, physical and bodily pain scales. The MCS is 
primarily comprised of the mental health, role functioning, and emotional and social 
functioning scales.  
 
Another measure specifically developed to assess HRQL in individuals with ESRD was 
the Kidney Disease Quality of Life Questionnaire (KDQOL) (Hays et al., 1994). This 
questionnaire consisted of the SF-36 as its generic core, and was supplemented with 
measures of specific concerns related to ESRD and dialysis. These included disease-
specific items, such as symptom problems, effects of kidney disease on daily life, 
burden of kidney disease, cognitive function, work status, sexual function, quality of 
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social interaction, sleep, social support, dialysis staff encouragement, and patient 
satisfaction.   
 
As discussed previously, the SF-36 consisted of both a mental health component (MCS) 
and a physical health component (PCS). According to Lamping (2004), it was important 
for HRQL measures to include both physical and mental components to allow the 
differences between both to be evaluated. However, the belief that the physical and 
mental health components of the person could be split up and observed in isolation, was 
indicative of the psychological segmentation of the person’s experience, described by 
Rose (1998).  
  
According to Rose (1998), the notion of psychology as a technology, was further 
reinforced by the technical means used by the discipline to get to its psychological 
truths. Rose described these techniques, as the techniques of positivism and included 
statistics and the experiment. By incorporating statistical norms and values, psychology 
was able to establish its scientific base, and enhanced its credibility with the physical 
sciences (Rose, 1998; Darbyshire, Oster & Henning, 2006). The use of an experimental 
approach evolved out of a desire for data, which could be quantified, generalised, and 
was suitable for comparison.  
 
Indeed, this desire for quantitative data, which could be generalised and compared was 
reiterated in the literature on HRQL in the person with ESRD (Lamping, 2004). For 
instance, various studies compared the quality of life of patients with ESRD with 
samples of the general population. Cleary & Drennan (2005) employed a descriptive, 
cross-sectional, survey design to examine the quality of life of patients undergoing 
haemodialysis therapy at a hospital in the Republic of Ireland. Health related quality of 
life was assessed in a non-probability sample of 97 patients using the SF-36 
questionnaire. The participants in the study reported significantly lower (worse) scores 
in seven of the eight scales of the SF-36 when compared with the general population.  
 
The results of this Irish study were also comparable with other studies. For example, 
Timmers et al (2008) explored the associations between quality of life and illness 
perceptions in ESRD patients in the Netherlands. Quality of life was assessed in both 
haemodialysis patients (n=91) and peritoneal dialysis patients (n=42) using the SF-36. 
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The findings indicated that the quality of life of dialysis patients in the study was 
dramatically lower than the general population, especially for the physical aspects of 
functioning.  
 
Shimoyama et al (2003) also examined health-related quality of life among peritoneal 
dialysis patients and their family caregivers in Japan. There were 26 peritoneal dialysis 
patients recruited in the study and quality of life was measured using the Kidney 
Disease Quality of Life Short Form questionnaire (KDQOL-SF). The findings indicated 
that patients scored lower than a normative population in all dimensions of the quality 
of life scale. However, the ability to generalise the findings may be limited by the small 
sample of patients in the study. Correspondingly, the findings of a study by DeOreo 
(1997) indicated that HRQOL was significantly lower in a sample of haemodialysis 
patients than a sample of the general population. The researchers used the SF-36 to 
assess the health status of 1000 patients on haemodialysis therapy in the USA. 
 
The findings of this research related to HRQOL certainly provided evidence that quality 
of life was lower in patients with ESRD than the general population. However, in the 
absence of contextual information about the person’s experience, it was difficult to 
ascertain the reasons why these deficits in quality of life existed and the potential 
implications they had on the person’s life. These findings illustrated a need to conduct a 
qualitative enquiry that specifically focused on the person’s experience of ESRD in an 
effort to contribute some of this essential contextual data. 
 
Furthermore, the existing research repeatedly emphasised the need to assess quality of 
life in the patient with ESRD in an effort to target healthcare interventions to enhance 
the quality of life of this patient population (Timmers et al., 2008; Cleary & Drennan, 
2005; Loos et al., 2003). However, the research related to the quality of life of the 
patient with ESRD was replete with contradictions and disparities concerning the level 
of quality of life within this patient group. There appeared to be little consensus as to 
what factors enhanced or diminished the person’s quality of life. Consequently, for 
practitioners providing care to people with ESRD, these disparities made it difficult to 
relate the findings to their everyday care of these patients.  
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For instance, there seemed to be little consensus about the relationship between dialysis 
adequacy and quality of life. The study by Cleary & Drennan (2005) sought to identify 
if there were any differences in quality of life between people who were adequately 
dialysed and those inadequately dialysed. Dialysis adequacy was assessed using urea 
kinetic modelling (Kt/V). The findings suggested that no significant differences were 
found between the well- and less well-dialysed groups on the majority of quality of life 
outcome variables. Morsch, Gonçalves & Barros (2006) subscribed to this perspective 
in a study, which investigated the health related quality of life of 40 haemodialysis 
patients in Brazil. A descriptive cohort study design was employed and quality of life 
was assessed using the SF-36 questionnaire. The findings did not reveal a correlation 
between dialysis adequacy (Kt/V) and HRQOL.  
  
In contrast, some studies highlighted that better dialysed patients reported better quality 
of life than patients who were inadequately dialysed (Chen et al., 2000; DeOreo, 1997). 
For instance, the study by Chen et al (2000) used the SF-36 questionnaire to examine 
the quality of life of 67 long-term peritoneal dialysis patients in China. The results of 
the study suggested that the quality of life of the participants was closely related to 
dialysis adequacy, as determined by Kt/V.  Similarly, the study by DeOreo (1997) found 
that patients who were receiving adequate dialysis, as measured by Kt/V levels reported 
better quality of life than less well-dialysed patients.   
 
There also seemed to be uncertainty as to whether the length of time on dialysis affected 
quality of life. For example, Bakewell, Higgins & Edmunds (2002) sought to determine 
the key factors that affected quality of life in peritoneal dialysis patients. They reviewed 
the results of a longitudinal study, which examined the quality of life of 88 patients on 
peritoneal dialysis therapy. Quality of life was assessed at enrolment to the study and at 
six-month intervals during the two-year study period. The sample consisted of patients 
from Indo-Asian and white European backgrounds and quality of life was assessed 
using the Kidney Disease and Quality of Life Short Form questionnaire (KDQOL-SF). 
The findings indicated that quality of life declined steadily for the participants 
throughout the duration of the study.  
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Contrary to these findings, the participants in the study by Morsch, Gonçalves & Barros 
(2006) who had been undergoing haemodialysis therapy for more than one year had 
better HRQOL results than patients who had been on the treatment for less time. These 
findings were corroborated in a cross sectional study by Neto et al (2000) which 
measured quality of life in 80 patients on haemodialysis therapy in Brazil. All 
participants in the study were on haemodialysis for less than sixty days and the 
researchers used the SF-36 to measure their quality of life. The findings indicated that 
the quality of life of the participants in the study was impaired in these early stages of 
dialysis treatment.  
 
It seemed that there was little consensus as to what factors enhanced or diminished 
quality of life, which made it difficult to see how these findings could be applied in the 
renal healthcare setting. However, as suggested by Lamping (2004), the primary focus 
of measurements of HRQL was more specifically to provide evidence on the 
effectiveness of new treatments. The author emphasised that these evaluations of quality 
of life allowed the financial costs of treatment to be weighed against the benefits to the 
patient. Hence, it seemed that cost-effectiveness was at the core of the HRQL research. 
Indeed, embedded in the discussion by Lamping was the need for reliable, valid, and 
responsive tools to measure HRQL, in an effort to provide robust methods to decide 
who received expensive treatments (e.g. dialysis) in the future.  
 
The author referred to a study by Mc Kenzie et al (1998), which signified that HRQL 
was a prominent reason why nephrologists in the UK and Canada decided whether or 
not to provide dialysis therapy. She insisted that these findings conveyed the 
significance and relevance of HRQL measures in the effective provision of treatment.  
However, it could also be argued that these findings add weight to the earlier argument 
by Rose (1998), which signified that psychology was a technology, i.e. something that 
was invented for the regulation of conduct and the exercise of power over others. From 
Rose’s perspective, the technology of psychology led us to believe that the person’s 
existence (including the quality of that existence) could be calculated and evaluated in 
terms of psychological truths. This was clearly indicated in the study above by 
McKenzie et al (1998), where ‘objective’ psychological measures were deemed to 
influence the person’s access to the life-saving treatment of dialysis.  
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Based on the findings of the literature thus far, it is suggested there is a need for 
contextual information based on the person’s perspective of ESRD to supplement the 
current measures of quality of life. Without this important information, we are failing to 
develop a comprehensive, in-depth understanding of the experience of ESRD for these 
individuals.  
 
This lack of contextual information was also a significant shortcoming in the existing 
research on coping with ESRD. This research was predominantly based on the 
theoretical framework of coping, advanced by Lazarus & Folkman (1984). The 
framework highlighted a distinction between “problem solving” and “emotion-focused” 
coping. According to the authors, emotion-focused coping referred to the cognitive 
processes used to lessen emotional distress e.g. avoidance, distancing, hope, and 
optimism. In contrast, problem-solving coping referred to the cognitive processes that 
were aimed at solving a problem e.g. generating alternative solutions, weighing 
alternatives, and choosing among them.  The cognitive processes of coping (i.e. 
problem-solving or emotion-focused) determined how the person behaved in response 
to stress.  
 
A descriptive correlation study by Cormier-Daigle & Stewert (1997) explored the 
coping strategies of 30 men on haemodialysis therapy in Canada. The Ways of Coping 
questionnaire was used to assess the coping strategies of the men in the study. This 
questionnaire was developed by Lazarus & Folkman (1984) and based on their 
theoretical framework of coping. The participants in the study used both problem-
focused and emotion-focused forms of coping. However, problem-focused coping was 
the most predominant coping strategy employed. The participants tended to rely on 
emotion-focused types of coping, such as avoidance as a way to handle the illness-
related complications. The authors deduced that the participants chose to avoid thinking 
about these complications because they potentially realised they had little control over 
their outcome.  However, the small convenience sample and the sole inclusion of men, 
prohibits the generalisability of the results.  
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Previous studies have also shown that patients on dialysis use problem-focused coping 
methods to a greater degree than emotion-focused ones. For instance, Mok & Tam 
(2001) examined the coping methods of 50 patients from three chronic haemodialysis 
centres in Hong Kong. According to the researchers, the participants in the study used 
more problem-orientated coping methods than emotion-focused coping methods. Over 
half of the participants in the study had been on haemodialysis therapy for more five 
years. The researchers suggested that the lengthy time spent on dialysis might have 
enabled the participants to accept the reality of living with the illness. Mok & Tam 
(2001) assessed coping using the Jalowiec Coping Scale (JCS) (Jalowiec, Murphy & 
Powers, 1984). The small, convenience sampling strategy employed in the study meant 
the findings could not be generalised to the larger population of patients with ESRD.  
 
The Jalowiec Coping Scale (JCS) was a predominant tool used in other studies to assess 
coping in patients with ESRD. The scale was also based on the theoretical framework of 
coping advanced by Lazarus & Folkman (1984). Jalowiec grouped the problem and 
emotion focused coping strategies identified by Lazarus & Folkman (1984) into eight 
coping styles: Confrontative; Evasive; Optimistic; Fatalistic; Emotive; Palliative; 
Supportant; and Self-reliant.  The optimistic coping style was identified as a 
predominant coping style amongst patients with ESRD.  
 
For example, a descriptive-correlational study by Logan, Pelletier-Hibbert & Hodgins 
(2006) examined the coping strategies used by hospital-based haemodialysis patients. 
The Jalowiec Coping Scale was used to assess the coping strategies reported in a 
convenience sample of 50 patients aged sixty-five and over. The sample was recruited 
from two sites in Canada. The most frequently used coping style was the optimistic 
style. The participants described this optimistic style as ‘keeping a sense of humour’, 
‘looking at the good side’ and ‘thinking positively’.  
 
Lindqvist, Carlsson & Sjoden (2004) used the Jalowiec Coping Scale to examine the 
coping strategies of 30 people with kidney transplants in two hospitals in Sweden. The 
findings indicated that the participants most frequently used optimistic, supportive, and 
self-reliant coping styles. The emotive and evasive coping styles were used least by the 
participants and were regarded as the least effective styles. The small, non-random 
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sample meant the findings were not representative of the accessible population of 
kidney transplant patients.    
 
Similar findings were reported in a study by Lindqvist & Sjoden (1998), which explored 
coping strategies among patients on continuous ambulatory peritoneal dialysis. The 
Jalowiec Coping Scale was used to assess coping in 26 patients selected from three 
hospitals in Sweden. The optimistic coping style was the most frequently used by 
participants in the sample and was regarded as the most effective. The participants also 
used self-reliant, confrontative, fatalistic, and supportant coping styles. The emotive and 
evasive coping styles were the least frequently used by the participants. The participants 
who reported using these styles rated themselves as less effective in managing their 
illness and treatment. The small sample size made it impossible to generalise the 
findings of the study to the wider population of dialysis patients.  
 
According to Polit & Hungler (1999), the use of an appropriate sample size and 
sampling plan allowed the researcher to be reasonably confident that the sample was 
representative of the target population. Therefore, the authors recommended the use of 
large, probability samples as the only viable way of obtaining representative samples in 
quantitative studies. They continued to suggest that the use of non-probability sampling 
strategies was problematic in quantitative research studies because these samples were 
rarely representative of the researcher’s target population. As highlighted in the studies 
outlined above, the use of small, non-probability sampling strategies made it impossible 
to generalise the findings to the larger population of patients with ESRD. Polit & 
Hungler (1999) indicated that if the researcher had no alternative except to use a 
convenience sample, a simple way to increase the generalisability of quantitative studies 
was to select participants from two or more sites While the researchers within these 
studies did recruit participants from two or more sites, the small number of patients 
selected from each site offered little to enhance the generalisability of the findings.    
 
It is also important to point out that the coping scales employed to assess coping in the 
person with ESRD (e.g. Jalowiec Coping Scale and Ways of Coping questionnaire) 
used a checklist approach, whereby the person ticked off the coping strategies they 
primarily used. However, Lazarus & Folkman (1984) emphasised that coping styles 
were not static but dynamic and rapidly changing. Both coping styles facilitated and 
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impeded each other in the coping process.. For example, a student may be highly 
anxious prior to an exam (emotion-focused coping) but this anxiety decreased when 
s/he turned to the task (problem-focused coping) of actually working through the paper 
(p153).  
 
These dynamic characteristics of coping questioned whether it was appropriate, or even 
possible to assess the person’s coping processes using a checklist approach. Darbyshire, 
Oster & Henning (2006) raised this point in relation to the use of coping scales to 
examine the adaptation of children with chronic renal disease. Drawing on the work of 
Danoff-Burg, Ayala & Revenson (2000), the authors emphasised that using a checklist 
approach to assess coping, provided an oversimplified description of the coping process. 
By excluding the contextual features of the person’s experience, a checklist approach 
effectively overlooked the complexity of coping (Darbyshire, Oster & Henning, 2006). 
Therefore, in order to pick up on the rapidly changing features of the coping process, 
there was need for qualitative, contextual data on the person’s experience (Darbyshire, 
Oster & Henning, 2006). To re-iterate, this contextual data included the person’s unique 
concerns about the impact of the illness on his/her everyday life, future, and meaningful 
relationships with family and loved ones (Scott, 2006). Without this essential contextual 
information, it was not possible to appropriately assess the coping skills of the person 
with ESRD.  
 
The lack of background and contextual information on the person’s experience may also 
result in the person with ESRD being incorrectly labelled as maladjusted or maladapted. 
For instance, the existing psychological research used scales, such as the Psychosocial 
Adjustment to Illness Scale-Self Report (PAIS-SR) (Derogatis, 1986) to measure 
adjustment in patients with ESRD (Kaplan De-Nour, 1982; Kimmel et al., 1995; Courts 
& Boyette, 1998; Tanyi & Werner, 2003, Yeh et al., 2004). The PAIS-SR was designed 
to assess adjustment in groups with chronic illnesses. It consists of forty-six items 
categorised into seven domains. These domains include health care orientation, 
vocational environment, domestic environment, sexual relationships, extended family 
relationships, social environment, and psychological distress.    
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Tanyi & Werner (2003) used the PAIS-SR to assess the adjustment of 65 women 
receiving haemodialysis in the USA. The findings indicated that the majority of women 
were fairly well adjusted to their illness and treatment. The researchers suggested that 
this finding may have occurred because nearly half of the sample were sixty years or 
over. It may be that with advancing age, the women’s expectations of their health were 
lower. Furthermore, better adjustment of these women may have also related to time 
since diagnosis. Many of the women had several years of experience with their illness, 
which may have allowed them time to reach adjustment (Tanyi & Werner, 2003).  
 
The women in the study did report lower adjustment in the vocational domain, social 
environment domain, and the sexual relationships domain of the PAIS-SR. The 
researchers suggested that the lower adjustment in the vocational domain was possibly 
due to the fact that the majority of women (87.7%) in the sample were not working. 
They signified that the lower scores in the social environment domain could possibly 
have occurred because haemodialysis took up took up too much time and resulted in too 
much fatigue for the women to be fully engaged in regular social activities. Adjustment 
problems in sexual relationships may be due to feelings of sexual unattractiveness or 
due to altered body image (Tanyi & Werner, 2003).  
 
The convenience sample combined with the sole inclusion of women limited the 
generalisability of the findings of this study. Moreover, forty-seven participants 
completed questionnaires independently, whereas 18 requested questionnaires to be read 
to them because of poor eyesight or having their dominant arm used for dialysis. This 
may have influenced the responses of these participants.   
 
Courts & Boyette (1998) used a comparative descriptive study to explore the 
psychological adjustment of male patients on three types of dialysis. These treatment 
modalities included peritoneal dialysis, home haemodialysis, and hospital based 
haemodialysis therapy. The PAIS-SR was used to measure adjustment in 15 
participants, with five in each dialysis group. The findings indicated that the patients on 
home haemodialysis had the highest level of psychosocial adjustment to illness. The 
participants on home haemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis had higher levels of 
psychosocial adjustment to illness than patients on hospital based haemodialysis. 
Therefore, the patients on hospital-based haemodialysis had the lowest levels of 
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psychosocial adjustment to illness. The small, convenience sample and the sole 
inclusion of males prohibited the researcher’s ability to generalise the findings.  
 
Yeh et al (2004) sought to compare psychosocial adjustment to illness in patients with 
generalised anxiety disorder and patients with end-stage renal disease. Subjects included 
102 patients on chronic dialysis (60 haemodialysis patients and 42 peritoneal dialysis 
patients), 58 patients with a kidney transplant, and 42 patients with general anxiety 
disorder. The evaluations included the PAIS-SR, the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, 
and the Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale.  
 
The patients with general anxiety disorder were assessed using these questionnaires 
before commencing five weeks of anxiolytic treatment and were re-assessed after the 
treatment. The chronic dialysis patients and the kidney transplant patients received only 
one assessment using the questionnaires. The researchers indicated that patients with 
general anxiety disorder are deemed physically healthier than patients with ESRD. 
However, psychosocial adjustment to illness of the patients with general anxiety 
disorder was not superior to that of patients in the chronic dialysis and kidney transplant 
groups. The researchers also indicated that adjustment was better in the kidney 
transplant group than in the chronic dialysis group, while adjustment was better in the 
haemodialysis patients than in the peritoneal dialysis patients. 
 
There were various limitations in this study, which meant the findings had to be 
assessed with caution. The chronic dialysis patients and the kidney transplant patients 
were only assessed once with the questionnaires, while the patients with general anxiety 
disorder received two assessments. The researchers indicated that the primary aim of the 
study was to compare adjustment to illness in patients with generalised anxiety disorder 
and patients with ESRD. However, they proceeded to provide an intervention for the 
patients with generalised anxiety disorder (five-week anxiolytic treatment) and did not 
provide any intervention for the chronic dialysis group or the kidney transplant group. 
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To accurately measure the effect of the anxiolytic treatment for patients with general 
anxiety disorder, it was necessary to compare this group with a similar group of 
patients. It was impossible to compare the effects of an intervention in patients with 
generalised anxiety without the use of a control group with matching characteristics. It 
seemed that the researchers used the group of patients with ESRD i.e. chronic dialysis 
and kidney transplant patients, as the control group in the study, as they provided no 
intervention for these patients. However, the use of a group of patients with ESRD 
made it difficult for the researchers either to match the groups or to control for 
extraneous variables. In order to assess the impact of the intervention, the researchers 
needed to have matched groups of patients and needed to control for extraneous 
characteristics. The use of a non-probability sampling strategy to recruit patients also 
limited the generalisability of the findings. These weaknesses prohibited accurate 
comparisons to be drawn within the study.   
 
In a study to measure aspects of quality of life in haemodialysis patients, Kimmel et al 
(1995) used the PAIS-SR to assess psychological adjustment to illness in 149 patients 
recruited from three sites in the USA. The researchers also used a range of other 
questionnaires to measure depression (Beck Depression Inventory), social support (The 
Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support) functional ability (Karnofsky 
Score) and disease severity (Severity Coefficient). The objective of the study was to 
assess the relationship between these measures. The findings indicated that psychosocial 
adjustment to illness correlated with various parameters of social, physical functioning, 
and wellbeing within the participants. However, it is important to point out that the 
researchers only assessed three of the six domains of adjustment from the PAIS-SR i.e. 
Vocational, Relationship-Sexual, and Social Environment. Therefore, this narrow 
assessment of adjustment limited the conclusions that could be drawn from the findings. 
In addition, ninety-three percent of patients enrolled in the study were African-
American, which meant the findings could not be generalised to patients with more 
diverse backgrounds.  
 
The researchers using the PAIS-SR scale calculated a score, which represented the 
person’s psychosocial adjustment to illness. Higher levels of psychosocial adjustment to 
illness were illustrated with lower PAIS-SR scores. Therefore, individuals who failed to 
achieve a score, which was indicative of a specific degree of normality in the seven 
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domains, were reported as being maladjusted. However, the qualitative literature, which 
will be discussed later, signified that some people who described themselves as being 
well adjusted, struggled on a daily basis to integrate the effects of their illness and 
treatment into their lives (Polaschek, 2000; Curtin et al., 2002). This relentless battle to 
participate in life while on dialysis was part of the successful adjustment to the illness 
and treatment. While many individuals considered themselves to be well adjusted, they 
might not appear that way when assessed using psychological adjustment scales.  
 
Darbyshire, Oster & Henning (2006) claimed that the mismatch between the person’s 
experience of adjustment to illness and the psychological interpretation of this 
experience, lay in the definition of normality. Normality from the perspective of 
psychology was usually based on the psychosocial functioning of a group of normal 
healthy subjects. However, this was not necessarily normality for the person with ESRD 
on dialysis. As Curtin et al (2002) pointed out, the person with ESRD on dialysis had to 
establish a “new” normal.  However, in the absence of more qualitative contextual data 
about the person’s experience of ESRD, it was not possible to establish what this new 
normal meant.  Hence, there was a risk of patients who were potentially well adjusted 
being viewed incorrectly as maladjusted.  
 
To summarise, the existing research predominantly explored the person’s experience of 
ESRD and dialysis from a psychological perspective using quantitative methodologies. 
This research used questionnaires, which focused on the person’s subjective experience 
of illness. The influence of the positivistic paradigm on this research meant that 
important contextual information about the person’s experience of living with ESRD 
and dialysis was not addressed. Consequently, this research failed to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the person’s experience of living day-to-day with 
ESRD and dialysis therapy. In the following section, the experience of ESRD presented 
in the qualitative literature, will be discussed in detail.   
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2.6 THE EXPERIENCE OF ESRD: THE QUALITATIVE PERSPECTIVE   
 
There were a growing number of qualitative research studies, which explored various 
aspects of the person’s experience of ESRD. This research offered valuable and 
interesting insights into the person’s perceptions and experience of his/her illness and 
treatment. However, the majority of qualitative studies were also primarily grounded 
within a psychological framework, which drew on psychological concepts and theories 
to explore the person’s subjective experience of ESRD and dialysis. Hence, this 
research also represented a Cartesian dualistic world-view of the person.   
 
Indeed, Leonard (1994) emphasised that nurses were preoccupied with adapting the 
Cartesian doctrine in their studies of the person’s experience of illness. As a result, 
these studies provided a perspective of the self as subject, “an uninvolved self passively 
contemplating the external world of things via representations that are held in the mind” 
(p44). From this perspective, the self (person) was always understood as “subject” and 
the world or environment as “object”. The subject understood and experienced the 
world through the ideas, beliefs, and values that were cognitively developed and 
retained in the mind (Leonard, 1994).  
 
Because of this Cartesian view of the self, nursing research tended to explore the 
person’s experience of illness in terms of cognitive variables such as traits, attributes, 
values, and emotions. However, it is suggested that by consistently limiting qualitative 
research to the concepts and theories of psychology, additional important insights into 
the person’s experience of ESRD may remain concealed. 
 
The discussion that follows provides an analysis of the existing qualitative literature 
associated with the person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis therapy. Much of this 
research adapted the ideas, concepts, and theoretical frameworks from the broader body 
of qualitative literature related to the person’s experience of chronic illness. Therefore, 
this literature will be interwoven throughout the review to ensure a comprehensive 
understanding of the person’s experience of ESRD is gleaned.     
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The existing qualitative literature described “suffering” as a significant feature within 
the person’s subjective experience of chronic illness (Charmaz, 1983; Kleinmann, 1991; 
Morse & Penrod, 1999; Polaschek, 2000; Hagren et al., 2001; Morse, 2001; Ohman, 
Soderberg & Lundman, 2003; Chesla, 2005; Hutchinson, 2005). There were various 
factors associated with the experience of suffering, which were subsequently 
highlighted in the literature related to the person’s experience of ESRD on dialysis.  
 
For instance, the unpleasant physical symptoms of chronic illness were repeatedly cited 
as prominent characteristics of suffering (Cassell, 1991; Kleinmann, 1991; Frank, 1995; 
Charmaz, 1999; Ohman, Soderberg & Lundman, 2003; Mc Cabe, 2004). Similarly, the 
existing qualitative literature on the person’s experience of ESRD, also found the 
physiological symptoms to be source of intense distress and suffering for the person 
(Gregory et al., 1998; Polaschek, 2000; Hagren et al., 2001; Heiwe, Clyne & Dahlgren, 
2003; Germain & Mc Carthy, 2004; O' Sullivan & Mc Carthy, 2007).  Indeed, a study 
by Saini et al (2006) indicated that individuals with advanced renal disease had a 
symptom burden that was statistically indistinguishable from patients with cancer. 
Although the sample in the study was small (n=22), the findings suggested that the 
physical symptoms of renal disease were a significant burden for some people. 
 
Brown, Chambers & Eggeling (2007) implied that the additional co-morbid conditions, 
which accompanied ESRD, made it the most symptomatic of any chronic disease group. 
Furthermore, there were a multitude of disease-specific complications, which resulted in 
severe and sometimes life-threatening consequences for the individual (Ballinger & 
Patchett, 2000; Ferro, Chambers & Davison, 2004; Brown, Chambers & Eggeling, 
2007).9  
 
Polaschek (2000) explored the experiences of renal illness for six men on home 
haemodialysis therapy in New Zealand. The critical interpretive methodology employed 
in the study was based on the work of Foucault. Data were collected using semi-
structured interviews followed by critical interpretation of the interview text. The 
experience of suffering from the unpleasant physiological symptoms of ESRD was 
significant for the participants in the study. Polaschek (2000) indicated that the 
                                                 
9 See Appendix A (p307) for a list of the co-morbid, and disease-specific physiological complications 
associated with ESRD.  
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dominant discourse amongst healthcare personnel assumed that dialysis therapy 
effectively removed the distressing physical symptoms of ESRD. However, in contrast 
to the dominant discourse, the findings of the study implied that despite excellent 
clearance of fluid and toxins, the participants continued to suffer from these symptoms. 
Moreover, they had a significant impact on the participants’ ability to function normally 
on a daily basis. The sole inclusion of men was a potential limitation of the study.  
 
Similarly, a qualitative hermeneutical study by Nagle (1998) indicated that even vigilant 
adherence to the dialysis treatment regime did not relieve the physiological 
complications of ESRD for all individuals. The study explored the experience of 
technology for eleven patients with ESRD on hospital-based haemodialysis therapy in 
Canada. Open-ended interviews were conducted with six male and five female 
participants. An approach to data analysis by Diekelmann, Allen & Tanner (1989) was 
used to analyse the interview texts. This method of data analysis was appropriate for use 
in this study, as it was specifically developed for studies using a hermeneutical 
phenomenological methodology.  
 
The findings implied that while most of the participants strictly adhered to the dialysis 
treatment regime, they continued to experience the distressing physical symptoms of 
ESRD. Because of these complications, the participants had begun to realise that the 
technology of dialysis minimised, but did not prevent further deterioration in their 
physical health. They described how over time the degenerative changes and declining 
stamina caused by the disease, placed limitations on their ability to perform everyday 
activities.   
 
Although ESRD is a chronic, life-long illness, it also includes acute episodes, which 
contribute to its distinctiveness and complexity.10 The literature signified how the acute 
complications of dialysis decreased the efficiency of the treatment and resulted in 
prolonged hospitalisation for the person (Challinor, 1998; Turner, 1998; Kotanko & 
Levin, 2008). Repeated hospitalisation merely contributed to the lifestyle disruptions of 
the person with ESRD.  
 
                                                 
10 See Appendix B (p309) for a list of the acute complications of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy.  
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According to Morse (2001), the predominant role of medicine meant the experience of 
suffering was commonly linked to pain and other unpleasant physical symptoms. 
However, the author emphasised that the concept of suffering was more extensive than 
this narrow focus. Other authors subscribed to this perspective and signified that the 
losses and lifestyle disruptions incurred by chronic illness were a fundamental source of 
suffering for the individual (Charmaz, 1983; Kleinmann, 1991; Frank, 1995; Toombs, 
1995; Morse, 2001).   
 
2.6.1 THE LOSSES AND LIFESTYLE DISRUPTIONS OF ESRD & DIALYSIS  
 
The existing literature highlighted many losses and lifestyle disruptions caused by 
ESRD and dialysis therapy. For instance, a Swedish study by Heiwe, Clyne & Dahlgren 
(2003) illustrated the loss of physical functioning experienced by sixteen patients on 
peritoneal dialysis and haemodialysis therapy. Phenomenography was the research 
methodology employed to understand the subjective experiences of the participants in 
the study. Phenomenography is an empirical, psychological approach to 
phenomenology, which focuses on the psychological or cognitive experiences of the 
person. The participants in the study reported how the persistent loss of energy caused 
by the fatigue of renal disease made them feel powerless and feeble. They described 
experiences of being exhausted and washed out. The fatigue contributed to a loss of 
functional capacity, which culminated in limitations in everyday activities such as 
walking, managing personal hygiene, preparing meals, and doing housework. For some 
participants, even the ability to stay awake for the whole day was a challenging 
endeavour. 
 
Similar findings were reported in a study by Al-Arabi (2006), which sought to describe 
how eighty people on haemodialysis in the USA subjectively experienced their quality 
of life. The loss of energy and fatigue associated with ESRD hindered the participants’ 
ability to perform normal activities, such as working, socialising, and travelling. The 
researcher used a constant comparative method of data analysis, which is predominantly 
associated with a grounded theory methodology. However, there was no information as 
to whether a specific methodological approach was used in the study. 
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According to Kimmel & Levy (2001), about two-thirds of ESRD patients on dialysis 
were unable to return to their employment. The physical complications of ESRD and 
dialysis meant returning to a strenuous job was too demanding for some patients 
(Kimmel & Levy, 2001). Various authors reported that the inability to work created 
financial difficulties for patients with ESRD (White & Grenyer, 1999; Sloan, 2002; 
Reiter & Chambers, 2004; Kaba et al., 2007).     
 
The restrictive nature of the dialysis treatment regime created significant lifestyle 
disruptions for the individual (White & Grenyer, 1999; Caress, Luker & Owens, 2001; 
Curtin et al., 2002; Faber, de Castell & Bryson, 2003; Al-Arabi, 2006). The literature 
highlighted how individuals on dialysis were required to comply with regular dialysis 
therapy sessions, strict dietary and fluid restrictions, and the intake of multiple 
medications.  The intrusiveness of the treatment regime impacted on their ability to 
perform normal everyday activities.  
 
For example, Curtin et al (2002) explored the experience of eighteen long-term 
survivors on haemodialysis therapy in the USA. Semi-structured interviews were 
carried out with ten male and eight female participants. The interview data were 
analysed using qualitative content analysis. While the researchers signified that they 
used an exploratory-descriptive research approach, they did not seem to incorporate a 
specific research methodology. The findings indicated that the intrusiveness of 
haemodialysis therapy made ESRD a particularly difficult disease to manage. It required 
radical lifestyle modifications to accommodate the dialysis treatment regime.  
 
The study by Al-Arabi (2006) also identified “living a restricted life” as a core theme in 
the participants’ experience of haemodialysis therapy. The participants described how 
the burdens and demands of ESRD and dialysis therapy had inflicted many losses on 
their lives. Among these were the loss of freedom, loss of choice, loss of physical 
appearance, and the loss of decision-making opportunities. The participants felt tied 
down due to the restrictive nature of the dialysis treatment regime. They felt their lives 
were entirely scheduled around dialysis therapy and were subsequently unable to 
perform normal everyday activities.  
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Correspondingly, participants in the study by Nagle (1998) highlighted how the 
restrictions and limitations of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy hindered their ability to 
engage in a normal life. The participants stated that their lives were almost engulfed by 
ESRD and dialysis therapy. Their life patterns were entirely structured around the self-
management of their illness and treatment regime. In addition, the time-consuming 
nature of the treatment meant they had to repeatedly re-arrange and cancel everyday 
activities.  
 
Various studies illustrated the time-consuming aspects of dialysis therapy (Polaschek, 
2000; Hagren et al., 2001; Curtin et al., 2002; Faber, de Castell & Bryson, 2003; Heiwe, 
Clyne & Dahlgren, 2003; Hagren et al., 2005; Walton, 2007). The study by Heiwe, 
Clyne & Dahlgren (2003) highlighted “temporal stress” as a predominant feature of the 
participants’ experience of dialysis therapy. It referred to the time consumed to attend 
dialysis therapy and medical appointments. The participants were never able to do 
anything spontaneously because their treatment regime governed their time. 
Furthermore, their continuous need for rest stole their time and hindered their ability to 
complete their normal daily activities.  
 
Kierans (2005) also highlighted the time-consuming nature of dialysis therapy. The 
study examined the narrative accounts of five people with ESRD in Ireland, who were 
either on dialysis or had a kidney transplant.  The researcher stated that she specifically 
focused on the phenomenological character of renal failure. According to Koch (1995), 
it was essential at the outset for researchers using a phenomenological approach to 
discuss the different philosophical traditions that inform its methods. Kierans did not 
stipulate the philosophical or methodological assumptions underlying her 
phenomenological approach. However, based on the researcher’s discussion of the 
narratives, it was evident she had adapted a broadly psychological account of 
phenomenology.  
 
There was no information provided in relation to the approach to data collection or 
analysis in the study. Moreover, there were no themes developed from the data. 
Therefore, this gave the impression that the narratives had merely been fitted onto a 
phenomenological discussion of the literature without being analysed in detail. The 
findings suggested that the participants on haemodialysis seemed to grieve for the time 
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they had lost due to the treatment. This included the time spent attached to the machine 
and time spent getting to and from the dialysis unit. According to Kierans (2005; p351), 
the participants highlighted their efforts to retrieve time by driving home from dialysis 
“at almost breakneck speeds, finding it hard to resist the temptation to win a little time 
back”.  
 
The participants in the study by Curtin et al (2002) had to undergo three haemodialysis 
sessions each week, which lasted approximately four hours. They also expended 
additional time travelling to and from the dialysis unit, waiting to be attached to the 
machine, and waiting for their needle sites to stop bleeding at the end of treatment. The 
excessive time commitment of the treatment meant the participants had a continuous 
struggle to maintain any kind of normal lifestyle. Indeed, the re-arrangement of 
everyday activities was a significant factor in this struggle to maintain a normal life.  
 
Hagren et al (2005) corroborated these findings in a study, which explored the 
experiences of forty-one patients on haemodialysis therapy in Sweden. There were 
twenty-six male and fifteen female participants in the sample. The researchers provided 
no evidence of the methodological approach used to carry out the research. However, 
qualitative, semi-structured interviews were used as a data collection technique 
followed by qualitative content analysis. The findings confirmed that haemodialysis 
therapy encroached on the participants’ time, and prevented them from engaging in 
everyday life. The participants expressed how the illness and treatment imposed marital, 
sexual, financial, work, and holiday restrictions on their lives. In particular, the intense 
tiredness they experienced contributed to these restrictions. As a result, some 
participants had withdrawn from active participation in society.   
 
Other studies signified that the restrictive treatment regime of dialysis therapy caused 
some individuals to miss out on socialisation opportunities (Fisher et al., 1998; Sloan & 
Rice, 2000; King et al., 2002; Martin-McDonald, 2002). For instance, White & Grenyer 
(1999) used a phenomenological approach to explore the biopsychosocial impact of 
haemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis therapy on patients (n=22) in Australia. 
Qualitative interviews were conducted with eleven male and eleven female participants. 
The researchers did not describe the underlying principles of the phenomenological 
approach used in the study. However, they signified that they used a Husserlian 
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phenomenological approach to analyse the data. The findings of the study indicated that 
social isolation caused by the restrictions of dialysis therapy was a major concern for 
the participants in the study. Some participants had to leave their homes and re-locate to 
cities in an effort to be nearer dialysis facilities. Hence, they lost vital connections with 
social networks because of their illness and treatment.  
 
Similarly, a study by Kaba et al (2007) illustrated the social impact of ESRD and 
haemodialysis therapy on the lives of twenty-three people in Greece. The researchers 
employed a grounded theory methodology incorporating qualitative interviews and 
qualitative data analysis. The participants indicated that the restrictions of the treatment 
regime of dialysis therapy disrupted all areas of their lives. Having to adhere to these 
restrictions led to social limitations for the participants. These limitations subsequently 
hindered the participants’ ability to engage in family and community life. Moreover, the 
time consuming nature of haemodialysis therapy merely contributed to their inability to 
participate in many social events. Although Kaba et al (2007) used a grounded theory 
methodology there was little evidence that theory generation was achieved in the study.   
 
Auer (2002) signified that ESRD and dialysis treatment altered the patient’s body 
image, which made them feel different and unattractive. The skin discoloration of 
uraemia, premature ageing, and musculoskeletal deterioration caused by ESRD, 
contributed to an altered body image in these patients (Nagle, 1998).  The invasive 
procedures required for the treatment of ESRD resulted in multiple scars and 
disfigurement, altering the patient’s sense of identity and level of confidence (Auer, 
2002).  
 
Other factors that negatively impacted on the patient’s body image included the 
appearance of a dialysis catheter or fistula, weight gain from excess fluid, increased 
abdominal girth brought about by peritoneal dialysis, and being connected to a dialysis 
machine (Auer, 2002; Curtin, Johnson & Schatell, 2004; Shirani & Finkelstein, 2004). 
For some individuals, the negative body image also had a negative effect on sexual 
functioning in intimate relationships (Auer, 2002; Shirani & Finkelstein, 2004).  
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The above discussion highlighted how ESRD and dialysis created many losses and 
lifestyle disruptions for the person. Various authors claimed that the lifestyle disruptions 
and losses induced by chronic illness were so profound that they culminated in a loss of 
self for the person (Bury, 1982; Charmaz, 1983; Sloan, 2002; Chesla, 2005).  
 
2.6.2 THE LOSS OF SELF  
 
The existing literature claimed that the loss of self was a significant form of suffering 
for the individual (Charmaz, 1983; Morse & Carter, 1996; Morse, 2001). The study by 
Charmaz (1983) highlighted how the experience of chronic illness resulted in a loss of 
the person’s self-concept. The author described self-concept as the organisation of 
cognitive attributes that have become consistent over time. The person maintained the 
cognitive organisation of the self-concept through empirical validation in everyday life 
(Charmaz, 1983). The participants in the study signified that they lived a restricted life 
because of chronic illness. They existed in social isolation, had become a burden on 
others, and felt that their experience of illness was repeatedly misunderstood and 
discredited by others. Because of these experiences, the participants suffered a loss of 
their self-concept.  
 
Correspondingly, in a personal account of the subjective experience of multiple 
sclerosis (MS), Toombs (1995) indicated that serious illness posed a profound threat to 
the self. As soon as the author was diagnosed with MS, she sensed that the illness 
represented a loss of personhood. From Toomb’s perspective, her sense of self was 
intertwined with her personal and professional roles, and her goals and aspirations in 
life. However, MS threatened to disrupt these roles and aspirations because she required 
extra time off work, and had lost the energy to do basic everyday tasks. The limitations 
in life were perceived as failures and subsequently diminished the author’s sense of self-
worth.  
 
The literature also highlighted how the lifestyle disruptions and losses associated with 
ESRD and dialysis therapy, culminated in a loss of self (Gregory et al., 1998; Curtin et 
al., 2002; Calvin, 2004; Jablonski, 2004; Murphy, 2006). For example, Jablonski (2004) 
indicated that ESRD and dialysis therapy affected all dimensions of the person’s life. 
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Hence, these individuals had a subjective awareness of the disease on a continuous 
basis. Over time, the person’s lifestyle altered dramatically in terms of health, 
psychological, social, economic, and family functioning (Jablonski, 2004). These 
lifestyle alterations caused the person to experience a loss of self-identity and self-
worth.  
 
Similar findings were reported in a study by Gregory et al (1998), which explored the 
perceptions of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy for thirty-six patients in Canada 
(Male=18; Female=18). A grounded theory methodology was employed incorporating 
semi-structured interviews and the constant comparative method of data analysis 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This method of data analysis was appropriate for use within 
this research methodology. 
 
The findings suggested that the disruptions of ESRD and dialysis caused the self to 
disintegrate. The researchers described the ‘self’, as an emotional/psychological state 
that altered with the evolving meanings of illness. The participants signified how their 
loss of control over renal function, and their dependence on the dialysis machine for 
survival created a loss of self-identity and self-worth. Some participants’ physical health 
had declined and they experienced reduced benefits from dialysis therapy. These 
burdens contributed to their loss of self and created a barrier to their acceptance of the 
illness and treatment.   
 
Curtin et al (2002) corroborated these findings, stating that the life-style limitations 
associated with ESRD and haemodialysis changed the person’s self-concept. Therefore, 
to adapt to the illness and treatment, the person had to restructure the self through a 
series of self-affirmations.11 
 
The study by Nagle (1998) contended that the technology of haemodialysis therapy 
created a loss of the embodied self. The participants in the study indicated that their life 
on haemodialysis therapy was characterised by lost opportunities and restrictions in 
living. Hence, they were compelled to come to terms with a life that was different. The 
ability to accept a different life was a difficult aspiration to achieve for many 
                                                 
11 These affirmations will be discussed later in the review in the section titled “the transformation 
process”. 
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participants because it threatened the integrity of the self. Therefore, in an attempt to 
retain the embodied self, they struggled to be the same, while simultaneously being 
transformed by the technological aspects of care.  
 
For example, some participants described the dialysis machine objectively and were 
adamant that it was not part of their identity. The need to be recognised as an individual 
and not just as a dialysis patient was an important feature in maintaining the embodied 
self. Because dialysis therapy was often distressing and uncomfortable, the participants 
tried to dissociate themselves from the treatment in order to preserve the self. However, 
this was not always possible, as the physical pain and discomfort experienced during 
haemodialysis therapy prevented total dissociation (Nagle, 1998). Like Nagle, other 
authors also reported how the participants’ experience of being attached to the 
haemodialysis machine threatened the integrity of the self (Hagren et al., 2001; Giles, 
2003, 2005).  
 
The existing literature highlighted how the loss of self culminated in distressing 
emotional responses for the person (Gregory et al., 1998; Morse, 2001; Curtin et al., 
2002; Calvin, 2004; Jablonski, 2004). For instance, the study by Kierans (2005) 
emphasised how the all-encompassing effects of ESRD created a loss of self amongst 
the participants. The disruptions caused by kidney disease made it necessary for the 
participants to negotiate their identity and role (Kierans, 2005). However, the 
unpredictability of the illness and treatment meant this was an ongoing activity, which 
provoked psychological distress.  
 
Urien (2007) signified that the loss of self generated feelings of death anxiety within the 
person. In addition, Gregory et al (1998) conveyed the feelings of helplessness, 
humiliation, and inadequacy created by the participants’ loss of self-worth. The 
following section will discuss the distressing emotional responses to ESRD and dialysis 
therapy.  
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2.6.3 THE DISTRESSING EMOTIONAL RESPONSES TO ESRD AND DIALYSIS 
 
The qualitative literature highlighted the distressing emotional responses associated 
with ESRD and dialysis therapy. In particular, uncertainty and anxiety seemed to be the 
most prevalent emotional responses experienced within this patient group. Like the 
existing quantitative research, the distressing emotions were predominantly interpreted 
from a psychological or cognitive perspective within the qualitative literature.   
 
2.6.3.1 Uncertainty & Anxiety 
 
In the personal account of her subjective experience of chronic illness, Toombs (1995) 
conveyed the distressing emotional responses she experienced as a result of multiple 
sclerosis (MS). According to Toombs, the ongoing uncertainty was the most 
challenging emotion to manage. The course of MS was so unpredictable that feelings of 
uncertainty relentlessly haunted her throughout the illness. The pervasive uncertainty 
meant she could never ascertain what her condition would be like on a daily basis. 
Moreover, her ability to project forward future goals was diminished.  
 
Living in the constant shadow of uncertainty was eventually so unbearable, that the 
author decided to reclaim some aspects of a normal life. This involved the suppression 
of uncertainty in an effort to function on a day-to-day basis. In particular, Toombs 
(1995) made a conscious decision to limit her thoughts of long-range goals. Rather than 
thinking of next month or next year, she concentrated on getting through one day at a 
time.  
 
While it was difficult to continuously focus on the present, it was the only way to cope 
with the disruptions in life, created by the illness. More importantly, the predominant 
focus on the present allowed Toombs to concentrate her attention on actual problems, 
rather than potential ones. As a result, she was able to implement specific strategies to 
overcome immediate problems and regain some control over her life. By bolstering 
control, Toombs was able to balance the sense of uncertainty, which threatened to 
engulf her life.  
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Nonetheless, Toombs (1995) concluded her account with a poignant description of the 
difficulties she persistently faced, while she tried to repress the uncertainty and anxiety 
evoked by her illness:  
There are thoughts that come unbidden in the night to reawaken my 
deepest anxieties. There is no way for me to look them in the face and 
remain intact. I must push them back. Back into the recesses of my 
consciousness. It is an act of will. I must think only of now. Of this day. 
Of this moment. Of what I have. Of what I can do. Of what gives me joy. 
Please, let me think only of this (p22). 
 
Like Toomb’s account, the existing qualitative research showed that the person with 
ESRD on dialysis tended to suppress the distressing feelings of uncertainty and anxiety. 
It seemed that these responses were so unpleasant for some individuals, that they used 
strategies to prevent themselves being overwhelmed by psychological distress. 
However, inevitably the distressing emotional responses could not be suppressed on a 
continuous basis. Consequently, the individual was confronted with the full intensity of 
the distressing emotions.  
 
For instance, the study by King et al (2002) explored adaptation to diabetic renal disease 
in twenty people. The phenomenological approach used in the study emanated from a 
psychological or cognitive perspective similar to Smith’s (1996) “interpretive 
phenomenological analysis” (IPA). In-depth interviews were conducted with ten male 
and ten female participants. The findings illustrated that stoicism or stoical endurance 
was the most dominant coping strategy used by the participants in the study. This 
coping strategy involved the participants carrying on with the illness as best they could, 
causing as little fuss as possible, and trying to look on the bright side. However, the 
experience of uncertainty that was inherent in the illness trajectory repeatedly 
undermined this stoical stance.   
 
The authors found that relatively few participants in the study focused on the future. 
Instead, most insisted that they lived from day to day in an effort to consciously avoid 
thinking about the future. While they were well aware that their condition would 
probably deteriorate further, they knew that focusing on these issues was both unhelpful 
and frightening. Despite initially worrying about the future, several participants had 
decided to adapt a fatalistic outlook, which enabled them to carry on with their lives. 
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Hence, the feelings of uncertainty and anxiety were not permitted to overwhelm these 
participants, or undermine their stoic endurance strategies.    
 
The avoidance or suppression of feelings of uncertainty and anxiety had a negative 
outcome for some participants. These participants avoided information related to their 
illness and treatment. However, the avoidance of information meant they lacked 
understanding about their condition, which subsequently induced greater anxiety and 
uncertainty.     
 
Similarly, the participants in a study by Caress, Luker & Owens (2001) also illuminated 
this dynamic movement between the suppression and release of the distressing emotions 
associated with ESRD. The primary aim of this study was to explore the subjective 
meaning of illness in a sample of renal patients (n=405). The secondary aim was to 
explore the applicability of Lipowski’s (1983) Meaning of Illness Schema as a 
framework to describe the participants’ subjective experience of ESRD.   
 
The participants’ accounts illustrated that they were concerned about their prognosis, 
and were anxious about the possibility of future deterioration in their health. Despite 
this anxiety, “challenge” was the most frequent option selected from the schema by the 
participants. For some participants, challenge involved a determination not to give in to 
renal disease. They made references to bearing up, making the best of it, soldiering on, 
not complaining, and stoically accepting their situation. Participants also made fatalistic 
comments, which implied that they merely tolerated or put up with the illness. The 
participants knew they had no choice but to make the best of a bad situation. Therefore, 
their reports suggested that they continuously struggled to tolerate the physical and 
psychosocial challenges of ESRD and renal replacement therapy (Caress, Luker & 
Owens, 2001).  
 
The uncertainty of life on haemodialysis was also emphasised in the study by Polaschek 
(2000). The participants reported concerns about the uncertainty and ongoing nature of 
dialysis therapy. As the time spent on dialysis passed, they had begun to recognise the 
relentless nature of ESRD and renal replacement therapy. The experience of repeatedly 
suffering the acute and long-term complications of ESRD and haemodialysis meant the 
participants could not ignore the chronic nature of their condition.  
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According to Polaschek (2000), the participants had come to realise that the 
development of the long-term complications of ESRD, were not necessarily avoided 
through effective dialysis therapy. Even though all the men considered that their 
treatment was going well at the moment, they all had experienced unexpected 
difficulties throughout the illness trajectory. Therefore, they were anxious and uncertain 
about potential problems that could arise in the future. The precariousness of their lives 
on dialysis and the prospect of a premature death was a significant source of uncertainty 
and anxiety (Polaschek, 2000).  
 
To cope with the uncertainty of life on home haemodialysis, the participants strove to 
keep dialysis separate from their everyday lives. They achieved this by adapting a 
defined treatment regime on a weekly basis. They organised their lives rigidly around a 
set pattern of dialysis treatments. For example, some participants dialysed in the early 
hours of the morning or late at night. While this involved discipline and negotiation, it 
ensured that the participants could essentially segregate their everyday lives from the 
treatment. This defined segregation between life on dialysis and normal everyday life 
enabled the participants to maintain control, and get through each day, living with the 
uncertainty of the illness.  
 
Kierans (2005) indicated that the participants on dialysis in her study focused on the 
imagined future with a kidney transplant because their lives were on hold. To re-iterate, 
this study examined the narrative accounts of five people, who were either on dialysis or 
had a kidney transplant in the Republic of Ireland. From the researcher’s perspective, it 
was this future-oriented perspective that enabled the participants to tolerate the dialysis 
treatment regimen. However, one participant who had received a kidney transplant 
implied that she was still unable to anticipate a future. There was always the potential of 
developing complications, which could initiate transplant rejection, a return to dialysis, 
or death (Kierans, 2005).  
 
Kierans suggested that the unpredictability of ESRD and the uncertainties attached to 
the future, contributed to discontinuities in the person’s cognitive experiences. As a 
result, the person oscillated between states of emotional ‘reprieve and distress’ (Kierans, 
2005; p350). Furthermore, his/her cognitive experience of time was disordered. 
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Consequently, the person continually focused on the present and tried to take one day at 
a time (Kierans, 2005).  
 
The participants in the study by Curtin et al (2002) commented on the instability of their 
lives and the uncertainty regarding their futures. The participants were anxious because 
they were continuously confronted with the reality of death. The unpredictability of 
their lives hindered their ability to make decisions about their future. To tolerate the 
uncertainty, some participants refrained from setting long-term goals and commitments, 
such as marriage, children, and major purchases. For those who chose to set life goals, 
several-year timelines were the most they could manage. Since the participants in the 
study were on long-term haemodialysis therapy, some regretted that they had not 
planned more for their futures.   
 
Embedded in the participants’ accounts were their efforts to maintain control in the face 
of uncertainty (Curtin et al., 2002). Several participants addressed this dichotomy by 
concentrating almost entirely on the present. Their accounts suggested that they lived in 
the moment, and took each day as it came. The participants’ decision to live in the 
present meant they were able to suppress the uncertainty, and reclaim some control over 
their lives (Curtin et al., 2002). 
 
Like Curtin et al (2002), most authors referred to feelings of uncertainty and anxiety 
interchangeably within their discussions of the person’s experience of ESRD and 
dialysis. However, Baines & Jindal (2003) specifically highlighted that anxiety occurred 
as a result of the person’s realisation of the closeness of death. In their textbook The 
Struggle for Life, the authors provided a psychological perspective of kidney disease 
and transplantation. Throughout the book, the authors provided discussions and 
narrative accounts based on their long-term psychotherapeutic sessions with patients on 
renal replacement therapy. They indicated that the experience of chronic illness, such as 
ESRD served to heighten a patient’s own death anxiety. 
 
Correspondingly, Hutchinson (2005) indicated that dialysis therapy and kidney 
transplantation were effective treatments, which prevented the person from immediate 
death from ESRD. However, they did not return the person’s life expectancy to that of 
the general population. Thus, the possibility of impending death was a source of 
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ongoing suffering and distress for these individuals. The distress was intensified when 
the death of a fellow dialysis patient occurred (Hutchinson, 2005). 
 
Hagren et al (2001) reported similar findings in a study, which explored the experience 
of suffering from ESRD for fifteen patients in Sweden. Semi-structured interviews were 
carried out with seven male and eight female participants. The interview data were 
analysed using interpretive content analysis.  The researchers indicated that they used a 
qualitative interpretive approach. However, they did not provide a clear connection to 
any methodological or philosophical framework in the study. Therefore, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether the data collection and analysis methods were consistent with the 
methodology.  
 
The participants in the study indicated that the many hours spent connected to the 
haemodialysis machine gave them time for reflection about their illness and their 
expectations for the future. As a result, they became anxious about what would happen 
if haemodialysis did not work, or if they were unable to get a kidney transplant. These 
uncertainties threatened the participants’ existence and confronted them with thoughts 
about death. The participants were constantly faced with the knowledge that they would 
not live forever. In particular, the loss of freedom, being forced to wait before dialysis 
therapy, and the lengthy dialysis sessions increased their awareness that precious time 
was running out. 
 
The subsequent study by Hagren et al (2005) also illuminated an existential struggle 
embedded within the participants’ experience of being on haemodialysis therapy. The 
researchers indicated that the dialysis machine played a significant role in this 
existential struggle. The dialysis machine infringed on time and dominated space, which 
served as a constant reminder to the participants that they were living on borrowed time. 
To overcome the uncertainty of living with ESRD, some participants in the study strove 
to “get through” each day of the illness as autonomously as possible. They also 
indicated that the ability to maintain a mental distance from thoughts about the illness 
played an important part in their ability to cope.  
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The participants in a study by Calvin (2004) emphasised how the continuous failure of 
their bodies, loss of independence, and additional co-morbid conditions of ESRD meant 
their lives were plagued by uncertainty. A grounded theory methodology was employed 
to explore the end of life decisions of twenty people with ESRD undergoing 
haemodialysis therapy in the USA. Qualitative interviews were carried out with eleven 
male and nine female participants. The researcher used the constant comparative 
method of data analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which was developed specifically for 
use within this research methodology. Based on the findings of the study, a substantive 
theory of “personal preservation” was formulated.  
 
The participants in the study knew that their progressively declining health would affect 
their longevity. The prospect of impending death contributed to their feelings of 
pervasive uncertainty. Calvin (2004) declared that when the participants were faced 
with the uncertainty of life on haemodialysis therapy, they moved into a phase of 
“personal preservation”. Consequently, they used various strategies to block out the 
distressing feelings of uncertainty.   
 
According to Calvin, death was always part of the participants’ lives, but they realised 
that death was ultimately out of their control. Therefore, several of the participants had 
dealt with this conflict between uncertainty and control, by distancing themselves from 
death. They blocked thoughts of death out of their mind, as this allowed them to 
maintain control over the distressing emotional responses associated with these thoughts 
(Calvin, 2004).    
  
Baines & Jindal (2003) corroborated these findings and claimed that death anxiety 
created problems with adjustment because it initiated blocking responses, which served 
to avoid or deny the inevitability of death. By blocking feelings of death anxiety, 
individuals were essentially able to deny the reality of their death. However, the authors 
insisted that the suppression of anxiety created negative outcomes on the person’s 
adaptation to ESRD. For instance, some individuals took a “back-seat” or fatalistic 
approach to life. By taking this approach, they adapted the perspective that their life 
course was determined by the illness. During dialysis, these individuals were often very 
compliant, and adhered unquestionably with the routine and restrictions of dialysis 
therapy. They were often considered ideal candidates for transplantation. However, they 
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were also the patients who failed to develop any meaningful lifestyle on dialysis 
therapy. According to Baines & Jindal (2003), the time spent on dialysis for these 
people merely became “empty time” where they remained “stuck in the routine of 
nothingness that [became] increasingly static, desolate, and frustrated” (p154). 
 
In a hermeneutical phenomenological study, Sloan (2002) indicated death was a real 
and anticipated part of the person’s experience of life on dialysis therapy. Using in-
depth interviews, the researcher explored the experience of ESRD and dialysis therapy 
for fifty-six people from two large dialysis centres in the USA. An approach to data 
analysis based on the work of Benner (1994) and Diekelmann & Ironside (1998) was 
employed in the study. These authors specifically developed data analysis approaches 
for use in studies using a hermeneutical phenomenological methodology.  
 
Sloan identified a central theme in the participants’ experience, which she labelled 
“dialysis is killing me”. The unpleasant symptoms and lifestyle disruptions associated 
with dialysis were so severe, that the treatment was seen by some of the participants as 
death inducing or “killing me”.  As a result, the participants described the demands of a 
therapy, which seemed to offer survival but at the cost of living a normal everyday life 
(Sloan, 2002). According to Sloan, the existing literature in the area of ESRD 
predominantly viewed death from a biological perspective. This view simply assumed 
that without biological integrity, there was no survival. However, Sloan’s hermeneutical 
phenomenological analysis of the participants’ accounts highlighted that death was 
experienced, while there was still biological life.  
 
The review of the qualitative literature highlighted that uncertainty and anxiety were the 
most prevalent distressing emotional responses to ESRD and dialysis therapy. Based on 
this literature, it appeared that the individual essentially oscillated between the release 
and suppression of these distressing responses. It is suggested that the dynamic 
movement between the suppression and release of anxiety and uncertainty, illustrated 
within this literature, was characteristic of the model of suffering, advanced by Morse 
(2001).  
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2.6.3.2 Morse’s Model of Suffering 
 
Morse and colleagues conducted extensive research on the concept of suffering over a 
number of years (Dewar & Morse, 1995; Morse & Carter, 1996; Morse & Penrod, 1999; 
Penrod, Morse & Wilson, 1999). Various research approaches were used in the studies, 
such as grounded theory, phenomenology, participant observation, and linguistic 
analysis. The samples in the studies consisted of male and female patients with a wide 
range of illnesses, including chronic illness. 
 
Morse (2001) claimed that suffering was the subjective response to losses e.g. loss of 
self, loss of dignity, loss of movement, loss of an anticipated future, the loss of another. 
It consisted of two states: “emotional suffering” and “enduring”. The author signified 
that emotional suffering was a distressed state where emotions were released. According 
to Morse (2001), when one emotionally suffered, s/he recognised the significance of 
what was lost and also recognised that the future was profoundly altered.  
 
Morse (2001) indicated that during the release of emotions, some individuals felt they 
would psychologically disintegrate or literally fall apart. To avoid this psychological 
disintegration, the person protected the self by cognitively blocking and suppressing the 
unpleasant emotional responses. Morse (2001) described this strategy as enduring. It 
was a self-preserving strategy, which enabled the person to function on a day-to-day 
basis and get through the unbearable situation. Persons who were enduring focused on 
the present and this focus allowed them to get through each moment of the adverse 
event. By focusing on the present, the person effectively blocked out the past and the 
future. In its most extreme form, enduring disconnected the person from life. As a 
result, some individuals had no memory of the stressful event (Morse, 2001).  
 
It is suggested that the unpleasant emotions of anxiety and uncertainty, represented in 
the qualitative literature on the person’s experience of ESRD, symbolised emotional 
suffering. To avoid emotional suffering, the individuals suppressed the feelings of 
uncertainty and anxiety, which subsequently culminated in enduring. Indeed, specific 
features of Morse’s (2001) description of enduring were represented within the 
literature, such as the suppression of emotions (King et al., 2002; Baines & Jindal, 
2003; Calvin, 2004; Kierans, 2005), focusing on getting through the situation 
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(Polaschek, 2000; Caress, Luker & Owens, 2001), and concentrating on the present 
(Curtin et al., 2002; King et al., 2002; Kierans, 2005).   
 
These responses to the distressing emotions of uncertainty and anxiety epitomised the 
concepts of emotional suffering and enduring, conveyed by Morse (2001). According to 
Morse, the process of suffering was not linear. There was a continuous movement back 
and forth between enduring and emotional suffering. In an earlier publication, Morse & 
Penrod (1999) concluded that feelings of uncertainty specifically generated a rapid 
movement between emotional suffering and enduring. The authors drew on the findings 
from previous studies, which delineated the concepts of enduring, emotional suffering, 
and hope in an effort to create links between these concepts (Morse & Doberneck, 1995; 
Morse & Carter, 1996). They claimed that uncertainty paralysed hope and induced 
discomforting emotional responses. Therefore, the individual merely existed in an 
emotional state, suffering his or her inability to move or act.  
 
It seemed the uncertainty that surrounded the participants’ future meant they had no 
other choice but to tolerate or endure the present. Therefore, uncertainty specifically 
encompassed a rapid movement between enduring and emotional suffering. When 
confronted with uncertainty, the person endured the present and was suspended, while 
hope was deferred. However, when the uncertainty continued overtime, the ability of 
some individuals to endure eventually failed and they fell back into emotional suffering 
(Morse & Penrod, 1999).  
 
The dynamic characteristics of the model of suffering by Morse (2001), depicted the 
apparent oscillation between the release and suppression of uncertainty and anxiety, 
which was illustrated in the existing literature related to the person’s experience of 
ESRD. However, this was somewhat different than the perspective of these emotions 
advanced in the existing quantitative research. As mentioned previously, the existing 
research, which examined the person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis was primarily 
based on an empirical psychological framework. Within this research, the distressing 
emotional responses to ESRD tended to be assessed as part of larger studies, which 
investigated depression, adjustment, quality of life, and coping.  For the most part, these 
studies interpreted the negative emotional responses to ESRD as evidence of 
depression, maladjustment, diminished quality of life, and an inability to cope.  
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However, by interpreting these unpleasant emotional responses in this way, it is 
suggested that this research effectively overlooked the potential significance of 
uncertainty and anxiety. Moreover, the dynamic characteristics, which formed the basis 
of the person’s experience of these emotions, were also disregarded. This important 
contextual detail was applied by some of the qualitative studies on the person’s 
experience of ESRD and dialysis therapy. This literature illustrated how the person 
essentially oscillated between the release and suppression of the unpleasant emotions 
caused by ESRD and dialysis. However, it is important to emphasise that these studies 
also adapted a primarily psychological perspective of these emotions.  
 
According to Morse (2001), it was the acceptance of the lost past and the altered future 
that enabled the person to move beyond suffering. In particular, the work of hope 
enabled this progression to take place.   
 
2.6.4 HOPE  
 
The experience of hope was addressed in the existing research that pertained to the 
person with ESRD on dialysis. However, the concept of hope, along with other positive 
emotional responses, was predominantly examined from a psychological perspective, 
which used questionnaires. Within this research, hope was rarely addressed as an 
independent factor. Instead, it was interpreted as a secondary issue in relation to the 
broader concepts of adjustment, quality of life, and coping. For the most part, hope was 
deemed a positive influence on these broader issues. Conversely, hopelessness and other 
distressing emotional responses were largely interpreted as signs of depression, 
maladjustment, poor quality of life, and poor coping ability.  
 
It is suggested that the primarily quantitative approach of this research overlooked 
significant contextual and background information embedded within the person’s 
experience of hope. This resulted in a superficial description of the experience of hope 
for the person with ESRD on dialysis. The existing qualitative literature provided some 
of this contextual information, which allowed a more comprehensive understanding of 
the person’s experience of hope to be articulated. In particular, the work of Morse & 
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Doberneck (1995), and Morse & Penrod (1999) facilitated a more in-depth 
understanding of the experience of hope for the person with ESRD on dialysis to be 
delineated. Hence, this work will be threaded intermittently throughout the following 
discussion.  
 
Many qualitative studies highlighted how the ability to maintain hope or an optimistic 
outlook, enabled the individual to accept life with ESRD and dialysis therapy (Sloan, 
1996; Nagle, 1998; Polaschek, 2000; Hagren et al., 2001; Al-Arabi, 2006). In particular, 
the hope of a kidney transplant offered these individuals the possibility of freedom from 
dialysis, and the chance of a normal life. 
 
For instance, Rittman et al (1993) used a hermeneutical phenomenological methodology 
to explore the experience of six people living with ESRD. In-depth interviews were 
conducted with one female and five male participants. Data were analysed using a 
seven-stage approach by Diekelmann, Allen & Tanner (1989). This approach was 
appropriate for use within this study as it was specifically formulated for the analysis of 
data in hermeneutical phenomenological studies. The theme “maintaining hope” 
referred to the participants’ ability to see new possibilities in coping with ESRD. 
According to the authors, the experience of suffering from the pain and disability of 
ESRD was alleviated by hope, and enabled the participants to get through their daily 
lives. The participants expressed the hope of receiving a kidney transplant, the hope of 
returning to work, the hope that a new treatment would be discovered, and the hope that 
they would be around to watch their families grow up.   
 
Similar findings were reported in a study by Ravenscroft (2005), which explored the 
experience of seven individuals with diabetic renal disease. In-depth interviews were 
carried out with two male and five female participants, followed by qualitative inductive 
analysis. While, Ravenscroft stated that she used a qualitative interpretive approach in 
the study, she did not describe the underlying methodological principles of this 
approach. Hope was discussed in two contexts in relation to the adjustment of the 
participants in the study. In the first context, hope was construed as positive thinking. It 
was focused on the present and was predominantly used in learning to manage the 
illness. In the second context, hope was reported as hope for a transplant. It was focused 
on the future and was predominantly used to facilitate acceptance of the illness.  
 61
 
The hope of a kidney transplant alone seemed to make acceptance of ESRD and dialysis 
easier, because it offered the participants the possibility of a normal life (Ravenscroft, 
2005). This hope intensified for those who had a possibility for simultaneous kidney-
pancreas transplantation. A kidney-pancreas transplant offered these participants the 
hope of life without dialysis and diabetes. 
 
According to Ravenscroft (2005), the participants in the study differentiated between 
the hope elicited by the possibility of transplantation, and the hope engendered by 
positive thinking and reappraisal.  This differentiation in patterns of hope was also 
highlighted in the study by Morse & Doberneck (1995), which delineated the concept of 
hope. The authors identified unique patterns of hope within various groups of 
individuals. These groups included six patients who were waiting for a heart transplant, 
nine patients who were being rehabilitated for spinal cord injuries, five patients who had 
survived breast cancer, and fifteen breastfeeding mothers who had returned to work.  
 
Within each group, unique patterns of hope were illuminated. For instance, those 
awaiting heart transplants were “hoping for a chance” at life with a new heart. These 
participants knew that the only other alternative to transplantation was death. Therefore, 
they felt they had no option except to try to maintain hope, while they waited for the 
transplant to arrive. The patients with spinal cord injuries portrayed “incremental hope” 
and focused only on small gains and at one step at a time. The breast cancer survivors 
were “hoping against hope” because these women were continually forced to redefine 
hope when faced with each new challenge or barrier in their illness experience. Finally, 
the breastfeeding mothers described a form of “provisional hope” where they made 
contingency goals with repeated back up plans in case these goals had to be revised 
(Morse & Doberneck, 1995).  
 
Like the study by Ravenscroft (2005), Morse & Doberneck identified different patterns 
of hope, which existed within different groups of individuals.  They also identified 
components that were universal to the subjective experience of hope in all groups. For 
instance, they described the ability to brace oneself for negative outcomes, as a 
universal component of the experience of hope. From the authors’ perspective, hope 
always existed with the threat of failure. Therefore, the role of despair was significant in 
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the participants’ ability to reformulate hope, and revise hope goals. However, this 
potential negative alternative was rarely discussed in the literature related to hope 
(Morse & Doberneck, 1995).  
 
Greene (1984) subscribed to this view indicating that it was overly simplistic to assume 
that hope was essentially and always good or positive. The author suggested that within 
the person’s complex psychology, hope was accompanied by the dread of hopelessness, 
or a fear that the desired goal would not be attained. Therefore, when hope was frail, 
feelings of hope tended to give way to more negative feelings, such as despair and 
depression (Greene, 1984).  
 
The studies by Morse & Doberneck (1995) and Morse & Penrod (1999) also illustrated 
this dynamic movement from the positive emotions of hope to the negative emotions of 
hopelessness and despair. The authors noted that a considerable time elapsed between 
the participants selecting and attaining a goal. While the person was initially hopeful, 
s/he had to wait and endure the time lapse until the goal was attained. Hence, Morse & 
Doberneck (1995) described a “determination to endure” as a universal component of 
hope, which allowed hope to be sustained. The ability to endure enabled the participants 
to suppress negative thoughts and emotions associated with their situation, and hold 
onto hope.  
 
However, as Morse & Doberneck (1995) pointed out, it was difficult for some 
participants to continuously suppress the negative emotional responses evoked by the 
illness or stressful situation. At these times, they oscillated into emotional suffering and 
experienced distressing emotional responses such as uncertainty, hopelessness, despair, 
and depression. For example, some breast cancer survivors conveyed that when they 
were confronted with each new challenge or barrier in their illness, they reverted to 
enduring. They struggled continuously to suppress the negative thoughts and emotions 
and focused on the preservation of the self. Alternatively, others were unable to see a 
goal or path out of the repeated setbacks. Therefore, they fell back into the hopelessness 
and despair of emotional suffering.  
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The experience of hope described by the other participants in the study also portrayed 
how critical events in their illness or situation created this movement between emotional 
suffering and enduring. In particular, the patients who were awaiting a heart transplant 
had no alternative except to maintain a positive attitude and endure the waiting time for 
a donor to be found. However, one young man who was awaiting a heart transplant 
recalled a time when he lost hope. He described the despair when he realised that the 
heart he was supposed to receive was not available for him.  
 
According to the authors, this oscillation between emotional suppression (enduring) and 
emotional releasing (emotional suffering) formed the basis of the concept of hope 
(Morse & Doberneck, 1995; Morse & Penrod, 1999). These dynamic characteristics 
were also identified within the experience of hope, conveyed in the qualitative literature 
related to the person’s experience of ESRD.  This literature illuminated that potentially 
negative thoughts, feelings, and emotions were embedded within the individuals’ 
experience of hope. Consequently, the experience of hope was not static for these 
individuals. Rather a vacillating movement accompanied the experience of hope, which 
consisted of the release and suppression of the unpleasant emotional responses 
associated with ESRD.    
 
For instance, the participants in the study by Calvin (2004) spoke about being hopeful, 
expecting favourable outcomes, and wishing for longevity. They recognised the 
potential brevity of their lives but persisted in their hope for a long, high-quality life. 
The ability to make the best of the current situation was significant for the participants.  
Despite the difficulty of their lives with ESRD, they described their willingness to 
maintain an optimistic outlook. Some complained about the negative adjustments they 
had to make because of ESRD and dialysis. Nonetheless, their zest for life still 
prevailed.  
 
Similarly, “staying alive” was a category identified in the study by Al-Arabi (2006), 
which referred to the participants’ efforts to cope with ESRD and dialysis therapy. The 
participants expressed their hope for a kidney transplant or a cure for ESRD. They used 
various strategies, which motivated them to continue with dialysis therapy, until a 
kidney transplant or a cure was found. The support of others, the ability to accept the 
treatment as part of life, and trust in God were described as strategies, which enabled 
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the participants to endure the treatment.  These strategies had given them the strength to 
get through each day, and remain hopeful of healing. 
 
In the study by Polaschek (2000), the participants expressed that the hope of a kidney 
transplant enabled them to cope with their illness and treatment. The participants 
described how the ability to look forward to a transplant, enabled them to endure the 
uncertainty and relentless nature of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy. The possibility of 
a kidney transplant offered the participants the hope that dialysis was a temporary 
problem. However, according to Polaschek (2000) the optimism of the participants 
merely reflected the optimism of the healthcare team in relation to kidney 
transplantation. The healthcare team had informed the participants that they could 
expect to receive a transplant within a few years. Despite having waited for many years, 
some of the participants remained confident that they would be transplanted shortly.  
 
In contrast, two of the participants had begun to realise that dialysis could continue 
indefinitely into the future. This contributed to the experience of uncertainty, which 
accompanied life on renal replacement therapy. However, apart from these two 
participants, the men showed almost no recognition of the degree of uncertainty, which 
surrounded transplantation. They had no awareness of the potential complications of the 
treatment and the possibility that it could fail. Therefore, although their hope of a 
transplant was objectively unrealistic, it provided a necessary coping mechanism for the 
participants to deal with the uncertainties of life on dialysis (Polaschek, 2000).  
 
The findings from the study by Polaschek (2000) demonstrated the dynamic movement 
between emotional suffering and enduring, which was embedded within the 
participants’ experience of hope. Other studies also portrayed this oscillation between 
emotional suffering and enduring, which formed the basis of the experience of hope for 
individuals with ESRD on dialysis therapy.  
 
For example, a study by Lindqvist, Carlsson & Sjoden (2000) described the perceived 
consequences of illness and treatment among eighty-six patients with ESRD. There 
were fifty-one male and thirty-five female participants in the sample who were either on 
haemodialysis therapy, peritoneal dialysis therapy, or had received a kidney transplant. 
Unstructured interviews and content analysis were the research methods used in the 
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study. The researchers identified the overall research approach taken in the study as 
exploratory-descriptive. However, they did not address any methodological or 
philosophical considerations in relation to this approach.  
 
A category labelled “hope/fulfilled dreams” was identified within the participants’ 
accounts. The participants conveyed the hope that everything would get better and the 
hope of a kidney transplant.  However, there were mixed feelings associated with the 
participants’ hope of a transplant. For some participants, the possibility of 
transplantation was identified as the greatest source of hope for a normal life. However, 
other individuals expressed feelings of dread in relation to transplantation because they 
had a negative experience of the procedure in the past, and were aware of the potential 
complications that could arise.  
 
Using a grounded theory methodology, Weems & Patterson (1989) sought to identify 
the concerns of fourteen candidates awaiting renal transplantation, and to identify 
coping strategies used during the wait. Qualitative interviews were conducted with ten 
male and four female patients who were within ten days after renal transplantation. The 
constant comparative method of data analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) was used. This 
approach to data analysis was suitable for this study, as it was specifically developed for 
use in studies using a grounded theory methodology.  
 
Based on the findings of the study, the major coping strategy used by the participants 
was tempered hope. The researchers used the term “tempered” because the participants’ 
hope was moderated or weakened by the uncertainties inherent in the waiting process. 
The participants’ expressed their experience of wavering between the positive emotional 
state of hope and the distressing states of uncertainty, anxiety, hopelessness, and 
despair.    
 
When the participants initially got through the evaluation to get on the transplant 
waiting list, they developed a sense of hopefulness that sustained them during the wait. 
Some participants seemed to be aware that a kidney transplant might never become 
available or was far off into the future. Therefore, as a protective mechanism, they 
tempered their hope with the knowledge of the reality of the situation. However, at the 
same time, signs of hopefulness were reflected in participants’ arrangements to ensure 
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they did not miss the phone call informing them of a potential donor kidney (Weems & 
Patterson, 1989).  
 
The participants recalled how living with the relentless uncertainty was a major burden, 
while they had waited for a kidney transplant. They were confronted by the uncertainty 
of the surgery itself and the inability to ascertain the post surgical outcome. The 
uncertainty intensified at critical junctures in the waiting period. For instance, when 
they felt unwell, when a fellow patient either received or rejected a kidney transplant, 
when they missed a phone call related to an available kidney, or when the waiting 
period became lengthy. These critical incidents challenged their usual coping strategies 
and caused the participants to become psychologically distressed. At these times, the 
participants would attempt to draw from this source of tempered hope to get through the 
adversity of life on dialysis (Weems & Patterson, 1989). 
 
While waiting, some participants were satisfied to adopt a fatalistic attitude to cope with 
the uncertainty and made statements like “when the time comes, it will come”.  Others 
wanted more certainty and calculated a potential time to expect the transplant surgery 
based on the information received from the healthcare team. However, these strategies 
were not always sufficient in dealing with uncertainty.  
 
As the time passed, the possibility of eventually receiving a transplant became more 
remote. In particular, when the date the participants figured they would receive a kidney 
transplant passed, they began to wonder if they would ever receive a kidney transplant. 
The earlier optimism was diminished, as the participants began to wonder if their names 
were still on the list or if they had been forgotten. Some blamed the nephrologists for 
the long wait. Others avoided thinking about it in an effort to block out the distressing 
reactions induced by the persistent waiting (Weems & Patterson, 1989).    
 
Correspondingly, a study by Sloan (1996) also exemplified how the distressing 
emotions of uncertainty and fear formed the background to the person’s hope of 
receiving a transplant. This hermeneutical phenomenological study explored the 
medical treatment decisions for patients with ESRD and their families in the USA. The 
participants were either on haemodialysis therapy or had a kidney transplant at the time 
of the interviews. Sloan used a hermeneutical approach to data analysis (Diekelmann, 
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Allen & Tanner, 1989) to understand the reasons behind the participants’ decision to 
seek kidney transplantation.  
 
Most of the participants in the study had decided to be considered for transplantation in 
an effort to be freed from dialysis therapy. One of their greatest hopes was that their 
lives would become more normal. However, beneath their hope of receiving a kidney 
transplant was the uncertainty of the potential complications associated with the 
procedure. For instance, the participants contemplated the possibility of repeated 
surgeries, pain, and the need for continuous medical intervention prior to making the 
decision to avail of a transplant. A major concern for the participants was the possibility 
of transplant rejection, resulting in a return to dialysis therapy. The grim possibility of 
not surviving the process of transplantation was also embedded in their accounts (Sloan, 
1996). Because of these concerns, some participants decided to forego the opportunity 
to receive a kidney transplant. Alternatively, the participants who decided to avail of the 
treatment described their experience of endlessly waiting for the transplant that never 
happened, or happened for someone else.  
 
In the subsequent study by Sloan (2002), the participants also described their hope of 
eventually receiving a kidney transplant. However, financial difficulties were reported 
as a source of uncertainty in their decision to consider transplantation. According to 
Sloan, some individuals simply did not have the appropriate healthcare insurance to 
cover the costs of the immunosuppressive therapy and the medical treatment required 
for kidney transplantation in the USA. The author emphasised that it was unknown how 
many of the transplant failures in the USA occurred because of individuals trying to 
“stretch [their] medications to the end of the month” (p146).  
 
Indeed, a recent study by Denhaerynck et al (2006) compared the adherence with 
immunosuppressive drugs amongst kidney transplant recipients in the USA (n=1563) 
and Europe (n=614). The findings indicated that there was a higher rate of non-
adherence with immunosuppressive medication in the US sample, than in the European 
sample. Like Sloan, the researchers claimed that differences in healthcare 
characteristics, such as health insurance coverage, and the reimbursement of expenses 
for drugs and medical treatment, were important factors in the higher rate of non-
adherence in people in the United States.  
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As pointed out in the above discussion, the existing literature demonstrated that hope 
was not a static experience or some positive end-state for the person with ESRD on 
dialysis therapy. It did not merely consist of the person setting goals and passively 
waiting for these goals to be achieved. Instead, the experience of hope triggered a 
dynamic movement between the suppression and release of the distressing emotional 
responses associated with ESRD. In particular, the work on the concept of hope by 
Morse & Doberneck (1995) and Morse & Penrod (1999) facilitated the dynamic 
characteristics of the experience of hope, to be illuminated within the qualitative 
literature. It allowed the oscillatory movement between enduring and emotional 
suffering, which was embedded within the person’s experience of hope to be 
demonstrated. Enduring enabled the person to sustain hope by actively blocking out or 
suppressing the negative emotional responses to ESRD. Alternatively, emotional 
suffering involved the release of these distressing emotions, which occurred when hope 
was undermined.   
 
Morse (2001) affirmed that after the cyclic movement between enduring and emotional 
suffering, the person was eventually ready to accept the lost past and altered future. 
Acceptance moved him/her beyond suffering and onto the reformulated self. The notion 
of reformulating the self was contained within the existing literature on the person’s 
experience of ESRD. However, it was more commonly identified as a “process of 
transformation”.    
 
2.6.5 THE PROCESS OF TRANSFORMATION    
 
The qualitative literature indicated that “transformation” was an essential feature of 
adjustment or adaptation to ESRD and dialysis. Transformation was described as a 
process where the self was re-defined and re-structured. This process enabled the person 
with ESRD achieve a new sense of normality, thus allowing the effects of the illness to 
be integrated into his/her life. While the notion of transformation was associated with 
adjustment to ESRD and dialysis, it differed considerably from our current 
understanding of this concept. Unlike the perspective of adjustment advanced in the 
existing quantitative literature, transformation was not an end state. The process was not 
completed with the attainment of normality in physical and psychosocial functioning. 
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Furthermore, transformation did not consist of the person progressing through a linear 
process, which eventually ended in successful adjustment.   
 
Transformation, as the experience of adjustment to ESRD and dialysis, was a long and 
drawn out process. It involved the person struggling continuously throughout the illness 
trajectory to re-define the self, integrate the limitations of the illness into their lives, and 
adapt to a new normal. Transformation was not a static process but was ongoing and 
dynamic, and occurred throughout the illness trajectory. In particular, the ability to 
achieve autonomy, independence, self-mastery, self-care, and so forth were identified as 
integral to the success of this process.   
 
For instance, the study by Gregory et al (1998), which explored the person’s 
experiences of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy, highlighted the re-definition of self as 
a dominant category. Despite the uncertainties inherent in the illness and treatment, the 
participants strove to achieve a new sense of self. The researchers claimed that this 
“new sense of self” was an emotional/psychological state that fluctuated with the 
evolving meanings of illness, and the perceived quality of supports. It involved the 
participants deriving satisfaction from the things they could still do, and by living in 
hope for a better future with a kidney transplant. These strategies acted as a buffer 
against the distressing emotional responses evoked by the illness and treatment.  
 
The accounts of several participants signified that the redefinition of the self was not a 
passive endeavour (Gregory et al., 1998). It involved a continuous struggle to come to 
terms with the illness, accept the treatment restrictions, and deal with the uncertainty of 
life on dialysis. The participants described their ability to eventually adapt to the 
physical, emotional, psychological, and social changes incurred by the illness and 
treatment. Their gradual adjustment to a new sense of normality was achieved through a 
process of transformation from the remembered “old self” to the “new self”.  
 
Gregory et al (1998) emphasised that transformation into the new normal was not an 
end state for the participants. Rather, the continuous changes overtime in physical 
functioning and activity tolerance meant the participants were continuously challenged 
to transform the self.  In addition, the complications specifically associated with 
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haemodialysis therapy, which included problems with access, cramps, hypotension, and 
delays, made adjustment to the treatment regime a continuous struggle.  
 
The constant emotional and psychological adjustments to changing health states made it 
difficult for some participants to adapt a positive sense of self (Gregory et al., 1998). 
Nonetheless, most participants in the study indicated that they strove to maintain a 
positive attitude about the future. In particular, the ability to maintain responsibility for 
self-care was an important aspect in the transformation process. By performing self-care 
activities, the participants continuously strove to achieve and maintain an acceptable 
level of normality.  
 
Similarly, the participants in the study by Nagle (1998) expressed multiple personal 
transformations, which culminated from living with ESRD. The participants described 
their experience of “coming to terms” with the losses and limitations imposed on their 
lives by ESRD and haemodialysis therapy. This involved trying to sustain a sense of 
normality by accommodating the restrictions of their illness and the treatment.  
 
The participants experienced a loss of their personhood because of ESRD and dialysis. 
However, they worked to redefine their personhood in an effort to integrate the 
technology of haemodialysis more seamlessly into their lives. In particular, the 
participants described the difficulty of having to accept machine dependency, while 
maintaining autonomy in every other aspect of their lives. They described how the 
vigilant monitoring of their bodies, combined with active involvement in decision-
making about their care were significant factors in maintaining autonomy.  
 
For instance, the participants’ lives were constructed around the self-management of 
their illness. They independently managed the dietary and fluid restrictions, the 
medication regime, and the monitoring of the complications associated with ESRD and 
dialysis. The ability to participate in a normal life was a continuous challenge for the 
participants. However, they pushed their physical limits in an effort to retain significant 
elements of their former selves (Nagle, 1998).  
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Correspondingly, a phenomenological study by Giles (2003) found that the life-world of 
four people was transformed by home haemodialysis therapy. The phenomenological 
methodology employed in the study was based on the work of Van Manen. According 
to Van Manen (1997) “phenomenological research is the explication of phenomena as 
they present themselves to consciousness” (p9). Therefore, this approach to 
phenomenology was largely founded on a psychological or cognitive perspective. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with the participants and data were analysed using 
an approach by Van Manen (1997). 
 
The findings of the study indicated how ESRD and haemodialysis therapy had 
transformed the bodily experience of the participants. The need for access to the 
bloodstream for dialysis meant the participants had lost control over their bodies. In this 
way, the body had essentially become a site for medical intervention. Despite the 
distress caused by their experience of haemodialysis therapy, the participants strove to 
retain control and sovereignty over their bodies. This ongoing process facilitated a 
transformation of the lived-body, as well as the life-world of the participants (Giles, 
2003).  
 
Curtin et al (2002) also described the process of surviving on long-term dialysis 
therapy, as a transformational experience. According to the researchers, the process of 
transformation, illustrated by the participants in their study, corresponded closely to that 
described by Paterson et al (1999). Paterson et al (1999) claimed that the existing 
literature contained various perspectives of transformation in chronic illness. However, 
the process was generally deemed to involve a restructuring of the illness experience 
and/or a restructuring of the self (Charmaz, 1983; Morse, 1997, 2001; Ohman, 
Soderberg & Lundman, 2003). The authors conducted a qualitative study, to specifically 
explicate the processes of transformation in a group of individuals with Type 1 diabetes 
(n=22) (Paterson et al., 1999).  
 
Transformation was described as an evolutionary activity, which involved the 
participants responding to the demands of the illness. It was viewed as a cognitive 
process, which evoked affective or emotional responses. According to the participants, 
transformation involved the conscious decision to assume control of the self-
management of diabetes. This decision resulted in significant changes in the 
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participants’ values, beliefs, assumptions, and daily practices in living with their illness. 
In particular, it led to the realisation that the participants themselves were the experts 
about their disease, and not the healthcare professionals or significant others. 
 
Like the previous studies, Paterson et al (1999) highlighted that that the process of 
transformation did not consist of an end state. Instead, the participants’ accounts 
implied that the process was never complete and continued repeatedly throughout the 
illness trajectory. These individuals were regularly faced with additional complications 
associated with their disease and its treatment. Hence, transformation was required on 
an ongoing basis to renegotiate a balance after each complication.  
 
Based on these findings, Paterson et al recommended that transformation should not be 
viewed as representative of effective adjustment to illness. Rather, the notion of 
transformation should be used as a way to understand the processes experienced by the 
person with a chronic illness, such as diabetes. By interpreting transformation in this 
way, retreats in the transformation process caused by additional complications or 
setbacks, should not be viewed as a regression or failure. Rather, they should be 
understood as a normal and necessary part of the transformation process (Paterson et al., 
1999).  
 
The study by Curtin et al (2002) also indicated that surviving on long-term 
haemodialysis therapy was a transformational experience similar to that identified by 
Paterson et al. The participants indicated that successful transformation of the self 
involved the comprehensive, active self-management of life with ESRD and 
haemodialysis therapy. Every participant was involved in the self-management of many 
aspects of his/her illness and treatment. The ability to have control over their lives, 
maintain a sense of independence, and accept responsibility for their treatment was 
mentioned repeatedly as part of the process of transformation.  
 
According to Curtin et al (2002), the process of transformation was long and demanding 
on the participants. However, all participants signified that the ability to retain at least 
some part of their pre-dialysis identity was an important feature in the transformation 
process. The researchers identified two distinct sets of activities, which were involved 
in achieving the transformed self: (a) adaptation to the changed self through a series of 
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self-affirmations (b) adaptation to the changed circumstances: coming to terms with 
permanent kidney failure. 
 
The participants achieved adaptation to the changed self through various self-
affirmations. For instance, all participants affirmed that they wanted to live. However, 
they knew that to keep living, they had to accept the limitations in lifestyle caused by 
the treatment regime of dialysis. Accepting these limitations enabled the participants to 
restructure their sense of self in order to survive on dialysis therapy.   
 
Although the effects of ESRD and dialysis challenged the participants’ sense of self, 
they still managed to retain an essential part of their identity. The affirmation “I am still 
me” enabled the participants to separate their individual identity from the disease 
(Curtin et al., 2002). Participants described their experience of taking ownership of their 
lives and separating out the self from the illness. The participants’ lives were seriously 
disrupted by ESRD and dialysis therapy. Despite these lifestyle limitations, the 
participants were able to retain significant characteristics of selfhood and affirmed that 
they were still too worthwhile to die. These positive and conscious affirmations 
highlighted the importance of self-worth in the process of transformation when 
confronted with ESRD.    
 
The final affirmation was related to self-efficacy (Curtin et al., 2002). Bandura (1997) 
claimed that a person’s decision to carry out a particular health related behaviour was 
influenced by the person’s beliefs about efficacy. According to the author, there were 
two types of efficacy beliefs, which included outcome efficacy, and self-efficacy.  
 
Outcome efficacy referred to the person’s belief about whether his/her behaviour would 
result in an effective outcome (e.g. taking medications will reduce my phosphate level 
and so prevent the discomfort of pruritis/itching). Self-efficacy referred to the person’s 
belief about whether they were able to carry out the behaviour (e.g. I am confident that I 
can manage my dietary and fluid restrictions everyday). The person’s perceived self-
efficacy influenced the person’s health-related behaviours (Bandura, 1997).  
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The study by Curtin et al (2002) found that the affirmation of self-efficacy or “I am in 
control” was an important feature in the transformation of the self. The participants 
believed that they could retain control over many aspects of their lives, and this was an 
essential part of their adjustment to ESRD and dialysis. However, for several of the 
participants, it was a struggle to maintain control over their healthcare in addition to 
their everyday roles and responsibilities. The need to be well informed about the 
consequences of the illness on their lives was an important factor in regaining control. 
These positive self-affirmations were an essential part of the process of successful 
transformation of the self. They enabled the participants to integrate the limitations of 
ESRD and dialysis into their lives.  
 
The second activity included in the process of transformation involved coming to terms 
with ESRD (Curtin et al., 2002). The participants had to come to terms with major life 
experiences during the transformation process. As mentioned previously, the 
participants described the uncertainty of their lives and the close proximity of death.12  
It was a major hurdle for the participants to come to terms with feelings of death 
anxiety, while simultaneously participating in life. However, the participants’ stark 
awareness of their own mortality seemed to motivate them instead of immobilising 
them. Indeed, several of the participants appeared to have confronted the possibility of 
their death, addressed it, and moved on in a positive manner (Curtin et al., 2002).   
 
As previously mentioned, the ability to maintain control was essential in the process of 
transformation (Curtin et al., 2002). However, the participants’ accounts signified that 
uncertainty was the converse of control. Hence, coming to terms with ESRD meant the 
participants had to reconcile their need for control with the uncertainties inherent in the 
illness and treatment. One way that the participants overcame this dichotomy was to 
focus entirely on the present. By making the definitive decision to live in the present, 
the participants were able to alleviate some of the uncertainty, which accompanied 
ESRD and regain a sense of control over their lives.   
 
                                                 
12 See page 53 for the previous discussion on uncertainty in the study by Curtin et al (2002).  
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If we recall, the person’s predominant focus on the present was described earlier in 
relation to Morse’s (2001) work on the concept of enduring.13 When enduring, the 
person focused on the present in an effort to get through an unbearable situation (Morse, 
2001). Based on these findings, it is suggested that the ability to endure may have been 
a significant feature in the process of transformation for the participants in the study by 
Curtin et al (2002). By focusing on the present, the participants were able to limit the 
distressing feelings of uncertainty and continue to get on with life.  
 
According to Curtin et al, the participants’ lives were constrained in many different 
ways by ESRD and dialysis. Coming to terms with such constraints represented a major 
step in the transformation process and adjustment to ESRD. Like the findings of the 
study by Paterson et al (1999), the participants tried to merge elements of their past 
lives with the realities of their present lives on dialysis. This enabled them to form an 
identity that fitted the confines of their illness, and simultaneously prevented distress 
(Curtin et al., 2002).  
 
For instance, some participants who had been active in the past described how they 
engaged in more passive pastimes. Other participants spoke of how they had learned to 
enjoy the small things in life. Previous studies on the transformation/reformulation of 
the self in chronic illness have also represented this merging of old and new realities 
(Charmaz, 1983; Morse, 1997; Paterson et al., 1999; Morse, 2001; Ohman, Soderberg & 
Lundman, 2003).  
 
Curtin et al (2002) signified that the intrusiveness of dialysis therapy made ESRD a 
particularly difficult illness to accommodate. However, the participants in the study 
tried hard to prevent dialysis from becoming the principal focus of their lives.  While 
they perceived dialysis as a chore, the participants were well aware that without the 
treatment they would not survive. Hence, some spoke of their gratitude for the 
technology, while others described a kind of love hate relationship with the machine.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See page 57 for the previous discussion on the concept of enduring.  
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Coming to terms with the repeated set backs of ESRD and dialysis (e.g. vascular access 
problems, bone disease, infections, cardiovascular disease) was a relentless challenge 
for the participants. They stated that they were unprepared for the harsh reality of the 
repeated setbacks, which occurred throughout the course of the disease. These setbacks 
took a toll on the participants over time. However, with energy, endurance, and courage, 
they had been able to struggle along toward the next challenge (Curtin et al., 2002).  
 
Overall, the participants viewed successful transformation as the comprehensive and 
active self-management of their lives with kidney disease. The process included efforts 
by the participants to change what was changeable, control what was controllable, and 
to actively struggle to come to terms with the consequences of ESRD (Curtin et al., 
2002).  
  
Additional studies also highlighted the importance of characteristics such as autonomy, 
self-care, self-mastery, and self-efficacy in the person’s ability to transform the self and 
adapt to ESRD and dialysis. For example, a more recent study by Curtin, Johnson & 
Schatell (2004) illustrated how the ability to maintain autonomy and control enabled 
some individuals to adapt to ESRD. In particular, the study sought to identify the 
domains and dimensions of self-management experienced by a group of eighteen people 
on peritoneal dialysis in the USA. Like the previous study by Curtin et al (2002), 
Curtin, Johnson & Schatell used an exploratory-descriptive research approach but did 
not address specific methodological considerations regarding this approach. Semi-
structured interviews were carried out with ten male and eight female participants 
followed by qualitative content analysis.  
 
The participants in the study were engaged in the self-management of their illness and 
treatment. According to the researchers, self-management in the study was composed of 
two domains. The first domain included the issue of autonomy and control in 
healthcare, while the second domain was related to the participants’ need for normality 
in their lives.  
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All of the participants in the study talked about the significance of autonomy in their 
ability to manage their own treatment. There were three features of the participants’ 
perception of autonomy: (1) Being an active collaborator in decision-making regarding 
their treatment and care, (2) Being able to manage the treatment independently, and (3) 
Maintaining self-efficacy (Curtin, Johnson & Schatell, 2004).  
 
All of the participants described their efforts to maintain autonomy by becoming active 
partners in their health care. They emphasised the importance of being fully involved in 
the decision-making component of their care. The self-care required for the peritoneal 
dialysis treatment regime meant the participants implemented many decisions in 
relation to their own care. The participants described how they managed the treatment 
independently on a daily basis. Although the dialysis regime was complex and highly 
technical, it was deemed a normal part of everyday life to the participants. They 
independently managed the continuous process of “connections” and “disconnections” 
required during peritoneal dialysis. They also cared for their peritoneal catheter sites, 
recognised and prevented complications, and managed their dietary and fluid 
restrictions (Curtin, Johnson & Schatell, 2004).  
 
Fifteen of the eighteen participants in the study spoke of self-efficacy. To reiterate, self-
efficacy referred to the individual’s belief as to whether they were able to carry out the 
necessary behaviours to manage the illness and/or treatment independently (Bandura, 
1997). The participants in the study possessed positive self-beliefs and performance 
skills. They were confident about the behaviours that led to positive health outcomes, 
and were also confident in their ability to carry them out (Curtin, Johnson & Schatell, 
2004).   
  
The quest for a normal life was also very important to the participants in the study. They 
pushed themselves to incorporate the disease and treatment into their everyday lives, 
and achieve a new sense of normality. This process was constituted by three 
components: (1) the achievement and maintenance of flexibility and freedom, (2) 
perceptions of body image, and (3) interpretations regarding the severity of their illness. 
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All the participants in the study described the freedom, the mobility, and normality that 
peritoneal dialysis offered them. The flexibility of the treatment regime enabled them to 
adjust their dialysis schedule to fit their work and social lives. Consequently, the 
participants were able to maintain their normal roles and responsibilities in everyday life 
(Curtin, Johnson & Schatell, 2004).  
 
The participants were very concerned about the changes in their bodies. They 
mentioned issues such as the appearance of the dialysis catheter, an excessively swollen 
abdomen, and weight gain. Despite the loss of confidence incurred by these changes, the 
participants had been able to confront, and move beyond their body image concerns. 
They simply decided that their altered body image was not going to interfere with their 
lifestyle.  
 
According to Curtin, Johnson & Schatell (2004), the participants seemed to have 
experienced minimal intrusions in their lifestyle. Therefore, they interpreted their illness 
quite positively, and appeared to be living full and productive lives around the 
treatment. Indeed, some described dialysis quite casually as “something I have to do, 
like brushing my teeth”, or “an inconvenience” (p621). The participants’ interpretation 
of ESRD and peritoneal dialysis differed considerably from the experiences of the 
participants on haemodialysis therapy in the previous qualitative study by Curtin et al 
(2002).  
 
In particular, the participants on haemodialysis therapy spoke frequently of the regular 
setbacks, acute episodes, and complications associated with haemodialysis therapy. 
Therefore, although these participants also managed their illness and treatment 
successfully, they definitely considered themselves as having a serious chronic illness.  
In contrast, the participants on peritoneal dialysis did not see sickness as an integral part 
of their identity. They did not report the frequent setbacks and complications of ESRD 
and dialysis. Indeed, the only participants on peritoneal dialysis who described 
themselves as being sick actually were sick with a complication or co-morbid illness 
episode.  
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Similarly, the participants on peritoneal dialysis did not feel at particular risk of 
impending death. These findings were also in sharp contrast with the participants’ 
descriptions of haemodialysis therapy in the previous study by Curtin et al (2002). The 
participants in this study reported that the uncertainty of ESRD and haemodialysis 
therapy meant that the spectre of death was continuously hanging over them (Curtin et 
al., 2002).  
 
It appeared that through hope, optimism, and a positive outlook, the participants on 
peritoneal dialysis were able to balance the need for autonomy and control against the 
uncertainties inherent in ESRD. This accomplishment contributed to their ability to 
achieve self-management and preserve many elements of a normal life in spite of 
chronic illness (Curtin, Johnson & Schatell, 2004).   
 
In addition to the studies discussed above, many other studies have highlighted the 
significance of maintaining autonomy, control, self-management, independence, and 
normality in the adjustment to ESRD and dialysis therapy (Hagren et al., 2001; King et 
al., 2002; Curtin, Johnson & Schatell, 2004; Giles, 2005; Ravenscroft, 2005; Polaschek, 
2007). Agich (2003) contended that the understanding of autonomy in the Western 
world assumed that independence, self-sufficiency, self-control, and non-interference 
were important characteristics for the individual. However, because this view of 
autonomy placed such emphasis on independence, any degree of dependence was 
viewed as a deficiency on the part of the individual (Agich, 2003). Various authors 
conveyed how the person’s forced dependence on dialysis for survival undermined 
his/her capacity to achieve a sense of personal autonomy.  
 
2.6.5.1 The Paradox of Autonomy  
 
Some of the diabetic patients in the study by Paterson et al (1999) claimed that there 
was a downside to the transformation process. These individuals experienced a tension 
between the need to be autonomous, while simultaneously feeling alone and solely 
responsible for the self-care of their illness. The determination to maintain the 
transformed self was sometimes a source of interpersonal conflict. This was particularly 
evident when the healthcare team ignored their needs and wishes. On these occasions, 
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the participants were confronted with the paradox of autonomy and dependence that was 
inherent in the process of transformation. 
 
The accounts of the participants in the study by Polaschek (2000) also illustrated a 
complex interrelationship between autonomy and dependence. The participants were 
competently managing their haemodialysis treatments at home. Indeed, they felt that the 
self-management of their treatment allowed them to maintain a more normal life than 
people on hospital-based haemodialysis therapy. For example, they did not have to 
waste time travelling to and from the hospital for dialysis, or have to wait for a machine 
to become available before treatment began (Polaschek, 2000).  
 
However, there were other aspects to the participants’ lives, which repeatedly reminded 
them of their dependence on haemodialysis therapy. The unpleasant residual symptoms 
of ESRD, which arose when they needed dialysis, reinforced their dependence on the 
treatment. Although the participants had to be self-caring and autonomous in the 
management of their treatment regime, they knew the dialysis machine ultimately had 
control over them. To survive, they had to accept their dependence on the technology of 
dialysis. Furthermore, most of the men in the study were dependent on their wives or 
partners to assist them with the dialysis procedure. These aspects of haemodialysis 
therapy reinforced the altered interrelationship between autonomy and dependence that 
existed for the participants in the study (Polaschek, 2000). 
 
According to Polaschek (2000), the dominant discourse amongst healthcare 
professionals presumes that people on haemodialysis, and particularly those on home-
based therapies can manage their treatment autonomously. While most of the 
participants in the study affirmed their autonomous, self-management of the treatment 
regime, their dependence on medical technology always undermined their sense of 
autonomy.  
 
Correspondingly, the participants in the study by Hagren et al (2001) expressed the 
importance of being able to achieve a sense of personal autonomy in the management of 
ESRD and dialysis therapy. However, the participants’ dependence on the dialysis 
machine, and the healthcare providers undermined their sense of autonomy.  They 
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interpreted haemodialysis as a lifeline and were acutely aware that their lives depended 
on the treatment.  
 
The more recent study by Hagren et al (2005) subsequently highlighted the participants’ 
determination to manage their lives on haemodialysis therapy as autonomously as 
possible. However, the vulnerability experienced by the participants because of their 
dependence on both the healthcare providers and the dialysis machine, diminished their 
sense of autonomy.  
 
Similar findings were reported in a study by Giles (2005), which explored the life-world 
of three people on home-haemodialysis therapy. Like the previous study by Giles 
(2003), a psychological approach to phenomenology based on the work of Van Manen 
(1997) was employed. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with the participants 
and data were analysed using an approach by Van Manen (1997). The participants’ 
accounts conveyed a paradoxical struggle between dependence and autonomy.  
Although the participants performed the treatment independently at home, their 
dependence on the dialysis machine limited their capacity to act as wholly autonomous 
agents.  
 
2.7 SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This literature review highlighted that the person’s experience of ESRD on 
haemodialysis was predominantly based on an empirical psychological framework.  
This research largely relied on quantitative approaches to measure and quantify various 
elements of the person’s experience using questionnaires. Most of these questionnaires 
adapted a structured and closed-ended approach, which limited the responses of the 
participants. As a result, an in-depth, detailed account of the person’s experience was 
not achieved.  
 
While there were a number of qualitative research studies, which explored the 
individual’s experience of ESRD, these studies were also primarily grounded within a 
psychological framework. Hence, they adapted psychological concepts and theories to 
explore the person’s subjective experience of ESRD and dialysis. Nonetheless, this 
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literature provided some interesting and insightful contextual information on the 
person’s experience of ESRD.   
 
For instance, the literature emphasised suffering as a predominant issue within the 
subjective experience of chronic illness. There were various factors associated with 
suffering, represented in the literature related to the person’s experience of ESRD. The 
distressing physiological symptoms, and the losses and lifestyle disruptions incurred by 
the disease, were described as a profound source of suffering. For some individuals, the 
combined impact of these issues culminated in a loss of self. The loss of self was also 
identified as a fundamental source of suffering, which initiated distressing emotional 
responses within the individual.  
 
In particular, the distressing emotions of uncertainty and anxiety were most prevalent in 
the existing qualitative literature related to the person’s experience of ESRD and 
dialysis therapy.  It seemed that many individuals used strategies to suppress their 
uncertainty and anxiety, in an effort to prevent themselves being overwhelmed by these 
distressing responses. Consequently, they experienced a dynamic movement between 
the release and suppression of anxiety and uncertainty.  
 
These oscillatory characteristics mirrored certain features of the model of suffering, 
advanced by Morse (2001). According to Morse (2001), people moved back and forth 
between the suppression and release of distressing emotional responses, until they were 
ready to accept their loss, and progress out of suffering. The experience of hope played 
a specifically important role in this progression, as it enabled the person to move 
beyond suffering and onto the reformulated self.  
 
The notion of reformulating the self was contained within the existing literature that 
pertained to the person’s experience of ESRD. However, it was more commonly 
conveyed as a process of transformation. Transformation was portrayed as an essential 
feature of adjustment or adaptation to ESRD and dialysis. It involved a process where 
the self was re-structured and re-defined. The process of transformation facilitated 
individuals to develop a new sense of normality.  
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As this brief summary of the literature review has illustrated, the qualitative literature 
provided more depth and detailed information about the person’s experience of ESRD 
and dialysis. In particular, the work of Morse and colleagues on the concept of suffering 
provided a useful framework to describe the findings of this literature. However, it is 
important to note that this research primarily originated from a psychological 
perspective, where the predominant focus was on the person’s subjective or cognitive 
experience of illness.  
 
2.8 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY 
 
Like the existing quantitative literature, the Cartesian dualistic world-view of the person 
was entrenched within the qualitative research related to the person’s experience of 
ESRD and dialysis. In other words, the emphasis on the perspective of the self as 
“subject” and the world as “object” formed its basis. As a result of this Cartesian view 
of the self, the existing qualitative research tended to explore the person’s experience of 
illness in terms of psychologically or cognitively based concepts, theories, emotions and 
attributes. This does not suggest that there was anything inherently wrong with this 
research. Rather, it is proposed that this research predominantly understood and 
interpreted the self cognitively or psychologically as subject.  
 
By repeatedly interpreting the self in this manner, it is suggested that this research may 
have effectively concealed, or covered over other equally valuable interpretations of the 
person and his/her experience of ESRD and dialysis.  Therefore, there is a need to 
provide an alternative approach to explore the person’s experience, which would 
overcome the subject/object dichotomy retained in the existing literature.  
 
In an effort to overcome this Cartesian dualistic perspective, this research study 
proposes an alternative way to explore the person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis. In 
particular, it is suggested that the use of a hermeneutical phenomenological 
methodology, based on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger will provide this alternative 
perspective.   
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Heidegger’s radical philosophy moves away from the dualistic thinking of Descartes, 
and offers a radicalised approach to understanding the human, as being-in-the-world. 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the human being challenges the psychological view of the 
self that we have adapted from Descartes (Aho, 2007).  Heidegger suggests that the 
human being does not merely consist of a material body (object) separated from an 
immaterial mind (subject). Rather, from Heidegger’s (1962) point of view, the self 
cannot be properly understood in terms of its objective properties, but in terms of what 
it does, “proximally and for the most part-in its average everydayness” (p16). 
Consequently, Aho (2007) insists that Heidegger’s philosophy illustrates how 
psychology continues to “misinterpret the self as either a masterful, subjective 
consciousness or a quantifiable, causally determined object” (p37). 
 
According to Heidegger, the world is not a container filled with objects, which is cut off 
and separated from the self. Rather the self is embedded within the meaningful nexus of 
social relations, which constitute the world (Aho, 2007). As Heidegger (1982) points 
out:  
Self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein. Self and 
world are not two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but 
self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the 
unity of the structure of being-in-the-world (p318) 
 
This phenomenological perspective of the self challenges the philosophical assumptions 
of the Cartesian world-view and provides an alternative way to interpret what it means 
to be a human being. Indeed, Benner (1994) suggests that it was Heidegger’s shift from 
considering problems of epistemology (the study of the nature of knowledge) to 
considering the problem of ontology (the study of what it means to be a human being) 
that radically altered modern debates on the nature of science and of knowledge. The 
author continues to suggest that nursing could benefit from considering the ontological 
question of what it is to be a person, prior to considering the epistemological questions, 
which tend to feature in much of the nursing literature.   
 
Therefore, the methodology selected to achieve the aim and objectives of this study is 
hermeneutical phenomenology. In particular, the methodology is predominantly 
informed by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. It is proposed that this methodology 
provides an alternative approach to explore the experience of the person with ESRD on 
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haemodialysis therapy than is currently provided in the existing literature.  However, 
Leonard (1994) contends that it is critical to consider the Heideggerian notion of the 
person prior to considering any notions of hermeneutical phenomenology as a research 
methodology.   
 
In particular, the notion of time or temporality forms the basis of Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the human being. While a small number of studies have used a 
Heideggerian phenomenological approach to explore the person’s experience of ESRD 
(Rittman et al., 1993; Sloan, 1996; Sloan, 2002), these studies do not accentuate 
Heidegger’s perspective of time. Conversely, Heidegger’s (1962) analysis of time 
specifically provides the philosophical perspective for this hermeneutical 
phenomenological study into the experience of the person with ESRD on haemodialysis 
therapy. This philosophical perspective also provides the background to the sampling 
strategy, techniques for data collection and analysis, and the interpretation and 
discussion of the findings.  These issues will be discussed in detail in the upcoming 
research methodology chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The methodology employed within this study is hermeneutical phenomenology. This 
chapter provides a detailed discussion of all aspects of the research methodology. It 
explains the objectives of the study, the philosophical perspective of the study, the 
sample and setting, the methods of data collection and analysis, the strategies to ensure 
the rigor of the study, and ethical issues.  
 
3.1 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The overall aim of this study was to provide an accurate, detailed, and in-depth 
description of the person’s experience of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy. The specific 
objectives of the study were to explore the experiences of ESRD and haemodialysis 
therapy in a sample of adult renal patients who:    
I. Were at various stages of the lifecycle.  
II. Had been on haemodialysis therapy for various lengths of time. 
III. Were on the waiting list for a kidney transplant.  
IV. Were not on the waiting list for a kidney transplant.  
V. Had previously received a kidney transplant. 
VI. Had not previously received a kidney transplant.   
 
3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE STUDY  
 
The approach to hermeneutical phenomenology in the study is specifically informed by 
the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Although Edmund Husserl (1859-
1938) founded the phenomenological movement, his approach to phenomenology is 
different to that of Heidegger. Therefore, I will begin by outlining some aspects of 
phenomenology from Husserl’s perspective in an effort to highlight these differences.   
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Through phenomenology, Husserl sets out to advance the philosophy of the time, which 
was founded on the tradition of Descartes.14 Husserl challenges the Cartesian dualistic 
perspective with his approach to phenomenology. Husserl views philosophy as a 
rigorous science, which is specifically related to consciousness (Johnson, 2000; 
Crowell, 2005). Therefore, his approach to phenomenology involves an investigation 
into consciousness.  
 
According to Husserl, we are conscious beings who always inhabit an experiential 
world, which he calls the “life-world” (Lebenswelt) (Moran, 2000, 2005). The life-
world provides the foundation for all our everyday living and activities (Moran, 2000, 
2005). It is always already there, and all our experience takes place within its horizon 
(Moran, 2000, 2005). From Husserl’s perspective, consciousness plays a primary role in 
displaying the life-world of the individual (Moran, 2000, 2005).  Husserl wants to bring 
to light our experiences of the life-world, or our lived experiences as they appear 
through the ultimate structures or “essences” of consciousness (Koch, 1995). He 
believes that this is achieved through intentionality. Consequently, Moran (2005) 
implies that for Husserl, intentionality is “the fundamental characteristic of conscious, 
mental, or psychic life” (p54). It provides the backdrop to his work on phenomenology. 
 
Intentionality in phenomenology does not mean the purpose we have in mind when we 
act (e.g. I intend to go shopping). Intentionality applies primarily to the theory of 
knowledge (epistemology) and is not related to practical activity (Sokolowski, 2000). 
Intentionality implies that all consciousness is consciousness “of” something, or an 
experience “of” something (Sokolowski, 2000). In other words, any act of 
consciousness is directed toward an object of some kind. Husserl uses the term noema 
to describe the objects in the world, which are intended (e.g. an object, a person), and 
the term noesis to describe the intentional or cognitive acts by which we intend things 
(e.g. perception, imagination) (Sokolowski, 2000). Intentionality provides a channel 
between consciousness and the objects in the world. In this way, Husserl believes that 
his notion of intentionality overcomes the subject-object dichotomy inherent in the 
Cartesian philosophy.  
 
                                                 
14 See pages 18-19 for the previous discussion on Descartes and Cartesian dualism.  
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To discover consciousness, one must adopt a phenomenological attitude, which Husserl 
describes as phenomenological reduction (Sokolowski, 2000). In order to achieve this 
reduction and reach the essence or ultimate structures of pure consciousness, we must 
suspend our intentionalities (Sokolowski, 2000).  This requires us to suspend our beliefs 
or bracket out the world and all the things in it (Sokolowski, 2000). This includes the 
world as perceived by the individual in everyday life, and as interpreted by philosophers 
and scientists (Koch, 1995). Once we have successfully performed this process of 
suspension or phenomenological reduction, we will discover and be able to describe the 
essence of consciousness. The notion of phenomenological reduction or bracketing is 
embedded within the research, which explores the person’s experience of ESRD using a 
Husserlian or psychological approach to phenomenology (White & Grenyer, 1999; King 
et al., 2002; Giles, 2003; Heiwe, Clyne & Dahlgren, 2003). 
 
However, Heidegger (1962) disagrees that Husserl’s approach to phenomenology 
overcomes the dualistic thinking of Descartes. Instead, Heidegger signifies that the 
problem with Husserl’s phenomenology is that it is embedded in the Cartesian tradition 
(Crowell, 2005).  This is signified when Husserl makes consciousness the prominent 
focus of his work (Crowell, 2005). By making lived experience an “inner” or 
“subjective” event based on the psychological subject, Heidegger believes that Husserl 
has not effectively advanced the Cartesian thinking of the time. Rather the Cartesian 
dichotomy is inherently retained within his work. Therefore, Heidegger (1962) sets 
about formulating an account of human life to overcome Husserl’s predominantly 
cognitive approach to the experiences of the human being. 
 
Unlike Husserl, Heidegger does not view the world as separate from the human being. 
Instead, Lafont (2005) contends that he considers it as a “holistically structured web of 
significance” in which human beings live (p266). Consequently, Heidegger (1962) uses 
the term Dasein, to describe a human being. Dasein means “to exist” or “to be there”. 
The use of this term reflects Heidegger’s perspective of the person as “being-in-the-
world” and dwelling in it.  By viewing the human being in this way, Heidegger 
disregards the subject/object dichotomy, which still prevails in Husserlian 
phenomenology. He also radically shifts the focus of the philosophy of the time from 
epistemology (study of the nature of knowledge) to ontology (the nature of being).  
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Heidegger (1962) believes that we are self-interpreting beings, and this interpretation is 
based on background understandings, which stem from our embeddedness in the world. 
Interpretation makes our understanding of the world explicit through language or 
discourse (Palmer, 1969). For this reason, Heidegger combines phenomenology with 
hermeneutics. Phenomenology is derived from the Greek words phainomenon, which 
means, “that which shows itself”, and logos, which means discourse or language 
(Moran, 2000). Hermeneutics is derived from the Greek word hermēneia. Hermēneia 
originated with the Greek god Hermes who translated what is beyond human 
understanding into messages humans can understand (Palmer, 1969). Therefore, 
hermeneutics is known as a process of understanding through interpretation.  
 
Historically, hermeneutics is described as the art or theory of interpretation of texts, and 
is prevalent in disciplines such as theology and law (Diekelmann, Allen & Tanner, 
1989). However, Heidegger uses hermeneutics as a way to uncover the structures of 
being. This move not only alters the existing approach to phenomenology, it also alters 
hermeneutics from the interpretation of texts to the interpretation of being (Palmer, 
1969).  Heidegger’s (1962) notion of time is central to his understanding of being, and 
is subsequently central to hermeneutic phenomenology. In the second Division of Being 
and Time (after section 64), Heidegger re-describes the fundamental structures of 
Dasein’s being in relation to time or temporality. The purpose of this analysis is to 
illuminate how being can only be understood in terms of time.  
 
As mentioned previously, a small number of studies explore the person’s experience of 
ESRD using a hermeneutical phenomenological approach based on the work of 
Heidegger (Rittman et al., 1993; Sloan, 1996; Sloan, 2002). However, these studies do 
not emphasise the temporal perspective, which forms the basis of Heidegger’s 
philosophy of the human being.  
 
Heidegger’s (1962) notion of time or temporality provides the philosophical perspective 
for this hermeneutical phenomenological study into the experience of the person with 
ESRD on haemodialysis therapy. Therefore, his perspective of time will now be 
discussed in detail.  
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3.2.1 HEIDEGGER’S PERSPECTIVE OF TIME  
 
According to Heidegger (1962), time does not signify our common understanding of 
time as objective or clock time. Instead, he uses the term ordinary time to describe the 
irreversible, infinite sequence of “nows”, which we understand as clock time. Heidegger 
(1982) indicates that our understanding of time as ordinary time emanates from the 
work of Aristotle.   
 
Aristotle provides both a theoretical and experiential account of time (Lear, 1988). From 
a theoretical perspective, Aristotle describes time as an objective entity, which is related 
to space. In other words, time is related to the measurement of change or motion 
(Adam, 2004). Thus, time is the irreversible, infinite succession of “nows” used to 
measure motion or change (Lear, 1988; Crocker, 1997). Therefore, in the Aristotelian 
notion of time, time flows through a sequence of “nows” from the future to the past 
(Heidegger, 1982). This sequence includes the “now” (present), the “not-yet-now” 
(future) and the “no-longer-now” (past) (Chanter, 2000). However, the present “now” is 
the most significant in this perspective of time, because this is the segment of time in 
which the change or motion occurs (Crocker, 1997).  
 
Aristotle’s description of time also refers to how time is experienced. He suggests that 
our ability to understand the objective nature of time is based on our apprehension or 
experience of it (Lear, 1988). Aristotle insists that only the soul can count, thus it is the 
soul, which experiences change (Lear, 1988; Adam, 2004). For Aristotle, the soul 
possesses conscious experience (Blackburn, 1994).15 Therefore, from Aristotle’s 
perspective, any account of the objective reality of time must include the influence of 
the soul (Lear, 1988). 
 
Subsequent philosophers critique Aristotle’s interpretation of time for giving 
precedence to the objective properties of time e.g. Husserl, Bergson. This objective 
perspective of time is embedded in the studies, which highlighted the time consuming 
nature of dialysis therapy, as a concern for patients with ESRD. Therefore, in an effort 
to overcome this shortcoming, these philosophers emphasise the need to give 
                                                 
15 However, modern philosophy of the mind dismantled this view and made it implausible to think in 
terms of the soul (Blackburn, 2004). 
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precedence to the conscious experience of time (Crocker, 1997). By doing this, they 
anticipate that the predominant understanding of time, as an objective entity related to 
space and motion is limited, thus allowing the conscious experience of time to be 
articulated in more detail.  
 
However, as Heidegger points out, this development in philosophical thinking creates a 
situation where time is understood on the basis of the subject’s conscious perception of 
time (Crocker, 1997). As a result, Heidegger insists this perspective of time is firmly 
grounded in Cartesian dualism. Moreover, the objective interpretation of time, which 
these philosophers are supposedly trying to overcome, is inherently contained within 
their descriptions of the conscious experience of time. This is clearly expressed in their 
predominant perspective of time as a linear, succession of “nows”, which are placed 
“alongside” each other, but not “connected” with one another (Crocker, 1997). From 
this perspective, the “now” (present), the “not-yet-now” (future), and the “no-longer-
now” (past) are separated by an interval (Chanter, 2000). 
 
According to Heidegger, the only way we can interpret time from this perspective is if 
we understand time to be inextricably linked with space i.e. the objective perspective of 
time, advanced by Aristotle.  Space enables us to place intervals between things and 
distinguish limits (Crocker, 1997). However, as Crocker points out: “Time properly 
conceived is duration. In duration, preceding and succeeding states are not separated 
from one another” (p408). 
 
This conscious or cognitive perception of time, to which Heidegger refers, is retained in 
the existing research related to the person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis therapy. 
This research highlights how the time-consuming nature of dialysis therapy causes the 
person to lose time when they attend the treatment (Kierans, 2005; Heiwe, Clyne & 
Dahlgren, 2003; Hagren et al., 2001, 2005; Polaschek, 2000). Indeed, the study by 
Kierans (2005) highlights how some people drive at high speeds to and from the 
dialysis unit in an effort to retrieve some additional hours and minutes. Within these 
studies, the time lost when the person attends dialysis therapy refers to the cognitive or 
conscious perception of time. This cognitive perspective of time is also embedded in the 
concept of enduring, advanced by Morse (2001). According to Morse (2001), when the 
person is enduring, s/he cognitively focuses on the present. By focusing on the present, 
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the past (i.e. cognitively remembered past) and future (cognitively imagined future) are 
blocked out.  
  
However, Heidegger emphasises that our predominantly cognitive interpretation of time 
emanates from a superficial interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of time. He 
indicates that the Aristotelian interpretation of time does signify a connection between 
the “now”, the “not-yet-now”, and the “no-longer-now”. However, this feature of 
Aristotle’s work has been missed in every subsequent account of time throughout the 
history of philosophy (Heidegger, 1962). As a result, these subsequent accounts of time 
fail to advance or develop Aristotle’s interpretation of time.  
 
For Aristotle, time is the measurement of motion, which is experienced with respect to 
“before” and “after” (Crocker, 1997). Aristotle uses the terms proteron and husteron to 
describe the before and after of motion (Crocker, 1997). However, these terms may also 
be translated as “earlier” or “later” (Crocker, 1997). According to Heidegger, earlier and 
later correspond to the objective, theoretical notion of time as an irreversible sequence 
of “nows”. They are temporal determinants, which describe linear points of time 
separated by intervals (Crocker, 1997). In contrast, Heidegger suggests that the terms 
“before” and “after” do not provide this perspective of time. Instead, the terms before 
and after signify that there is a connection between the sequence of “nows”.  It suggests 
that there is a nexus between the present (now), the past (no-longer-now), and the future 
(not-yet-now) (Crocker, 1997).  
 
Heidegger (1982) implies that every account of time since Aristotle, has interpreted the 
terms proteron and husteron to mean earlier and later. Hence, these accounts provide a 
theoretical, objective account of time in isolation of the experiential account of time, 
advanced by Aristotle. Heidegger insists that if we are to recognise the accuracy of the 
Aristotelian definition of time, we should interpret the terms proteron and husteron to 
mean both before and after, and earlier and later (Crocker, 1997). When we understand 
these terms in this way, we can see that time does not merely consist of an irreversible, 
infinite sequence of “nows”, nor does it consist of a separate past, present, and future. 
Instead, there is a connection between these dimensions of time.  
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Heidegger insists that by misinterpreting the ontological features, which existed in 
Aristotle’s account of time, subsequent philosophers describe only our consciousness of 
time (Crocker, 1997). The shortcoming of these thinkers is that they fail to see the 
relationship between being and time. By re-interpreting Aristotle’s account of time in 
this manner, Heidegger (1962) paves the way for his ontological account of time.  
 
According to Heidegger (1962) time is originary temporality, and is a basic structure of 
Dasein’s being. Therefore, in trying to understand being, we must acknowledge that it is 
inherently linked to originary temporality, as Heidegger (1962) points out: 
Thus the way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have 
their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, is what we shall 
call its “Temporal” determinateness. Thus the fundamental ontological 
task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the Temporality 
of Being. In the exposition of the problem of Temporality the question of 
the meaning of Being will first be concretely answered (p40). 
 
From Heidegger’s (1962) perspective, originary temporality forms the basis of all other 
modes of time. In particular, he distinguishes two additional modes of time called 
world-time and ordinary time. These two modes of time are a modified version of 
originary temporality (Heidegger, 1962; Blattner, 1999, 2005). This means that the 
conceptual features, which constitute originary temporality, determine the features that 
make up world-time and ordinary time. The following discussion will provide a detailed 
description of the three modes of time, beginning with originary temporality.   
 
3.2.1.1 Originary Temporality 
 
Originary temporality consists of an ecstatic unity consisting of the future, past, and 
present.  Ekstases is the term used by Heidegger to describe how the temporal 
perspective of time stands out from the normal perspective of time, as objective or clock 
time (Gelven, 1989). He uses this term to signify, that from a temporal perspective, the 
present incorporates the past, and the future (Dostal, 1993). 
 
Heidegger (1962) says that Dasein’s being consists of three elements: existence, 
facticity, and falling. These three elements together are called the care-structure and 
each of the elements is grounded in an ecstases of originary temporality (Blattner, 1999, 
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2005). Therefore, existence, facticity, and falling, are grounded in the future, past, and 
present respectively. Heidegger (1962) implies that the care-structure of Dasein needs to 
be disclosed in an effort to understand being. Disclosedness means to allow the care-
structure to be seen, or make it manifest (Blattner, 1999, 2005). Heidegger identifies 
four constituent elements of disclosedness including understanding, affectedness, 
falleness, and discourse (Blattner, 1999, 2005). The three ecstases of originary 
temporality will now be discussed in relation to the three elements of the care-structure 
and three elements of disclosedness. Discourse discloses the temporally situated care-
structure of Dasein’s being through language. Consequently, this constituent element of 
disclosedness will be addressed separately after the following discussion on time.  
 
3.2.1.1.1 The Originary Future    
 
Existence is grounded in the originary future and is disclosed through understanding. 
Understanding is the ability to grasp one’s possibilities for being, within the context of 
his/her world (Palmer, 1969). Dasein understands itself by pressing ahead or projecting 
itself forward into some way of life, or some possibility of being (Gelven, 1989; 
Mulhall, 1996; Blattner, 1999). As Heidegger (1962) conveys: “understanding projects 
the being of Dasein…Dasein understands itself - it always has and always will - in 
terms of possibilities” (p145) 
 
This projection or “pressing-ahead” exemplifies that understanding is related to the 
future. However, the future from Heidegger’s (1962) perspective does not correspond 
with the ordinary conception of the future in terms of a sequence of “nows”. It does not 
signify a “not yet now-but later” (Heidegger, 1962; p375). Rather, Dasein is futural in 
that it understands itself by projecting itself forward into some way of life, or some 
possibility of being (Palmer, 1969).  
 
This way to be Dasein is not something that will come later and thus belongs to the 
future (Mulhall, 1996; Blattner, 2005). My possibilities are not something that can 
become an end-state, but instead are something, which I continuously go towards. For 
example, if I understand myself as a nurse, I will project myself forward in a nurse’s 
way of life. Hence, understanding myself as a nurse does not end when I complete the 
programme of training to become a nurse. Being a nurse is something I continuously 
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cast myself as, it is always futural in terms of what I am doing now.  Heidegger (1962) 
states: 
By the term ‘futural’, we do not here have in view a “now” which has 
not yet become ‘actual’ and which sometime will be for the first time. 
We have in view the coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself (p373). 
 
From this perspective, my future possibilities are more extensive than the goals I can 
achieve in the future. What I can “be” in the future is something which will never be 
complete, and is therefore something that I continuously cast myself toward (Blattner, 
1992). Therefore, Dasein is never ultimately finished, because there are always 
possibilities, always a “not-yet” that shows up as mattering (Blattner, 1992). This gives 
it a sense of purpose and anticipation.  
 
According to Palmer (1969), the projection associated with understanding must have a 
base. Therefore, understanding is always related to facticity.   
 
3.2.1.1.2 The Originary Past 
 
Facticity is grounded in Dasein’s originary past. Heidegger (1962) describes facticity as 
the basis (Grund) of existence. By factical existence, he means the worldly involvement 
of the human being in the world. For Heidegger, the world is the significant set of 
relationships, practices, and language that we have by virtue of being born into a 
particular culture (Leonard, 1994). He uses the term throwness, to express a feature of 
factical existence, which implies that Dasein is always already in a situation. Thus, 
throwness signifies that we are cast into certain circumstances, and subsequently live 
out our possibilities in life in terms of this throwness (Wrathall, 2006).  Throwness 
provides the basis or the ground for our projected possibilities (Blattner, 1999). 
Heidegger’s (1962) notion of throwness is based on the conceptions of affectedness and 
attunedness.  
 
Affectedness (Befindlichkeit) discloses Dasein in its throwness. Affectedness can be 
described as the way things show up as mattering to us, or the way we are affected by 
things. Affectedness is based on the interpretation of moods (Stimmung) (Dreyfus, 
1991). Attunedness is the term used by Heidegger to describe the interpretation of 
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moods (Dreyfus, 1991). Our attunedness highlights the different ways that things show 
up as mattering to us (Heidegger, 1962). These attunements are not past events but 
instead belong to the past ekstases of originary temporality, which Heidegger describes 
as beeness (Gewesenheit). Heidegger uses the term beeness to highlight that the past, 
experienced as the historicity of Dasein, is not bygone (Inwood, 1997). It is something I 
can return to again and again-it is a living past.  Heidegger (1962) claims that “as long 
as Dasein factically exists, it is never past [vergangen], but it always is indeed as 
already having been, in the sense of the ‘I am-as-having-been’ ” (p376). 
 
In other words, Dasein is historical because it is thrown into the world and has acquired 
an understanding of being from its past tradition. Because Dasein is thrown into the 
world, being-with-others is an essential structure of its existence. Dasein is thrown into 
the world along with others. Therefore, being in the world is social in nature 
(Heidegger, 1962).  
 
This temporal account of the past as having-been is different from the ordinary 
perspective of the past as a pure “now”, which has passed away to become a “no-longer-
now”. Dasein’s possibilities matter to it because of its affectedness and attunements 
from the past. The past sets up the possibilities for Dasein’s future existence. For 
example, if I am attuned to caring or if caring matters to me, I may become a nurse. 
That is, I press ahead into being a nurse because it is important to me. If this possibility 
did not matter to me, I would not pursue it. In fact, it is because these possibilities 
matter to me that I act in a specific way in the originary present.   
 
3.2.1.1.3 The Originary Present 
 
The present ecstases of originary temporality is significant in relation to being because 
Dasein performs every action in the present “in-order-to” project forward into some 
goal or possibility in the future. As Heidegger (1962) points out, “The horizonal schema 
for the Present is defined by the ‘in-order-to’ ” (p416). Blattner (1992) suggests that it 
is the present, which highlights the spannedness of originary temporality, described by 
Heidegger. We act in the present, based on our attunements from the past, to project 
forward into possibilities in the originary future (Blattner, 1992). Consequently, 
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temporality is not three separate dimensions of time, rather it is a unified whole, with a 
projective or purposeful character based on the originary future (Blattner, 1992). 
 
According to Heidegger (1962), our ordinary life causes us to fall away or become 
submerged in forms of complacency and everydayness. Therefore, the everyday manner 
in which we live is characterised by falling (Verfallen) (Moran, 2000). Falling consists 
of our everyday tasks, activities and involvements in the world. In falling, we merely 
pass information along and allow ourselves to be absorbed in idle talk and gossip. We 
are simply the same as everybody else; we are in the state of “Das Man” (Heidegger, 
1962).   
 
Falling is grounded in the present ecstases of originary temporality (Dostal, 1993; 
Blattner, 1999, 2005). Therefore, Heidegger (1962) describes the originary present as 
world-time because falling refers to Dasein’s everyday involvements in the world.  
World-time originates out of the originary present, and subsequently retains some of the 
conceptual features of originary temporality (Blattner, 2005).  
 
3.2.1.2 World-Time 
 
World-time is the second mode of time described by Heidegger (Blattner, 2005). It is 
the irreversible sequence of times called “nows”, where the present is the “now”, the 
past is the “no-longer-now” and the future is the “not-yet-now”. The term world-time is 
used to describe this mode of time because it is the time that relates to falling. 
Therefore, world-time is Dasein’s qualitative experience of time in its everyday 
involvements in the world (Blattner, 2005). In particular, it is the time that contains the 
everyday activities performed by Dasein.  
 
As previously mentioned, world-time is constituted by the present ecstases of originary 
temporality. Therefore, the structure of world-time originates out of, and is 
simultaneously embedded within originary temporality through the originary present 
(Heidegger, 1962; Blattner, 2005).  Indeed, Blattner (2005, p319)  describes world-time 
as a “levelled-off” or “thinned out” version of originary temporality. This means that 
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world-time is part of the unified structure of originary temporality, and subsequently 
forms the basis for the care-structure of Dasein’s being.  
 
Like originary temporality, the world-time “now” (present) also consists of a past (no-
longer-now) and a future (not-yet-now). However, the past, present, and future of 
world-time, relate specifically to Dasein’s use of equipment and tools in its everyday 
involvement with the world. Heidegger (1962) describes Dasein’s practical use of tools 
and equipment in its everyday tasks, as the temporality of circumspective concern. He 
states that the temporality of circumspective concern is grounded or embedded in world-
time. Moreover, certain characteristics of world-time are indirectly derived from 
originary temporality, by way of the temporality of circumspective concern (Blattner, 
1999).  
 
Heidegger (1962) indicates that it is our ability to project into the originary future, 
which structures the temporality of circumspective concern.  Therefore, the projective 
character of the future of originary temporality provides the basis for the everyday 
activities and tasks performed in world-time by Dasein. In other words, we engage with 
tools and equipment in the temporality of circumspective concern “in-order-to” project 
forward into goals and possibilities in the originary future.  
 
Remember that in originary temporality, every action is performed in the present “in-
order-to” project forward into some possibility in the future. Therefore, the projective 
character of the future of originary temporality provides the projective character for the 
temporality of circumspective concern.    
 
There are two characteristics of the temporality of circumspective concern called 
awaiting and retaining (Heidegger, 1962). Through world-time, these characteristics 
constitute the actual activity of the originary present (Gelven, 1989). Therefore, the 
projection of originary temporality is preserved in these characteristics. Awaiting refers 
to the way Dasein looks forward or anticipates the completion of the task. Heidegger 
(1962) indicates that when Dasein uses equipment or tools, it awaits or expects the 
completion of the task. Retaining refers to Dasein’s manipulation of the tools and 
equipment in the completion of the task (Blattner, 1992). Dasein retains a background 
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of practical experience, which informs its use of equipment and tools (Gelven, 1989). 
Heidegger calls this background experience the wherewithal.  
 
Therefore, when confronted with a task, Dasein retains the wherewithal or background 
experience to complete the task.  By retaining or relying on this wherewithal, Dasein is 
able to select and use the most appropriate tools and equipment to get the task done. The 
temporality of circumspective concern involves Dasein both awaiting the completion of 
the task, and retaining the wherewithal required to complete the task. It is the feature of 
world-time, which constitutes the actual activity of the originary present (Gelven, 
1989). 
 
As previously mentioned, it is the projective character of the originary future, which 
structures the temporality of circumspective concern (Blattner, 1999). However, this 
feature only becomes apparent when the tools or equipment we use in our everyday 
tasks break down. The tools and equipment, which Dasein uses to perform everyday 
tasks becomes inconspicuous (Palmer, 1969). These objects are so taken-for-granted by 
Dasein that they take on a bodily presence (Blattner, 2005). Heidegger (1962) uses the 
term readiness-to-hand or availableness to describe the smooth and transparent 
functioning of the equipment and tools, which Dasein uses in its everyday practical 
activities. Indeed, he indicates that it is only when the equipment cannot function as 
ready-to-hand, such as in breakdown, that these tools/equipment become visible.  
 
At the point of breakdown, the significance of the tool or piece of equipment is 
highlighted (Palmer, 1969). In other words, the tool/ equipment is viewed as something 
to be wielded “in-order-to” bring some goal to realisation in the future (Mulhall, 1996; 
Blattner, 2005). Thus, it is only when some breakdown in the equipment or tools occur 
that the existential significance of the temporality of circumspective concern is 
highlighted (Mulhall, 1996; Blattner, 2005). In breakdown, the “in-order-to” function of 
the tool or piece of equipment is revealed.  
 
It is the purposeful character of the temporality of circumspective concern, which gives 
world-time its sequential and irreversible characteristics. World-time is sequential and 
irreversible because the future has priority in originary temporality (Blattner, 2005). 
Dasein’s continual progression in one direction toward the future creates a string or 
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sequence of tasks, with each task leading to a subsequent task (Blattner, 2005). 
Therefore, world time is irreversible and sequential because it structures Dasein’s use of 
the equipment and tools in its everyday practical activities.   
 
The above discussion highlights that world-time is derived indirectly from originary 
temporality, via the temporality of circumspective concern. However, there are specific 
features of world time itself, which depend explanatorily upon originary temporality 
(Blattner, 1999). Heidegger (1962) identifies these four features as significance, 
datability, spannedness, and publicness. Each of these features can be seen as a 
modified version of some feature of originary temporality (Blattner, 2005). The 
following discussion will analyse the four features of world-time and their 
correspondence with originary temporality.  
 
3.2.1.2.1 Significance 
 
According to Heidegger, world-time is significant because the “now” is always 
understood by Dasein as either the right time or wrong time to do certain things 
(Blattner, 1999, 2005). Therefore, the “nows” of world-time are significant because they 
are either appropriate or inappropriate for certain activities. The significance of world-
time is always based on the future of originary temporality. I perform certain tasks in 
world-time “in-order-to” project forward into possibilities in the future. Therefore, it is 
ultimately these possibilities that determine whether it is the right or wrong time to 
perform certain activities.  
 
3.2.1.2.2 Datability 
 
Datability implies that the experience of time is dated by events. Therefore, Dasein’s 
experience of the “now” of world-time is experienced as a time when a significant event 
occurs e.g. dinnertime, time to read, time to use the computer (Blattner, 1999). This 
perspective of time is different to our view of time as an objective, linear succession of 
empty “nows”. World-time does not refer to the clock time of seconds, minutes or 
hours. Instead, world-time relates to Dasein’s everyday engagement in the world. It 
refers to times, which have a qualitative content i.e. as times when something 
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significant happens (Blattner, 2005). Dasein dates events in its everyday involvement in 
the world because the events have significance (Blattner, 2005). As mentioned above, 
this significance is based on the purposeful character of the originary future.   
 
3.2.1.2.3 Spannedness 
 
World-time is spanned because it is embedded in the originary present (Gelven, 1989; 
Blattner, 1999). The originary present spans from the originary future to the originary 
past. Therefore, this spannedness is retained in world-time. The spannedness of world-
time is illuminated in the temporality of circumspective concern. Remember in the 
temporality of circumspective concern, Dasein performs tasks in the “now”, by 
retaining the necessary background experience (wherewithal), and awaiting the 
completion of the task. Therefore, the “now” of world-time extends or spans from the 
“not-yet-now” to the “no-longer-now”. As a result of the spannedness of world-time, 
every “now” lasts for a while (Blattner, 1999, 2005). For example, the “now” while I 
type on my computer lasts from a before, when I was walking to the computer, to an 
after, when I go to lunch.   
 
3.2.1.2.4 Publicness 
 
The “now” of world-time is public. This means that we collectively understand what 
“now” means (Blattner, 1999, 2005). The publicness of the “now” of world-time 
ensures that we are able to collectively coordinate our tasks, activities, and practices on 
a daily basis (Blattner, 1999, 2005). The coordination of activities through the 
publicness of world-time ensures that a breakdown in activities is for the most part 
avoided. Consequently, this enables society to function smoothly and cohesively 
(Blattner, 1999, 2005). 
 
According to Heidegger (1962), world-time is public because originary temporality is 
public. Because Dasein is thrown into the world, being-with-others is an essential 
structure of its existence. As originary temporality forms the basis of Dasein’s 
existence, then being-with-others is also a feature of originary temporality. As 
Heidegger (1962) states: 
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The ‘now’ which anyone expresses is always said in the publicness of 
Being-in-the-world with one another. Thus the time which any Dasein 
has currently interpreted and expressed has as such already been given a 
public character on the basis of that Dasein’s ecstatical Being-in-the-
world  (p463-464). 
  
Heidegger continues to suggest that all of the projects, which Dasein aims to realise in 
the originary future stem from it being part of a social world (Blattner, 1999, 2005). 
Therefore, world-time is public because Dasein’s activities are constituted by being-
with-one-another (Blattner, 1999, 2005).  
 
To summarise, world-time is the irreversible sequence of times called “nows”.  It is the 
time that relates to falling i.e. Dasein’s experience of time in its everyday involvements 
and activities in the world. Therefore, world-time originates out of the present ecstases 
of originary temporality, and subsequently retains some of its features. These features 
include significance, datability, spannedness, publicness, and sequentiality. Each of 
these features is a modified form of originary temporality (Blattner, 1999).  
 
In addition, world-time consists of Dasein’s use of equipment and tools in its everyday 
involvement with the world. Heidegger (1962) describes this as the temporality of 
circumspective concern. The temporality of circumspective concern has a purposeful or 
teleological character, which it derives through world-time, from the originary future. 
This purposeful character of the temporality of circumspective concern provides world-
time with its sequential and irreversible flow.  
 
3.2.1.3 Ordinary Time  
 
According to Heidegger (1962), ordinary time is the infinite, irreversible succession of 
“nows”, which we associate with clock time. It is viewed as the pure container of events 
and the medium in which change occurs (Blattner, 2005).  Unlike world-time, ordinary 
time is deemed independent from human’s involvement in the world (Blattner, 2005). 
Therefore, the “nows” of ordinary time are empty and do not relate to Dasein’s 
everyday activities and tasks.  
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In the ordinary interpretation of time as a sequence of “nows”, world-time is levelled 
off. The levelling off of world time means that the datability and significance of the 
“now” of world-time are covered over. Heidegger (1962) claims: 
In the ordinary interpretations of time as a sequence of “nows”, both 
datability and significance are missing. These two structures are not 
permitted to ‘come to the fore’ when time is characterized as a pure 
succession. The ordinary interpretation of time covers them up. When 
these are covered up, the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality, 
in which the datability and the significance of the “now” are grounded, 
gets levelled off. The “nows” get shorn of these relations, as it were; and, 
as thus shorn, they simply range themselves along after one other so as 
to make up a succession (p474). 
 
 
Without significance and datability, the “nows” lack the qualitative content, which is 
characteristic of world-time. Therefore, all we are left with is an infinite and irreversible 
sequence of empty “nows” (Blattner, 1999). Irreversibility and infiniteness are the 
conceptual features, which essentially constitute ordinary time.  
 
3.2.1.3.1 Irreversibility 
 
According to Heidegger, we can understand the irreversibility of ordinary time when we 
see it as a levelled off version of world-time (Blattner, 1999, 2005). The previous 
discussion on world-time, suggests that it is irreversible as a result of the purposeful 
character of the future of originary temporality. Hence, it is because of the irreversibility 
of world-time that ordinary time is irreversible. Blattner (1999) illustrates this stating, 
“the irreversibility of ordinary time is grounded in the irreversibility of world-time, 
which itself has to do with world-time’s contentful features and, in turn, arises from 
originary temporality” (p223). 
 
3.2.1.3.2 Infiniteness 
 
Heidegger (1962) suggests that when we perceive time from a theoretical and cognitive 
perspective, it is understood to be infinite. Heidegger (1962) uses the term present-at-
hand to describe the theoretical and cognitive way in which we sometimes understand 
being-in-the-world. His account of the present-at-hand theoretical mode of cognition 
can be applied to his discussion on ordinary time.  
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From Heidegger’s (1962) perspective, we can only perceive time as infinite, if we view 
it through the lens of the present-at-hand mode of cognition. By observing time from 
this objective, theoretical stance, the conceptual features, which constitute world-time, 
are concealed (Blattner, 2005). Instead, we focus on the endless sequence of “nows”, in 
isolation of Dasein’s practical everyday involvements in the world, as Heidegger (1962) 
suggests:  
The principal thesis of the ordinary way of interpreting time-namely, 
that time is ‘infinite’…This thesis becomes possible only on the basis of 
an orientation towards a free-floating “in-itself” of a course of “nows” 
which is present-at-hand-an orientation in which the full phenomenon of 
the “now” has been covered up to its datability, its worldhood, its 
spannedness, and its character of having a location of the same kind as 
Dasein’s, so that it has dwindled to an unrecognizable fragment (p476). 
 
Based on Heidegger’s (1962) account, world-time forms the basis of ordinary time. We 
do not normally understand ordinary or clock time as an abstract, isolated entity. 
Instead, we understand clock time in relation to the everyday activities we perform in 
world-time (Blattner, 1999, 2005). Therefore, Dasein uses clock time so it can fit a 
number of tasks into each day (Blattner, 1999, 2005). However, if we focus primarily 
on the endless sequence of ordinary time, we overlook the features of world-time, which 
provide its basis.  
 
When we understand ordinary time as a levelling-off of world-time, we can see that 
ordinary time also originates, through world-time, from originary temporality. Since 
originary temporality forms the basis of the care-structure of Dasein’s being, 
Heidegger’s thesis suggests that time ultimately depends upon human beings (Blattner, 
1999, 2005). Hence, without Dasein there would be no time.  
 
To summarise, originary temporality incorporates an ecstatic unity consisting of the 
future, past, and present. From this perspective, time is not merely the infinite, 
irreversible sequence of “nows”, which we associate with clock time. Instead, in 
originary temporality, the present incorporates the past, and the future (Dostal, 1993). 
According to Heidegger (1962), there are two additional modes of time, which originate 
from originary temporality called world-time and ordinary time. The explanation of 
world-time and ordinary time is dependent on originary temporality because these two 
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modes of time are derived from originary temporality (Blattner, 1999, 2005). Moreover, 
the conceptual features, which constitute originary temporality, determine the 
conceptual features, which make up world-time and ordinary time. Consequently, 
originary temporality forms the basis of the other two modes of time.  
 
According to Heidegger (1962), originary temporality is a basic structure of Dasein’s 
being, which he refers to as the “care-structure”. The care-structure consists of three 
elements known as existence, facticity, and falling. Each of these elements is grounded 
in an ecstases of originary temporality. The future corresponds with existence, the past 
corresponds with facticity, and the present corresponds with falling.  
 
The care-structure of Dasein’s being is disclosed through understanding, affectedness, 
falling, and discourse. Apart from discourse, each element of disclosedness has already 
been discussed. For instance, existence is disclosed through understanding, facticity is 
disclosed through affectedness, and falleness is disclosed through everydayness or 
falling. Discourse is the fourth, and final way in which the temporally embedded care-
structure of Dasein’s being is disclosed, and shall now be discussed.  
 
3.2.1.4 Discourse (Language) 
 
Discourse is the way Dasein discloses the whole of the care-structure through language. 
According to Palmer (1969) this represents the hermeneutical process because it is the 
process where being becomes thematised by language.  As mentioned already, 
understanding occurs within the interrelated formation of the care-structure, and it is 
based on originary temporality. It is this entire structure that provides the contextual 
basis for language, as well as the possibility that words can have significance for us at 
all (Palmer, 1969; Moran, 2000). However, it is through interpretation that our 
understanding is made explicit through language. 
 
As a result of the contextual basis of discourse or language, when we see something, we 
interpret is “as” this or “as” that, based on this background understanding. Therefore, 
interpretation renders explicit the word “as” because prior to every statement that I 
make about an object, there is a foundation of understanding (Lafont, 2005). For 
 106
example, when we see a chair, we do not see it as a piece of wood, we see it “as” 
something to sit on, as something comfortable or uncomfortable.  
 
Heidegger (1962) describes this interpretation as the hermeneutical form of the word 
“as” and continues to differentiate between this, and what he terms the apophantic form 
of the word “as”. The apophantic “as” refers to the logical assertions and/or theoretical 
statements, used by science to describe the human being. Heidegger (1962) uses the 
example “the hammer is heavy” to illustrate what he means by the apophantic “as”. He 
says that the interpretation of the hammer “as” something with physical properties, such 
as heaviness, is indicative of science’s approach to interpreting things based on logical 
assertions and theoretical statements (Palmer, 1969). From this interpretation, the 
hammer is described as something with objective properties, which can be observed.  
 
According to Heidegger (1962), the “as” which interprets the hammer in an objective 
way, as something that can be weighed, measured, and categorised, is the apophantic 
“as”. However, he contests that this narrow interpretation of the hammer “as” object 
simultaneously conceals its function “as” a tool, which is used in our everyday 
involvements in the world.  
 
In contrast to the apophantic “as”, the hermeneutical “as” interprets the hammer as 
something, which is used in the tasks and activities we perform everyday in world-
time.16 We use these tools in world-time to perform tasks “in-order-to” project forward 
into possibilities in the originary future. However, when we interpret the hammer as 
merely an object i.e. in terms of the apophantic “as”, it is effectively severed from its 
temporal and existential context i.e. the hermeneutical “as” (Palmer, 1969). When we 
interpret the hammer in terms of the apophantic “as”, this lived, relational context is 
disconnected, and the hammer is presented as something to be observed in terms of 
theoretical characteristics and categories.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See page 97 for the previous discussion on world-time.  
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However, this detached perspective fails to acknowledge that the interpretation of the 
hammer in terms of the apophantic “as” is based on the hermeneutical “as” 
interpretation of the hammer (Palmer, 1969). In other words, our ability to assert that 
the hammer is too heavy is entirely based on our involved, engaged use of the hammer 
in everyday practices. It is only because we are unable to complete our tasks effectively 
that we interpret the hammer as being too heavy. At this point, the theoretical properties 
and characteristics of the hammer become evident. Otherwise, the hammer would not 
show up for us at all, because we would be using it in an absorbed, engaged manner.  
 
Similarly, it is only by ignoring the more original hermeneutical “as” that the human 
being can be understood and described in terms of mere theoretical categories and 
constructions (Palmer, 1969). From, Heidegger’s (1962) perspective, the apophantic 
“as” is based on the hermeneutical “as”. However, the scientific method, which values 
objectivity, gives primacy to interpretations of the human being, which are entirely 
based on the apophantic “as”.  
 
Heidegger (2001) continues to suggest that all of the variations of modern psychology 
are held beneath the approach of the scientific method. As a result, the psychological 
interpretation of human experience and emotional suffering is predominantly interpreted 
from the perspective of detached objectivity, using causal interactions, categories, and 
theoretical constructions (Heidegger, 2001). In other words, the psychological 
framework interprets human experience in terms of the apophantic “as”.  
 
If we recall, this was highlighted in the literature review on the person’s experience of 
ESRD and dialysis. The literature predominantly emanated from a psychological 
perspective, which used quantitative methodologies to examine the person’s experience 
in an objective manner. The findings of this research described the person’s experience 
in terms of predetermined characteristics, concepts, and theories. In addition, the 
qualitative literature was also grounded within this psychological framework and drew 
on psychological characteristics, concepts, and theories to explore the person’s 
experience of ESRD and dialysis.  
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The findings of this literature showed that the person’s experience of ESRD and dialysis 
is primarily interpreted in terms of the apophantic “as” rather than the hermeneutical 
“as”. However, as Heidegger (1962) emphasises, if we continually interpret human 
experience based purely on the apophantic “as”, we will effectively conceal or cover 
over the hermeneutical “as”, which forms its basis. Therefore, Heidegger (1962) stresses 
the need to get beyond this restricted view of the human being and delve deeper into the 
hermeneutical “as”. His hermeneutical phenomenological approach of the person 
provides a way to get beyond the apophantic “as” (i.e. the scientific/psychological 
assertions), and disclose or bring to light the hermeneutical “as”. 
 
To acknowledge the hermeneutical “as” is to recognise that all interpretations about 
human experience (i.e.scientific/psychological) are derived from and rooted in existence 
or being (Palmer, 1969). As mentioned previously, our understanding of being-in-the-
world is constituted by the three elements of the care-structure and the larger context of 
originary temporality.17 Therefore, when we interpret something through language, it 
conceals within it this foundation of understanding, which we have obtained from 
already being-in-the-world.  
 
Heidegger calls this the fore-structure of understanding, and during interpretation this 
fore-structure of understanding is rendered explicit through language/discourse (Palmer, 
1969; Diekelmann & Ironside, 1998; Lafont, 2005). There are three elements of the 
fore-structure: fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. The fore-having refers to 
the prior intelligibility and background practices, which provide us with an 
understanding of the phenomena that we want to interpret. The fore-sight is the specific 
perspective from which we approach the interpretation, and is also constituted by 
background practices. Fore-conception describes our anticipated sense of what our 
interpreting will reveal (Palmer, 1969; Diekelmann & Ironside, 1998; Lafont, 2005). It 
is grounded in the conceptualisations and vocabulary that are at our disposal during 
interpretation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
17 See page 93 for the discussion on the care-structure and originary temporality.  
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Lafont (2005) contends that this notion of the fore-structure implies that interpretations 
are always grounded within the particular context, perspective, and conceptualisations 
of the interpreter. These three elements (i.e. fore-having, fore-sight, fore-conception) 
constitute the hermeneutic circle from which all interpretation evolves (Lafont, 2005).  
 
Based on this perspective, both the researcher and participants engaged in research 
investigations, interpret their experience within this hermeneutic circle of 
understanding. However, this circular view of interpretation questions the traditional 
scientific aspiration of “objective” interpretations “without presuppositions” (Palmer, 
1969; Lafont, 2005). As Heidegger (1962) points out: “An interpretation is never a 
presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us” (p191). 
 
For Heidegger, the notion that one can interpret without presuppositions is in direct 
contrast to the way understanding operates (Palmer, 1969). The unnoticed 
presuppositions of the person are present in every interpretive construction, so that there 
is no such thing as an “objective” and “presuppositionless” interpreter (Palmer, 1969). 
Consequently, researchers using hermeneutical phenomenology do not try to “bracket” 
their presuppositions, as Husserlian phenomenology would suggest. Instead, the 
researcher’s interpretations are grounded on his/her fore-structure of understanding.    
 
The philosophical perspective of Martin Heidegger informs this hermeneutical 
phenomenological study of the person’s experience of ESRD and haemodialysis 
therapy. It guides all stages of the research process including the sampling strategy, the 
methods of data collection and analysis, and the interpretation and discussion of the 
findings.  These elements of the research process will now be discussed in more detail 
in the following sections of this chapter.    
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3.3 RESEARCH SETTING AND SAMPLE  
 
The setting for the study was a haemodialysis unit based in a large teaching hospital in 
the Republic of Ireland. Prior to the study, I had no connection or affiliation with the 
hospital, haemodialysis unit, or clinical care of the participants at the study hospital. 
According to Steeves (2000), one of the tenets of hermeneutic phenomenological 
research is to select people who will offer a picture of what it is like to make sense of 
their experience. Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling strategy, which 
allows the researcher to select participants who are most likely to reveal the phenomena 
under study (Holloway & Wheeler, 1997).  
 
It is important to point out, that prior to conducting this study for PhD, I had completed 
another qualitative study as part of a postgraduate nursing course. This initial study also 
explored the experience of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy for sixteen participants in 
another renal unit based in a large city hospital in the Republic of Ireland.  While 
conducting this initial study, I was also a member of the nursing team on the dialysis 
unit. The findings yielded some interesting insights into the person’s experience of 
ESRD and haemodialysis therapy and contributed to my decision to embark on the 
current study for PhD. However, I decided it would be beneficial to conduct the study 
for PhD at another location in the Republic of Ireland. I felt this might potentially allow 
me to develop a broader perspective of the person’s experience of ESRD and 
haemodialysis therapy.  
 
The purposive sample of sixteen participants selected in this initial study had yielded 
substantial amounts of data in relation to the participants’ experience. Therefore, I 
decided that a purposive sample of sixteen participants was an appropriate sample size 
to yield a rich and in-depth description of the participants’ experience in the current 
study for PhD.  
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The sample inclusion criteria consisted of participants who:   
 Were aged 18+  
 Were able to converse in English. 
 Were diagnosed with ESRD and receiving maintenance haemodialysis therapy.  
 Were receiving haemodialysis therapy from 0-1 years, 1-5 years, and 5-10 years.  
 Were on the waiting list for a kidney transplant. 
 Were not on the waiting list for a kidney transplant. 
 Had previously received a kidney transplant. 
 Had not previously received a kidney transplant.  
 
The findings from the initial study highlighted that the inclusion of patients with 
specific kinds of experiences in the sample yielded a broader perspective of the 
experience of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy. For instance, some participants who 
were on haemodialysis therapy on a long-term basis seemed to provide different 
experiences than participants who were on the treatment for a shorter duration of time. 
Correspondingly, some participants who were on the waiting list for a kidney transplant 
seemed to depict different experiences than those who were not on the waiting list for a 
kidney transplant, and so forth. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to include these 
specific groups of patients within the study for PhD. The inclusion of this range of 
participants facilitated a more in-depth description of the experience of being a patient 
on haemodialysis to be formulated.   
 
The participants were selected based on the assistance and information of the nursing 
and medical staff working on the haemodialysis unit. They identified patients who were 
either physically or psychologically unable to participate in the study, and these patients 
were not included in the study.      
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3.4 DATA COLLECTION  
 
As mentioned previously, our understanding is based on the care-structure of our 
existence, and is embedded within the threefold structure of originary temporality. 
Dasein discloses this entire care-structure through language. Hence, the understanding 
people have of their experience is usually contained in the narratives or stories they tell 
(Benner, 1994; Ray, 1994; Kahn, 2000a). Qualitative interviews are a useful approach 
to elicit this narrative data (Benner, 1994; Ray, 1994; Kahn, 2000a).  
 
Based on the findings of the initial study I had conducted as part of a previous 
postgraduate nursing programme, I decided that it would be beneficial to conduct the 
study for PhD using a longitudinal study design. I felt that a follow-up interview with 
the participants approximately one year after the first interview would allow the 
participants to offer more narratives and more descriptions of their experience of ESRD 
and haemodialysis therapy. It was anticipated that this would allow a more in-depth, 
detailed description of their experience to be developed. Within the follow-up interview, 
several participants’ accounts illustrated that their experience had changed quite 
dramatically over time. Therefore, these changes in the participants’ experience over 
time were incorporated into the findings.  
  
It was my intention to conduct two interviews with each of the sixteen participants. The 
follow-up interview was conducted about one year after the initial interview. However, 
it was not possible to re-interview two of the initial sixteen participants. Sadly, one of 
these participants had died, and the other participant had relocated to another country 
for treatment. Three participants had received kidney transplants at the time of the 
follow-up interview. Two of these participants were interviewed in their own homes, 
and the third participant was interviewed at the transplant centre, when she attended an 
outpatient appointment.   
 
The approach to qualitative interviewing in this study resembled a conversation with 
each interview lasting about an hour. In the first interview, one opening question was 
used, in which the participants were asked: “What is it like to live on dialysis therapy?” 
After the initial question, I followed up with probing questions such as, “Can you give 
me an example of that?” “What was that like?” “What did that mean to you?” and “Can 
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you describe or tell me more about… (e.g., a particular experience)?” These types of 
questions preserved the conversational nature of the interview. Therefore, the 
participants were not constrained by pointed questions, which could have limited the 
contextual nature of their narratives (Benner, 1994).  
 
Essentially the same approach was used in the follow-up interview with the participants. 
In addition, I had developed a number of specific topics that needed to be addressed 
within the follow-up interview. These topics were based on the analysis of the data from 
the first interviews. For instance, in the first interview, several participants described 
their experience of waiting for a kidney transplant, wasting time, killing time, and 
communicating with nurses. Hence, I allocated enough time during the follow-up 
interview to specifically focus on these topics.  
 
It was my intention to conduct the interviews with the participants either in their homes 
or in a quiet room, away from the haemodialysis unit. However, all the participants 
requested to have the initial interview while undergoing haemodialysis therapy. It 
seemed that the participants found the time during haemodialysis therapy lengthy and 
boring. Therefore, they gladly welcomed the opportunity to be interviewed about their 
experience during this time.   
 
Interruptions and distractions have been described as major pitfalls during an interview 
(Morse & Field, 1996; Bryman, 2001). Since I had worked as a nurse on haemodialysis 
units in the past, I was aware of the distractions and noise, which could occur during the 
interviews with the participants on the haemodialysis unit. Nonetheless, it seemed unfair 
to request these patients to give up any more of their time to be interviewed about their 
illness and treatment. Consequently, there were various measures taken to minimise the 
potential noise and distractions on the haemodialysis unit during the interviews with 
participants. 
  
For instance, the noisiest time on the haemodialysis unit seemed to occur between 
shifts, when patients were starting and finishing haemodialysis treatments. Through 
collaboration with nursing staff on the dialysis unit, I did not interview participants 
during these times. There were some areas on the dialysis unit, which were quieter and 
more private than others. By liaising with the nurses, I was able to negotiate that 
 114
participants were allocated to these areas for the purpose of the interviews.  The curtains 
were pulled around to enhance privacy and avoid interruptions. While there was always 
the risk of machine alarms and the development of acute complications during 
haemodialysis therapy, these disruptions were minimal during the interviews with 
participants. All interviews with the participants were audio taped and transcribed 
verbatim. The transcripts were then checked against the tapes for accuracy prior to data 
analysis.  
 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS   
 
The approach to data analysis was adapted from the work of Diekelmann, Allen & 
Tanner (1989). This approach was specifically developed by the authors for the analysis 
of data in studies using a Heideggerian hermeneutical research methodology.   
 
In particular, Heidegger’s (1962) perspective of interpretation formed the basis of this 
method of analysis. Diekelmann, Allen & Tanner, (1989) viewed interpretation to be 
grounded in the fore-structure of understanding.18 Hence, their hermeneutical approach 
to analysis emphasised that interpretation was always related to the background context, 
perspective, and assumptions of the researcher. All interpretations of the researcher 
were created within this “hermeneutic circle”.  
 
The approach to data analysis by Diekelmann, Allen & Tanner (1989) had previously 
been used in hermeneutical studies, which explored the person’s experience of ESRD 
and dialysis therapy (Rittman et al., 1993; Sloan, 1996; Nagle, 1998). There were seven 
stages in the analysis process. All stages involved an intense process of reading, writing, 
thinking, and dialogue in relation to the data. The following account will delineate how 
these stages were incorporated in the analysis of the narrative data in my study.   
 
 
 
  
                                                 
18 See page 108 for the previous discussion on the fore-structure of understanding.  
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1. All interviews were read and re-read in their entirety to obtain an overall 
understanding of the data.  
2. Interpretive summaries of each interview were written up, and a list of 
categories created with accompanying narrative data.   
3. The categories were compared and contrasted between interview texts from all 
the participants. This allowed the shared or similar categories that recurred 
throughout the texts to be identified and developed into themes. All 
interpretations of the researcher were supported with narratives from the 
interview text. A database created in Microsoft Access was used to code, 
synthesise, store, and retrieve categories and themes. This database also 
facilitated searches across data for the categories and themes. 
4. A central practice of the hermeneutical analysis process used in this study was 
the inclusion of other researchers in the interpretation of the data. For instance, I 
presented my interpretations to the two members of my PhD supervisory team, 
and to an expert practitioner in nephrology nursing with a PhD in this area. This 
process allowed vague or unclear interpretations to be clarified through 
dialogue, debate, and referring back to the interview text. Moreover, it served to 
challenge and affirm my interpretations, which assured the interpretations were 
warranted, and reflected the participants’ experience. The presentation of themes 
and supporting narratives at both national and international research conferences 
also challenged and verified my interpretations of the data.19  
5. When questions about interpretations were raised, I referred back to the original 
transcribed interview text, and my written interpretation of that text, to assess 
whether my interpretation was warranted. I also extended my descriptions of the 
interpretations to make them more comprehensive and clear.  
6. As the themes were developed, refined, and compared, a constitutive pattern that 
linked the themes was identified.20  
7. A draft report of the interpretive analysis was developed and presented to the 
members of my PhD supervisory team. It provided a detailed discussion on the 
constitutive pattern and relational themes formulated from the data. The themes 
were supplemented with many narratives taken from the interview text of the 
                                                 
19 See Appendix C (p310) for list of conference presentations.  
20 A constitutive pattern is one that exists in all the data and explains the link or relationship between the 
themes (Diekelmann, Allen & Tanner, 1989).  
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participants. Responses and suggestions from my PhD supervisory team were 
incorporated into the final draft.  
On two occasions, I attended the Institute for Interpretive Phenomenology in the USA. 
This institute was facilitated by Professor Diekelmann and colleagues and provided 
advanced training on the hermeneutical approach to data analysis used in this study.  
 
3.6 RIGOUR OF THE STUDY 
 
The hermeneutical phenomenological methodology employed in this study implied that 
the background context and perspective of the researcher informed the interpretation of 
the data. Interpretation was based on the fusion of the participants’ perspective with the 
researcher’s perspective, to achieve a more in-depth understanding of the phenomena 
under study (Koch, 1996; Draucker, 1999). However, the challenge of using this 
hermeneutical approach was the control of bias, to ensure that my interpretations were 
an accurate portrayal of the participants’ experience of ESRD and haemodialysis 
therapy. According to Wolcott (1995), bias will only influence a study if the researcher 
does not acknowledge it. If bias is acknowledged, it can lend focus to the study.  
 
The approach to data analysis by Diekelmann, Allen & Tanner (1989) served to control 
bias and enhance rigour in the study. As mentioned previously, this approach to data 
analysis involved incorporating other researchers in the interpretation of the data. 
Multiple interpretations of the data at every stage of the analysis served to challenge, 
question, and confirm my interpretations of the data.  
 
By reading both the narratives of the participants, and my interpretations, the other 
researchers involved in the interpretive process served to enhance the interpretations. 
This process of strengthening the interpretations ensured that interpretations were 
substantiated and accurate, and subsequently enhanced the rigour of the study.   
 
A continual process of reading, writing, thinking, and dialogue occurred throughout this 
hermeneutical study. The prolific handwritten accounts generated repeated cycles of 
critical reflection, which facilitated the progression of the study. Furthermore, these 
cycles of critical reflection enhanced the rigour of the study. As I had previously 
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worked as a nurse on haemodialysis units, I realised that this background context and 
perspective would influence the interpretations and decisions I made throughout the 
study. Therefore, there was a need to identify the perspectives, preconceptions, and 
assumptions I had about the topic, which might overly influence or bias my 
interpretation of the participants’ accounts.  
 
By critically thinking, reflecting, and writing throughout the study, I was able to 
heighten my awareness of the preconceptions and assumptions I had about the study 
topic. Indeed, this is why Kahn (2000b) recommended a process of critical reflection 
within hermeneutical phenomenological studies. The author stated that this process 
helped to identify preconceptions, assumptions, and prejudices about the research topic, 
which could lead to bias.  
 
It is important to point out that the aim of reflection was not to suspend or “bracket” my 
assumptions or presuppositions, as the Husserlian/psychological approaches to 
phenomenology have contended. Unlike a Husserlian or psychological approach to 
phenomenology, the suspension or “bracketing” of presuppositions is not deemed 
appropriate within a Heideggerian phenomenological study.  The aim of these written 
reflective accounts was merely to heighten my awareness of these presuppositions, so 
they would not overly influence my interpretation of the data.   
 
The written accounts maintained during this study also provided a record of the 
thoughts, interpretations, and decisions I made throughout the various stages of the 
research process. Molzahn & Sheilds (1997) described the ability to maintain 
comprehensive notes relating to the progression of the study as an element of rigour. 
The database created in Microsoft Access also provided a record of the categories and 
themes developed during data analysis.    
 
Some authors suggested that the credibility of qualitative studies was enhanced through 
prolonged engagement with the participants (Leininger, 1994; Streubert & Carpenter, 
1995; Molzahn & Sheilds, 1997). I spent a substantial amount of time with each 
participant, before, during, and after each interview. In addition, by conducting two 
interviews with the participants, I ensured that prolonged engagement and rapport was 
attained. The follow-up interview with the participants allowed gaps in the data from 
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the first interviews to be addressed. It also enabled further information and clarification 
about their experiences to be documented. This process facilitated a more in-depth 
description of the richness and complexity of the participants’ experience to be 
generated, which enhanced the credibility of the findings.    
 
3.7 ETHICAL ISSUES 
 
Lo Biondo-Wood & Haber (1998) identified three basic ethical principles to guide all 
research investigations, which included respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. 
The principle of respect for persons signified that persons had the right to self-
determination and the freedom to participate, or not to participate in research (Lo 
Biondo-Wood & Haber, 1998; Burns & Grove, 2001). Beneficence was described as an 
obligation to do no harm and maximise the possible benefits for individuals who 
participated in research (Lo Biondo-Wood & Haber, 1998).  The principle of justice 
implied that human beings should be treated fairly during research studies (Lo Biondo-
Wood & Haber, 1998).   
 
These principles were upheld throughout all stages of this hermeneutical study on the 
person’s experience of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy. Formal written ethics 
approval to conduct the study was given by the Research Ethics Committee at the study 
hospital.  Permission to carry out the study in their clinical area was granted by the 
consultant nephrologists and the nurse managers of the renal unit at the study hospital.  
 
The participants were informed of the nature and purpose of the study, the main features 
of the design, as well as the possible outcomes of the study.  Participants were allowed 
time to ask any questions regarding the study and were then requested to sign a consent 
form.21 A copy of the signed informed consent form was given to the participants, 
which included a brief background to the research, contact information, and details 
about the purpose of the study.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 See Appendix D (p311) for a copy of the informed consent form.  
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The participants were informed that they had the right to participate or refuse to 
participate in the research and that they could withdraw from the study at any time. The 
privacy and confidentiality of participants was assured throughout the study by 
assigning a pseudonym to each participant and ensuring that their names never came in 
contact with the data.  All data from the interviews were locked in a cabinet and stored 
at a separate location from the study hospital.  
 
The qualitative interview format used in the study required the participants to discuss 
the effects of ESRD and haemodialysis on their lives. Cohen (2000) suggests that 
patients find qualitative interviewing helpful, as it allows them to talk about experiences 
that they have never had the opportunity to discuss before. However, it was also 
recognised that describing the experience of illness could potentially generate feelings 
of sadness and distress amongst some participants. Therefore, I ensured that the risk of 
distress was minimised during the interviews with the participants.  
 
For instance, the conversational style of the interview allowed the participants to control 
many of the topics raised and discussed during the interviews. In addition, the 
participants were not pressurised in any way to talk about experiences, which appeared 
to upset them. Prior to conducting the interviews, I had a specific plan of action that 
would be used in the event that a participant became upset during the interviews.  
 
Firstly, the research interview and tape recorder would be stopped, and I would spend 
time with the participant responding to his/her distress. Secondly, I would inform the 
nurses on the haemodialysis unit that the participant had become upset during the 
interview, and would require some follow-up support. Finally, the participant(s) would 
also be referred for follow-up support from the Renal Nurse Specialist on the 
haemodialysis unit. This nurse held a recognised qualification in counselling and was 
available to provide support and counselling both during and after the study. 
Fortunately, this action plan was not initiated, as none of the participants became 
distressed during or after the interviews.  
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3.8 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This chapter discussed the methodological features of the study. A hermeneutical 
phenomenological approach was employed, based on the philosophical perspective of 
Martin Heidegger. In particular, Heidegger’s (1962) notion of time or temporality was 
central to his phenomenological analysis of existence or being. This philosophy guided 
all stages of the research process.  
 
To summarise, a purposive sampling strategy was used to select participants who would 
provide an in-depth description of their experience of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy. 
Data were collected using in-depth qualitative interviews, which resembled a 
conversation. A hermeneutical approach to data analysis by Diekelmann, Allen & 
Tanner (1989) was used to analyse the interview data. The findings gleaned from this 
hermeneutical analysis of the data will be discussed in detail in the upcoming chapter.   
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CHAPTER 4 : FINDINGS  
 
This chapter presents the interpretive findings of the study. The experience of waiting 
was identified as a constitutive pattern in this study.22 As mentioned earlier in the 
research methodology chapter, a constitutive pattern was an overarching pattern that 
existed within the data from all participants. It explained the link or relationship 
between the themes created from the data (Diekelmann, Allen & Tanner, 1989). The 
experience of waiting consisted of three themes:  
1. Lost Time 
2. Waiting for a Kidney Transplant 
3. Communicating with Nurses: Myth versus Reality.    
 
The participants’ accounts illustrated that they spent a lot of time waiting when they 
attended haemodialysis therapy. The time spent waiting was unrelated to their everyday 
lives, and held them back from their everyday activities. Therefore, the participants 
interpreted the time spent waiting, as time lost out of their everyday lives.  
 
The theme Lost Time was constituted by two sub themes:   
1. Killing Time  
2. Wasting Time 
 
The participants described their efforts to kill time, while they waited for haemodialysis 
therapy to end. They also described their experience of wasting time, as a result of 
waiting unnecessarily before and after haemodialysis therapy.  The continuous nature of 
haemodialysis therapy meant the participants had to repeatedly endure the experience of 
waiting each week. Therefore, they described the distress, which accompanied this 
experience.   
 
A successful kidney transplant offered the participants freedom from the confines of 
long-term haemodialysis therapy, and the possibility of returning to an almost normal 
lifestyle. However, a suitable donor match had to be established to ensure the success of 
transplantation. Therefore, the participants were placed on a transplant waiting list until 
a suitable donor match was located and transplantation could proceed. Since there are a 
                                                 
22 For a visual display of the themes and sub themes, which constituted the participants’ experience of 
waiting, see Figure 1 (p129).  
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limited number of donor kidneys available, the waiting process took a substantial 
amount of time for some participants.  
 
The experience of waiting for a kidney transplant was significant for the participants in 
the study.  The theme Waiting for a Kidney Transplant consisted of three sub themes:  
 
1. Living in Hope. 
2. Uncertainty.  
3. Being on Hold. 
 
The participants’ accounts highlighted their experience of living in hope, while they 
waited for a kidney transplant. The information they received from the healthcare team 
in relation to the “average” waiting time for a kidney transplant, contributed to their 
experience of hope. Because of this information, several participants expected to receive 
a kidney transplant within a relatively short duration of time. However, when they 
exceeded the average waiting time for a kidney transplant, they became uncertain.  
 
When confronted with uncertainty, some participants were unable to contemplate 
possibilities for the future. Furthermore, the restrictions of haemodialysis therapy 
prevented them from participating fully in their everyday activities. Consequently, they 
described their experience of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant.  
 
It is proposed that Heidegger’s phenomenological notion of time was embedded within 
the participants’ experience of waiting, described in the themes Lost Time and Waiting 
for a Kidney Transplant. It seemed that that the experience of waiting described in these 
themes highlighted the threefold structure of originary temporality to the participants.23 
This temporal feature of the participants’ experience of waiting characterised 
Heidegger’s (1962, 1995) account of anxiety and boredom. According to Heidegger 
(1962, 1995), anxiety and boredom were existential moods. It is necessary to provide an 
account of Heidegger’s perspective of mood before moving onto the description of the 
participants’ description of waiting, portrayed in the study.  
 
                                                 
23 See page 93 for the previous discussion on originary temporality.  
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Heidegger’s (1962) description of anxiety as an existential mood was strikingly 
different to the psychological perspective of this concept, portrayed in the existing 
literature related to the person with ESRD. Within this literature, anxiety and 
uncertainty were discussed interchangeably and were deemed psychological responses 
to the losses and lifestyle disruptions created by ESRD and dialysis therapy.24  
 
The experience of boredom was not specifically addressed in the literature related to the 
person’s experience of ESRD. Indeed, Barbalet (1999) claimed that while boredom was 
a common experience, it was usually more taken for granted than explored. 
Correspondingly, Svendsen (2005, p8) declared that “very few people have any well-
thought-out concept of boredom. It is usually a blank label applied to everything that 
fails to get our attention”.  However, based on a review of the existing literature on 
boredom, it seemed that the concept was largely deemed a subjective or cognitive 
response that occurred within the individual (Hill & Perkins, 1985; Perkins & Hill, 
1985; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Vodanovich & Kass, 1990; Seib & Vodanovich, 1998; 
Vodanovich, 2003; Lee & Mittelstaedt, 2004).   
 
If we recall, this predominantly psychological perspective of moods emanated from the 
Cartesian tradition. This tradition led to thinking in terms of two worlds: one inner, 
subjective world, which consisted of conscious processes, and one outer, objective 
world, which was outside or independent of the person (Hollis, 1994). This belief 
encouraged us to assume that our moods were either a subjective state, which came 
from inside the person, or an objective state, which came from outside the person.  
However, Heidegger’s (1962) notion of mood rejected this assumption and claimed that 
moods were neither purely subjective nor objective. He conveyed that mood “comes 
neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’, but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way 
of such Being…” (p176-7). 
  
Although Heidegger (1962) sometimes used the term state-of-mind to describe mood, 
his notion of mood did not refer to a subjective, private mental state. Indeed, he 
emphasised that the fact that moods were public, and could be shared with other people, 
confirmed that moods were not merely subjective (Dreyfus, 1991; Wrathall, 2006). 
                                                 
24 See page 49 for the discussion on uncertainty and anxiety in the literature review.   
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Heidegger (1962) claimed that moods were not merely private feelings derived from 
consciousness and projected over a situation. Consequently, he rejected the idea that 
moods should be understood from a psychological perspective as feelings, experiences, 
or consciousness.  
 
It is important to note that when Heidegger (1962, 1995) made this point, he was not 
setting out to dispute the psychological characterisation of feelings and experiences. 
Rather, by linking mood to existence, Heidegger offered us an alternative way of 
understanding these everyday feelings and experiences, which came before all 
theoretical categorisation. Therefore, Heidegger deliberately used the term mood, to 
show us that moods were not to be confused with the psychological understanding of 
feelings and emotions, which currently existed.  
 
If mood was not a subjective state, then based on the Cartesian tradition, we were led to 
assume that it was an objective state, something that came from outside of the person. In 
contrast, Heidegger’s account suggested that moods did not purely exist outside the 
person either. Instead, his analysis of mood signified that moods were a product of our 
existence, and subsequently arose from our “being-in-the-world”. In order to explicate 
more clearly, what Heidegger meant when he spoke about moods, anxiety and boredom 
will now be discussed.  
 
Heidegger (1962) described boredom and anxiety as fundamental existential moods. He 
signified that moods stemmed from our “throwness” into the world. If we recall from 
the previous discussion on the originary past, Heidegger (1962) used the term throwness 
to express the way we were thrown into the world.25 Because we were thrown into the 
world, we had to submit to things that we had little or no choice about. For instance, the 
place we were born, our physical features, the resources in our environment (Wrathall, 
2006). More importantly, we had to succumb to our throwness into death i.e. our finite 
existence.    
 
 
 
                                                 
25 See page 93 for the previous discussion on originary temporality. 
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According to Heidegger (1962, 1995), anxiety (Angst) and boredom (Langeweile), as 
two fundamental existential moods, disclosed the finitude of Dasein’s existence i.e. its 
throwness into death. These moods achieved this by illuminating the threefold structure 
of originary temporality, which formed the basis of the care-structure of Dasein’s being 
(Heidegger, 1962).  
 
If we recall, Heidegger (1962) described originary temporality as a basic structure of 
Dasein’s being. He said that originary temporality was an ecstatical unity consisting of 
the past, present, and future. The three ecstases of originary temporality formed a 
unified whole, with a projective character based on the originary future. As a result of 
originary temporality, Dasein was always projecting into possibilities in the future. It 
was this projection, which made death a possibility that lay before Dasein throughout its 
existence (Mulhall, 2005). 
 
Thus, from Heidegger’s perspective, death was not seen as biological death (Mulhall, 
2005). It was not merely an event, which occurred at the end of one’s life. Instead, death 
was a feature of Dasein’s throwness. By being thrown into the world, we were also 
thrown into death. Therefore, death was viewed as one possibility of our existence 
(Mulhall, 2005). Heidegger (1962) illustrated this point when he said “Let the term 
“dying” stand for that way of Being in which Dasein is towards its death” (p291). 
 
By illuminating the ecstatic structure of originary temporality, anxiety and boredom 
highlighted that death was one possibility of Dasein (Hoffman, 2005). According to 
Heidegger (1962, 1995), the moment when the finitude of existence was disclosed to 
Dasein was the moment of vision. It was the decisive moment where Dasein was 
prompted to live in either the authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. By 
highlighting the finitude of existence, anxiety and boredom prompted Dasein to live in 
either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence.  
 
Heidegger (1962) described the inauthentic mode of existence as our absorption in 
everydayness. He signified that Dasein tended to flee when confronted with the 
possibility of death (Mulhall, 2005). Therefore, to avoid reflecting on its death and 
finitude, Dasein absorbed itself in everydayness (Mulhall, 2005). As previously 
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mentioned, Heidegger (1962) used the term “falling” to describe the everydayness of 
Dasein.26  
 
In falling, we were so caught up in our tasks and activities that we did not reflect on our 
existence. Instead, we merely engaged in everyday idle talk and gossip. We were in the 
state of “Das Man”, which meant we were the same as everyone else and experienced 
things collectively as they did (Heidegger, 1962).  Therefore, to avoid facing the 
finitude of existence, Dasein absorbed itself in the everyday tasks and activities it 
performed in world-time.  Heidegger (1962) referred to this absorption in everydayness, 
as the inauthentic mode of existence. It was the mode of existence we were familiar 
with in our everyday involvements in the world.  
 
On the contrary, to live in the authentic mode of existence, Dasein had to reflect on the 
finitude of its existence, and take responsibility for this existence. Heidegger’s concept 
of authenticity consisted of forerunning resoluteness. According to Gelven (1989), 
resoluteness was closely linked to freedom and choice. To be resolute meant to be free 
to choose our possibilities in life. It implied that Dasein was solely responsible for the 
way it existed and took ownership of this existence (Gelven, 1989; Mulhall, 2005). 
Forerunning meant grasping the possibility of death and finitude, while simultaneously 
being able to project into possibilities in life (Blattner, 1999; Carman, 2005).  
 
When anxiety and boredom disclosed the finitude of existence, the person was 
prompted to live in either the authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. As Mulhall  
(2005) pointed out, most people tended to flee and live in the inauthentic mode of 
existence when confronted with death. According to Heidegger, the everyday moods 
experienced by the person depicted his/her evasion from the finitude of existence 
(Hoffman, 2005). When the person was absorbed in the everydayness of the inauthentic 
mode of existence, s/he was able to conceal or cover over the finitude of existence. 
Thus, the person experienced pleasant everyday moods, such as satisfaction, 
contentment, enjoyment, happiness, hope etc.  
 
                                                 
26 See page 97 for the previous discussion on falling. 
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However, if for some reason the person was unable to live in the authentic or 
inauthentic mode of existence, s/he was subsequently unable to entirely conceal the 
finitude of existence. The inability to live in either mode of existence culminated in the 
unpleasant and distressing moods experienced by the person on an everyday basis, such 
as sadness, depression, despair, irritation, frustration, anger, and so forth. 
 
Therefore, anxiety and boredom, as two fundamental existential moods, disclosed the 
person’s throwness into death (Hoffman, 2005). By doing this, they provided the basis 
for the moods experienced by the person in everyday life (Dreyfus, 1991; Hoffman, 
2005). Consequently, from Heidegger’s perspective, all our everyday moods were 
essentially inauthentic moods (Hoffman, 2005). They characterised our inability to live 
in an authentic mode of existence. In other words, they were evasions from our 
throwness into death, or as Heidegger (1962) puts it “they disclose Dasein in its 
throwness, and-proximally and for the most part-in the manner of an evasive turning-
away”(p175).     
 
It is important to point out, that the authentic and inauthentic modes of existence were 
two modes of originary temporality (Blattner, 1999). Heidegger (1962) stated that 
“Temporality temporalizes, and indeed it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These 
make possible the multiplicity of Dasein’s modes of Being, and especially the basic 
possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence” (p377). Consequently, this implied that 
the threefold structure of originary temporality remained unified in both modes of 
existence.27 By choosing to live in the authentic mode of existence, Dasein was aware of 
the finitude of its existence, but still projected forward into possibilities in the originary 
future. Hence, it acted in the present, based on its affectedness from the past, to project 
forward into some possibility in the future.  
 
By choosing to live in the inauthentic mode of existence, essentially the same thing 
occurred. Except in the inauthentic mode of existence, Dasein did not acknowledge its 
finite nature. Instead, it allowed itself to be absorbed in the everyday tasks and 
activities, which occurred in world-time to avoid this realisation. Nonetheless, in both 
modes of existence, the threefold structure of originary temporality remained unified.  
 
                                                 
27 See page 93 for the previous discussion on the threefold structure of originary temporality.  
 128
It is proposed, that the experience of waiting, described in the themes Lost Time and 
Waiting for a Kidney Transplant highlighted the unified structure of originary 
temporality to the participants. This subsequently culminated in the fundamental 
existential moods of anxiety and boredom, described by Heidegger (1995). The 
experience of anxiety and boredom prompted the participants to live in either an 
authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. However, because of the persistent nature of 
their experience of waiting, the participants were unable to live in either mode of 
existence.  
 
It is suggested that the participants’ inability to live in either mode of existence because 
of the experience of waiting, created a disruption in the threefold structure of originary 
temporality.  Moreover, it culminated in a range of distressing moods, which intensified 
as the waiting continued indefinitely. These characteristic features were contained 
within the narrative accounts of the participants’ experience of waiting.   
  
Although the participants repeatedly attended the haemodialysis unit, their distressing 
experience of waiting did not appear to be recognised by the healthcare professionals 
responsible for their care. In particular, the nurses on the haemodialysis unit were the 
primary caregivers for these participants. Despite regular nurse-patient interaction, the 
narratives of the participants exemplified that the nurses rarely communicated with 
them during their treatment. Hence, the nurses did not address or attend to the 
participants’ distressing experience of waiting.  
 
The participants’ perspective of communicating with nurses during haemodialysis 
therapy is discussed in the third and final theme in the study. The theme is labelled 
Communicating with Nurses: Myth versus Reality. A visual display of the themes and 
sub themes, which constituted the participants’ experience of waiting, is provided in 
Figure 1 (p129).  
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The findings of the study will now be presented, beginning with the theme Lost Time. 
Where possible, two interviews were conducted with each participant. Therefore, a 
participant identification number (ID number) and interview number are attached at the 
end of each narrative that is discussed in the findings.  The participants’ ID numbers are 
contained in Table 1 (p131). Hence, 1/1 refers to the first interview with Amy, while 1/2 
refers to the second interview with Amy; 4/1 refers to the first interview with Connie, 
while 4/2 refers to the second interview with Connie, and so forth. To ensure 
confidentiality was maintained, the names assigned to the participants are pseudonyms. 
The participants’ age, and length of time on haemodialysis therapy are also contained in 
Table 1 (p131). As the table illustrates, some participants’ circumstances had changed 
by the time of the follow-up interview. Also, three participants i.e. Amy, Elena, and 
Harrison, were deemed physically unfit for transplantation, so they were not on the 
transplant waiting list and knew they would remain on dialysis for the rest of their lives. 
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Table 1: Participant Information 
 
Number of Years on Haemodialysis 
Therapy 
ID 
Number 
Pseudonym Age 
1st Interview 2nd Interview 
1 Amy 54 1 year  
(Not suitable for 
transplantation) 
2 years 
(Not suitable for 
transplantation) 
2 Ali 55 2 years 3 years 
3 Alex 31 1 year  Transplanted three 
months earlier. 
4 Connie 63 10 months 1 year 10 months 
5 Carl 30 1 month 1 year 1 month 
6 Chris 40 1 year 6 months 2 years 6 months 
7 Danny 49 1 year 7 months 2 years 7 months 
8 Donna 34 2 years 3 years 
9 David 59 1 year 2 years 
10 Elena 57 1 year 6 months  
(Not suitable for 
transplantation) 
2 years 6 months 
(Not suitable for 
transplantation) 
11 Gloria 57 4 years 5 months Deceased 
12 Harrison 66 4 months 
(Not suitable for 
transplantation) 
1 year 4 months 
(Not suitable for 
transplantation) 
13 Jeff 32 1 year 2 years 
14 John 51 5 years Re-located to 
another country. 
15 Liz 44 2 years 9 months Transplanted one 
month earlier.  
16 Nancy 43 4 years  Transplanted eleven 
months earlier.  
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4.1 THEME 1 - LOST TIME 
 
The findings suggested that the participants spent a lot of time waiting when they 
attended haemodialysis therapy. The time spent waiting was deemed empty and 
unproductive. It was unrelated to the participants’ everyday lives, and held them back 
from performing everyday activities. Therefore, they interpreted the time spent waiting, 
as time lost out of their everyday lives. The experience of waiting was distressing for 
the participants and was associated with uneasiness, irritation, frustration, anger, 
boredom, and despair. The continuous nature of haemodialysis therapy meant the 
participants had to repeatedly endure the experience of waiting each time they attended 
the treatment.  
 
The theme Lost Time was constituted by two sub themes: 
1. Killing Time  
2. Wasting Time.  
 
The participants’ accounts signified that they spent a lot of time during haemodialysis 
therapy merely waiting for the treatment to end. Therefore, they described their attempts 
to kill time, in an effort to overcome the unpleasant experience of waiting during 
haemodialysis therapy. The participants also reported that they spent a substantial 
amount of time waiting unnecessarily before and after the treatment. They described the 
time spent waiting needlessly as wasting time.  
 
The follow-up interview illustrated that a small number of participants were able to 
overcome the experience of waiting when they attended haemodialysis therapy. A 
detailed discussion of each of the sub themes will now be provided with the 
accompanying narratives of the participants.  
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4.1.1 SUB THEME - KILLING TIME 
 
The participants described their experience of waiting impatiently for haemodialysis 
therapy to end. While waiting, the time seemed to pass very slowly. Therefore, they 
tried to kill time in an effort to overcome the unpleasant experience of waiting during 
haemodialysis therapy.  
 
The participants used various strategies to kill time during the treatment, such as 
sleeping, reading, doing puzzles, watching television/DVDs, and having a cup of tea. 
However, they were physically attached to the haemodialysis machine, which restrained 
the variety of activities they could perform during the treatment. This meant they had to 
repeatedly rely on the same strategies to kill time during haemodialysis therapy.  
 
With the exception of sleeping, there seemed to be no pastime, which could sufficiently 
kill time for the duration of haemodialysis therapy. Therefore, the participants spent a 
lot of time merely watching the clock, while they waited for the treatment to end. 
 
It seemed reasonable to suggest that communicating with nurses was an appropriate 
way for the participants to kill time during haemodialysis therapy. However, the 
participants’ accounts indicated that the nurses rarely spent time communicating with 
them during their treatment.28 Hence, these nurses did not attend to the participants’ 
distressing experience of killing time, while they waited impatiently for haemodialysis 
therapy to end. This was reflected in the environment of the haemodialysis unit, which 
offered little to enable the participants to kill time during the treatment.  
 
For instance, there were a small number of televisions provided on the unit, which had 
to be shared by a number of patients. Consequently, the participants were unable to 
freely choose the programmes they wanted to watch during haemodialysis therapy. 
Some participants highlighted their desire to talk to other patients as a way of killing 
time during their treatment. However, the layout and organisation of the haemodialysis 
unit did not facilitate communication between patients.  
 
                                                 
28 The lack of nurse-patient communication will be discussed in the upcoming theme titled 
Communicating with Nurses: Myth versus Reality.  
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The participants’ accounts signified that the strategies they employed to kill time during 
haemodialysis therapy did not have a specific purpose or outcome. They did not 
represent the experience of leisurely passing time, which was normally associated with 
everyday pastimes. Instead, these strategies were merely a way of killing time, so that 
the wait for haemodialysis therapy to end would be over as quickly as possible.  
 
The participants signified that their efforts to kill time did not occupy or fill the entire 
duration of haemodialysis therapy. Therefore, they had nothing to do for a substantial 
amount of their treatment time, which culminated in uneasiness, irritation, frustration, 
and boredom. The repetitive nature of haemodialysis therapy meant the participants had 
to persistently endure the experience of waiting each week. The follow-up interview 
with the participants allowed their experience of killing time to be documented 
overtime. However, in many instances, the participants were unable to overcome the 
experience of waiting during haemodialysis therapy.  
 
For instance, in both interviews with Ali, a 55-year-old male, he described his 
experience of killing time, while he waited for haemodialysis therapy to end. The 
following account was taken from the first interview with Ali.  
He said: 
The first two hours are not too bad…the last two because you’re looking 
forward to coming off, you’re getting tired and you’re getting restless, 
so the time does drag, it would be like the four hours put together...you 
can watch television, and you can read but I find it hard to concentrate 
here to read, I find it hard even to watch television…with the noise of the 
television and with the noise of the machines…and sometimes the 
earphones would not work…I find there’s so much going on in the unit 
that it’s not easy to concentrate on reading…some people can go to 
sleep on the machine, I can’t, I couldn’t do that. (2/1)29 
 
 
Ali’s account indicated that the time dragged during the last two hours of haemodialysis 
therapy. While he tried to kill time by reading and watching television, these strategies 
did not kill time for the entire duration of the treatment. Occasionally the individual 
headphones did not work, which made it impossible for Ali to hear the television. In 
                                                 
29 Within the findings section, the use of (…) within the narratives signifies the natural pauses contained 
within the participants’ speech during the conversation.  
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addition, there were times when the excessive noise on the haemodialysis unit hindered 
his ability to read or sleep.  
 
Ali’s account emphasised that the strategies he used to kill time did not fill the entire 
duration of haemodialysis therapy.  Hence, he spent the last two hours with essentially 
nothing to do, except wait impatiently for the treatment to end. Embedded within Ali’s 
description of waiting was his predominant focus on clock time.   
 
As his narrative continued, Ali expressed his desire to talk to other patients, in an effort 
to kill time during haemodialysis therapy. However, he claimed that he was frequently 
rotated to different dialysis stations, which prohibited him from getting to know other 
patients. Furthermore, the placement of the haemodialysis machine effectively blocked 
him from communicating with other patients during treatment.  
The unit is so big that you can end up beside anybody that you don’t 
know…and the machine kind of blocks you from talking anyway…If you 
had somebody beside you and were talking to somebody, it [time on 
dialysis] would go faster…whether it was about the machine or about 
how they were feeling, it [time] certainly would [go faster], there is no 
doubt about that. (2/1) 
 
 
Similarly, Nancy, a 43-year-old female also highlighted her experience of killing time, 
while she waited for haemodialysis therapy to end. Nancy signified that the time spent 
during haemodialysis therapy was long and drawn out. It held her back from engaging 
in everyday activities and culminated in the irritating feeling of wasting time.  
 
According to Nancy, sleeping was the most effective way to make the time disappear 
during haemodialysis therapy. Therefore, she tried to tire herself out during the day, so 
she would be able to sleep throughout the treatment. However, there were occasions 
when Nancy was unable to sleep. On these occasions, she used to perform various 
activities in an effort to kill time, such as reading, listening to music, and watching 
movies on her portable DVD player. Since Nancy was physically attached to the 
haemodialysis machine via her arteriovenous fistula (AVF), her activities were 
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particularly confined during treatment.30 Therefore, she repeatedly rotated the same 
activities in an effort to kill time.  
 
Nancy’s account verified that her efforts to kill time did not sufficiently occupy the 
entire treatment time of haemodialysis therapy. Therefore, she was unable to overcome 
the empty and unproductive time spent waiting for the treatment to end. Like Ali, 
Nancy’s account confirmed that the environment of the haemodialysis unit did not 
facilitate her ability to kill time during treatment. She had to share a television with 
other patients, which meant she was unable to choose the programmes she wanted to 
watch. 
Here is Nancy’s account:  
 
Some nights it’s very long [especially] when you want to get home and 
get things done…you’re just thinking to yourself…please get me off [the 
machine]...I do things during the day to tire myself out so I know when I 
get here [to the dialysis unit] I will sleep…the night I can’t sleep is very 
long…I came here one night without my book and my music, and the 
night was really long, so now I bring in a DVD player on the odd night 
so I can watch a film…every so often I get a very long night when I get 
irritated and I want to go home ….I mean they brainwash you in here 
with Coronation Street [laughs] and I hate it …so if you want to watch 
TV, you have to watch that or whatever is already on…that’s why I bring 
in my own music and books…just to keep changing the night, otherwise 
it’s just the same old routine …an odd night you might get caught up in 
a film…Your tied ! The machine is so big…I look at it as if I’m stuck to 
that bloody machine. (16/1) 
 
 
Gloria also conveyed her experience of killing time, while she waited to finish 
haemodialysis therapy. She signified that the time dragged, so she employed various 
strategies to kill time during the treatment.  
 
Like Nancy, being physically attached to the haemodialysis machine via her AVF meant 
Gloria had to repeatedly rely on the same activities to kill time. However, her account 
implied that these activities did not keep her occupied for the entire duration of 
haemodialysis therapy. Consequently, she spent a lot of time watching the clock, while 
                                                 
30 Patients with an arteriovenous fistula or graft have two large bore needles inserted in one of their arms 
during haemodialysis therapy, to allow access to the circulation. Consequently, these patients are required 
to keep their arm still throughout the treatment. This severely restricts their movement and ability to 
perform pastimes.  
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she waited impatiently for the treatment to end. The following account was taken from 
my first interview with Gloria. Sadly, she died within the following year. 
It [time on dialysis] drags, but I could be lying here for an hour after 
dialysis and it wouldn’t bother me, but when you’re attached to that 
[dialysis machine] you’re just watching the clock the whole time...nearly 
the whole time, unless I get engrossed in my book, and I have my radio 
and my bridge game as well, so I kind of rotate them all around …I 
don’t know how to describe it really, it’s just that when you go on that 
[machine], you look at the clock and you say two hours to go, an hour 
and a half, only a half an hour left…once you’re hooked up to there 
[dialysis machine] you’re watching the clock, it’s amazing really. (11/1) 
 
 
Gloria’s narrative gave the impression that the strategies she used to kill time did not 
have a specific purpose or outcome. Instead, they were merely used for the sole purpose 
of getting through the empty time during haemodialysis therapy. Embedded in her 
account was the excruciating experience of waiting impatiently for dialysis to end. 
Indeed, as Gloria’s narrative progressed, she emphasised the need for activities to be 
available on the unit, which would make the time spent waiting more productive.  
I often think [laughs] wouldn’t it be lovely if you could have a massage 
on your feet…or maybe some kind of bicycle that you get a bit of 
exercise while you’re here, that would be nice. (11/1) 
 
 
In both interviews with Connie, she also described her experience of killing time, while 
she waited for haemodialysis to end. She declared that the time passed slowly during 
haemodialysis therapy. Therefore, it was essential to be able to perform activities to kill 
time for the duration of the treatment.  
 
Connie said she enjoyed watching television as a way of killing time. In particular, she 
expressed her desire to watch a popular Friday night talk show. However, the television 
had been removed from the dialysis station that Connie was regularly assigned to on a 
Friday night. This meant she was currently unable to watch her favourite programme.  
There are some nights and you’d say it [time] is slow…but you see I do 
a crossword and I read, but for the people that don’t do that, it must be 
an eternity for them…but having said that, there’s always somebody 
going up and down and time passes that way…it doesn’t go that fast now 
either, but when you do have something to occupy your mind it’s 
better…now I must say I like to watch television…On Friday night the 
group of us [patients] would be here and we might like to watch the Late 
Late Show, but I can’t because there’s no telly over there [points to 
other side of dialysis unit]…I don’t know whether they’ll [TVs] ever 
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come back again, but they used to have them and they’re not there now, 
well that one isn’t. (4/2) 
 
Correspondingly, the experience of killing time was also characterised in the narratives 
from both interviews with Alex. Alex indicated that the time passed slowly during 
haemodialysis therapy. Therefore, he read the paper, and watched television in order to 
kill time. However, like the other participants, Alex had an AVF, which significantly 
restricted his movement. Therefore, the strategies he employed did not sufficiently kill 
time for the entire duration of his treatment.  
 
Since Alex was unable to kill time during haemodialysis, he had nothing to do except 
wait for the treatment to end. The predominant focus on clock time was entrenched 
within his account.   
It [time] can be slow enough yea…four hours is long enough now, and 
not a whole lot to do…I read the paper for the first hour, that passes 
about an hour, and after that, it’s just look around you, then I look at the 
telly or just rest for the other three hours…It can be hard enough, just 
knowing you can’t get out [of bed], you mightn’t have to get out but just 
the fact that you’re tied to the bed is probably the biggest thing…yea it’s 
boring enough now…the first hour doesn’t go too bad but the second, 
third, and fourth, there isn’t a lot to do, I’m kind of looking forward to 
the cup of tea…usually you have probably around an hour left after you 
get the tea. (3/1) 
 
 
Beneath Alex’s account was the boredom he experienced, while he waited for 
haemodialysis therapy to end. Indeed, the highlight of the treatment for Alex occurred 
when he received a cup of tea toward the end of the treatment. It seemed the timing of 
the cup of tea served as a reminder to Alex that his waiting would soon be over.    
 
Other participants also described their experience of killing time, while they waited for 
haemodialysis to end. For example, Donna was an insulin dependent diabetic, and as a 
result was partially blind. She indicated that the time was “very long” during 
haemodialysis therapy.  In particular, the environment of the unit offered little to enable 
her to kill time during treatment.  Donna stated that the televisions on the unit were 
mounted from the ceiling, which meant they were too far away for her to see. 
Furthermore, the deterioration in her sight limited her ability to read during the 
treatment.   
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Donna’s account signified that she had nothing to do during haemodialysis therapy 
except wait for the treatment to end.  Therefore, she emphasised the need for activities 
to be provided, which would make the time during haemodialysis more interesting and 
productive.  
It [time on dialysis] is very long and the televisions are up too high…I 
bring in my CD Walkman so I can listen to music. I used to be an 
excellent reader but I got diabetes and now I’m left without my 
eyesight…I mean if you had computers to come in and work on, it would 
be great, it would create something to do, it would be something to pass 
the time away. (8/1) 
 
 
In the follow-up interview with Donna, she had managed to develop new ways of 
killing time during haemodialysis therapy. She had recently received the gift of a 
portable DVD player and used this to pass the time on dialysis. In addition, Donna had 
changed her dialysis time to the evening. This meant that she was on haemodialysis 
therapy with a different group of patients who engaged in conversation with her during 
treatment.  
My birthday was about two weeks ago and I got a portable DVD 
player…Because I’m going blind, I can’t see the televisions up 
there…and you can’t hear them, so I’ve got the little DVD player that I 
can have beside me…it’s going well…I can watch the DVD and play 
CDs on it as well, you can listen to music on it as well if you wanted 
to…and another thing that is good is that I’m [on dialysis] later now…I 
used to be on in the morning but I’m in the evenings now and a group of 
the patients [on dialysis], they’d all have good fun and tell you a story 
or two. (8/2) 
 
 
Despite these new pastimes, Donna insisted that she was still unable to kill time for the 
entire duration of the treatment. Therefore, she spent the last hour of dialysis just 
“counting the minutes”, while she waited impatiently for the treatment to end.   
 
It’s like watching paint dry…Molly [Donna’s carer] sits at the end of the 
bed and we’d be talking and I’d say to her “how long have I left now”, 
and she’d say “fifty five minutes”…and then I’d say “Is that clock 
going” and she’d say “yes”, and that’s the way I am for the last hour, it 
drives me nuts, it [time] is so long, why, I don’t know, because it is only 
an hour...you’re counting the minutes all day while you’re in here. (8/2)  
 
The uneasiness, irritation, and frustration caused by Donna’s experience of waiting 
during haemodialysis therapy were palpable within her account. 
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Likewise, in both interviews with Elena, she portrayed the distressing experience of 
killing time, while she waited for dialysis therapy to end. Elena specified that the last 
hour was the most distressing, because she had nothing to do. Implicitly contained in 
her account was the irritating feeling of wasting valuable time, while she waited for the 
treatment to end. Therefore, she emphasised the need for activities on the unit, which 
would enable patients to kill time and overcome the unpleasant experience of waiting.  
I think it would help people who are on dialysis to stimulate them, rather 
than just lying there…to have some form of activity that you can do 
while you’re just lying there…the last hour is the worst for me, it just 
seems to drag…you’re watching the clock all the time, you can’t see the 
one on the machine but you can see the ones on the wall, and you’re 
constantly thinking “oh is it only ten minutes since the last time I 
looked”…It’s just waiting really I suppose…just waiting to come off 
[dialysis]. (10/2) 
 
 
In contrast to the other participants, the first interview with David demonstrated that he 
had no problems killing time during haemodialysis therapy. Instead, he expressed the 
pleasant experience of leisurely passing the time during his treatment.  
I don’t mind my time on the machine, I’m usually in good form…it 
doesn’t bother me at all…I always try and sleep about an hour if I can 
while I’m on the machine, and if I can sleep that hour on the machine, 
the rest of the time is not long…and then I try and have the cup of tea 
and that’ll pass another half an hour…there’s a lot of little things that 
you can depend on [to pass the time]. (9/1) 
 
 
Conversely, in the follow-up interview with David, his experience of leisurely passing 
the time during dialysis therapy had changed. His narrative signified that the time 
during treatment was long and drawn out. Regardless of what activity he performed, 
David was unable to kill time for the entire duration of dialysis.  
 
For instance, he tried to sleep, but inevitably woke up after about an hour.  He watched 
TV, but eventually got bored of this pastime, because he had seen all the films before. 
While David liked to talk to other patients during haemodialysis therapy, he was 
blocked by the placement of the dialysis machine. Moreover, he was sometimes situated 
beside patients that were too tired to talk. This was David’s account: 
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It’s [dialysis] boring…you spend three hours stuck on a machine and 
you’re dying to get off…you’d sleep an hour and then when you wake up 
you’re just looking around you…you’re watching something on T.V. but 
you get sick of that too, you’ve seen all the films already, they’re all 
repeats…now today after you’ve being here with me, I feel today it’s 
[the time on dialysis] gone before I know it, if you didn’t come in, I’d be 
trying to doze off, go to sleep for five minutes, wake up, look at the clock 
again to see the time…I try to chat to other patients but everybody seems 
tired and they’re not really in form to talk…and those machines are 
between the beds as well and you cannot see the person properly…and 
you can’t talk to somebody if you’re not looking at them, you’re kind of 
blocked. (9/2) 
 
David’s narrative emphasised that he was unable to kill time during haemodialysis 
therapy. He had nothing to do except watch the clock, while he waited impatiently for 
the treatment to end. Thus, his account suggested that the time spent waiting was empty 
and unproductive. The activities he performed to kill time during haemodialysis did not 
have a significant purpose or outcome. They were only used to get through the empty 
time spent waiting. Beneath David’s account of waiting was the disheartening feeling of 
wasting time.   
 
Like David, the first interview with Chris, also illuminated the boredom he experienced, 
while he waited for haemodialysis to end.   
He said: 
It’s good to be able to talk and interact [with other patients] because it 
definitely passes the time and it kills the time…it makes dialysis easier if 
you’re interacting with other patients…Sometimes, when you’re a 
patient lying there, you get bored, you get so bored…It’s good to have 
interaction between the patients…Maybe patients that do interact should 
be next to each other, not one at either end [of the ward], people that do 
interact, have them closer, but sometimes it can be the opposite that’s 
done…Sometimes it’s [time] slow and sometimes it’s fast…if you’re 
beside someone you talk a lot to, I think it goes faster…If you’re talking 
and doing something, it goes faster, if you’re on your own and looking at 
the ceiling it probably goes slower, it feels slower...the machine blocks 
patients [from talking]…they [nurses] could have the machine a bit 
further back. (6/1) 
 
 
Chris’s account confirmed that he had nothing to keep him occupied during 
haemodialysis therapy. He expressed a yearning to talk to other patients in an effort to 
kill time. However, the placement of the dialysis machine made it difficult for him to 
engage in conversation with other patients. In addition, he was occasionally situated 
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beside patients that tended to sleep during dialysis therapy. Therefore, Chris spent most 
of his time just waiting for the treatment to end. 
 
In the follow-up interview with Chris, his experience of waiting during haemodialysis 
therapy had changed. He had commenced a course in computer networks within the last 
year. Therefore, he was able to kill time working and watching DVDs on his laptop 
computer. By working on the laptop computer, Chris had been able to fill the time 
during dialysis therapy more effectively. His account implied that by filling the time, he 
had subsequently been able to overcome the distressing experience of waiting during 
haemodialysis therapy.  
[L]ately I’ve been working on the computer, I have CDs I put in, they’re 
like tutorial CDs that I can go through…you forget that you’re sitting 
here on dialysis waiting [to come off], it helps the time go faster I 
guess…I think I’m doing better with the time than I was, the last time I 
talked to you, I was having trouble with the time, more I think than now, 
you just find ways to pass the time. (6/2)  
 
 
Similarly, in both interviews with Amy, she described her experience of killing time, 
while she waited for haemodialysis therapy to end. Amy was an insulin dependent 
diabetic. As a result of her diabetes, she was blind, and had previously had a right lower 
leg amputation.  
 
In particular, Amy’s ability to kill time during the treatment was restricted by her 
blindness.  She was unable to read or watch television during haemodialysis therapy. 
Therefore, with the exception of sleeping, Amy had nothing to do for the entire duration 
of the treatment but wait impatiently for it to end.  
Well, if I was able to read a book, or even watch the telly, but I have 
nothing to do, I really don’t have anything to pass the time for me, so I 
just have to lie there and that’s it. Sometimes, if I don’t have a good 
night’s sleep, I’ll have an hour or so of sleep on dialysis in the morning, 
which does make a big difference, it really does, you don’t feel it [time] 
so long, but I don’t usually sleep now. (1/1)  
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Another participant, John expressed that the time was long while he waited for 
haemodialysis to end. The televisions rarely worked, which made it difficult for him to 
kill time. John had re-located to Ireland from the UK about a year before our interview. 
His account verified that he found it more difficult to kill time during dialysis since he 
moved to Ireland. He claimed that in the haemodialysis unit in the UK, there was a 
portable television at each station. Consequently, John was able to watch the 
programmes he enjoyed during treatment.  
John stated:  
 
The time is long [during dialysis]…In the UK, we used to have an 
individual portable TV, with your own remote, so you could watch what 
you wanted…and I used to go to dialysis in the evenings from 6 to 10 so 
it was always when prime time TV were on, so it wasn’t too bad because 
I wasn’t doing anything that I wouldn’t have been doing if I was at 
home…it still felt restrictive because you had to sit there but basically if 
you think about it, I’d have been doing the same thing if I’d been at 
home…in fact I’d have more choice because my wife wouldn’t have 
control of the remote [laughs]…I don’t bother with it [TV] here because 
the sound is hardly ever on, it’s along way off from you, it’s never usable 
to be honest, it might be something in the background, coloured lights 
but there’s no sound really. (14/1) 
 
 
The ability to freely choose the programmes he liked to watch meant that John was able 
to leisurely pass the time during haemodialysis therapy. More importantly, it enabled 
him to adapt a more positive perspective of the treatment.  
  
In addition to the time spent waiting during haemodialysis therapy, the participants also 
described their experience of waiting before and after the treatment. Their experience of 
waiting will now be discussed in the following sub theme Wasting Time.  
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4.1.2 SUB THEME  - WASTING TIME 
 
The participants indicated that the time consumed when they attended haemodialysis 
therapy greatly exceeded the actual treatment time. They spent a lot of additional time 
waiting unnecessarily before and after haemodialysis therapy. Examples of their 
experiences of waiting included waiting for dialysis machines to become available, 
waiting for hospital transport to take them to and from treatment, and waiting for 
doctors to arrive to the unit to attend to them.  
 
While waiting, the participants were unable to participate in their everyday lives and 
activities. Therefore, they interpreted the experience of waiting, as wasting valuable 
time out of their everyday lives. The participants had to repeatedly endure the 
experience of wasting time each time they attended haemodialysis therapy. Therefore, 
embedded in their accounts were the feelings of irritation, frustration, anger, and 
despair.   
 
For instance, Harrison, a 66-year-old male described his experience of wasting time, 
waiting for a haemodialysis machine when he arrived for treatment. Despite having to 
attend the hospital for treatment three times each week, Harrison continued to work full-
time as a community worker. His entire narrative centred on his enthusiasm for the 
worthwhile role he performed in the community. Therefore, he interpreted the time 
spent waiting unnecessarily for a dialysis machine, as wasting valuable time, which 
could be used productively in his daily activities.    
 
In the follow-up interview with Harrison, he recalled a particular incident, where he had 
to wait an excessively long time for his dialysis machine to become available. 
Embedded in his account was his frustration and anger toward the nurses on the 
haemodialysis unit for failing to recognise the distress caused by his experience of 
repeatedly waiting. Consequently, he decided to complain to the unit manager in an 
effort to avoid wasting additional time.     
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Harrison recounted:  
I spent an hour and twenty minutes sitting on a chair out in the 
corridor…I did speak to ____[unit manager] about it because I was 
getting fed up of it...I mean we’re supposed to be here at half past three 
and I got on [dialysis] at ten to five…It’s just frustrating, I said to 
____[unit manager] “if the dialysis time is ten to five, well tell me it’s 
ten to five, it makes no difference to me, but why have me sitting on a 
cold corridor”…I mean I sat there…but I can’t do anything sitting in 
that corridor…I sit there with my legs crossed looking like a fool, that’s 
how I feel and I don’t think it’s fair to any patient…as I said to ___[unit 
manager] “it’s organisation, I can’t see why you can’t draw up a time 
table for eighty one patients for seven days”…But you see I think they’re 
too accommodating…if someone comes late, they keep the machine for 
them, but if you’re running a system to help everybody, somebody has to 
make a sacrifice…I have to travel an hour, surely if I can come on time, 
these other patients can be on time…I think that’s how it should be 
organised…leave a blank slot on every day, leave a blank bed, so if 
somebody wants to come late, they can…but it should be for a decent 
reason, not because somebody is going out for a night and they want to 
come in early…I saw a fella asking to start [dialysis] on a Friday 
morning instead of night, they [nurses] told him to come in and they’d 
see what they could do, and here am I coming at four o’clock and I’m 
sitting outside in the corridor. (12/2) 
 
 
It seemed that patients on the haemodialysis unit were allocated a specific dialysis time, 
but some did not adhere to these times. These patients simply arrived for treatment 
when it suited them, and were allocated to a dialysis machine by the nurses. This 
approach to the allocation of dialysis machines caused a cumulative effect throughout 
the day, which resulted in patients like Harrison having to wait for a machine to become 
available.  
 
In a similar account, Alex also recalled his experience of waiting excessively for a 
dialysis machine to become available when he would present for treatment. His account 
was taken from his follow-up interview. At the time, he had recently received a kidney 
transplant. While Alex was on haemodialysis therapy, he continued to work as an 
electrician. He drove himself to and from haemodialysis therapy, which took an hour 
each way. Therefore, on dialysis days, Alex had to finish work early to get to the 
hospital at the appropriate time for his treatment. However, his account implied that 
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there were occasions when he would arrive to the unit and have to wait for up to two 
hours for a machine to become available.  
 
Alex recalled:   
At times you could be waiting anything from an hour to two hours, it 
depended, it made it [dialysis] that much harder because it was an hours 
drive up and an hours drive back, that was two hours and you have four 
hours on the machine, that was six hours, so another two hours waiting 
just added to it as well, so it averaged about seven to eight hours a day 
to get your dialysis, to get there and back…so there was waiting 
involved, and once you get on [the machine], you were waiting to get off, 
so it’s all waiting…It’s kind of frustrating really, it’s hard to go in and 
sit for two hours and think half your dialysis could be done when you 
haven’t even started…it’s just more frustrating than anything…There 
was no one to say why they delayed us, it just seemed to be a normal 
part of life in dialysis, if someone came in a few minutes early, there’s a 
very strong possibility that they got in ahead of you and they might 
actually have your bed gone…it’s hard to pull them out then, and that 
did actually happen a good bit, someone might come in for whatever 
reason and if the bed was there, they [nurses] tended to put them on and 
dialyse them. (3/2) 
 
 
Like Harrison, Alex’s narrative also verified that the nurses effectively overlooked his 
distressing experience of wasting time, having to wait for a dialysis machine. He said 
the nurses would put patients on machines, even if they arrived outside of their allocated 
time. Therefore, despite arriving promptly for treatment, Alex was still left waiting for a 
machine.  His account conveyed how the experience of waiting unnecessarily for a 
haemodialysis machine simply devoured more time out of his everyday life. Therefore, 
beneath Alex’s account, was the frustrating feeling of wasting time.  
 
Gloria also described her experience of waiting for a dialysis machine to become 
available when she attended dialysis therapy. Gloria indicated that there were times 
when the nurses were so busy that patients would have to wait for a machine to become 
available. Like Alex, her account implied that the time spent waiting merely consumed 
more time out of her everyday life. Gloria’s description of “just hanging around 
waiting” exemplified that she had nothing to do while she waited. Thus, embedded in 
her account was the irritating feeling of wasting valuable time out of her everyday life.  
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There was a time when they [nurses] were very busy and there were ten 
patients all coming in together at the one time, and that meant that you 
had three quarters of an hour to wait before you got on the 
machine…you were just hanging around waiting…I know I’m 
contradicting myself when I said before that I don’t mind hanging 
around if I’m not on the machine,31 but it’s different when your coming 
off dialysis…but before it [dialysis], you’re waiting to go on it and 
you’re thinking, “oh another half an hour, that’ll be a half hour later 
getting off than I thought I’d be”…it eats more time…you just want to 
get in, and get it over and out of the way as fast as you can. (11/1) 
 
 
Correspondingly, Amy also recounted her experience of wasting time waiting for a 
haemodialysis machine to become available. As mentioned previously, Amy was an 
insulin dependent diabetic and was blind. She also had a right lower leg amputation in 
the past because of recurrent diabetic foot ulcers.  
 
At the time of the follow-up interview, Amy had been on haemodialysis therapy for two 
years. She said:  
Well it’s great to come in at this time [6am], you just walk in and go on 
the machine, because you’re long enough in here without having to 
wait…and that can’t be helped either because when you’re on the 
machine, you don’t know what’s going to happen…like I’ve been 
delayed a few times trying to stop the blood [bleeding from fistula after 
dialysis], but of course somebody has to wait, and it’s always because 
something is happening to someone or another…It’s terrible, it’s really 
terrible [to have to wait for a dialysis machine] and I am quite patient 
but really it used to happen day after day, at least a half an hour…and a 
half an hour waiting feels like ages, but it was often the hour and more 
than an hour…but some girl had a transplant [and left the unit], she 
used to come in at six, so I asked to come in at six instead, and it’s a way 
better. (1/2) 
 
 
Amy’s narrative indicated that the time passed slowly, while she waited impatiently for 
a dialysis machine to become available. She implied that dialysis therapy consumed 
enough time out of her life, without having to waste more time waiting for a machine. 
Therefore, to avoid this unnecessary waiting, Amy had recently taken a dialysis time of 
six o’ clock in the morning. Arriving to the unit at this time ensured that Amy avoided 
wasting valuable time, waiting unnecessarily for a haemodialysis machine to become 
available. Consequently, her experience of attending the treatment has improved.    
                                                 
31 See page 137 for Gloria’s previous description of killing time during haemodialysis where she 
describes her experience of waiting after haemodialysis is over.  
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Elena also recalled her experience of wasting time, while she waited for doctors to 
attend to her during haemodialysis therapy. Elena had recently begun to use her AVF 
during haemodialysis therapy. However, prior to using her fistula, she relied on a 
central venous catheter (CVC) to gain access to her bloodstream during treatment.   
 
Elena experienced recurrent clotting and poor blood flow in her CVC, which required 
frequent administration of a thrombolytic agent before and after haemodialysis therapy. 
In order to have the thrombolytic agent inserted into her CVC, Elena had to wait for a 
doctor to arrive to the dialysis unit to administer it before and after treatment. In 
addition, she had to wait for an hour to allow the clot(s) to dissolve before dialysis could 
commence.  
This was Elena’s account:  
The [dialysis] line wouldn’t work…it was so annoying all the waiting, 
you’d have to wait for the doctor to come and put something down to 
clear the line and then you’d have to wait another hour to let it 
work…there’s so much wasted time…As well, I have to come from 
[patients home], which takes an hour and a quarter to get here, then 
when I’d get here, the [dialysis] line would pack up in the first hour and 
I’d have to wait for the doctor, which could take another half an hour 
and it has taken longer…at the end of dialysis again I would have to 
wait for the doctor to come back and put more stuff into the line, so it 
works the next time…By the time I’d go home I would be absolutely 
exhausted …I sent a letter of complaint to the hospital at one stage 
because it was really frustrating, you get angry. (10/1) 
 
 
Within Elena’s account was her anger and frustration towards the healthcare team for 
ignoring her distressing experience of wasting time. Hence, she decided to send a letter 
of complaint to the management of the hospital in an effort to address the problem.   
 
In the follow-up interview with David, he described his experience of wasting time, 
while he waited for hospital transport to take him home after his treatment. David 
availed of a taxi, which was organised by the hospital, to take him to and from the 
dialysis unit. He shared the hospital taxi with another patient on haemodialysis, called 
John.   
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David’s treatment time was three hours, while John’s was four hours. Consequently, 
David had to wait for at least an extra hour after he finished his treatment before the 
hospital taxi would take them both home. John had an AVF, which sometimes took a 
while to stop bleeding after dialysis. When this problem occurred, David’s waiting time 
was significantly increased.  
 
On the day of the follow-up interview with David, he had also been waiting for one 
hour and twenty minutes for a haemodialysis machine to become available. This 
additional time spent waiting, merely contributed to the distressing experience of 
wasting time illustrated within his account.  
David said: 
I live fifty miles away from here [dialysis unit], and it takes over an hour 
to get in here in the morning, and the same to get home in the 
evening…and then I share the [hospital] taxi with another patient and I 
could be waiting for him…I only do three hours on dialysis and the other 
guy does four, so I have to wait an hour for him…so sometimes I’d be off 
[dialysis] for nearly two hours before I’d get home…You get off the 
machine, you go out to the day room, you sit there for an hour, then if 
it’s hard to stop the bleeding [from John’s AVF], he could be an extra 
half hour, and if he didn’t feel well, he could be there for two hours, and 
you’re sitting around waiting, waiting…That is very annoying, you run 
out of patience, that’s my problem…I came in this morning at about 
twenty minutes to twelve…I didn’t get on the machine until one o’clock, 
so that’s another hour gone, it’s really a drag, the time is passing by and 
you’re wasting time for nothing…The whole thing is wasting 
time…You’re wasting your own time…So if you had home dialysis 
[peritoneal dialysis], you wouldn’t be waiting around, and you wouldn’t 
be hanging about in this place…it would make a big difference, because 
I’m wasting a whole day. (9/2) 
 
 
David’s narrative implied that the time spent waiting before and after haemodialysis 
therapy held him back from his everyday activities, and was subsequently interpreted as 
wasting valuable time out of his life. Indeed, the frustration and anger, which 
accompanied his experience of waiting, were evident within his account. David’s 
account signified that his experience of waiting excessively for hospital taxis was not 
going to be rectified. Therefore, to avoid this pointless waste of his time, he was 
seriously considering changing from haemodialysis therapy to having peritoneal dialysis 
in his own home. 
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Like David, Nancy also recalled her experience of wasting time, when she waited for a 
hospital taxi to take her home after haemodialysis therapy. In the follow-up interview 
with Nancy, she had recently received a kidney transplant after being on dialysis for 
four years. She signified that when she attended haemodialysis therapy, she used to 
travel to the unit in a hospital taxi with another patient called Mark. Therefore, when 
Mark had complications after dialysis therapy, she would have to wait for him to 
recover before the taxi would take them both home. Conversely, if Nancy had problems, 
Mark would have to wait.  
 
Nancy’s account exemplified the impatience and resentment she experienced because of 
having to wait for Mark after she finished. Moreover, it also illustrated the stress and 
pressure she experienced when she was the cause of the delay.  
Nancy recounted: 
 
I was sharing a taxi with Mark [another patient] and if he had a 
problem, I had to wait, if I had a problem, he had to wait, and there was 
a lot of problems with bleeding [from AVFs], and Mark had trouble with 
his heartbeat…So not only are you dealing with your own problems but 
you’re thinking “I hope they don’t call the doctor for Mark, please Mark 
don’t be sick”…and you feel bad because you’ve had these bleeders, 
you’ve had these cramps, they’re all problems dialysis patients have but 
Mark is getting them, and you’re thinking “I’m going to be late 
tonight”…And if you have problems, you get stressed out and you’re 
thinking “he’s [Mark] waiting in the taxi for me”, so you were putting 
more pressure on yourself, then you’re apologising when you get into 
the taxi, and you’re still sick. (16/2) 
 
 
The narrative account of Carl also characterised the experience of waiting as wasting 
time. In the follow-up interview with Carl, he said that when he initially started 
haemodialysis therapy, he had availed of a hospital taxi to take him to and from 
treatment. However, the taxi driver would call to collect him hours in advance of his 
allocated treatment time. This frequently resulted in Carl having to wait up to three 
hours before a dialysis machine became available.   
 
Carl also shared a hospital taxi with another patient, and had to wait for this patient to 
complete her treatment before the taxi would take them both home. Because of the 
excessive waiting, Carl was wasting an entire day just to attend haemodialysis therapy. 
This subsequently prevented him from working full-time.  
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As a result of being unable to work full-time, Carl decided to drive himself to and from 
the unit. By organising his own transport, Carl had been able to overcome the 
distressing experience of wasting time, waiting unnecessarily before and after 
haemodialysis therapy. More importantly, he had been able to return to work on a full-
time basis.  
I was coming in here at twelve o’clock in the day and the whole day was 
gone…I was getting picked up by a [hospital] taxi…so I’m driving 
myself now because it just puts up the time waiting for a taxi…I’m so far 
away, I live forty miles away and he [taxi driver] used to come two 
hours, maybe two and a half to three hours before my dialysis time, and 
you could be an hour waiting in the evening before he used to come to 
pick us up…I was travelling with another woman as well, so the whole 
day was gone, you could do nothing…It’s grand now, I can come in here 
in the evening and work during the day and you’d be alright for work 
then again in the morning…[I used to be] sitting up there waiting, 
waiting up there in the waiting room, because we’d different times, me 
and the other woman that was travelling with me…I was only on three 
and a half hours and she was on four hours, and she was an old woman 
and it [dialysis] affected her a little bit, she wasn’t just able to get up 
and walk out the door after it, she had to rest for a while, so he [taxi 
driver] always had time laid out to give her a bit of recovery time as 
well before he’d come…so it was long…I could be off [the machine] for 
an hour and a half before he [taxi driver] used to come…where now you 
can just go when you get off [the machine]…it gives you more freedom 
and more independence to come and go, and you’re not waiting for 
taxis. (5/2) 
 
 
Similarly, Jeff recalled his experience of wasting time, while he waited for a hospital 
taxi to take him to the dialysis unit for treatment. Like Carl, when Jeff initially started 
haemodialysis therapy, he also availed of a taxi to take him to and from the hospital. 
However, the taxi driver did not arrive at the same time each evening. Therefore, Jeff 
was wasting time, waiting for him to arrive.  
You were ready for an hour expecting someone to pick you up say at half 
three, and half three would come and no one would arrive…it could be 
four o’clock and the taxi would just pull up then and he [taxi driver] 
would never say why he was late…if it suited him [taxi driver], he could 
come at three o’clock, before you’d be even ready, it’s whatever suited 
him really, I used to be late here for dialysis…I’m meant to be here at 
five o’clock, and it was often half five or quarter to six before I was here, 
so that was very frustrating…that’s why I started to drive and I’m still 
driving now and I wouldn’t change it. (13/2) 
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Both Jeff and Carl signified that they were forced to organise their own transport to and 
from haemodialysis, to overcome the experience of wasting time waiting for taxis.   
 
4.1.3 DISCUSSION OF THEME 
 
It is suggested that time played a key role in the participants’ experience of waiting, 
presented in the theme Lost Time.32 Like the participants’ accounts, the existing 
literature highlighted how the time-consuming nature of haemodialysis therapy created 
disruptions in the person’s life (Nagle, 1998; Hagren et al., 2001; Heiwe, Clyne & 
Dahlgren, 2003; Hagren et al., 2005). However, in contrast to this literature, it was not 
the linear, succession of “nows” of clock time that was significant in the participants’ 
experience of waiting. Instead it seemed that the participants’ experience of waiting, 
described in the theme Lost Time created a disruption to the four defining features of 
world-time.   
 
If we recall, Heidegger suggested that world-time was Dasein’s qualitative experience 
of time in its everyday involvements in the world. In particular, it was the time that 
contained the everyday activities performed by Dasein.33 There were four defining 
features of world-time called significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness. The 
participants’ experience of waiting, described in the sub themes Killing Time and 
Wasting Time appeared to create a disruption to the four defining features of world-
time. The following discussion will illustrate how this disruption might have occurred.  
 
According to Heidegger (1962), world-time was significant because we always 
understood the “now” as either the right or wrong time to do certain things.34 The tasks 
we performed in world-time were significant because they were based on the future of 
originary temporality. We performed tasks in world-time in-order-to project forward 
into some possibility in the future. Therefore, it was our possibilities in the future, 
which determined whether it was the right or wrong time to perform certain tasks or 
activities.  
                                                 
32 This theme will also be discussed in relation to a broader body of literature (specifically the work of 
Janice Morse) in Chapter 5: Discussion of the Findings.   
33 See page 97 for the previous discussion on Heidegger’s analysis of world-time. 
34 See page 100 for the previous discussion on the significance of world-time.  
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The participants’ descriptions of waiting, described in the theme Lost Time suggested 
that the time spent waiting was unrelated to their everyday lives. It did not contain the 
everyday activities and tasks associated with world-time. The participants had nothing 
productive to do while they waited. Therefore, the time spent waiting was effectively 
empty.  
  
For instance, in the sub theme Killing Time, the participants described how the activities 
they used to kill time during haemodialysis therapy, were not performed in-order-to 
project into some possibility or goal in the future. These activities did not have a 
significant outcome or purpose. They were merely used for the sole purpose of killing 
time until haemodialysis therapy ended.35 Correspondingly, in the sub theme Wasting 
Time, the participants described their experience of waiting needlessly before and after 
haemodialysis therapy. The time spent waiting held the participants back from their 
everyday activities and was interpreted as wasted time.36  
 
These features of the participants’ experience of waiting, contained in the sub themes 
Killing Time and Wasting Time indicated that they were not acting in world-time in-
order-to project forward into possibilities in the future. Consequently, these findings 
implied that the participants’ experience of waiting created a disruption to the 
significance of world-time.  The intermittent nature of haemodialysis therapy meant the 
participants had to repeatedly endure this disruption to the significance of world-time 
each week.  
 
Dasein dated events in its everyday involvements in the world because the events had 
significance. Therefore, datability was inextricably linked to significance and implied 
that the experience of time was dated by events.37 Dasein’s experience of the “now” of 
world-time was experienced as a time when a significant event occurred. Datability only 
materialised if the person was able to engage in significant events in the everydayness 
of world-time. As mentioned above, the participants’ experience of wasting time and 
killing time signified a disruption to the significance of world-time. Hence, it is 
                                                 
35 For example, see the accounts of Ali (p134), Nancy (p135), David (p141), Chris (p141). 
36 For example, see the accounts of Harrison (p145), Gloria (p146), Elena (p148), David (p149).  
37 See page 100 for previous discussion on the datability of world-time.  
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proposed that the disruption to significance subsequently created a disruption to the 
datability of world-time.  
 
World-time was spanned because it was embedded in the originary present.38 The 
originary present spanned from the originary future to the originary past. This 
spannedness was retained in world-time. Therefore, the “now” of world-time extended, 
or spanned from the “no-longer-now” (before) to the “not-yet-now” (after). The 
spannedness of world-time was also retained in the temporality of circumspective 
concern.   
 
Recall how, in the temporality of circumspective concern, Dasein performed tasks in the 
“now”, by “retaining” the necessary background experience, and “awaiting” the 
completion of the task.39 Therefore, the actual performance of the task spanned from the 
retaining to the awaiting of the task. It was because the world-time “now” spanned or 
extended from the before to the after, that the task spanned from the retaining to the 
awaiting in the temporality of circumspective concern. Therefore, the spanned “now” of 
world-time was constituted by a task, and subsequently lasted for the duration of the 
task.  
 
The participants’ descriptions of waiting contained in the theme Lost Time, illustrated 
that the “now” spent waiting was not constituted by a purposeful task or activity. For 
instance, in the sub theme Killing Time, the participants described how the activities 
they used to kill time during haemodialysis therapy did not have a productive outcome 
or purpose. They were merely used to occupy them until the treatment ended. Therefore, 
these activities did not fill the entire duration of haemodialysis therapy and the 
participants endured empty time, while they waited for the treatment to end.40  
 
Likewise, the participants’ accounts of waiting contained in the sub theme Wasting 
Time conveyed how the time spent waiting held them back from their everyday 
activities. They did nothing fruitful while they waited needlessly before and after 
haemodialysis therapy. Thus, they described the experience of waiting, as wasting 
                                                 
38 See page 101 for the previous discussion on the spannedness of world-time.  
39 See page 98 for the previous discussion on the temporality of circumspective concern. 
40 For example, see the accounts of Ali (p134), Nancy (p135), David (p141), Chris (p141). 
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time.41 The participants’ experience of killing time and wasting time confirmed that the 
“now” spent waiting was not constituted by a task or activity. This implied that their 
experience of waiting represented a disruption to the spannedness of world-time.  
 
By creating a disruption to the spannedness of world-time, it is proposed that the 
participants’ experience of waiting also created a disruption to the spannedness of 
originary temporality. If we recall, world-time constituted the originary present.42 
Through world-time, the originary present provided originary temporality with its 
spannedness. The person performed tasks and activities in world-time (i.e. originary 
present) based on his/her attunements from the past, to project forward into possibilities 
in the originary future. Therefore, if there was a disruption to the spannedness of world-
time, there was subsequently a disruption to the spannedness of originary temporality.  
 
The “now” of world-time was public, which implied that we collectively understood 
what now meant.43 The publicness of the “now” of world-time ensured that we were 
able to collectively coordinate our tasks, activities, and practices on a daily basis. 
According to Heidegger (1962), world-time was public because originary temporality 
was public. “Being-with-others” was an essential structure of our existence and 
simultaneously of originary temporality. Dasein was thrown into the world along with 
others. Therefore, being in the world was social in nature.  
 
It is suggested, that the participants’ descriptions of waiting, illustrated in the theme 
Lost Time characterised a disruption to the publicness of world-time. In particular, the 
participants’ accounts of waiting, described in the sub theme Killing Time showed that 
the time spent waiting during haemodialysis therapy, was not a time for being-with-
others. Nor was it a time for collectively co-ordinating activities and tasks with other 
people.  
 
For instance, some participants specifically expressed their desire to talk to other 
patients in an effort to kill time during haemodialysis therapy. However, the layout and 
organisation of the dialysis unit did not facilitate communication between patients. 
                                                 
41 For example, see the accounts of Harrison (p145), Gloria (p146), Elena (p148), David (p149).  
42 See page 97 for previous discussion on world-time.  
43 See page 101 for the previous discussion on the publicness of world-time.  
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Moreover the level of nurse-patient communication rarely extended beyond a superficial 
level.44 Hence, the participants remained largely isolated during the treatment.45 These 
aspects of the participants’ accounts of killing time seemed to illustrate a disruption to 
the publicness of world-time.  
 
The participants’ experience of waiting, described in the sub theme Wasting Time also 
characterised a disruption to the publicness of world-time. The participants indicated 
that they wasted a lot of time waiting unnecessarily before and after haemodialysis 
therapy. They provided accounts of waiting for haemodialysis machines to become 
available, waiting for hospital taxis to take them to and from the hospital, and waiting 
for doctors to attend to them during treatment.46 
 
As mentioned previously, the publicness of the “now” of world-time ensured that we 
were able to collectively coordinate our tasks, activities, and practices on a daily basis. 
However, the participants’ accounts of wasting time confirmed that “now” did not 
collectively mean the same thing to the participants, as it did to the staff working in the 
healthcare system. As a result, the participants spent a lot of time waiting unnecessarily 
before and after haemodialysis therapy.  
 
For example, the participants were given a specific time to attend haemodialysis 
therapy. However, when they arrived at that specific time, their machine was 
unavailable. The lack of a structured and coordinated approach to the allocation of 
haemodialysis machines on the unit meant the nurses’ understanding of “now” did not 
correspond with the participants’ understanding of “now”. Hence, the participants were 
left waiting around until a haemodialysis machine eventually became available.47  
 
The participants who used the hospital taxi service also described their experience of 
waiting unnecessarily when they attended haemodialysis therapy. They stated that the 
hospital taxi drivers were supposed to arrive at a specific time to take them for 
haemodialysis therapy. However, it seemed “now” did not collectively mean the same 
                                                 
44 The superficial level of communication will be discussed in the upcoming theme titled Communicating 
with nurses: Myth versus Reality.    
45 For example, see the accounts of Ali (p134), David (p141), and Chris (p141).  
46 See page 144 for the sub theme Wasting Time.  
47 For example, see the accounts of Harrison (p145), Alex (p146), Gloria (p146), Amy (p147). 
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thing to the participants and the taxi drivers. Therefore, the drivers would arrive either 
too early or too late to take the participants to dialysis. If the driver arrived early, the 
participant had to wait for a machine when they got to the unit. Conversely, if the driver 
arrived late, the participant would be left waiting at home.48  
 
By using the publicness of the “now” to collectively coordinate our tasks and activities 
on a daily basis ensured that a breakdown in our everyday activities was avoided 
(Heidegger, 1962). However, the valuable time wasted, as a result of waiting 
unnecessarily for dialysis machines, taxi drivers, and doctors made it difficult for the 
participants to coordinate their everyday activities and lives around haemodialysis 
therapy. Consequently, it is suggested that the participants’ experience of waiting, 
described in the sub theme Wasting Time created a disruption to the publicness of 
world-time.  
 
The above discussion highlighted how the participants’ experience of waiting, contained 
in the theme Lost Time may have created a disruption to the four features of world-time. 
The defining features of originary temporality were retained in world-time. Indeed, 
world-time actually constituted the originary present. It is for this reason, that a 
disruption in world-time may have precipitated a disruption to originary temporality. 
The disruption to world-time and originary temporality caused by the participants’ 
experience of waiting symbolised various characteristics of Heidegger’s (1995) 
description of boredom.  
 
 
According to Heidegger (1962), boredom was a fundamental existential mood, which 
highlighted the finitude of one’s existence.49 He identified three forms of boredom, 
which ranged from the most superficial to the most profound. The third form of 
boredom was the most profound because it disclosed Dasein’s finite existence. 
Therefore, the third form of boredom was the origin of the other two forms of boredom. 
Heidegger (1995) said that we all had an uneasy awareness of the experience of 
profound boredom within ourselves. It was this awareness, which alerted us to escape 
from the first and second forms of boredom.   
                                                 
48 For example, see the accounts of Carl (p151) & Jeff (p151).  
49 See page 125 for Heidegger’s analysis of boredom as an existential mood.  
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The unpleasant awareness of our finite existence, which was most profound in the third 
form of boredom, was also retained in both the first and second forms of boredom. This 
awareness was superficial in the first form of boredom, but more intense in the second 
form. Thus, the second form of boredom was described as being more profound or 
intense than the first. By fleeing from the first and second forms of boredom, we were 
ultimately trying to avoid oscillating into the third and most profound form of boredom. 
However, if for some reason, we were unable to flee from either the first or second form 
of boredom, we were drawn into profound boredom, and were subsequently confronted 
with the finitude of our existence.  
 
It is suggested that the participants’ relentless experience of waiting, described in the 
theme Lost Time meant they were unable to flee from the first and second form of 
boredom. Hence, they were drawn into the third and most profound form of boredom, 
described by Heidegger (1995). In the following discussion, the three forms of boredom 
will be analysed in relation to the theme Lost Time.   
 
4.1.3.1 The First Form of Boredom 
 
According to Heidegger (1995), the first form of boredom involved “becoming bored by 
something” (p78).  For example, we may become bored by certain things, such as a 
book, a play, or a prolonged wait for a flight, bus, or train.  Time dragged in this type of 
boredom because we were bound in a situation, which was limited in extrinsic 
stimulation (Heidegger, 1995) . Therefore, the cause of boredom came from outside and 
was obvious (Aho, 2007).  
 
Heidegger (1995) stated that when we were forced to wait in a particular situation, we 
experienced the first form of boredom. The theme Lost Time highlighted that the 
participants had to repeatedly endure the experience of waiting each time they attended 
haemodialysis therapy.50 Patients with ESRD require haemodialysis therapy in order to 
survive. Therefore, the participants had no choice but to endure the distressing 
experience of waiting each time they attended the haemodialysis unit for treatment.  
                                                 
50 See page 132 for the theme Lost Time.  
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In the first form of boredom, the time became long and seemed to pass slowly or drag 
(Heidegger, 1995). Therefore, the person tried to do things in an effort pass the time and 
get rid of the boredom. According to Heidegger (1995), “passing the time is a driving 
away of boredom that drives time on”(p93).  
           
The participants’ narratives in the sub theme Killing Time conveyed that time dragged 
during haemodialysis therapy. The strategies they used were insufficient to kill time for 
the entire duration of haemodialysis therapy. Hence, they spent a large proportion of 
time merely waiting for the treatment to end.51  
  
The participants described their experience of watching the clock, while they waited for 
the treatment to end.52 The impatience, uneasiness, irritation, and frustration were 
expressed within their accounts of killing time. The participants’ predominant focus on 
clock time was also illustrated in their accounts of wasting time before and after dialysis 
therapy.53  
 
According to Heidegger (1995), in the first form of boredom the person watched the 
clock. However, watching the clock was not a way or means of passing the time, such 
as reading a book, or watching television. Rather, watching the clock was a sign that our 
efforts to pass the time were not successful. Therefore, boredom continued to torment 
us, and our impatience and uneasiness verified this fact (Heidegger, 1995). By watching 
the clock, we were trying to gauge how much time was left before the wait was finally 
over. As Heidegger (1995) indicated, “It is not a matter of simply spending time but of 
killing it, of making it pass more quickly” (p97). 
  
Heidegger (1995) described two structural moments or features of the first form of 
boredom: being held in limbo, and being left empty. In the first form of boredom, we 
were held in limbo by time as it dragged for a particular duration. For instance, when 
we waited for the train, we were held in limbo by the dragging of time until the train 
                                                 
51 For example, see the accounts of Ali (p134), Nancy (p135), Alex (p138), and Donna (p139).   
52 For example, see the accounts of Gloria (p137), Donna (p139), David (p141), and Elena (p140).   
53 For example, see the accounts of Harrison (p145), Alex (p146), Gloria (p146).   
 160
arrived. Likewise, while the participants waited for haemodialysis to end, they were 
held in limbo by the dragging of time.  
 
When Heidegger (1995) claimed that we were held in limbo by time as it dragged in the 
first form of boredom, he meant that we were held back from the everyday activities, 
which we normally performed in world-time. If we recall, world-time referred to the 
person’s qualitative experience of time in its everyday involvements in the world. In 
particular, it was the time that contained the everyday activities performed by the 
person. World-time actually constituted the originary present, and was thus embedded 
in originary temporality.  
 
The person performed activities in world-time (originary present) in-order-to project 
forward into possibilities in the originary future.  Therefore, the everyday activities 
performed by the person in world-time were full, in that they had a specific purpose or 
outcome (Heidegger, 1995).  The person was fully occupied with these activities and 
absorbed him/herself within them on a daily basis.  
 
Conversely, the things and activities used by the person to kill time when trying to drive 
away the first form of boredom, were not the same as the absorbed, everyday activities 
performed in world-time (Heidegger, 1995). The person did not really have a vested 
interest in the activities s/he did to pass the time, nor was s/he focused on the outcome 
of the activity. Hence, the activities used by the person to pass the time were essentially 
empty. They were merely used as a way to keep the person occupied. Therefore, when 
the person was held in limbo by time as it dragged in the first form of boredom, s/he 
was also left empty by the things and activities used to pass the time (Heidegger, 1995).  
 
The participants’ accounts in my study signified that the activities they used to kill time 
during haemodialysis therapy were not the same as the absorbed, activities they 
performed in their everyday lives. The activities they used to kill time did not have a 
specific outcome or purpose. They were simply performed by the participants to pass 
the time during the treatment. As a result, it seemed that the participants were left empty 
by these activities. Indeed, their accounts indicated that the activities they performed did 
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not effectively kill time for the entire duration of haemodialysis therapy.54 Therefore, 
because of being held in limbo by the dragging of time, the participants were also left 
empty by the activities they used to kill time, while they waited for haemodialysis to 
end.  
 
Heidegger (1995) claimed that particular things or events have their particular time. 
This was previously mentioned in the discussion on world-time.55 If we recall, 
significance was one of the defining features of world-time. World-time was significant 
because the person always understood the “now” as either the right time or wrong time 
to do certain things. Therefore, the “nows” of world-time were significant because they 
were either appropriate or inappropriate for certain activities. For example, “now” while 
I am doing this work on the computer, is not the right time for watching television.  
 
Heidegger (1995) stated that the first form of boredom occurred when the person 
exceeded the appropriate time for a particular thing. When the person exceeded the time 
that was appropriate for a specific thing, s/he was held in limbo and left empty. For 
instance, when our train was delayed, we exceeded the time that we expected to be in 
the train station. Until the train arrived, the train station offered us nothing. As a result, 
the train station both held us in limbo and left us empty until the train arrived.  
 
The participants’ accounts of waiting, presented in the sub theme Wasting Time 
highlighted that they spent a large proportion of time waiting unnecessarily before and 
after haemodialysis therapy.56 As a result, the time spent in the dialysis unit greatly 
exceeded the actual treatment time. This additional time spent waiting held the 
participants back from their everyday lives and activities. Consequently, the 
haemodialysis unit offered them nothing, and essentially left them empty, while they 
waited before and after the treatment.   
  
The first form of boredom, advanced by Heidegger was a transient form of boredom 
(Aho, 2007). As soon as the train arrived, we escaped the boredom of the railway 
station. However, the participants’ descriptions of waiting, described in the theme Lost 
                                                 
54 For example, see the accounts of Nancy (p135), Donna (p139), Elena (p140), and David (p141). 
55 See page 97 for the discussion on world-time. 
56 For example, see the accounts of Harrison (p145), David (p149), Elena (p148), and Nancy (p150).  
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Time suggested that their experience of waiting was not transient. They had to 
repeatedly endure the distressing experience of waiting each time they attended the 
hospital for haemodialysis therapy. As a result, they were continuously held back from 
their everyday activities, and subsequently endured a disruption to world-time.  
 
The participants’ experience of repeatedly waiting when they attended haemodialysis 
therapy implied they were unable to flee from the first form of boredom. Therefore, it is 
proposed that the participants oscillated into the second, and more profound form of 
boredom, described by Heidegger (1995).    
 
4.1.3.2 The Second Form of Boredom 
 
Heidegger (1995) stated that the second form of boredom was more profound than the 
first. It involved “being bored with something” (p106). However, unlike the first form 
of boredom, it was something indeterminate and unfamiliar, which seemed to cause the 
second form of boredom (Heidegger, 1995). The something indeterminate and 
unfamiliar that caused the second form of boredom was the standing of world-time. 
Therefore, in the second form of boredom, we were held in limbo by the standing of 
world-time (Heidegger, 1995).   
 
According to Heidegger (1995) our passing the time was somehow repressed in the 
second form of boredom. For some reason, we were not able to move freely and get into 
activities like we did to pass the time in the first form of boredom (Heidegger, 1995). 
Heidegger (1995) used the example of being invited somewhere for the evening, to 
exemplify how our passing the time could be suppressed in the second form of 
boredom. For instance, when we were at the evening invitation, our ability to freely pass 
the time e.g. by pacing up and down, reading a book, watching television, was 
suppressed because of the social rules of politeness, which governed the situation 
(Heidegger, 1995).  
 
The participants’ descriptions of waiting, presented in the sub theme Killing Time 
highlighted how their efforts to kill time were suppressed during haemodialysis 
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therapy.57 It is suggested that this suppression culminated in the second form of 
boredom, described by Heidegger (1995). As previously mentioned, world-time referred 
to the irreversible, sequence of times called “nows”, where the present was the “now”, 
the past was the “no-longer-now” and the future was the “not-yet-now”. It was the time 
that contained the activities performed by the person in his/her everyday involvements 
in the world.58 Indeed, these activities provided world time with its irreversible 
sequence or flow. However, when these activities stopped, the flowing of world-time 
also stopped and it subsequently came to a stand.  
 
According to Heidegger (1995), when world-time came to a stand, the “now” was not 
eliminated. Rather, it did not have the possibility of a transition from a “not-yet-now” to 
a “no-longer-now”. Hence, for the duration of time that the person was unable to engage 
in his/her everyday activities, the present “now” was merely static. The person was 
forced to endure the present “now” of world-time, cut off or unbounded from the “not-
yet-now” and the “no-longer-now” (Heidegger, 1995).  
 
Heidegger (1995) used the example of the evening invitation to highlight how world-
time came to a stand in the second form of boredom. He said that while the person 
attended the evening invitation, the activities s/he normally performed in world-time 
were suspended. Therefore, the irreversible flow of world-time subsequently came to a 
stand for the duration of the evening.  
 
From Heidegger’s (1995) perspective, in our everyday understanding of time, be it 
world-time or ordinary (clock) time, time flowed. Therefore, the standing of world-time 
caused it to become something unfamiliar and indeterminate. It was this standing of 
world-time, as distinct from flowing, that was the unfamiliar and indeterminate 
“something” that bored the person in the second form of boredom. 
As previously discussed, the participants’ experience of waiting, described in the theme 
Lost Time created a disruption to the four features of world-time.59 It is suggested, that 
the disruption in world-time, caused by the participants’ experience of waiting, may 
                                                 
57 For example, see the accounts of Ali (p134), Alex (p138), Nancy (p135), Donna (p139).  
58 See page 97 for the previous discussion on world-time.  
59 See page 152 for the previous discussion on the disruption to the four features of world-time created by 
the participants’ experience of waiting, described in the sub themes Killing Time and Wasting Time.  
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have brought world-time to a stand. It is subsequently proposed that the standing of 
world-time culminated in the second form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995).   
 
Heidegger (1995) used the example of the evening invitation to illuminate the transient 
nature of the second form of boredom. He emphasised that the boredom experienced 
during the evening only lasted for the duration of time we were there. Once the evening 
was over, we would be able to flee or escape the boredom. However, if for some reason 
the person was unable to flee the second form of boredom, s/he progressed into the third 
and most profound form of boredom (Heidegger, 1995).  
 
The participants in the study had to repeatedly endure the experience of waiting each 
time they attended haemodialysis therapy. This implied that they were unable to 
overcome the standing of world-time, and were subsequently unable to flee or escape 
from the second form of boredom. Therefore, it is proposed that the participants’ 
inability to escape from the second form of boredom may have caused them to advance 
into the third and most profound form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995).   
 
4.1.3.3 The Third Form of Boredom  
 
Heidegger (1995) claimed that the third form of boredom was the most profound kind 
of boredom. He said “profound boredom bores when we say, or better, whenever we 
silently know, that it is boring for one” (p134).  
 
In the third form of boredom, Dasein was held in limbo by the suspension of time. 
However, the time that related to profound boredom was different from our normal, 
everyday understanding of time, as ordinary (clock) or world-time. Instead Heidegger 
(1995) claimed that in profound boredom “time entrances [bannt] Dasein, not as the 
time which has remained standing as distinct from flowing, but rather the time beyond 
such flowing and its standing, the time which in each case Dasein itself as a whole is” 
(p147). The third and most profound form of boredom was caused by the suspension of 
originary temporality (Haar, 1999). Therefore, the time Heidegger referred to in the 
quote above was the threefold structure of originary temporality.  
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In order to understand the third form of boredom, we must replace our understanding of 
time as ordinary or world-time, with Heidegger’s (1962) notion of originary 
temporality.60 If we recall, originary temporality was composed of an “ecstatic” unity 
that consisted of the future, past, and present. We acted in the originary present, based 
on our affectedness from the originary past, to project forward into possibilities in the 
originary future. In the third, and most profound form of boredom, originary temporality 
was suspended or stopped. Profound boredom took apart the synthesis of originary 
temporality (Haar, 1999). As a result, the past and future became detached from the 
present ecstases of originary temporality.  
 
It seemed that the participants’ inability to flee the first and second forms of boredom 
caused them to progress into the third form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995). 
As previously highlighted, the participants’ experience of waiting, described in the 
theme Lost Time created a disruption to world-time.61 Now world-time was embedded 
within the unified structure of originary temporality, and constituted the present ecstases 
of originary temporality. The person performed his/her everyday activities and actions 
in world-time (the originary present) to project forward into possibilities in the originary 
future. Therefore, a disruption to world-time subsequently culminated in a disruption to 
originary temporality.  
 
When world-time was disrupted, the person was no longer acting in the originary 
present to project forward into possibilities in the future. Therefore, originary 
temporality was also suspended or stopped. It is proposed, that the disruption to world-
time created by the participants’ experience of persistently waiting, resulted in a 
disruption in the threefold structure of originary temporality. This caused the suspension 
of originary temporality, which culminated in profound boredom.  
 
In profound boredom, we were held in limbo by the suspension of originary temporality 
(Heidegger, 1995). Heidegger indicated that when we were held in limbo by the 
suspension of originary temporality, we were held back from our own possibilities in 
life; we were held back from our past and future; and finally we were held back from 
                                                 
60 Refer to page 93 for the previous discussion on Heidegger’s notion of originary temporality.  
61 See page 152 for the discussion on the disruption to world-time created by the participants’ experience 
of repeatedly waiting when they attended haemodialysis therapy.  
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the time we were familiar with in our everyday involvements in the world i.e. world-
time (Haar, 1999).  
 
As a result of being held in limbo by the suspension of originary temporality, we were 
forced to recognise and endure empty time (Haar, 1999).  When originary temporality 
was suspended, the past and future became isolated from the originary present. This did 
not mean that the past and future disappeared, or were permanently removed. It simply 
implied that their defining features within the unified structure of originary temporality 
were suspended (Haar, 1999).  
 
The disintegration in the ecstatic unity of originary temporality forced the present 
ecstases to stretch and lengthen itself to fill the entire time horizon (Hoffman, 2005). In 
other words, the present extended to fill the void left by the other two ecstases. 
However, without the defining features of the originary past and future, the extended 
present also lost its defining features. Therefore, it became characterised by inaction, 
and the person was forced to recognise and endure empty time (Haar, 1999). The empty 
present led to nothing but a repetition of the same present (Haar, 1999).  
 
Because time was essentially empty, everything seemed empty when we experienced 
profound boredom. The empty time of boredom was not related to our past or future. 
Therefore, while we remained trapped in this empty time, everything seemed to be 
without value and indifferent to us (Haar, 1999). 
 
The participants’ descriptions of waiting, presented in the theme Lost Time suggested 
they were held in limbo by the suspension of originary temporality. For instance, the 
participants’ descriptions of Killing Time and Wasting Time implied that they were 
unable to do anything productive while they waited relentlessly. The time spent waiting 
was unrelated to their everyday lives and prevented them from engaging in their 
everyday activities. Therefore, they were not acting in world-time (i.e. the originary 
present) to project forward into possibilities in the originary future. Instead, the time 
spent waiting when the participants attended haemodialysis therapy was characteristic 
of the empty time of profound boredom, described by Heidegger (1995). Moreover, 
they had to repeatedly endure the empty time of profound boredom every time they 
attended haemodialysis therapy.  
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According to Heidegger, the suspension of originary temporality in profound boredom 
paradoxically illuminated the threefold structure of originary temporality to Dasein 
(Hoffman, 2005). When the threefold structure of originary temporality was suspended, 
it stood still and time appeared to be unreasonably long (Haar, 1999).  
 
Heidegger (1995) claimed that: 
In boredom, Langeweile, the while [Weile] becomes long [lang]. Which 
while? Any short while? No, but rather the while whilst Dasein is as 
such, the while that measures out that tarrying awhile [Verweilen] which 
is allotted to Dasein as such, i.e., the while whilst it is to be in the midst 
of these beings... (p152). 
 
Therefore, the while that became long in profound boredom, was the whole while in 
which Dasein existed. In other words, profound boredom illuminated the time 
embedded in Dasein’s existence, i.e. the time that stretched from birth to death 
(Hoffman, 2005).  
 
However, by highlighting the “long while” in which Dasein existed, profound boredom 
ultimately disclosed the shortness of Dasein’s existence (Hoffman, 2005). Therefore, 
the long while that was disclosed through profound boredom actually turned out to be a 
“short while” - the short while that is allotted to Dasein’s finite existence. As Heidegger 
(1995) conveyed: “It is this whole while-and yet a short while; and so every Dasein in 
turn is a short while” (p152).  
 
By illuminating the unified structure of originary temporality, profound boredom served 
to disclose the finitude of Dasein’s existence. This confronted Dasein with the [non-
chronological] shortness of “its” time (Hoffman, 2005). It was this confrontation with 
the shortness or finitude of existence, which entranced, or oppressed Dasein in profound 
boredom. It highlighted to Dasein that its time was running out (Hoffman, 2005).  
 
By disclosing the finite existence of Dasein, profound boredom subsequently gave one 
the irritating, or distressing feeling of wasting time (Haar, 1999).  The feeling of 
wasting time arose because in boredom, Dasein realised that it was wasting the finite 
time allotted to its existence. The experience of wasting time also occurred in the 
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second form of boredom. However, Dasein was not explicitly aware of the existential 
issue that lay beneath the experience of wasting time, in this second form of boredom.  
 
The distressing experience of wasting time was explicitly contained in the participants’ 
descriptions of waiting, contained in the sub theme Wasting Time.62 However, it was 
also inherently contained within the participants’ descriptions of Killing Time, while 
they waited for haemodialysis therapy to end. While the participants waited for 
haemodialysis to end, they did nothing productive. Therefore, the unpleasant experience 
of wasting time was embedded in their accounts.63 
 
According to Heidegger (1995), the moment when Dasein’s finite time was disclosed by 
profound boredom was the moment of vision. It was the decisive moment where Dasein 
was prompted to make a decision in relation to “its” time, which could turn the disunity 
of originary temporality into unity.  
 
By confronting Dasein with the finitude of existence, profound boredom prompted it to 
live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence.64 In the inauthentic mode of 
existence, Dasein absorbed itself in the everyday tasks and activities it performed in 
world-time to avoid facing the finitude of existence. Conversely, in the inauthentic 
mode of existence, Dasein embraced the finitude of its existence, and was subsequently 
able to project forward into possibilities in life.  
 
It seemed that the profound boredom caused by the participants’ experience of waiting, 
expressed in the theme Lost Time, confronted them with the finitude of their existence. 
This prompted them to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. 
However, the persistent nature of the participants’ experience of waiting each time they 
attended haemodialysis therapy meant they were unable to live in either mode of 
existence.  
 
 
 
                                                 
62 For example, see the accounts of Harrison (p145), Elena (p148), Gloria (p146), Carl (p151).  
63 For example, see the accounts of Nancy (p135), Elena (p140), David (p141), Chris (p141).  
64 See page 125-126 for a detailed account of both modes of existence.  
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If we recall, the inability to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence 
in response to boredom created a disruption in the threefold structure of originary 
temporality. Furthermore, it culminated in the unpleasant and distressing moods we 
experience on an everyday basis e.g. uneasiness, irritation, frustration, anger, and 
despair.65 These distressing moods were portrayed in the participants’ accounts of 
waiting, contained in the theme Lost Time.66   
 
For most of the participants, the ongoing experience of waiting each time they attended 
their treatment meant they continually failed to live in either mode of existence. As a 
result, the distressing moods, which accompanied their experience of waiting continued 
to intensify to the level of despair.    
 
Conversely, the follow-up interview illustrated that a small number of participants were 
able to live in the inauthentic mode of existence in response to profound boredom. For 
instance, Chris had developed new strategies to pass the time during haemodialysis 
therapy.67 He had commenced a course in computer networks within the last year and 
spent the time during haemodialysis therapy working, and watching DVDs on his laptop 
computer. Therefore, he was no longer spending his time during haemodialysis therapy 
merely waiting for the treatment to end. Instead, Chris was performing activities during 
the treatment, which were significant in relation to his everyday life. This enabled him 
to view the time during haemodialysis therapy as being more productive.  
 
Another participant, Carl also expressed his ability to overcome the experience of 
waiting unnecessarily when he attended haemodialysis therapy.68 Carl said that when he 
initially started haemodialysis therapy, he had wasted a lot of time waiting for a hospital 
taxi to take him to and from treatment. To avoid waiting unnecessarily before and after 
haemodialysis therapy, Carl started driving himself to and from the hospital. By 
organising his own transport, Carl was able to avoid wasting valuable time, waiting 
needlessly for the hospital taxi. More importantly, he was able to return to work on a 
full-time basis.  
                                                 
65 See page 127-128 for the discussion on the person’s inability to live in either mode of existence.  
66 For example, see the accounts of “killing time” by Nancy (p135), Donna (p139), Alex (p138) and the 
accounts of “wasting time” by Harrison, (p145), Alex (p146), Elena (p148), David (p149).  
67 Refer to page 142 for Chris’s account.  
68 Refer to page 151 for Carl’s account.   
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Similarly, Jeff recalled his experience of wasting time, waiting for the hospital taxi to 
take him to the haemodialysis unit.69 By organising his own transport, Jeff was also able 
to overcome the distressing experience of wasting time.  
 
It is suggested, that the participants’ ability to live in the inauthentic mode of existence, 
enabled them to resolve the disruption in world-time caused by their experience of 
waiting. It also enabled them to reconnect the threefold structure of originary 
temporality, and alleviate the distressing moods caused by their experience of waiting. 
Finally, the ability to reconnect the unified structure of originary temporality also 
enabled them to overcome profound boredom.  
 
4.1.4 SUMMARY OF THEME 
 
Within this theme, the participants’ experience of waiting when they attended 
haemodialysis therapy was discussed. The excessive time spent waiting prevented the 
participants from engaging in their everyday activities, and was interpreted as Lost 
Time.  The theme Lost Time was constituted by two sub themes: Killing Time and 
Wasting Time. The participants described their attempts to kill time, while they waited 
for haemodialysis therapy to end. They also illustrated their experience of wasting time 
waiting unnecessarily before and after haemodialysis therapy.  
 
It was proposed that the participants’ persistent experience of waiting created a 
disruption to the characteristic features of world-time and originary temporality, 
advanced by Heidegger (1962). This subsequently culminated in the existential mood of 
boredom, also depicted by Heidegger (1995). As an existential mood, boredom 
disclosed the possibility of death to the participants. This prompted them to live in 
either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. However, the relentless nature of 
the participants’ experience of waiting meant they were unable to live in either mode of 
existence.  
 
                                                 
69 Refer to page 151 for Jeff’s account.   
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The inability to live in either mode of existence created a disruption to the threefold 
structure of originary temporality. In addition, it culminated in a range of distressing 
moods, such as uneasiness, irritation, frustration, and anger. For most of the 
participants, the ongoing experience of waiting meant they were continuously unable to 
live in either mode of existence.  This resulted in the acceleration of the distressing 
moods, which accompanied their experience of waiting.    
 
In contrast, the follow-up interview showed that a small number of participants were 
able to live in the inauthentic mode of existence when faced with the possibility of 
death. These participants were able to reconnect the unified structure of originary 
temporality and ease their distress. Moreover, they were able to overcome the profound 
boredom caused by the experience of waiting.  
 
Because of the participants’ disheartening experience of waiting each time they attended 
haemodialysis therapy, several looked forward to receiving a kidney transplant. A 
successful kidney transplant offered the participants the possibility of freedom from the 
restrictions and limitations imposed on their lives by haemodialysis therapy. Moreover, 
it provided them with a potential escape from the distressing experience of waiting 
when they attended their treatment.   
 
However, in order to receive a kidney transplant, the participants had to be placed on 
the transplant waiting list until a suitable donor match became available. For most of the 
participants, this took a substantial amount of time. Hence, the experience of waiting for 
a kidney transplant was significant for the participants in this study. This experience 
will now be discussed in the next section.    
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4.2 THEME 2 - WAITING FOR A KIDNEY TRANSPLANT 
 
The experience of waiting for a kidney transplant was significant for the participants in 
the study. The theme Waiting for a Kidney Transplant consisted of three sub themes:  
 
1. Living in Hope 
2. Uncertainty 
3. Being on Hold 
 
Many participants described their experience of living in hope, while they waited for a 
kidney transplant. The hope of a transplant offered the participants the possibility of 
returning to a normal life in the future. It also enabled them to live through the adversity 
of life on haemodialysis therapy. The healthcare professionals informed the participants 
of the average waiting time for a kidney transplant. Based on this information, the 
participants believed they would receive a transplant within a specific duration of time. 
Therefore, when they exceeded this duration, they became increasingly uncertain.  
 
The uncertainty of waiting indefinitely for a kidney transplant meant that some 
participants were unable to contemplate possibilities in the future. Moreover, the 
lifestyle disruptions caused by haemodialysis therapy prevented them from performing 
many of the activities they took for granted in the past. Consequently, the participants 
described their experience of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant.  
 
The follow-up interview showed that a small number of participants were able to 
overcome the experience of being on hold. The ability to participate in normal, 
everyday activities was a significant factor in this process. It enabled the participants to 
get on with their lives, while waiting for a kidney transplant.  The three sub themes 
Living in Hope, Uncertainty, and Being on Hold, will now be discussed with the 
accompanying narratives of the participants.  
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4.2.1 SUB THEME 1 - LIVING IN HOPE 
 
Several participants described their experience of living in hope, while they waited for a 
kidney transplant. The hope of a kidney transplant provided the participants with the 
possibility of returning to a normal life in the future. In addition, it provided them with 
the strength to endure the experience of being a renal patient. The information received 
from healthcare professionals in relation to the average waiting time for a kidney 
transplant, contributed to the participants experience of living in hope. They assumed 
they would receive a transplant within a specific length of time.   
 
Embedded in the participants’ accounts of living in hope, was their predominant focus 
on clock and calendar time. It is suggested that the participants concentrated on clock 
and calendar time in an effort to get through the days, weeks, months, and years until 
the wait for a transplant was finally over.  
 
For instance, at the time of the first interview with Jeff, he had been on haemodialysis 
therapy for one year. He said that when he first commenced haemodialysis therapy, his 
consultant informed him that he would probably receive a kidney transplant within a 
short duration of time. From this information, Jeff understood haemodialysis to be a 
temporary problem, which would be alleviated by a kidney transplant.  Therefore, Jeff 
described his experience of living in hope, while he waited for a kidney transplant. 
Beneath Jeff’s account of waiting, was his predominant focus on clock and calendar 
time.  
Jeff stated: 
 
Doctor ____ came down and said that they [medical team] would work 
me up for a transplant as quick as possible…So I got a line fitted and I 
was on dialysis...I don’t really mind dialysis because I know it’s going to 
be short-term, well I hope it’s going to be short term anyway. It takes up 
a lot of time so it does, there’s three days of the week gone, I don’t get 
home now until eleven or half eleven at night…I sort of dealt with it 
[haemodialysis] pretty quickly, because they’re [healthcare team] all so 
good and Doctor ______ said I would get a transplant quickly, so it all 
happened so fast. They were taking the blood for the tissue type to get it 
to [hospital laboratory] straight away, and I just felt that I wouldn’t be 
on dialysis for too long. (13/1) 
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Like Jeff, another participant Danny also described his experience of living in hope 
while he waited for a kidney transplant. In the first interview with Danny, he was on 
haemodialysis for one year and seven months. He described how the relentless regime 
of haemodialysis therapy made him contemplate skipping the treatment. However, the 
hope of eventually receiving a kidney transplant enabled Danny to get through life on 
haemodialysis therapy. Consequently, he used the analogy of the “light at the end of the 
tunnel” to illustrate his experience of living in hope, while he waited for a transplant.    
 
Seeing other patients being called for a transplant and leave the dialysis unit contributed 
to Danny’s experience of hope. These patients served to reassure him that one day he 
would also be called for a transplant.   
 
This was Danny’s account:   
The hope that the phone will ring one day and that I’ll get a transplant, 
and that life will be completely normal, well almost, then at least I won’t 
have to come in here three evenings a week…I know I’ll be on 
medication but at least I’ll be able to come and go and be more 
normal…it is that [hope of a transplant] that keeps me going…some 
days I think I can’t be bothered going in for dialysis but then I know it’s 
a stupid thing to do, but the thought has crossed my mind, but then other 
days, I think well at least there is a light at the end of the tunnel…even 
more so now after being here [on dialysis unit] and seeing people going 
off and getting their transplants…it’s great to see patients who get their 
kidney and are off dialysis…good for them…one of these days the phone 
is going to ring [for me]…it is that bit of hope that keeps you going. 
(7/1) 
 
 
Other participants used Danny’s analogy of the light at the end of the tunnel to 
characterise their experience of hope, while they waited for a kidney transplant. This 
hope enabled the participants to tolerate everyday life on haemodialysis therapy.  
For example, in the first interview with Liz, she had been on haemodialysis for two 
years and nine months. It had taken Liz over a year to get her name on the transplant 
list, as she had been overweight. According to the Department of Organ Procurement 
and Transplantation in Ireland, the Body Mass Index (BMI) of the person had to be 
below 32 before s/he was considered for transplantation. Consequently, Liz was above 
this BMI figure, and it had taken her a while to lose weight before her name was entered 
onto the transplant list.  
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At the time of our first interview, Liz had been on the transplant waiting list for one 
year and eight months. She described her experience of living in hope, while she waited 
for a kidney transplant:  
Hopefully I’ll get a kidney soon and that’ll be the end of it [dialysis], 
you always live in hope…there’s light at the end of the tunnel, there’s 
hope there…because coming in here [to dialysis] you meet patients and 
they get their transplants and it gives you great hope to see someone 
getting a transplant. (15/1) 
 
 
I asked Liz what she would like to do if she received a kidney transplant and she 
replied: 
Oh I’d be able to spend more time with my children, and do things…just 
to have freedom…not to be thinking about coming in here all the time. 
You go to bed at night and say “oh dialysis tomorrow” and the kids are 
even beginning to say to me “dialysis tomorrow mam”. (15/1) 
 
 
Liz’s account emphasised the loss of freedom she experienced due to the restrictions of 
haemodialysis therapy.  Therefore, by receiving a kidney transplant, she hoped she 
would be freed from the confines of dialysis therapy and allowed to spend more time 
with her children. Liz’s account signified that she predominantly focused on clock and 
calendar time, while she waited for a kidney transplant.  
 
Similarly, Alex also confirmed that the hope of a kidney transplant enabled him to 
remain positive about life on haemodialysis therapy. Before he commenced 
haemodialysis therapy, Alex used to attend the outpatients department of the hospital 
for monitoring of his kidney function. While he waited to see his doctors, he had the 
opportunity to talk to patients who had received kidney transplants, and were living 
normal lives. 
 
These patients provided Alex with a positive outlook on kidney transplantation, which 
enabled him to remain upbeat about haemodialysis therapy. His narrative epitomised the 
belief that haemodialysis was a short-term problem, which would be alleviated by a 
kidney transplant.  
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I’d met people who had transplants and I realised it’s [dialysis] actually 
not as bad as I thought it was…I met one guy who had a transplant 
twenty five years ago and it’s still working fine, the average is sixteen 
years and to hear that, it’s not bad…that’s the way I looked at it, if 
someone said you could have twenty five years fairly relatively trouble 
free, it’s not too bad…it’s [dialysis] a bit uncomfortable for maybe a 
year or two but after that, if I look after myself and if luck is on my side 
it [kidney transplantation] can go well. (3/1) 
 
 
David’s account, like those shared by the other participants, reflected the theme of 
waiting as living in hope. In the first interview with David, he had been on 
haemodialysis therapy for one year. When he commenced haemodialysis therapy, the 
healthcare team informed him that he would be eligible to receive a kidney transplant.  
Therefore, he was waiting for an appointment for a pre-transplant medical assessment, 
which would allow him entry to the transplant waiting list. David’s account exemplified 
how the perspective of clock and calendar time was ingrained within his experience of 
living in hope. 
He said: 
You’re living in hope [of getting a transplant], you just feel like it could 
be tomorrow, it could be a year from tomorrow, it could be any 
day…That’s the way I think, it [the transplant] will happen but you have 
to wait. (9/1) 
 
 
The possibility of eventually receiving a kidney transplant enabled David to maintain a 
positive outlook on haemodialysis therapy. Indeed, he even described the gratitude he 
felt toward the haemodialysis machine for allowing him to survive.  
It’s [dialysis] not bad, I don’t feel it’s really bad, and aren’t we very 
lucky that we have something that’s keeping us alive, if we hadn’t 
dialysis, where would we be, there was a time that there was no dialysis 
and what did people do…just die, so aren’t we lucky. (9/1)  
 
 
At the time of the first interview with Carl, he had been on haemodialysis therapy for 
one month. He seemed uncomfortable being attached to the machine and was not very 
talkative during the interview. However, in the follow-up interview, Carl had been on 
haemodialysis therapy for one year and one month. He appeared much more settled in 
the environment of the haemodialysis unit and talked in detail about his experience.  
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Carl described his experience of living in hope, while he waited for a kidney transplant. 
He had been aware for two years before he commenced dialysis therapy that his kidney 
function was deteriorating. Consequently, his name was entered on the transplant 
waiting list about five months before he began the treatment.  He said that he had met 
and talked with other patients who had successful kidney transplants.  This enabled Carl 
to remain hopeful of eventually returning to a normal life.   
I’m still waiting, I’m on it [the transplant list] nearly a year and a 
half…but it’s going grand now, hearing about people getting it 
[transplant] is encouraging while you’re waiting for it…I was talking to 
a few people that had transplants, I have a neighbour who had a 
transplant and he was telling me about it …I see him there and he’s 
working away and flying around the place. I had seen him before he got 
his kidney and he was in a bad state, he’s in his fifties and he was very 
down and weak, and you see him now and he’s working away and 
driving, it’s grand to see that, it gives you a lot of hope that you could be 
like that as well, he has his life back and all his time to himself again. 
(5/2)      
 
 
In both interviews with Ali, he signified that the hope of receiving a kidney transplant 
enabled him to tolerate the relentless regime of haemodialysis therapy.  Ali was fifty-
five years of age and had first commenced haemodialysis therapy when he was twenty-
two. He received his first kidney transplant within two years. However, the transplant 
failed after just six weeks, initiating a return to dialysis therapy. Ali then received 
another transplant thirteen years later, which functioned for seventeen years.   
 
The following narrative was taken from the follow-up interview with Ali, when he had 
been on haemodialysis therapy for three years. He was not yet on the transplant waiting 
list, but was going through the pre-transplant assessment process.  Like the other 
participants, Ali’s narrative highlighted his focus on clock and calendar time, while he 
waited to eventually receive a kidney transplant. 
Well they’re doing the work up [pre-transplant assessment] at the 
moment, and actually this day week I’ll be having my stress test…and all 
the other tests are done, so if the stress test was over, please God I 
should be getting on it [waiting list] then, I should hear from 
____[transplant unit] hopefully within the next month or so…that’s 
providing of course that I’ll pass the stress test, but hopefully I will…I’m 
absolutely delighted…If you’re on the list there’s hope, there’s light at 
the end of the tunnel. (2/2)  
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The follow-up interview with some participants illuminated that their experience of 
living in hope changed to uncertainty overtime. This change in their experience was 
incorporated in the following sub theme titled Uncertainty.  
 
4.2.2 SUB THEME 2 - UNCERTAINTY  
 
Many participants described the experience of uncertainty, while they waited for a 
kidney transplant. The participants’ accounts specifically conveyed how the information 
they had received from the healthcare team about the average waiting time for a kidney 
transplant, contributed to their uncertainty. It was normal practice for the healthcare 
team to inform patients of the average length of time they could expect to wait for a 
kidney transplant. This information was mostly given at the time of the participants’ 
diagnosis with ESRD, and offered hope at this particularly difficult time. 
 
It is important to point out that the average waiting time for a kidney transplant is 
merely an estimate, and many patients wait well beyond this time frame. However, it 
seemed that several of the participants interpreted the average waiting time to mean the 
“actual” waiting time for a kidney transplant. While this belief allowed the participants 
to live in hope as they initially waited for a kidney transplant, it did not sustain their 
hope in the long-term. When the participants either reached or exceeded the “expected” 
date for a kidney transplant, they became uncertain.  
 
When confronted with uncertainty, the participants became increasingly concerned 
about their possibilities for the future. Without a definite endpoint to the wait for a 
kidney transplant, they began to recognise that haemodialysis therapy was not the 
temporary problem they had initially anticipated. Indeed, beneath the participants’ 
accounts was the dismal possibility that they might never receive a kidney transplant. 
Thus, the distressing feelings of sadness, disappointment, hopelessness, and despair 
were threaded throughout their narratives.   
 
Some participants illustrated their experience of uncertainty in the first interview. At the 
time of the interview, these participants had already reached, or exceeded the average 
waiting time for a kidney transplant. Conversely, other participants described their 
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experience of uncertainty in the follow-up interview. Their narratives illuminated how 
their experience of living hope had changed to uncertainty overtime.  
 
As a result of the uncertainty of waiting indefinitely for a kidney transplant, the 
participants lost trust in the healthcare team. They began to suspect, that the previous 
information they had received about the average waiting time was inaccurate.  
 
For instance, in the follow-up interview with Jeff, his previous experience of living in 
hope, while he waited for a kidney transplant had changed. If we recall, the information 
Jeff received from his consultant led him to believe that he would receive a kidney 
transplant within a short duration of time.70 However, by the time of the follow-up 
interview, Jeff had been waiting almost two years for a kidney transplant. Therefore, he 
was becoming increasingly uncertain about his possibilities in the future.   
 
Jeff’s account signified that he had expected to wait between twelve to eighteen months 
for a kidney transplant. However, since he had exceeded this duration, Jeff’s despair 
was apparent, as he began to wonder if there would ever be an end to haemodialysis 
therapy.  
Jeff recounted:  
Well in the beginning, I was told that the average waiting list [for a 
transplant] was around twelve to eighteen months, so when I started on 
dialysis I had sort of two years left out in my head for it all to be 
over…but I’m nearly two years on dialysis now, so you just don’t 
know…it’s waiting all the time…I was told that I wouldn’t have to wait 
that long [for a transplant] at all because I was young, and I’m waiting 
nearly nineteen months now. (13/2) 
 
 
Because of Jeff’s uncertainty, the initial admiration he had towards the healthcare team 
had been replaced by mistrust and resentment. His account implied that the healthcare 
team had not addressed his misapprehensions about the waiting process for a kidney 
transplant. Correspondingly, Danny also illustrated how his experience of living in hope 
had changed to uncertainty overtime.71 According to Danny, the healthcare team had 
informed him that the average waiting time for a kidney transplant was eighteen months 
to two years. However, at the time of our follow-up interview, Danny had been on the 
                                                 
70 See page 173 for Jeff’s previous account of living in hope.  
71 See page 174 for Danny’s previous account of living in hope.  
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transplant list for two years. Consequently, the reassurance he initially obtained from 
seeing other patients receive a kidney transplant, had now turned to disappointment and 
despair, as he questioned “why not me?”  
 
In particular, Danny’s earlier perspective of a transplant, as the light at the end of the 
tunnel had been challenged, since the end of the tunnel was no longer in sight. The 
uncertainty of waiting indefinitely for a kidney transplant meant that his possibilities for 
the future had diminished. As a result, Danny was faced with the realisation that he 
might have to tolerate life on haemodialysis therapy for much longer than he had 
initially suspected.  
 
Danny implied that at the time of his diagnosis with ESRD, the healthcare team 
informed him of the average waiting time for a kidney transplant. Apart from this 
superficial information, it seemed he had received no further information and support 
during the wait. Therefore, his unrealistic beliefs about kidney transplantation were 
never rectified. Danny said:  
I thought…well because you hear the figures eighteen months to two 
years banded about, that I’d have got a transplant…and then you come 
in here [to the dialysis unit] and you talk to people and you listen to the 
patients, and you find out how long they’ve been on dialysis, and the 
figures just vary so much, you think, well it could be another couple of 
years, [it could be] a lot longer than I anticipated…When I first came to 
the clinic before I started dialysis I’d ask [the healthcare team] what 
was the average [waiting time for a transplant], and that was the figure 
I was given then, but that was like three or four years ago…the average 
wait was eighteen months to two years, but I’ve heard of people having 
transplants just after a few months, and then there’s people that have 
been waiting five to six years…It’s hard not to think “well why not 
me?”…I have days when I’ve had a bad day at work and I don’t want to 
be in dialysis…I get days when just the thought of coming here…I could 
just turn the car around and drive off home and not bother…and you 
think well how come some people…I’ve met them here, I’ve seen them 
start dialysis, I’ve seen them go and have a transplant and they’re gone, 
and I’m still here. “Why am I still here? Why am I here? Sometimes I 
think maybe I’m going to be waiting a long time, I better just get used to 
the idea. (7/2)  
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In the first interview with Liz, she presented her experience of living in hope, while she 
waited for a kidney transplant.72 In particular, seeing other patients being called for a 
transplant strengthened her experience of hope. By the time of the follow-up interview, 
Liz had received a kidney transplant one month previously. I asked her what it had been 
like to wait for a transplant for the past year, and she recalled: 
I waited almost three years [for a transplant]. At first, you’re so worked 
up after being told [by the healthcare team] you’re on the waiting list, 
you’re thinking “yea, great, great”, and then after a few years, you think 
it’s never going to come…and the occasional time you might hear 
somebody got a transplant you say “will my day ever come?” You just 
get to a stage where you think it’s [the transplant] never going to 
happen…you go into the dialysis unit and you hear somebody was called 
[for a transplant] and you’d be delighted for them but still your heart 
would drop when it wasn’t you. (15/2) 
 
 
Liz’s account signified how her hope gradually declined due to the uncertainty of 
waiting indefinitely for a kidney transplant. As the waiting time increased, it was no 
longer a source of hope to see other patients being called to receive a kidney transplant. 
Rather Liz, felt disappointment and despair when she witnessed other patients receive a 
transplant, while she remained on haemodialysis.  
 
Similarly, the follow-up interview with David also exemplified how the continuous wait 
for a kidney transplant had turned his hope to uncertainty. In the previous theme, David 
described how the hope of receiving a kidney transplant enabled him to maintain a 
positive outlook on haemodialysis therapy.73 However, in the follow-up interview, he 
said he had been to the transplant unit twice for an assessment. On both occasions, 
David’s BMI was greater than 32, and he failed to gain entry onto the transplant waiting 
list.74  
 
Like the other participants, David believed he would get on the waiting list and receive 
a kidney transplant within a short duration of time. However, after being on 
haemodialysis therapy for two years, he had still not achieved this goal. Therefore, his 
previous experience of living in hope had given way to uncertainty.  
                                                 
72 See page 175 for Liz’s previous account of living in hope.  
73 See page 176 for David’s previous account of living in hope.  
74 The transplant unit stipulates that the person’s Body Mass Index (BMI) must be below 32 before 
transplantation is considered. 
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When confronted with uncertainty, David had become increasingly concerned about his 
future possibilities. Without any real chance of a kidney transplant in the near future, he 
was faced with the stark reality of being “stuck” on haemodialysis for the rest of his life.  
David stated:  
I’ve been to _____[the transplant unit] twice…they [medical team] say 
I’m over weight…I’m really trying so hard, but it’s impossible to get the 
weight down. I’m down about four kilos, so I’m having another check in 
______[the transplant unit] next month to see if I can get on the 
list…but he [consultant] probably won’t [put me on the list] unless I lose 
more weight…so maybe I would get on the list but maybe not…the 
longer it [waiting for a transplant] goes on, the worse you feel about 
it…at the beginning, you don’t realise what’s going on, you have no 
knowledge of what’s happening at all…but after being on dialysis for 
two years you feel you’re going to be stuck here and that’s it. (9/2)  
 
 
David’s account verified that he was ill informed about the process of kidney 
transplantation. The healthcare team should have been aware that patients with a BMI 
above 32 were not considered eligible for transplantation. Therefore, it would seem 
reasonable to suggest that they would pass this information on to the patients. This 
would have prevented David from making the disappointing journey twice to the 
transplant unit, merely to be told he was unsuitable for transplantation. More 
importantly, it would have allowed him to participate in a weight loss programme to 
reduce his BMI.  
 
In contrast, David’s account emphasised that he did not receive any follow-up 
information or support, while he waited for a kidney transplant. Indeed, despite being 
unable to lose weight, he was about to make another fruitless journey to the transplant 
unit for another assessment.   
 
Some participants described their experience of uncertainty in the first interview. At the 
time of the interview, these participants had already exceeded the length of time they 
expected to be waiting for a kidney transplant. For example, in the first interview with 
Nancy, she discussed her experience of uncertainty when she exceeded the average 
waiting time for a kidney transplant. When Nancy commenced haemodialysis therapy, 
the medical team informed her that she would be waiting for “a year and a bit” for a 
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transplant. Consequently, she interpreted this information to mean that she would 
definitely receive a kidney transplant within two years.  
 
However, at the time of our first interview, Nancy had already been on haemodialysis 
therapy for four years. She signified that the uncertainty of waiting indefinitely for a 
kidney transplant had turned her hope to despair and devastation. As a result of Nancy’s 
experience, she expressed the need for more realistic information from the healthcare 
team regarding the waiting time for a kidney transplant.  
 
Yes, I’m on the [transplant] list…I’ve had the check up in ____[the 
transplant unit] and I have antibodies, but I’m on the [transplant] 
list…but the doctors said I’d be waiting for about a year and a bit to get 
the transplant…then it became two years and a bit, three years and a bit, 
and now it’s four years…people shouldn’t listen to this! If there is one 
thing that needs to be changed and it’s that [what the doctor says about 
transplantation] because you do hang on to it, you think, ok I can do a 
year or two years on dialysis, but then it’s devastating when you pass the 
two years. (16/1) 
 
    
Similarly, Chris also emphasised the need for realistic follow-up information in relation 
to the waiting process for a kidney transplant. He stated that the transplant coordinator 
had informed him that he would receive a kidney transplant in about a year. However, at 
the time of our first interview, Chris had already been on the transplant waiting list for 
over a year.  
 
Chris’s account confirmed that he was becoming increasingly uncertain because of 
exceeding the average waiting time for a kidney transplant. He had begun to question 
the fairness of the waiting process, and the honesty of the healthcare team.  
Well, the thing I don’t understand is that the transplant co-ordinator told 
me it’s a years waiting list…and I find out from here [ward] that there’s 
only been like two transplants here in the last year…and I think there is 
more than fifteen people on the list, so I don’t know how it adds up…I’m 
just wondering, are they telling me the good news [because] they don’t 
want to give me the bad news that it’s more than a year…If somebody 
said to me I would have to wait another year [for a transplant], it would 
be like a nightmare…I think they [healthcare team] should tell us 
straight and I hope they are, because if they say a year and it takes three 
years…there are alternative decisions I could make, maybe not make but 
explore…I hope to get it within a year, maybe a little over or within a 
year. (6/1)  
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Chris’s narrative implied that he found the relentless regime of haemodialysis therapy 
difficult to bear.  Therefore, to have to wait another year would be like a “nightmare” 
for him. 
 
The first interview with John also characterised the uncertainty of exceeding the average 
waiting time for a kidney transplant. At the time of the interview, John had been on 
haemodialysis for five years. He had previously been on dialysis in another country but 
re-located to live in Ireland.  
 
John expressed his disbelief at the lengthy waiting time for a kidney transplant. In 
particular, he said that if he received a kidney transplant, he would like to return to 
work. However, his history of chronic renal failure, combined with five years on 
haemodialysis therapy meant John was increasingly uncertain about the possibility of 
ever returning to work.  
 
In the UK the waiting list was supposed to be eighteen months to two 
years on average, and here it’s supposed to be a year on average, so it’s 
bad luck to be five years without one [a transplant]…There was a bloke 
who went on the list the same day as me in 2001 and he got one a 
fortnight later…I find it hard to believe its been so long…I’d like to work 
again if I was well enough [with a transplant]…I just don’t know how 
far down the slippery slope my heart has gone and my circulation…all 
them years with damaged kidneys, and then five years on dialysis…I 
might not be that healthy…I don’t know how healthy I’m gonna be if I 
get one. (14/1) 
 
 
The uncertainty of waiting relentlessly for a kidney transplant prevented some 
participants from being able to visualise possibilities in the future. Therefore, they 
described their experience of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant.  
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4.2.3 SUB THEME 3 - BEING ON HOLD 
 
As a result of the experience of uncertainty, some participants were unable to 
contemplate possibilities in the future. Moreover, the limitations and restrictions 
imposed by haemodialysis therapy prevented them from performing many of the 
everyday activities they took for granted in the past. Consequently, the participants 
described their experience of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant.  
 
The participants’ accounts implied that the time spent on hold, was a time held back or 
disconnected from the narrative of their lives. It was almost entirely constituted by the 
repetitive regime of haemodialysis therapy. Hence, the moods of sadness, 
disappointment, depression, hopelessness, and despair were palpable throughout their 
accounts.  
 
The follow-up interview signified that two participants had overcome the experience of 
being on hold, while waiting for a kidney transplant. The ability to re-engage in 
everyday activities, such as work was an important part of this process. The 
participants’ accounts of being on hold will now be discussed.  
   
In the first interview with Chris, he described his experience of being on hold, while he 
waited for a kidney transplant. He said that being able to work was a significant factor 
in his life. However, since he commenced haemodialysis therapy, he had been unable to 
work, and was becoming increasingly concerned about his financial situation.  
 
Chris worked as a carpenter before he commenced dialysis therapy, and his job was 
physically demanding. However, the repetitive nature of the treatment regime, 
combined with the physiological complications meant he had not been able to return to 
work. Until Chris was able to return to work, he found it difficult to visualise any 
possibilities for the future. Therefore, he described his experience of being on hold, 
while he waited for a kidney transplant, which would allow him to achieve this goal.  
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My life is on hold…because I worked in construction as a carpenter, I 
worked in the commercial end of carpentry and some jobs can be 
physical, your life is on hold…but right now that the fistula has kind of 
straightened out and I’m on the [transplant] list, I’m kind of looking to 
get back to work a few days a week…Before that up to two weeks ago, I 
couldn’t because I was in the hospital for infections and I don’t know 
what employer will employ you if you’re taking every second day off or a 
few days a week off…but I’m looking to work three days a week now but 
that’s about it…I see a future if I get a transplant, it’s mainly about 
work…how are you going to survive and pay your bills…you have to 
come in here three times a week for four and a half hours…it’s 
continuous, until you get a transplant. (6/1)  
 
 
Chris’s account illustrated how his experience of being on hold culminated in feelings 
of hopelessness and despair.  
 
Like Chris, the first interview with Nancy also characterised her experience of being on 
hold, while she waited for a kidney transplant. Nancy’s anecdote conveyed that while 
she waited for a kidney transplant, her life was engulfed by the repetitive regime of 
haemodialysis therapy. She emphasised how the restrictions and limitations imposed on 
her life by haemodialysis therapy prevented her from participating in normal everyday 
activities such as working, going on holiday, and socialising.  
This was Nancy’s account: 
You’re always constantly aware of dialysis…you’d love to just pick up a 
brochure and go on holiday but you can’t because it’s constantly there... 
and you say to yourself “well when I get the transplant, I’ll be back to 
normal”, you look at life as if it’s on hold until you get a transplant…I 
mean I find the diet and the fluids ok but you’re very aware of it…I was 
at the wedding there last week and I wanted to relax and have a few 
drinks but in the back of your head you think it will overload you…to me 
your life is on hold because you’re not doing what you want to do…I 
know I have to follow these rules but it gets in the way of work, it gets in 
the way of a normal routine…it’s like I’m bonded to it [dialysis]…I’m 
always walking around with it, and when you do get the transplant it’s 
like the shackles are gone. (16/1)  
 
 
Nancy’s narrative illustrated that the time spent on hold waiting for a transplant, was 
incompatible with the narrative of her life. Therefore, she felt like a “different person” 
while she was forced to continuously endure the repetitive regime of haemodialysis 
therapy. Embedded in Nancy’s account was the hopelessness and despair caused by the 
experience of being on hold. She yearned to return to the normal life she enjoyed prior 
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to haemodialysis therapy. However, Nancy was unable to contemplate possibilities for 
the future, until she received a kidney transplant, which would allow the “shackles” of 
dialysis to be removed.  
 
For John, the inability to return to work was the predominant factor contributing to his 
experience of being on hold, while he waited for a kidney transplant.  
He said: 
Well I do think my life is on hold because I worked until just before I 
started dialysis, and there’s days when I feel I could work now, and 
there’s days when I know that I couldn’t…so if I got a job, I know I 
wouldn’t be able to keep it and I’d be off all the time…If I was in work, 
my performance would be pretty poor, like falling asleep at your desk 
and that kind of thing, that’s how I was before I gave up work. (14/1)  
 
 
In the follow-up interview with David, I asked him if he felt on hold, while he waited 
for a kidney transplant. He replied:  
I sure do feel on hold…There’s times when you get down to the bottom 
of the dumps…you’re waiting and sometimes you think it’s [the 
transplant] never going to happen…because I heard on the radio a few 
days ago that there are 550 people on the [transplant waiting] list and 
there was only 120 transplants this year…you just get really, really 
pissed off with it [waiting], and you feel it’s never going to 
happen…that’s the way I feel at the moment really…You get a bit 
depressed at times, you feel it’s never going to happen, and you get to a 
stage and you say, “why am I trying so hard to get on this thing 
[transplant list]?”There’s no hope for me getting on it [the transplant 
list]…there’s so many people on there at the moment, and you just feel 
“Is my day ever going to come?” (9/2) 
 
 
David’s account highlighted the sadness, depression, and despair caused by the 
experience of being on hold, while he waited for a kidney transplant. The absence of a 
definite endpoint to the wait meant that David was unable to contemplate any 
possibilities for the future. 
 
Like the other participants, David assumed he would receive a kidney transplant within 
a specific length of time. However, by the time of our follow-up interview, he had well 
exceeded this duration, and was still waiting to get his name on the transplant waiting 
list. Consequently, he felt depressed because he realised that his wait for a kidney 
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transplant was going to be a lot longer than he had initially predicted. Indeed, the 
information David had recently heard on the radio, merely confirmed this bleak reality. 
 
The fear of missing out on the opportunity to receive a kidney transplant played a part 
in some participants’ experience of being on hold. For instance, in the follow-up 
interview with Jeff, he highlighted how his life centred on the “waiting game” for a 
kidney transplant. Therefore, he signified that he was on hold until he eventually 
received the call to receive a kidney transplant. Embedded in Jeff’s account of being on 
hold was the fear of missing out on the call for a kidney transplant.  
You’re on hold so you are…it’s just a big waiting game now…waiting 
for that call [for a transplant]…you never leave the phone, you have the 
phone with you 24/7…I thought that I would have got the transplant by 
now, but now I feel that it should definitely come in the next six months 
but you’re just hoping that it will…but you don’t know like…it’s still on 
hold. (13/2)  
 
 
As Jeff’s narrative progressed, he described how the restrictive nature of the 
haemodialysis treatment regime also contributed to his experience of being on hold. He 
implied that his life was almost entirely constituted by the repetitive treatment regime, 
while he waited for a kidney transplant.  
Every Tuesday, Thursday, Sunday for the past twenty three 
months…you’re just planning to go to dialysis…you’re watching 
everything you eat, everything you drink…after getting the transplant, I 
think you’d get your life back anyway…you feel as if your life is on 
hold…it wouldn’t be on hold then, you could go out and you could have 
a drink, you could eat whatever you wanted, you’d go back to a normal 
life then again. (13/2) 
 
 
Similarly, Danny also signified that he had decided to put his life on hold, while he 
waited for a kidney transplant. Before Danny commenced haemodialysis therapy, he 
used to work as a lorry driver. However, at the time of our first interview, he indicated 
that he rarely worked, because he was afraid of missing out on the chance to receive a 
kidney transplant.  
 
The fear of missing out on a transplant also prevented Danny from visiting his family in 
the UK.  Therefore, he described his experience of waiting for a transplant, as being 
held back in a time, which revolved around the repetitive regime of dialysis therapy.  
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My life is on hold…very, very much so…I can’t plan anything, can’t go 
anywhere…I’m waiting for the phone to ring…when are you going to get 
that call for a transplant…The odd weekend away is as much as you can 
manage…then you can’t go far because [you might be called for a 
transplant]…I have family over in the UK and I would like to see them 
for a weekend, but it’s completely out of the question…you can’t plan…a 
call is going to come out of the blue and that can impact on your work 
because I might get a days work but they [employers] will say “you’ve 
got to go to the other side of the country”…what happens if the phone 
rings…I could earn a bit more money but there’s always that chance [I 
might be called for a transplant]…everything [emphasis] revolves 
around dialysis. (7/1) 
 
 
As Danny’s narrative continued, he emphasised the financial implications of not 
working. For instance, there were times when he struggled to pay bills and buy food. 
While Danny remained on hold, waiting for a kidney transplant, he was confined to the 
house with “nothing to look forward to”. Therefore, the distressing moods of sadness, 
hopelessness, and despair were implicitly contained within his account. 
When your stuck in the house and can’t work…I’d be staring at the 
wall…that’s when I get the bad days…if I have nothing to look forward 
to in the week but dialysis…Sometimes I wonder how I manage, because 
by the time I’ve paid rent, gas, electric, there’s very little [money] left…I 
thank God for a renal diet sometimes because you get a good bit of rice 
and pasta for a few euros…If was eating what I used to eat I couldn’t 
afford it. (7/1) 
 
 
A year later in the follow-up interview with Danny, he had begun to realise that he 
could potentially have to wait a long time for a kidney transplant.  This realisation 
encouraged Danny to return to work, and get on with his life, while he remained on 
haemodialysis therapy.   
 
In particular, the financial implications of being unemployed had been the catalyst for 
Danny’s decision to return to work. He found it extremely difficult to manage 
financially on the benefits he received from social support.  Consequently, he felt he had 
no choice except to seek employment, in an effort to earn some money.   
 
By recommencing work, Danny had been able to overcome the experience of being on 
hold, while he waited for a kidney transplant. As a result, he was able to look forward to 
possibilities in the future. Indeed, he signified that he was looking forward to a trip to 
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the UK to go shopping with his family. According to Danny, this would not have been 
possible the last time we spoke.    
Danny stated:    
When I first got on the [transplant] list, I thought any day the phone will 
ring, and the guys I worked for were asking, “Can you go here? Can you 
go there?” and I was saying, “no, I can’t, I need to be near home, if the 
phone rings, I’ve got to go”. But as time has gone on, I think this isn’t 
going to happen realistically now…I’ve got to accept the fact and I can’t 
put my whole life totally on hold waiting for that phone call…that’s why 
I’ve gradually got back into more work, driving longer distance, doing 
longer hours, because I need the money…What they pay you on social 
[support] wouldn’t buy peanuts, so it’s a case of having to…I’ve had to 
out of necessity take on more work, I’ve had to sort of say “well I can’t 
just put everything on the back burner and sit by the fire waiting for that 
day to come” because it could be two more years even, and I’ve bills to 
pay and rent to pay like everybody else…the money has to come from 
somewhere, so that’s where I’m at now…[before] I would be sitting at 
home earning nothing…That fear that you wouldn’t be ready to go [if 
you were called for a transplant] and that your chance would be 
gone...It was dreadful because I’ve never been a person to sit around 
doing nothing if there’s work to be done, and then to be suddenly sat in 
front of the TV, it’s something I’ve never, ever done or got used to 
doing…But it was literally a case of getting used to the fact that this 
[transplant] probably isn’t going to happen tomorrow, or the next day, 
or six months, or twelve months, or eighteen months…I’ve got to get 
used of the idea that I’ve got to get back into my life, get on with life and 
get on with earning, and do as many normal things as I can…I try as 
much as I can, although it’s still a routine…I plan ahead now, like I’ve 
planned Christmas, I’m going to ____[UK] shopping, I’m going to take 
off at the weekend and just go shopping, I’ve planned and organised 
Christmas, so I’m pretty much trying to get on with it [life] as best I can, 
I couldn’t have done that the last time I spoke to you. (7/2)  
 
 
The follow-up interview with Chris also demonstrated that he had been able to 
overcome the experience of being on hold, while he waited for a kidney transplant. If 
we recall, Chris’s inability to return to work was the main factor contributing to his 
experience of being on hold. He insisted that he was unable to visualise a future until he 
received a transplant, which would allow him to return to work.   
 
However, in the follow-up interview, Chris had accepted that working, as a carpenter 
was potentially too strenuous, either on haemodialysis or with a kidney transplant. 
During the past year, he had undertaken a course in computer networks, in an effort to 
get a more suitable job. By actively pursuing a change in career, Chris had been taking 
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active steps to return to employment. Consequently, his narrative indicated that his life 
was “not so much on hold” as the last time we spoke.  
Well it’s [life] not so much on hold…I can do things…I’m waiting for a 
transplant but I’m thinking if I get a transplant, I might not be able to do 
construction, so I’m looking down the road…maybe it’s [construction] 
not the best thing to be doing, health wise…so I know something about 
computers and I decided to do some exams and try and get a job at 
that…It’s interesting, I did it before years ago, I did computers for two 
years, I like working with them…I did a FAS course for eight months on 
computer networks, so that got me into it a bit more…so now I just want 
to do some more exams…If I’m looking for a job I guess the more 
certificates you have, the better. (6/2)  
 
 
The accounts of Danny and Chris suggested that their ability to re-engage in normal, 
everyday activities, such as work allowed them to overcome the experience of being on 
hold, while they waited for a transplant. Moreover, it enabled them to get on with their 
lives while they remained on haemodialysis therapy.    
 
4.2.4 DISCUSSION OF THE THEME  
 
It is proposed that time played a central role in the participants’ experience of waiting 
for a kidney transplant.75 In particular, Heidegger’s phenomenological notion of time 
seemed to capture the perspective of time characterised within the participants’ 
accounts. Therefore, the three modes of time described by Heidegger (1962) provided 
an overarching framework for the discussion of the participants’ experience of waiting 
for a kidney transplant.  
 
Several participants described their experience of living in hope, while they waited for a 
kidney transplant.76 The information received from the healthcare team in relation to the 
average waiting time for a kidney transplant, contributed to their experience of living in 
hope. It led the participants to assume they would receive a kidney transplant within a 
definite duration of time. It is suggested that this assumption encouraged the 
participants to focus on clock time up until they reached or exceeded the average 
                                                 
75 This theme will also be discussed in relation to a broader body of literature (specifically the work of 
Janice Morse) in Chapter 5: Discussion of the Findings.    
76 For examples of the participants’ experience of living in hope, see the accounts of Jeff (p173), Danny 
(p174) & Liz (p175).  
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waiting time for a kidney transplant. If we recall, the participants’ accounts of living in 
hope, while they waited for a kidney transplant, illustrated their predominant focus on 
clock and calendar time.77 By focusing on clock and calendar time, the participants were 
able to get through the days, weeks, months, and years until the wait for a transplant 
was finally over. 
 
As previously mentioned, Heidegger (1962) used the term ordinary time to describe the 
infinite, irreversible sequence of “nows” that we refer to as clock time.78 However, he 
insisted that the concept of time was much more extensive than this theoretical 
perspective. According to Heidegger (1962), we did not normally understand ordinary 
or clock time as an abstract entity that consisted of an infinite, irreversible sequence of 
“nows”. On the contrary, he claimed that we understood clock time in relation to the 
everyday activities we performed in the world (Blattner, 1999).  
 
World-time was described by Heidegger (1962), as the time that contained the activities, 
which we carried out in our everyday involvement in the world. When we referred to 
ordinary or clock time, it was usually to structure and coordinate our activities in world-
time. Therefore, Heidegger (1962) contended that ordinary time originated out of world 
time, while world-time subsequently originated out of originary temporality.  
 
Through world-time, originary temporality provided the basis and context of ordinary 
time. This meant originary temporality provided the contextual, existential background 
of ordinary time. However, Heidegger (1962) insisted that if we merely focused on the 
endless, empty sequence of “nows”, this contextual background of ordinary time 
remained hidden (Blattner, 1999).  By observing time from this abstract perspective, the 
features of world-time and originary temporality, which provided the background to 
ordinary time were essentially covered up or concealed.  
 
The participants in the study presumed they would receive a kidney transplant within a 
specific length of time. Therefore, they concentrated on clock time until they reached or 
exceeded the endpoint of this duration. However, it is suggested that by specifically 
                                                 
77 For example, see the accounts of Danny (p174), Liz (p175), Alex (p175), and Carl (p177). 
78 See page 102 for the previous discussion on ordinary or clock time.  
 193
focusing on clock time, the other modes of time, which formed the basis of the 
participants’ experience of waiting, remained concealed or covered over.  
 
When the participants went beyond the “expected” waiting time for a kidney transplant, 
they experienced uncertainty.79 At this point, their perspective of time changed. The 
participants were no longer focusing on merely getting through the empty “nows” of 
ordinary time, while they waited for a transplant. They began to realise that 
haemodialysis was not the short-term problem they had initially anticipated. Instead, 
their descriptions of uncertainty characterised the grim realisation that they could 
potentially be on dialysis for the rest of their lives. In the absence of a definite endpoint 
to their wait for a kidney transplant, the participants grew increasingly concerned about 
their possibilities for the future.80  
 
Heidegger (1962) claimed that as a result of originary temporality, the person was 
always projecting into possibilities in the future.81 Indeed, the originary future provided 
the projection for the unified whole of originary temporality. It was for this reason, that 
the originary future had priority over the originary past and present. It is proposed, that 
when the participants became uncertain about their future possibilities in life, the 
threefold structure of originary temporality was illuminated. These features of the 
participants’ experience of uncertainty corresponded to Heidegger’s (1962) description 
of anxiety (angst).  
 
According to Heidegger (1962) anxiety, like boredom was a fundamental existential 
mood.82 Anxiety disclosed the three elements of the “care-structure” of Dasein’s being, 
grounded in the corresponding three ecstases of originary temporality (Hoffman, 2005). 
If we recall, Heidegger (1962) stated that the care-structure of Dasein’s being consisted 
of three elements: existence, facticity, and falling. Each one of the elements was 
entrenched within an ecstases of originary temporality (Blattner, 2005). This meant that 
                                                 
79 For examples of the participants’ experience of uncertainty, see the accounts of Danny (p180), Liz 
(p181), Nancy (p183) & Chris (p183).  
80 For example, see the accounts of Jeff (p179), Danny (p180), Liz (p181), John (p184).  
81 See page 94 for the previous discussion on the originary future.  
82 See page 125 for the previous discussion on Heidegger’s notion of anxiety and boredom.   
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existence, facticity, and falling were embedded in the future, past, and present 
respectively.83  
 
Anxiety illuminated the unified structure of originary temporality, which formed the 
basis of the care-structure of Dasein’s being (Heidegger, 1962). By illuminating the 
ecstatic structure of originary temporality, anxiety highlighted that death was one 
possibility of Dasein’s existence (Hoffman, 2005). As previously mentioned, the 
projection of the originary future provided the projection for the entire ecstatical 
structure of originary temporality. However, it was also because of the projection of the 
originary future, that death was one possibility of Dasein’s existence (Mulhall, 2005).  
 
As a result of our finite existence, Heidegger (1962) declared that we were dying 
throughout our life. He emphasised this point when he said, “factically, Dasein is dying 
as long as it exists” (p295). By illuminating the threefold structure of originary 
temporality, anxiety (angst) disclosed Dasein’s finite time. Thus, like boredom, anxiety 
was a fundamental existential mood because it highlighted the possibility of death to 
Dasein. According to Heidegger (1962), when confronted with the possibility of death, 
the person was prompted to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of 
existence.84  
 
It is proposed, that Heidegger’s (1962) depiction of anxiety epitomised the participants’ 
experience of uncertainty, while they waited for a kidney transplant. By illuminating the 
threefold structure of originary temporality, it seemed that the experience of uncertainty 
illuminated the possibility of death to the participants.  
 
From Heidegger’s (1962) perspective, we cover up or evade the certainty of death by 
absorbing ourselves in everydayness (falling).85  However, the experience of waiting 
indefinitely for a kidney transplant created uncertainty in the participants’ everyday 
                                                 
83 See page 93 for a more-in-depth discussion on the care structure of Dasein’s being in relation to 
originary temporality. 
84 In the authentic mode of existence, I am aware of the finitude of my existence, but still project forward 
into possibilities in the originary future. In the inauthentic mode of existence, I do not acknowledge my 
finite nature. Instead, I allow myself to be absorbed in the everyday tasks and activities, which occur in 
world-time to avoid this realisation. The threefold structure of originary temporality remains unified in 
both modes of existence. See pages 125-126 for in-depth discussion on the two modes of existence.  
85 See pages 97 for the previous discussion on falling/everydayness. 
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lives, thus highlighting the certainty of death. Therefore, the experience of uncertainty 
paradoxically disclosed the certainty of death to the participants.  
 
In this way, the participants’ experience of uncertainty depicted Heidegger’s (1962) 
notion of anxiety i.e. it disclosed the finitude of their existence. As a result, the 
participants were prompted to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of 
existence. However, the uncertainty of waiting on a long-term basis for a kidney 
transplant meant that some participants could not live in either mode of existence. As 
previously mentioned, the inability of the person to live in either mode of existence in 
response to anxiety triggered the unpleasant and distressing moods we experienced in 
everyday life. Furthermore, it created a disruption to the threefold structure of originary 
temporality.86 
 
It is suggested that the distressing moods of sadness, disappointment, hopelessness, and 
despair, which were threaded throughout the participants’ accounts of uncertainty, 
indicated that they were unable to live in either mode of existence.87 Moreover, the 
participants’ descriptions of being on hold, while they waited for a transplant seemed to 
characterise a disruption in the unified structure of originary temporality. The 
uncertainty of waiting indefinitely for a kidney transplant meant the participants were 
unable to contemplate possibilities for their future. In addition, the lifestyle disruptions 
imposed by the treatment regime of dialysis therapy prevented them from engaging in 
many of the everyday activities they took for granted in the past. Consequently, they 
described their experience of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant.88  
 
The participants’ experience of being on hold signified that they were unable to engage 
in either mode of existence when faced with the reality of death. The uncertainty 
associated with the persistent wait for a kidney transplant suspended their ability to 
project forward into possibilities in the originary future. Thus, they were unable to live 
in the authentic mode of existence. Furthermore, the restrictions of the haemodialysis 
                                                 
86 See page 127-128 for the previous discussion on the person’s inability to live in either mode of 
existence in response to anxiety and boredom.  
87 For example, see the accounts of Danny (p180), Liz (p181), David (p182), Nancy (p183).  
88 For examples of the participants’ experience of being on hold, see the accounts of Chris (p185), Danny 
(p189), Nancy (p186), David (p187).  
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treatment regime inhibited their ability to absorb themselves in the everydayness of an 
inauthentic mode of existence. 
  
It is proposed, that the participants’ inability to live in either an authentic or inauthentic 
mode of existence may have created a disruption to the threefold structure of originary 
temporality. This disruption was illustrated in the participants’ experience of being on 
hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant. For instance, the participants’ inability 
to project forward into possibilities in life implied that the originary future had lost its 
projective characteristics. If we recall, the three ecstases of originary temporality 
formed a unified structure with a projective character based on the originary future.89 
Without the projection of the originary future, the ecstatical unity of originary 
temporality was disconnected.  
 
Furthermore, it seemed that the participants’ experience of being on hold might have 
also created a disruption to world-time. To re-iterate, world-time referred to Dasein’s 
qualitative experience of time in its everyday involvements in the world.90 It was the 
time that contained the everyday activities performed by Dasein. It is suggested that the 
participants’ inability to engage in their everyday lives and activities, while on hold 
waiting for a transplant, may have created a disruption to world-time.  
 
Remember world-time constituted the present ecstases of originary temporality. The 
structure of world-time was embedded in the unified structure of originary temporality. 
World-time provided the action for the originary present, which enabled the person to 
project forward into possibilities in the originary future. Based on this perspective, a 
disruption to world-time would subsequently culminate in a disruption to originary 
temporality.  Therefore, it is proposed that by creating a disruption to world-time, the 
participants’ experience of being on hold, while they waited for a transplant also created 
a disruption to originary temporality. The disruption in world-time and originary 
temporality was characteristic of the description of boredom, advanced by Heidegger 
(1995).  
 
                                                 
89 See page 94 for the previous discussion on the originary future.  
90 See page 97 for the previous discussion on world-time.  
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If we recall, Heidegger’s (1995) description of boredom was discussed in the previous 
theme.91 Heidegger presented boredom as a fundamental existential mood, which 
disclosed the finitude of our existence. He identified three forms of boredom, which 
ranged from the most superficial to the most profound. The three forms of boredom 
were discussed in detail in relation to the previous theme Lost Time.92  
 
To re-iterate, the third form of boredom was the most profound, because it illuminated 
Dasein’s finite existence. From Heidegger’s (1995) perspective, we all had an 
unpleasant awareness of the experience of profound boredom within ourselves. It was 
this awareness, which alerted us to escape from the first and second forms of boredom. 
Therefore, the third form of boredom was the origin of the other two forms of boredom.  
The awareness of our finite existence was retained in both the first and second forms of 
boredom. However, it was more intense in the second form of boredom than the first. 
For this reason, the second form of boredom was described as being more profound than 
the first. 
 
By fleeing from the first and second forms of boredom, we avoided oscillating into the 
third and most profound form of boredom (Heidegger, 1995). However, if we were 
unable to escape from these forms of boredom, we progressed into the third and most 
profound form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995). The third form of boredom 
confronted us with the stark realisation of our finite existence.   
 
It is proposed, that the participants’ experience of relentlessly waiting for a kidney 
transplant made it difficult for them to flee or escape from the first and second forms of 
boredom. Hence, they may have been drawn into the third and most profound form of 
boredom, described by Heidegger (1995). In the account that follows, the three forms of 
boredom will be discussed in relation to the theme Waiting for a Kidney Transplant.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 See page 158 for the previous discussion on Heidegger’s notion of boredom.  
92 See page 158 for the previous discussion on the three forms of boredom by Heidegger.  
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4.2.4.1 The First Form of Boredom 
 
According to Heidegger (1995) the first form of boredom occurred when we were 
forced to wait in a particular situation. The participants in my study had no choice 
except to wait for a suitable donor to become available, if they wanted to receive a 
kidney transplant. For many, this took a substantial amount of time.  
 
In the first form of boredom, the time became long and drawn out (Heidegger, 1995). 
Therefore, the person tried to pass the time in an effort to get rid of the boredom. 
However, if the person was unable to pass the time, s/he watched the clock (Heidegger, 
1995). Concentrating on clock time, or watching the clock was a feature of the first 
form of boredom. It signified that the person’s efforts to pass the time were not 
successful.  When the person watched the clock or focused on clock time, s/he was 
simply trying to gauge how much time remained before the wait was finally over 
(Heidegger, 1995).  
 
The predominant focus on clock and calendar time was depicted in the participants’ 
accounts of waiting, described in the sub theme Living In Hope.93 The participants’ 
accounts showed that by focusing on clock and calendar time, they were able to get 
through the duration of time until the wait was finally over. These features of the 
participants’ accounts corresponded to the first form of boredom, described by 
Heidegger (1995). 
 
According to Heidegger (1995), the first form of boredom occurred when we exceeded 
the appropriate time for a particular thing. As previously mentioned, the significance of 
world-time ensured that everything we did in world-time lasted for a particular 
duration.94 However, if we went beyond the time that was appropriate for a specific 
event, we experienced the first form of boredom.  
 
The participants’ accounts signified that they expected to receive a kidney transplant 
within a particular time span. Therefore, they did not intend to remain on haemodialysis 
therapy on a long-term basis. Indeed, many of their accounts illustrated that they 
                                                 
93 For example, see the accounts of Liz (p175), Alex (p175), David (p176), Ali (p177).   
94 See page 100 for the previous discussion on the significance of world-time 
 199
understood haemodialysis therapy to be a short-term problem. However, the 
participants’ narratives, portrayed in the sub-theme Uncertainty, emphasised the distress 
they experienced when they exceeded the duration they had intended to wait for a 
kidney transplant.95 By exceeding the “appropriate” waiting time for a kidney 
transplant, it is proposed that the participants may have experienced the first form of 
boredom, addressed by Heidegger (1995).  
 
According to Heidegger, the first form of boredom was transient (Aho, 2007). As soon 
as I escaped from whatever was boring me, I subsequently drove away the boredom. It 
appeared that the participants’ experience of waiting indefinitely for a kidney transplant 
prevented them from fleeing the first form of boredom. As a result, they may have 
advanced into the second and more profound form of boredom, described by Heidegger 
(1995).    
 
4.2.4.2 The Second Form of Boredom  
 
If we recall, the second form of boredom was more profound than the first form, 
because it seemed to come from something indeterminate and unfamiliar (Heidegger, 
1995). According to Heidegger (1995), the indeterminate and unfamiliar thing that 
caused the second form of boredom was the standing of world-time.96  
 
In the discussion of the previous theme, Heidegger’s example of attending an evening 
invitation was used to demonstrate how world-time came to a stand in the second form 
of boredom. Heidegger (1995) said that when we decided to attend an evening 
invitation, the activities we normally performed in world-time were brought to a stand. 
Consequently, the irreversible flow of world-time also came to a stand for the duration 
of the evening. The standing of world-time was the unfamiliar and indeterminate 
“something” that bored us in the second form of boredom.  
The second form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995) seemed to epitomise the 
participants’ experience of being on hold, while waiting for a kidney transplant. For 
instance, the participants described the experience of being on hold, as being unable to 
                                                 
95 For example, see the accounts of Jeff (p179), Danny (p180), Nancy (p183) & Chris (183). 
96 See page 158 for the previous account of boredom. 
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engage fully in their everyday activities. Indeed, for Chris, Danny, and John, the 
inability to participate in work seemed to be the primary reason for their experience of 
being on hold.97 It is proposed, that the participants’ inability to engage in their 
everyday activities may have caused world-time to come to a stand. As a result, their 
experience of being on hold was characteristic of the second form of boredom, 
described by Heidegger (1995).  
 
Heidegger (1995) used the example of the evening invitation to signify that the second 
form of boredom was usually transient. It only lasted for the duration of the evening. 
When the evening was over, we re-engaged in our everyday activities and escaped this 
level of boredom.   
 
Conversely, the participants’ accounts suggested that the experience of waiting for a 
kidney transplant was not transient. The absence of a definite endpoint to the wait for a 
kidney transplant meant they had to tolerate the experience of waiting on a continuous 
and long-term basis. This meant the patients were unable to flee from the standing of 
world-time, which accompanied the second form of boredom. The participants’ inability 
to flee the second form of boredom, suggested that they might have progressed into the 
third and most profound form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995).  
 
4.2.4.3 The Third Form of Boredom  
 
As previously mentioned, the third form of boredom was the most profound type of 
boredom.98 In contrast to the second form of boredom, it was the threefold structure of 
originary temporality, which was suspended or stopped in the third form of boredom 
(Haar, 1999). Therefore, Dasein was held in limbo by the suspension of originary 
temporality. According to Heidegger, when we were held in limbo by the suspension of 
originary temporality, we were held back from our own possibilities in life, held back 
from our past and future, and held back from world-time (Haar, 1999). The experience 
of being held in limbo, by the suspension of originary temporality was expressed in the 
participants’ descriptions of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant.  
 
                                                 
97 See the accounts of Chris (p185), Danny (p189), and John (p187).    
98 See page 158 for the previous discussion on boredom.  
 201
For instance, the absence of a specific end to the wait for a kidney transplant meant the 
participants were unable to contemplate possibilities in life.99 When the participants 
were held back from their possibilities in life, the originary future lost its projective 
character. Without the projective function of the future, it is suggested that the threefold 
structure of originary temporality disintegrated, and the participants were held back 
from their originary past and future.  
 
In addition, the participants’ descriptions of being on hold also signified that they were 
unable to participate fully in their everyday activities.100 This suggested that they were 
held back from world-time. As a result of being held back from world-time, the 
participants were no longer acting in world-time (originary present), based on their 
attunements from the past, to project forward into possibilities in the originary future. 
Therefore, this contributed to the disintegration of the unified structure of originary 
temporality.  
 
These features of the participants’ experience of being on hold conveyed that they were 
held in limbo by the suspension of originary temporality. As a result, they were 
compelled to endure the empty time of profound boredom.  From Heidegger’s (1962) 
perspective, the person usually acted in the originary present (i.e. world-time) based on 
his/her affectedness and attunements from the past to project forward into possibilities 
in the originary future.101 However, when the person was held in limbo by the 
suspension of originary temporality, the originary present was characterised by inaction. 
This empty present was the empty time of profound boredom. It culminated in nothing 
but a repetition of the same present (Haar, 1999). Some participants’ descriptions of 
being on hold confirmed that the time spent on hold, was almost entirely constituted by 
the repetitive regime of haemodialysis therapy.102 This feature of the participants’ 
accounts appeared to symbolise the empty time of profound boredom.  
 
Heidegger (1995) indicated that the suspension of originary temporality in profound 
boredom illuminated the threefold structure of originary temporality to the person. By 
illuminating the unified structure of originary temporality, profound boredom disclosed 
                                                 
99 For example, see the accounts of Chris (p185), Nancy (p186), Jeff (p188), David (p187). 
100 For example, see the accounts of Nancy (p186), John (p187), Jeff (p188), Danny (p189).  
101 See page 96 for the previous discussion on the originary present.  
102 For example, see the accounts of Chris (p185), Nancy (p186), Jeff (p188), Danny (p189).   
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the finitude of the person’s existence.103 It was this awareness, which oppressed the 
person in profound boredom. By highlighting the finitude of existence, profound 
boredom prompted the person to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of 
existence.104  
 
The participants’ descriptions of being on hold signified that they were unable to live in 
either mode of existence in response to boredom. Moreover, the relentless nature of the 
wait meant that the participants failed to live in either mode of existence on a long-term 
basis. To re-iterate, the inability of the person to live in either mode of existence when 
faced with the possibility of death culminated in the unpleasant and distressing moods 
we experienced on an everyday basis. In addition, it disrupted the threefold structure of 
originary temporality.105  
 
The participants’ accounts of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant 
contained a range of unpleasant and distressing moods.106 Moreover, the continuous 
failure of the participants to live in either mode of existence caused these moods to 
intensify to the level of sheer hopelessness and despair.  The participants’ inability to 
live in either mode of existence also prevented them from reconnecting the threefold 
structure of originary temporality. As a result, they were unable to overcome both the 
profound boredom and the experience of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney 
transplant.  
  
In contrast, the follow-up interviews demonstrated that Chris and Danny had been able 
to overcome the experience of being on hold, while waiting for a kidney transplant.107 
By re-engaging in work on an everyday basis, these participants were able to overcome 
the experience of being on hold. The participants’ efforts to absorb themselves in 
everyday activities illustrated that they had been able to live in the inauthentic mode of 
                                                 
103 See page 125 for the in-depth discussion on how profound boredom discloses the finitude of our 
existence.   
104 In the authentic mode of existence, I am aware of the finitude of my existence, but still project forward 
into possibilities in the originary future. In the inauthentic mode of existence, I do not acknowledge my 
finite nature. Instead, I allow myself to be absorbed in the everyday tasks and activities, which occur in 
world-time to avoid this realisation. The threefold structure of originary temporality remains unified in 
both modes of existence. See pages 125-126 for in-depth discussion on the two modes of existence. 
105 See pages 127-128 for the previous discussion on the person’s inability to live in either mode of 
existence.   
106 For example, see the account of Chris (p185), Nancy (p186), David (p187), Danny (p189). 
107 See page 190 for Danny’s account, and page 191 for Chris’s account.  
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existence. It is proposed, that by absorbing themselves in the inauthentic mode of 
existence, these participants were able to reconnect the threefold structure of originary 
temporality. This subsequently enabled them to overcome the profound boredom and 
the experience of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant.   
 
4.2.5 SUMMARY OF THEME  
 
The theme Waiting for a Kidney Transplant consisted of three sub-themes: Living in 
Hope, Uncertainty, and Being on Hold. The participants described their experience of 
living in hope, while they waited for a kidney transplant. The hope of receiving a 
transplant offered the participants the possibility of a normal life in the future. However, 
as the time spent waiting continued indefinitely, they became uncertain.  
 
The uncertainty of waiting persistently for a kidney transplant meant the participants 
were unable to contemplate possibilities for their future. Moreover, the lifestyle 
disruptions caused by the treatment regime of haemodialysis therapy prevented them 
from taking part in their everyday activities. Therefore, they conveyed their experience 
of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant. Because of the ongoing 
nature of the wait, most participants were unable to overcome the experience of being 
on hold. Thus, they experienced unpleasant moods, such as sadness, depression, 
hopelessness, and despair.  Conversely, the follow-up interview highlighted that a small 
number of participants had been able to overcome the experience of being on hold, and 
get on with life while they waited for a kidney transplant.  
 
It was suggested that the participants’ experience of waiting indefinitely for a kidney 
transplant culminated in the existential moods of anxiety and boredom, advanced by 
Heidegger (1962, 1995). As existential moods, anxiety and boredom highlighted the 
threefold structure of originary temporality to the participants. This disclosed death as a 
possibility of their existence. When confronted with the possibility of death, the 
participants were prompted to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of 
 204
existence.108 However, the relentless experience of waiting for a kidney transplant 
meant they were unable to live in either mode of existence.  
 
The participants’ inability to live in either mode of existence created a disruption in the 
unified structure of originary temporality. This disruption was illustrated in the sub 
theme Being on Hold. The failure of the participants to live in either mode of existence 
also culminated in the distressing moods, contained in the sub themes Uncertainty and 
Being on Hold.  
 
Alternatively, the follow-up interview confirmed that a small number of participants 
were able to absorb themselves in the inauthentic mode of existence when faced with 
the possibility of death. These participants were able to reconnect the three ecstases of 
originary temporality and alleviate the distress caused by their experience of waiting. 
For the participants who could not achieve this aspiration, the unpleasant moods 
continued to intensify to the point of sheer hopelessness and despair. They were unable 
to reconnect the threefold structure of originary temporality. Consequently, they were 
also unable to overcome the profound boredom and experience of being on hold, 
associated with their experience of waiting.  
 
While the participants waited for a kidney transplant, they were attending the hospital 
for haemodialysis therapy three times each week. During this time, the nurses on the 
haemodialysis unit were the primary health care provider for these patients. More than 
any other health care provider, these nurses had the opportunity to provide information 
and support for the participants, while they waited for a kidney transplant. However, the 
participants’ accounts emphasised that the nurses on the haemodialysis unit rarely 
communicated with them during their treatment. Consequently, the participants’ 
experience of waiting, described in the themes Lost Time and Waiting for a Kidney 
Transplant was not recognised or addressed by these nurses. The participants’ 
experience of communicating with the nurses will be discussed in the third and final 
theme labelled: Communicating with Nurses: Myth versus Reality.  
                                                 
108 In the authentic mode of existence, I am aware of the finitude of my existence, but still project forward 
into possibilities in the originary future. In the inauthentic mode of existence, I do not acknowledge my 
finite nature. Instead, I allow myself to be absorbed in the everyday tasks and activities, which occur in 
world-time to avoid this realisation. The threefold structure of originary temporality remains unified in 
both modes of existence.  
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4.3 THEME 3 - COMMUNICATING WITH NURSES: MYTH VERSUS 
REALITY  
 
Several of the participants described their inability to communicate with nurses during 
haemodialysis therapy. They indicated that the nurses on the haemodialysis unit were 
persistently busy, putting patients on and taking them off dialysis machines. The 
excessive throughput of patients meant the nurses rarely spent time talking or listening 
to the participants during their treatment. Indeed, the only time the nurses seemed to 
interact with the participants was to manage the technical and physical aspects of care. 
Therefore, the level of nurse-patient communication rarely progressed beyond a 
superficial or clinical level.  
 
The participants’ accounts illustrated that the absence of nurse-patient communication 
made them feel isolated and invisible. The superficial dialogue with the nurses 
effectively prevented the participants from expressing their unique experience of life on 
haemodialysis therapy. Therefore, the nurses did not recognise or respond to their 
experience of waiting, described in the previous themes.   
 
The participants implied that they were dissatisfied with the shallow level of nurse-
patient communication, which occurred during haemodialysis therapy. As a result, the 
distressing feelings of disappointment, isolation, irritation, frustration, and anger were 
both implicitly and explicitly expressed in their accounts. 
 
For instance, in both interviews with Ali, he indicated that the nurses were too busy to 
communicate with him during haemodialysis therapy.  The following account was taken 
from our follow-up interview. Ali implied that the number of patients requiring 
treatment meant the nurses did not have the time to stop and talk to him during 
treatment. Therefore, the only time the nurses approached him, was to respond to 
machine alarms.  
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Ali said:  
They [the nurses] would come to you [during dialysis], but only if you 
wanted them…or they might pass by and they’d say “are you o.k?” but 
they wouldn’t have time to stand and chat to you…they might for a 
minute or two…If the machine is beeping, they’ll have to come then, but 
they just correct the machine and go again…they wouldn’t have time to 
stand up here for ten minutes to chat to you…there’s too many patients 
here, and normally there might be only two or three nurses on, so their 
time is taken up. (2/2) 
 
 
Correspondingly, in the follow-up interview with Liz, she had received a kidney 
transplant one month previously. She recalled how the nurses had been too busy to talk 
to her during haemodialysis therapy. Occasionally they had been so busy, they failed to 
regularly monitor her blood pressure.   
Liz recalled:  
 
Sometimes you’d get to talk to the nurses, and other times they were so 
busy, they wouldn’t have time even to check your blood 
pressure…They’d check it when you go on the machine and when you’re 
coming off, but usually they’d check it once or twice during the 
dialysis…but some days they wouldn’t have time, they’d be so busy…If 
someone was sick or that, they would be busy…they would come back 
and talk to you if they weren’t busy. (15/2)  
 
 
In both interviews with Alex, he illustrated the lack of nurse-patient communication, 
which existed on the haemodialysis unit. At the time of the follow-up interview, he had 
recently received a kidney transplant. He recalled how the nurses on the haemodialysis 
unit had been too busy to talk to him during treatment. Indeed, they seldom approached 
him, unless a technical or physiological complication occurred.  
Alex recounted: 
They [nurses] usually seemed to be busy enough…and I suppose with 
breaks and that there wouldn’t be that many of them around…and they’d 
be usually putting someone on, or taking them off, or else they’d be 
doing reports…You could have several dialysis sessions and they 
wouldn’t really come up to you and sit down and have a chat…that 
wouldn’t really happen…the odd one might…If you felt weak or sick, 
they’d be all around you then! But lucky enough it [dialysis] went very 
straightforward for me during dialysis…I wasn’t a major problem to 
them…If there was any problems, or if the machine started beeping, 
there’d be someone over to you. (3/2) 
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Beneath Alex’s account was the irritation and frustration he felt toward the nurses for 
their repeated failure to communicate with him during dialysis.   
 
Like Alex, Jeff also exemplified his inability to communicate with nurses on the 
haemodialysis unit. He described the attention he had initially received from the 
healthcare team when he commenced the treatment. At the time, Jeff had to have 
dialysis access formed, and frequently communicated and interacted with the healthcare 
team.  
 
However, since Jeff had commenced haemodialysis therapy, he felt forgotten and 
abandoned. The nurses on the dialysis unit did not approach him during treatment 
unless his machine alarmed.  
Jeff said:  
The thing about dialysis…is when you start on it…and you’re getting 
your permcath [dialysis line] fitted, you’re getting your fistula 
done…and the next thing all that is done, and you’re just left on dialysis 
then, and if there is nothing going wrong…it’s not so much that you’re 
forgotten about, but there is no one coming to you…If the machine 
doesn’t beep, there is no reason for a nurse to be coming up to take your 
blood pressure…where if there is something wrong with you, there is 
always someone around…It would usually be a problem with the 
machine, it would be beeping, but the machine hasn’t beeped at all now, 
it mightn’t beep at all for the night, so there would be no one coming 
near you. (13/2) 
 
 
Jeff’s account conveyed his disappointment with the level of engagement and 
interaction he received from the nurses.   
 
Similarly, Danny also highlighted his dissatisfaction and disappointment with the 
degree of nurse-patient communication on the haemodialysis unit. In the first interview 
with Danny, he expressed a need to talk to nurses and share his concerns about his 
illness and treatment. However, since the nurses rarely spoke to him during dialysis, his 
concerns were not acknowledged.  
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This was Danny’s account: 
They [nurses] sometimes come and have a chat…but then at times it’s 
chaos, you get put on [the machine] and that’s it, you don’t get to speak 
to anybody for the whole shift…I accept there are staff issues, you can’t 
expect people to sit down and spend half and hour chatting everyday, 
but it would be nice to be asked how you are getting on, and if you had 
any problems…You do feel a bit isolated at times…very few of them 
[nurses] have any comprehension of what it is like to be here on 
dialysis…the restrictions and the limitations…You really do need 
somebody, that you could pick up the phone and tell them you’re 
problems. (7/1) 
 
 
Danny’s narrative implied that the nurses failed to recognise or understand his personal 
experience of being a patient on haemodialysis therapy. Embedded in his account were 
the feelings of irritation, frustration, and isolation, as he tried to grapple with the 
difficulties of life on haemodialysis therapy. Because of the isolation he had 
experienced, Danny recommended the need to have “somebody” to specifically attend 
to his interpersonal needs.  
 
The follow-up interview with Danny signified that his situation had not changed. The 
nurses were still too busy to talk to him during his treatment. Indeed, they rarely 
approached him unless a physical or technical problem occurred during the treatment. 
You might chat to somebody if they were passing to do your blood 
pressure…but not if everything is going well, or this thing [machine] is 
not bleeping or anything…You might have a little chat for two minutes, 
but then invariably somebody else is alarming and off they [nurses] 
go…Basically they get you sorted and they take off, so you don’t really 
talk much to anybody. (7/2) 
 
 
According to Elena, the nurses did not have the time talk and listen to her concerns 
during dialysis therapy. Therefore, like Danny, she emphasised the need to have 
someone to address her questions about ESRD and haemodialysis therapy.  
All the nurses do their best, and they can’t spend minutes or hours just 
chatting to make you feel better…they have a job to do…I think it would 
be nice if there was a person who took care of that side of things, to 
follow it [care] through…like when you come to dialysis, you have a lot 
of questions, and you want to know what to do…They [nurses] write it 
down in the diary that you need to see a dietician or a doctor, but 
sometimes they never see it through. (10/1) 
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In the follow-up interview with Elena, I also asked if she had the opportunity to talk 
with nurses during her treatment and she replied:  
No…they [the nurses] seem to be so intent on pressing the buttons on the 
machine, reading what it says…Like talking to somebody at the same 
time as they’re doing something isn’t a good idea either…because if 
they’re [nurses] doing things and then they suddenly say “oh dear”, and 
you think, “what have they done now?”…You know they’ve lost their 
concentration…so therefore you tend not to worry them too much about 
trivia until they’ve got it [machine] more or less set up. (10/2) 
 
 
Like the other participants, Elena’s account exemplified how the technological aspects 
of haemodialysis therapy took up all the nurses’ time and attention. Therefore, she 
seldom had the opportunity to communicate with them during her treatment.  
 
In the follow-up interview with Nancy, she had received a kidney transplant almost a 
year previously. She recalled the difficulty she had experienced while making the 
transition from life on haemodialysis, to life with a transplant. From Nancy’s 
perspective, the nurses on the dialysis unit had been too busy to communicate with her 
during treatment. Consequently, she had received very little information or support 
while she waited for a kidney transplant.  
You wouldn’t get a chance [to talk to the nurses], they would be so 
busy…They would put you on the machine, but it was a basic “how are 
you today?” and I’d say “I’m fine”, just very shallow 
conversation…You couldn’t say “well, I really don’t feel good”, they 
hadn’t time…If I was very sick, I’d say “oh God! I’m not well, I’ve been 
vomiting”, and they’d say “we’ll get the doctor over to you”, and they 
would…that’s it basically…It was always about your needles, or about 
the blood pressure, or about your medication…to do with your illness to 
a certain extent. (16/2) 
 
 
Although Nancy had been on haemodialysis therapy for over four years, her 
conversation with the nurses did not seem to have progressed beyond a “clinical” level. 
Indeed, Nancy’s account illustrated that the nurses rarely focused on anything beyond 
the technical and physical aspects of patient care. By specifically structuring the 
conversation with Nancy around these issues, it is suggested that the nurses essentially 
disregarded her distinctive experience of illness and treatment.    
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The participants’ accounts implied that they were discontented with the superficial level 
of nurse-patient communication. Consequently, threaded throughout their narratives 
were the distressing feelings of disappointment, isolation, irritation, and frustration. For 
some participants, the persistent deficit in nurse-patient communication caused these 
distressing feelings to escalate to the level of anger, resentment, and hostility. This 
subsequently hindered the progression of a positive nurse-patient relationship.    
  
For example, David spoke about the poor relationship he had with some nurses on the 
dialysis unit. Beneath David’s account was his desire to be involved in decisions about 
his treatment and care. However, he insisted that some nurses refused to recognise or 
accept his unique knowledge of his illness.  The lack of effective nurse-patient 
communication effectively prevented David from expressing his opinions about his 
treatment. Moreover, it hindered the development of a therapeutic nurse-patient 
relationship.  
 
It may well have been the case, that the nurses were providing the most appropriate 
treatment for David. However, their failure to communicate in a concerned and caring 
manner meant that he viewed the nurses’ approach as controlling rather than caring. 
Thus, he interpreted their requests as demands, and expressed his resentment, hostility, 
and anger towards the nurses.  
 
In response, David challenged the control exerted by the nurses by refusing to adhere to 
the prescribed treatment regime. Each time he arrived for treatment, he specifically 
demanded that his treatment time of four hours, be reduced to three and half hours.  
David recalled:  
At the beginning [of dialysis] I found it very hard…there was no such 
thing as [nurses] being kind or nice to people or anything…but the good 
ones [nurses] made up for it…there is good ones [nurses]…but the other 
ones hate to be here, and if you see someone like that on the shift, you 
just don’t like it…There is a few that think they’re boss and that’s it! 
Really boss, and you can say whatever you want to say, but they’ll do 
what they want to do…But to be honest with you, I kick up [challenge 
the nurses] and they don’t like me for doing it…I just say “I’m the 
patient, you’re the nurse, and I don’t want to do it that way, and you 
should look after me…Because it’s no use doing something that you 
don’t want to do. (9/2)  
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Chris also conveyed the absence of a positive relationship with the nurses on the 
dialysis unit. In the first interview with Chris, he stated that the nurses tended to 
separate patients who talked and interacted during dialysis therapy. I asked him why he 
felt the nurses did this, and he replied:  
Well you’d have to know one or two of the patients that come in here in 
the morning [laughs]…sometimes you can’t have them sitting beside 
each other because they argue…Also some of the nurses’ personalities 
are different than others…I think it’s just the luck of the draw…I don’t 
think they [nurses] would do it [separate patients] on purpose. (6/1) 
 
 
During my time collecting data on the haemodialysis unit, the nurses informed me that 
Chris was very disruptive during dialysis therapy. He continuously called and nagged 
different nurses throughout dialysis, repeatedly asking them the same questions about 
his treatment. Although the nurses tried to ignore him, Chris also created arguments 
with other fellow patients, which culminated in these patients also complaining to the 
nurses during treatment.   
 
Therefore, Chris caused the arguments he referred to in his account.  To limit the 
disruption caused by his behaviour, the nurses decided to situate him at a dialysis station 
at the far end of the unit. This way his ability to annoy other patients and nurses was 
limited.  
 
In the follow up interview with Chris, he highlighted his growing suspicions that the 
nurses were deliberately isolating him during treatment in order to keep him quiet. 
Embedded in his account was a sense of disappointment and frustration that he was 
being deliberately ignored by the very people who were supposed to care for him.  
Chris said:  
I’m usually surrounded by older women that don’t talk, and they just go 
to sleep…It depends on the nurses that are on at night and how they 
assign the beds…I don’t know…they [nurses] seem to think I talk too 
much…I don’t know why it happens [that he is segregated] but it still 
happens…Really I don’t talk, I don’t know why some nurses do 
it…Sometimes I feel like I’m being isolated…I’m used to it now [sighs] 
because they’re [nurses] always doing it…But I talk to some of those old 
guys down there because they’re the only people that talk, none of the 
other people talk, they go to sleep, they normally don’t talk much, and it 
depends who [which nurse] is on the night shift I guess…Some nurses 
would like everything to be quiet with not much talking going on. (6/2) 
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4.3.1 DISCUSSION OF THEME 
 
The existing literature repeatedly supported the view that communication was a 
fundamental part of nursing, and was essential in the development of an effective nurse-
patient relationship (Peplau, 1992; Arnold & Boggs, 1995; Peplau, 1997; Attree, 2001; 
Mc Cabe, 2004). Considering that the participants attended dialysis three times each 
week, it seemed reasonable to suggest that the nurses working in this area should be 
able to spend some time communicating with these individuals. However, as the 
narratives above pointed out, the participants rarely had the opportunity to communicate 
with nurses during their treatment. The participants’ descriptions of communicating 
with nurses will now be discussed in relation to the existing literature on the person’s 
experience of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy.109   
 
The nurses on the haemodialysis unit seemed to be relentlessly busy. As a result, they 
did not spend sufficient time talking and listening to the participants during treatment. 
A qualitative study by Faber, De Castell & Bryson (2003) also demonstrated that some 
healthcare providers rarely spent time engaging in social interaction with patients during 
haemodialysis therapy. The four participants in the study had been dialysing in the same 
ward, with many of the same health care providers for months or years. Despite this, the 
researchers noted that very little social interaction occurred between the people on 
dialysis and the healthcare providers. In fact, healthcare providers tended to perform 
their work, without any engagement with the person who was receiving care. From the 
researchers’ perspective, it was almost unbelievable that people spent so much time 
together, and yet had such minimal social contact. However, they contended that the 
increased throughput of patients on dialysis, limited the amount of time available for 
healthcare providers to interact with each person.  
 
The participants in my study emphasised that the nurses were too busy to communicate 
with them during haemodialysis therapy. The only time the nurses attended to them was 
to manage the technical and physical aspects of care.110 Consequently, the nurses tended 
to structure their communication with the participants specifically around these issues. 
                                                 
109 This theme will also be discussed in relation to a broader body of literature in Chapter 5: Discussion of 
the Findings.    
110 For example, see the accounts of Ali (p206), Alex (p206), Elena (p 208-209) & Danny (p207-208). 
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However, this meant that the level of nurse-patient communication rarely got beyond a 
superficial or clinical level. 
 
Other authors have conveyed how the high turnover of patients on the haemodialysis 
unit, created a situation where the nurse primarily concentrated on the technical and 
physical features of care (Bevan, 1998; Sloan, 2002). For instance, Bevan (1998) 
compared the excessive throughput of patients on the haemodialysis unit to “a conveyor 
belt or production line of patients for treatment” (p732).  From the author’s viewpoint, 
the busyness on the haemodialysis unit meant the nurses’ attention was predominantly 
focused on the technological aspects of patient care. However, this narrow focus created 
a situation where the nurse merely managed the machine and the patient in an 
“unseeing, ritualised manner” (p734).  
 
Correspondingly, the study by Sloan (2002) suggested that haemodialysis units were 
run on schedules similar to major airports, where people continuously arrived and 
departed from a specific dialysis chair. The nurse essentially viewed her role as 
confined to the management of the technologies of the treatment. Sloan confirmed that 
the pressure for reduced healthcare costs and efficiency, decreased the amount of time 
healthcare providers spent with patients.  Consequently, the management of the dialysis 
machine absorbed most of the nurse’s attention, while the patient slipped into the 
background. Sloan’s (2002) study reported how the nurses’ technological focus created 
a breakdown in their ability to communicate and care. As a result, several of the 
participants in the study felt invisible.  
 
The participants in my study implied that the lack of nurse-patient communication made 
them feel isolated and invisible. The depth of conversation with the nurses was not 
sufficient to allow the participants to convey their unique experience of life on 
haemodialysis therapy. Hence, they expressed a desire to have a designated person who 
would provide the necessary levels of interpersonal care, which would allow their 
concerns to be addressed.111  
 
                                                 
111 For example, see the accounts of Jeff (p207), Danny (p207-208), Elena (p208-209) & Nancy (p209). 
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These findings were corroborated within the existing literature related to the person’s 
experience of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy. For instance, the study by Hagren et al 
(2005) contended that a sense of emotional distance existed between the healthcare 
providers and the participants in the study. The participants signified that the nurses did 
not understand or respect their life situation. As a result, they emphasised the need to 
have healthcare providers who would provide person-centred care.  
 
Similarly, the participants in the study by Nagle (1998) articulated their desire to be 
recognised as a unique person with individual needs. They required this level of 
personalised care to overcome the threat of depersonalisation posed by the technology 
of dialysis. They felt they knew their situation better than the healthcare providers, and 
wanted this knowledge to be incorporated into decisions about their care.  Despite their 
constant efforts to be heard, several participants stated that the nurses failed to recognise 
or accept their wishes regarding their care.  
 
Like these participants, the narrative account of David also verified that the nurses 
refused to accept his opinions about his treatment and care.112 As a result, David refused 
to adhere to his prescribed treatment regime, in an effort to exert some control over the 
situation. It is suggested that the lack of nurse-patient communication, illustrated in my 
study may have also prevented the nurses from recognising the participants’ unique and 
personal experience of life on haemodialysis therapy. Consequently, their experience of 
waiting was not recognised or acknowledged by these nurses.  
 
For example, the participants’ accounts implied that the nurses did not acknowledge 
their distressing experience of killing time, while they waited impatiently for the 
treatment to end.113 This was reflected in the environment of the haemodialysis unit, as 
there was nothing provided for the participants, which would help them to pass the time. 
Moreover, the inappropriate placement of haemodialysis machines, and the random 
allocation of patients to dialysis spaces, prevented communication between patients 
during treatment.114   
 
                                                 
112 See page 210 for David’s account.  
113 See page 133 for the sub theme Killing Time. 
114 For example, see the accounts of Ali (p134), David (p141), Donna (p139) & Elena (p140).  
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According to McCabe (2004) communicating with nurses was an effective way for 
patients to pass the time when they were in hospital. However, the absence of nurse-
patient communication on the dialysis unit meant the participants were unable to use 
this strategy to pass the time during their treatment. It also seemed that the lack of 
effective nurse-patient communication might have also caused the nurses to disregard 
the participants’ experience of waiting, described in the sub theme Wasting Time. If we 
recall, the participants described their experience of wasting time, having to wait for 
dialysis machines, hospital taxis, and doctors.115 The participants’ accounts indicated 
that the nurses on the haemodialysis unit did not acknowledge their experience of 
wasting time.116  
 
For instance, some participants emphasised how the nurses essentially overlooked their 
experience of having to repeatedly wait for haemodialysis machines to become 
available.117 In addition, the nurses did not appear to recognise the participants’ distress 
caused by waiting for hospital taxis. While the nurses on the unit had the ability to deal 
with these avoidable and unnecessary delays, it seemed this did not occur. Therefore, 
some participants were forced to organise their own transport to and from the hospital, 
to avoid wasting time.118   
  
The participants’ experience of waiting for a kidney transplant also appeared to be 
overlooked by the nurses on the haemodialysis unit.  The sheer lack of nurse-patient 
communication meant the nurses failed to recognise the participants’ concerns and 
uncertainties surrounding the process of transplantation. Therefore, the necessary 
follow-up information and support was not provided for the participants throughout the 
waiting time.119  
 
Because of the deficient levels of follow-up information and support, it seemed the 
nurses never corrected the participants’ unrealistic expectations about kidney 
transplantation. Hence, the participants continued to live in hope, because they viewed 
haemodialysis therapy, as a temporary problem. However, when the “expected” date for 
                                                 
115 See page 144 for the sub theme Wasting Time.  
116 For example, see the accounts of Harrison (p145), Alex (p146), Eleana (p148) & David (p149).  
117 For example, see the accounts of Harrison (p145), Alex (p146), & Gloria (p146). 
118 For example, see the accounts of Carl (p151) and Jeff (p151).  
119 For example, see the accounts of Jeff (p179), Danny (p180), David (p182), Nancy (p183).   
 216
a kidney transplant passed, they became increasingly uncertain. When confronted with 
uncertainty, the initial trust the participants had in the nurses was challenged. They 
began to question the fairness of the waiting process and the honesty of the healthcare 
team.  
 
Similarly, the participants in the study by Weems & Patterson (1989) also “figured” a 
potential time by which they hoped to receive a kidney transplant. They based this time 
frame on the numerical information they had received from the healthcare team.  
However, when they failed to receive a kidney transplant within this duration, some 
participants began to question the rules of selection. Their optimistic outlook of 
transplantation was diminished, as the participants began to wonder if their names were 
still on the list, or if they had been forgotten.  
 
Correspondingly, the men in the study by Polaschek (2000) also interpreted 
haemodialysis therapy, as a provisional treatment until they received a kidney 
transplant.  They were convinced that they would definitely receive a transplant, and 
that it would be “successful”. According to Polaschek (2000), the unrealistic 
expectations about transplantation held by the participants, merely reflected the 
dominant discourse of the healthcare professionals working in the area.    
 
The participants in my study presented a similar experience to those in the study by 
Polaschek (2000). For instance, at the time of the participants’ diagnosis with ESRD, 
the healthcare team informed them of the average waiting time for a kidney transplant. 
While this information offered hope at a difficult time, it was also essential that the 
participants were made aware that the average waiting time was a provisional 
timeframe. However, the participants’ accounts illustrated that they misinterpreted the 
information they received from the healthcare team. They understood ESRD and 
haemodialysis therapy to be short-term problems, which would be alleviated by a 
transplant. Because of this unrealistic view, the participants were ill prepared for the 
complexities of life with a chronic illness.   
 
While it was acceptable for the healthcare team to inform the participants of the average 
waiting time for a kidney transplant, it was also essential that they informed them of the 
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chronic nature of their illness. Moreover, the participants should have received ongoing 
information and support to enable them to come to terms with life on dialysis therapy.    
 
As mentioned previously, the participants regularly interacted with the nurses on the 
haemodialysis unit, while they waited for a kidney transplant. Therefore, it would seem 
reasonable to suggest that these nurses should have provided the necessary ongoing 
information and support required by the participants. However, the absence of nurse-
patient communication meant the nurses neither acknowledged or addressed the 
participants’ needs for information and support. As a result, the nurses disregarded the 
participants concerns and uncertainties about kidney transplantation. 
 
The participants in the study Sloan (2002) also indicated that the concerns they had in 
relation to their illness and treatment went largely unrecognised by the healthcare 
providers. Sloan contended that the participants’ accounts represented a story of 
breakdown, where healthcare providers became inattentive and insensitive to the 
patients’ needs.  
 
For instance, the healthcare providers often chastised participants for their non-
compliance with the dietary and fluid restrictions, yet failed to respond to the positive 
efforts they were making. Moreover, the participants’ accounts were replete with 
examples of how oppressive labels negatively shaped their experiences of ESRD and 
dialysis therapy. It seemed that the healthcare providers concentrated on the 
development of self-care behaviours amongst patients. These behaviours were deemed 
to result in positive outcomes with the dialysis treatment regime. Therefore, the 
participants who were unwilling and/or unable to engage in these behaviours were 
labelled as “bad patients”, “non-compliant”, “passive”, or “unmotivated” to help 
themselves (Sloan, 2002).  
 
This unnecessary labelling of patients was illustrated in the narrative accounts of 
Chris.120 It seemed that Chris’s failure to abide with the behavioural norms on the 
haemodialysis unit, resulted in him being labelled a “disruptive” patient. Therefore, he 
was allocated a dialysis space that was away from the nurses’ station, and isolated from 
                                                 
120 See page 211 for Chris’s account.  
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patients who would talk to him during treatment. Chris’s disruptive behaviour was 
deemed by the nurses to warrant this type of segregation. However, as a result of the 
inappropriate level of nurse-patient communication, the nurses failed to address the 
underlying cause of Chris’s behaviour.  
 
Both interviews with Chris were conducted during his treatment. Afterwards the nurses 
expressed their surprise that he had controlled his disruptive behaviour for the duration 
of the interview. From my perspective, it appeared that Chris was very grateful to have 
someone to talk and listen to him during haemodialysis therapy. Indeed, the distress 
caused by his ongoing experience of waiting was illustrated in the sub themes Killing 
Time, Uncertainty, and Being on Hold. 121 However, the labelling of Chris as disruptive 
meant his experience was effectively silenced in his superficial dialogue with the 
nurses.     
 
Similarly, in the study by Sloan (1996), which explored the medical treatment decisions 
for ESRD patients in the USA, an overarching pattern called “Illness as lived in 
structured silence” was developed. This theme referred to the social barriers to dialogue 
that existed between the participants and their care providers. The effect of “labelling” 
was described as a significant feature, which led to the silencing of nurse-patient 
communication in relation to transplantation. Some participants claimed they were 
considered unsuitable for transplantation because the healthcare team had labelled them 
“too old”, “non compliant” or “unappreciative”.   
 
These labels created a situation where the conversation about transplantation was 
silenced between the healthcare providers and the participants. Thus, the participants 
did not get to speak to anyone about transplantation, and had no option but to remain on 
dialysis.  Like these participants, the labelling of Chris as a disruptive patient by the 
nurses on the haemodialysis unit meant his distressing experience of waiting was 
silenced. Therefore, he expressed his disappointment at the insufficient level of nurse-
patient communication.  
 
                                                 
121 See pages 141, 183, and 185 for Chris’s accounts of killing time, uncertainty, and being on hold.   
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Like Chris, the other participants in my study implied that they were also unhappy with 
the superficial level of nurse-patient communication. The distressing feelings of 
disappointment, frustration, resentment, animosity, and anger were interweaved within 
their narratives. For some participants, the unacceptable level of nurse-patient 
communication was difficult to tolerate on an ongoing basis. Therefore, the distressing 
feelings seemed to escalate for these participants. It is suggested that the persistent 
deficit in nurse-patient communication may have created a barrier to the development of 
a positive relationship between the participants and the nurses.  
 
The literature conveyed that effective communication was required for the development 
of a positive nurse-patient relationship (Peplau, 1992; Fosbinder, 1994; McCabe, 2004). 
These authors also emphasised that a positive nurse-patient relationship was necessary 
for high quality, patient-centred care. Various studies, which explored the person’s 
experience of ESRD and dialysis, also commented on the importance of a positive 
nurse-patient relationship.  
 
For instance, the participants in the study by Sloan (2002) highlighted how the caring 
practices of some nurses enabled them to overcome their experience of being 
depersonalised by the environment of the haemodialysis unit. The willingness of these 
nurses to spend time with the participants specifically facilitated their ability to come to 
terms with their illness and treatment. Moreover, these concerned and caring behaviours 
made the participants’ feel “valued”, “at home” and “safe” (Sloan, 2002). 
 
Correspondingly, the study by Rittman et al (1993) identified a theme entitled “dwelling 
in dialysis”. The theme referred to the participants’ experience of living with, and being 
“at home” in the dialysis unit. The relationship of the participants with the nurses was 
an integral part of this theme. The participants spent many hours each week with the 
nurses, and had come to view the dialysis unit as home.  
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The findings conveyed that the nurses recognised and affirmed the significance of the 
participants’ experience of living on dialysis. In particular, they recognised the sense of 
ownership the participants had of “their space” on the unit. For example, the 
participants became attached to the objects in their space during dialysis therapy. They 
wanted to use the same chair, dialysis machine, and television during each visit. Any 
change in machines, schedules, or allocated place in the unit was interpreted as a loss by 
the participants. According to the researchers, the nurses’ ability to recognise and 
understand the participants’ connection with their space on the dialysis unit, served to 
counter the dehumanising effects of the dialysis technology.  
 
The participants in the study by Gregory et al (1998) indicated that nurses’ continuous 
presence on the haemodialysis unit made them the most ongoing and reliable source of 
emotional and psychological support. The nurses were appreciated for their caring 
attitude, their ability to accept the patient as a person, and their ability to make the 
patient feel comfortable. Their willingness to spend time with the participants and 
address their questions and concerns were also deemed important. According to the 
authors, the caring nature of these nurses served to enhance the participants’ adjustment 
to dialysis therapy.    
 
Conversely, it seemed that the lack of nurse-patient communication, described by the 
participants in my study, essentially hindered the development of a positive nurse-
patient relationship. According to Thorne & Robinson (1989), there were three distinct 
stages in the patient-healthcare provider relationship: the naive trust stage, the 
disenchantment stage, and the guarded alliance stage. The authors indicated that most 
chronically ill patients had unrealistic expectations that medicine would provide a 
“cure” for their illness. As a result, these patients entered into a relationship with 
healthcare providers based on “naive trust”.  
 
However, when the reality of the long-term nature of chronic illness was realised, this 
trust was unavoidably shattered. Thus, the person entered the “disenchantment” stage of 
the relationship with healthcare providers. Within this stage, the breakdown of trust 
typically resulted in feelings of dissatisfaction and animosity amongst the patients. 
Eventually this unpleasant stage in the relationship improved through a form of 
“guarded alliance”. Guarded alliance referred to the various new kinds of relationships 
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with healthcare providers, which served to accommodate the patients’ ongoing 
dependence on their services (Thorne & Robinson, 1989).   
 
A study by Sloan (1999) demonstrated the presence of all three stages in the nurse-
patient relationships of individuals with ESRD. The findings illustrated that in the early 
days of treatment, the relationship of some participants with the nurses was based on 
“naive trust”. The participants believed in the nurses’ sincerity and competence to 
manage their health problems. However, as setbacks inevitably occurred in the illness 
trajectory, the relationship progressed into the “disenchantment” stage.  
 
The nurses’ failure to respond or understand the needs of the participants fuelled the 
disenchantment stage of the nurse-patient relationship. The participants tended to view 
the physical setbacks as evidence of incompetence or lack of interest on behalf of the 
nurses. They were angry about the chronic nature of their disease and the apparent 
futility of medicine to resolve their problems. The unavoidable necessity for treatment 
meant the participants relied on the nurses for their continued support. This dependence 
forced the participants and the nurses to interact. The interaction moved the nurse-
patient relationship into the “guarded alliance” stage (Sloan, 1999).  
 
Based on the length of time that the participants in my study spent with the nurses, one 
would expect the nurse-patient relationship to have reached the “guarded alliance” 
stage, presented by Thorne & Robinson (1989). However, it is suggested that the 
absence of effective nurse-patient communication prevented the participants’ 
relationship with the nurses from progressing beyond the “disenchantment” stage.  
 
To re-iterate, the disenchantment stage typically culminated in feelings of 
dissatisfaction and animosity amongst patients (Thorne & Robinson, 1989). In my 
study, the participants’ accounts of communicating with the nurses implied that they 
were dissatisfied with the nurses’ level of engagement. Consequently, the distressing 
feelings of isolation, frustration, animosity, and anger were both implicitly and 
explicitly expressed in their accounts.122  
 
                                                 
122 For example, see the accounts of Danny (p207-208), David (p210), and Chris (p211).   
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4.3.2 SUMMARY OF THEME  
 
This theme discussed the participants’ experience of communicating with the nurses on 
the haemodialysis unit. Their accounts implied that the nurses were too busy to 
communicate with them during dialysis therapy. Instead, the nurses confined their 
attention to the technical and physical aspects of care.    
 
This superficial level of nurse-patient communication meant the nurses failed to 
acknowledge the participants’ distinctive experience of living on haemodialysis therapy. 
As a result, the participants felt isolated and invisible. Moreover, their experience of 
waiting, described in the themes Lost Time and Waiting for a Kidney Transplant was 
not acknowledged or addressed by the nurses.  
 
The participants’ accounts conveyed that they were dissatisfied with the inadequate 
level of nurse-patient communication. Therefore, the distressing feelings of 
disappointment, isolation, irritation, and frustration were palpable throughout their 
narratives. For some participants, the ongoing failure of the nurses to engage in 
appropriate levels of communication caused these distressing feelings to intensify to the 
level of anger, resentment, and hostility. This subsequently created a barrier to the 
development of a positive nurse-patient relationship.    
 
4.3.3 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
Within this chapter, the findings of the study were discussed. The experience of waiting 
was identified as a constitutive pattern in the study. The pattern consisted of three 
themes: Lost Time; Waiting for a Kidney Transplant, and Communicating with Nurses: 
Myth versus Reality.  
 
The theme Lost Time referred to the excessive time spent waiting when the participants 
attended haemodialysis therapy. The time spent waiting prevented the participants from 
engaging in everyday activities, and was interpreted as lost time. The theme Lost Time 
was constituted by two sub themes: Killing Time and Wasting Time. The participants 
described their struggle to kill time while they waited for haemodialysis to end. They 
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also described their experience of wasting time waiting unnecessarily before and after 
haemodialysis therapy. The experience of repeatedly waiting seemed to culminate in the 
existential mood of boredom, depicted by Heidegger (1995).   
 
 
The theme Waiting for a Kidney Transplant was also presented in this chapter. The 
theme consisted of three sub-themes: Living in Hope, Uncertainty, and Being on Hold. 
The participants described their experience of living in hope, while they waited for a 
kidney transplant. However, as the wait for a transplant continued without an endpoint 
in sight, they became uncertain. The uncertainty of waiting indefinitely for a kidney 
transplant meant the participants were unable to contemplate possibilities for the future. 
In addition, the restrictions of life on haemodialysis effectively hindered them from 
participating in their everyday activities. Therefore, they described their experience of 
being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant. It was suggested that the 
participants’ relentless experience of waiting for a transplant resulted in the existential 
moods of anxiety and boredom, described by Heidegger (1962, 1995). 
 
The superficial level of nurse-patient communication on the haemodialysis unit meant 
the participants’ experience of waiting was not recognised by the nurses. Therefore, the 
nurses did not attend to the participants’ experience of waiting. This lack of nurse-
patient communication was discussed in the third and final theme titled Communicating 
with Nurses: Myth versus Reality.  In the following chapter, the three themes, which 
constituted the participants’ experience of waiting, will be discussed in relation to the 
existing literature.  
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CHAPTER 5 : DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
 
This chapter provides a discussion of the findings. The participant’s accounts of waiting 
will be discussed in terms of the existing literature. The discussion of the findings 
consists of two sections. In the first section, titled “Insights from the nursing literature”, 
the participant’s experience of waiting will be discussed in relation to the concept of 
enduring, advanced by Morse (2001).  
 
If we recall, the participants’ experience of waiting culminated in the existential moods 
of anxiety and boredom. These moods highlighted the finitude of existence to the 
participants and prompted them to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of 
existence. However, the relentless and repetitive nature of their experience of waiting 
meant the participants failed to live in either mode of existence. The inability to live in 
either mode of existence in response to anxiety and boredom created a disconnection in 
temporality. Moreover, it culminated in distressing moods for the person.123  
 
It is proposed, that the disconnection in temporality and the intensification of distressing 
moods, illuminated within the participants’ experience of waiting, were depicted in the 
concept of “enduring”, advanced by Morse (2001). From Morse’s perspective, the 
concept of enduring was based on a primarily psychological framework. Hence, the 
experience of enduring was viewed as a cognitive or subjective state, which culminated 
in a series of emotional and behavioural responses.  
 
Conversely, the participants’ accounts in the study highlighted that their experience of 
waiting did not merely consist of a psychological response, which resulted in various 
emotions and behaviours. Instead, their experience of waiting was a constitutive feature 
of their existence or their “being-in-the-world”. However, these existential features, 
which formed the basis of the participants’ experience of waiting, were not incorporated 
into Morse’s (2001) concept of enduring. Hence, there was a need to expand and refine 
the concept in order to address this conceptual gap.  
                                                 
123 See pages 127-128 for the previous discussion on the person’s inability to live in either mode of 
existence. 
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By incorporating characteristics of Heidegger’s existential perspective of temporality 
and mood with Morse’s (2001) concept of enduring, a model of enduring was 
formulated to provide a more comprehensive description of the participants’ experience 
of waiting. This will be discussed in the second section of this chapter titled “Insights 
from the nursing literature”.124   
 
According to Morse (2001), the person who was enduring required nursing care to be 
patient-centred. The nurse was required to spend enough time with the patient to allow 
him/her to recognise and respond appropriately to the person’s experience of enduring. 
This personal knowledge of the patient was essential if therapeutic nursing interventions 
were to be provided.  
 
In contrast, the participants’ accounts in my study indicated that care on the 
haemodialysis unit was not patient-centred. In particular, the theme Communicating 
with Nurses: Myth versus Reality clearly illustrated this point. It is proposed, that the 
context of care on the haemodialysis unit may have been responsible for the absence of 
patient-centred care. This suggestion will also be discussed in the second section of this 
chapter titled “The context of care on the haemodialysis unit”.      
                                                 
124 Refer to Appendix E (p313) for a further discussion of the participants’ experience of waiting in 
relation to the existential literature of Samuel Beckett and Franz Kafka.  
 226
 
5.1 INSIGHTS FROM THE NURSING LITERATURE 
 
It is proposed that Morse’s (2001) concept of “enduring” encapsulated the participants’ 
experience of waiting, advanced in the study. As mentioned in the literature review, 
Morse (2001) described suffering as a response to loss, such as the loss of self, the loss 
of health, the loss of an anticipated future, and the loss of another. There were two 
behavioural states, which constituted her model of suffering: “enduring” and “emotional 
suffering”.  
 
Morse (2001) signified that emotional suffering was a very distressed state where 
emotions were released. Conversely, the state of enduring involved the cognitive 
suppression or blocking of emotions. Enduring was a strategy that allowed the person to 
“get through” an unbearable situation (Morse & Carter, 1995, 1996; Morse, 2001). The 
person who was enduring focused primarily on the present. However, within this 
present-oriented state, the person essentially blocked out the past and future (Morse, 
2001).   
 
Morse (2001) illustrated that suffering was not a linear process. Instead, the person 
oscillated back and forth between the states of “enduring” and “emotional suffering” 
before eventually moving onto the reformulated self.  According to Morse (2001), the 
distressing emotional responses varied in intensity when the person was enduring. 
However, when these emotional responses became too intense to suppress, it resulted in 
a failure to endure and the person moved into emotional suffering. After slightly 
moving into the state of emotional suffering, some individuals perceived that they might 
psychologically disintegrate due to an overwhelming release of unpleasant emotions. 
Hence, after temporarily sensing emotional suffering, they quickly moved back into 
enduring.  
 
This back and forth oscillation between enduring and emotional suffering repeatedly 
occurred until the person acknowledged that the loss or unbearable event had occurred. 
It was this acknowledgement that enabled the person to move into emotional suffering. 
Morse (2001) claimed that the person had to enter the state of emotional suffering 
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before s/he accepted the lost past and the altered future. Once the person achieved 
acceptance, s/he overcame suffering and moved onto the “reformulated self”.  
  
Within the work of Morse, there appeared to be an underlying assumption that the 
person moved back and forth between the suppression and release of distressing 
emotional responses, before automatically moving onto the reformulated self. Indeed, 
this assumption was also embedded within the existing literature related to the person’s 
experience of ESRD and dialysis therapy. This literature illuminated a dynamic 
movement between distressing and positive emotional responses, which eventually 
resulted in the transformation of the self. However, like Morse’s work, this literature did 
not sufficiently address what would happen in the event of the person getting “stuck” in 
either emotional suffering or enduring.  
 
This seemed to be precisely what happened to the participants in my study. Their 
accounts emphasised that they were unable to overcome the persistent experience of 
waiting. Hence, they were subsequently unable to escape the experience of enduring. It 
is proposed that the inability to escape from enduring culminated in the existential 
moods of anxiety and boredom, described by Heidegger (1962).  
 
Unlike the existential perspective of Heidegger (1962), Morse’s (2001) concept of 
enduring was primarily based on a psychological perspective. Based on Morse’s (2001) 
interpretation, enduring was viewed as a cognitive or subjective state, which initiated a 
series of emotional and behavioural responses. In contrast, the participants’ accounts in 
my study highlighted that their experience of waiting did not merely consist of a 
psychological response, which resulted in various emotions and behaviours. Instead, 
their experience of waiting was a constitutive feature of their existence or “being-in-the-
world”.  
 
These existential features, which formed the basis of the participants’ experience of 
waiting, were not incorporated into Morse’s (2001) concept of enduring. Hence, there 
was a need to expand and refine the concept in order to address this conceptual gap. By 
incorporating characteristics of Heidegger’s existential perspective of mood and 
temporality with Morse’s (2001) concept of enduring, it was anticipated that a more 
appropriate description of the participants’ experience of waiting would be formulated.  
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5.1.1 TOWARD A MODEL OF ENDURING 
 
Through the amalgamation of Heidegger’s existential perspective with Morse’s (2001) 
concept of enduring, a new “model of enduring” was formulated to provide a more 
comprehensive description of the participants’ experience of waiting. A diagrammatical 
representation of this model is illustrated in Figure 2 (p232). 
 
It is proposed, that because of the participants’ experience of persistently waiting, 
described in the themes Lost Time and Waiting for a Kidney Transplant, they were 
unable to escape the experience of enduring. This culminated in the existential moods of 
anxiety and boredom, depicted by Heidegger (1962, 1995). These moods illuminated 
the possibility of death to the participants, which prompted them to live in either an 
authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. However, the ongoing nature of the 
experience of waiting meant that many of the participants were unable to live in either 
mode of existence. Consequently, they experienced an intensification of distressing 
moods and a disruption in the threefold structure of originary temporality.  
 
These features of the participants’ experience of waiting epitomised specific 
characteristics of Morse’s (2001) concept of enduring. Within the following discussion, 
the proposed model of enduring outlined in Figure 2 (p232) will be used as a framework 
or scaffolding to describe the participants’ experience of waiting.  
 
As previously mentioned, the participants described their experience of living in hope, 
while they waited for a kidney transplant. The participants’ accounts of living in hope 
indicated that they predominantly focused on clock and calendar time. By focusing on 
clock/calendar time, they were able to get through the days, weeks, months, and years 
spent waiting for a kidney transplant. In particular, the participants’ believed they would 
receive a transplant within a specific time frame. This expectation contributed to their 
concentration on clock/calendar time.  
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Morse & Doberneck (1995) described a “determination to endure” as a universal 
component of hope, which allowed hope to be sustained. The authors stated that a 
significant time elapsed between the person selecting and attaining a goal. While the 
person was hopeful, s/he had to wait and endure the time lapse until the goal was 
attained (Morse & Doberneck, 1995; Morse & Penrod, 1999).  
 
According to Morse (2001) and Morse & Carter (1996) enduring was a response that 
occurred when one had no choice but to get through an unbearable situation. When 
enduring, the person focused on the present and it was this focus that kept him/her 
going minute by minute. The person developed strategies to physically “hold on” to the 
present, such as watching the clock or counting something. However, this predominant 
focus on the present meant they blocked out the past and the future.  
 
It is suggested that the description of watching the clock, presented in the participants’ 
accounts of living in hope, was depicted in the description of enduring by Morse and 
colleagues. The participants predominantly focused on clock time while they waited for 
a kidney transplant. Like Morse’s description of enduring, it seemed that the 
participants’ concentration on the “nows” of clock time effectively blocked off the past 
and future. However, the interpretation of time, which formed the basis of the 
participants’ experience, was not the largely psychological or cognitive interpretation of 
time, embedded in Morse’s concept of enduring. Rather, it was Heidegger’s (1962) 
perspective of ordinary or clock time, which formed the basis of the participants’ 
experience of living in hope. Moreover, Heidegger’s interpretation of time offered a 
more comprehensive explanation as to why the past and future were essentially blocked 
out when the person concentrated on clock time.  
 
If we recall, Heidegger (1962) claimed that we did not normally understand time in 
terms of the endless sequence of “nows” of clock or ordinary time.125 In contrast, we 
normally understood clock time in relation to the activities we performed in the world 
on a daily basis. World-time referred to the time used to structure and coordinate these 
everyday activities. Therefore, this perspective of time formed the contextual basis or 
background to ordinary or clock time. Since world-time constituted the originary 
                                                 
125 See page 102 for the previous discussion on ordinary or clock time.  
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present, it was also embedded in the threefold structure of originary temporality. This 
meant that the threefold structure of originary temporality formed the core of both 
world-time and ordinary or clock time. However, as Heidegger (1962) pointed out, 
when the person merely focused on the endless sequence of “nows” of clock or ordinary 
time, this contextual background was concealed or covered over.  
 
In other words, by focusing on the present “now” of ordinary or clock time, the past and 
future of originary temporality, which constituted its base, was effectively blocked out.  
By re-interpreting Morse’s concept of enduring in terms of Heidegger’s perspective of 
time or temporality, it was possible to understand the participants’ experience of living 
in hope as enduring. By focusing only on the present “nows” of clock time, while they 
initially waited for a transplant, the participants effectively overlooked the originary 
past and future, which provided its contextual base. 
 
It is proposed that the relentless nature of the participants’ experience of waiting meant 
they were unable to escape from enduring. Thus, when the wait for a kidney transplant 
continued well beyond their expectations, the participants’ experience of living in hope 
turned to uncertainty. Because of uncertainty, they began to realise that haemodialysis 
therapy might not be the short-term problem they had initially anticipated. Thus, their 
experience of uncertainty culminated in uneasiness, sadness, disappointment, and 
depression.  
 
The acceleration of distress, which accompanied the participants’ experience of 
uncertainty, was incorporated in Morse’s (2001) description of enduring. Morse (2001) 
emphasised that enduring involved the suppression of unpleasant emotions. However, 
she subsequently implied that when individuals were enduring, their emotional levels 
could change in intensity. For instance, there were times when emotional suppression 
occurred without the person even being aware (Morse & Penrod, 1999; Morse, 2001). 
Conversely, on other occasions it took a great deal of energy for the person to suppress 
their distressing emotions. As a result, the distressing emotions increased in intensity 
while enduring (Morse & Penrod, 1999; Morse, 2001). 
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As previously mentioned, Morse and colleagues interpreted enduring as a cognitive or 
subjective state, which initiated emotional and behavioural responses. Therefore, the 
intensification of distress, which occurred when one was enduring, referred to 
“emotional” or “psychological” distress. Unlike Morse’s perspective, the distress 
experienced by the participants while they waited for a kidney transplant, was not 
merely a psychological response. For instance, they did not describe their experience of 
uncertainty as an emotional reaction. Rather, the characteristic features of the 
participants’ experience of uncertainty symbolised Heidegger’s (1962) description of 
anxiety.126 Hence, this implied that the failure of the participants to escape from the 
experience of enduring created existential anxiety (see Figure 2, p232).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126 See page 125 for the previous discussion on the fundamental existential mood of anxiety. 
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According to Heidegger (1962), anxiety and boredom were fundamental existential 
moods. Therefore, to provide a thorough understanding of the participants’ experience 
of uncertainty, there was a need to supplement Morse’s (2001) psychological 
perspective of emotion with Heidegger’s existential perspective of mood. If we recall, 
Heidegger’s (1962, 1995) notion of mood did not refer to the predominantly 
psychological perspective of feelings or experiences. Instead, mood or attunement was 
described as a product of existence and arose out of being-in-the-world.127  
 
As a fundamental existential mood, anxiety highlighted the threefold structure of 
originary temporality to the person. This disclosed death as a possibility of the person’s 
future. When confronted with the finitude of their existence, the participants were 
prompted to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence.128 However, 
their accounts of uncertainty suggested that as a result of waiting indefinitely for a 
transplant, they were unable to live in either mode of existence. 
 
Heidegger (1962, 1995) claimed that the inability to live in either mode of existence 
was responsible for the unpleasant and distressing moods we experienced on an 
everyday basis. Hence, it was proposed that the participants’ inability to live in either 
mode of existence resulted in the distressing moods, which accompanied their 
experience of uncertainty. Moreover, the indefinite nature of the participants’ 
experience of waiting for a kidney transplant meant they were persistently unable to live 
in either mode of existence, which caused the distressing moods to intensify.  
 
If we recall, Morse (2001) indicated that the distressing emotions varied in intensity 
when the person was enduring. However, using Heidegger’s (1962, 1995) interpretation 
of mood, we were able to provide a more fitting description of the distressing moods, 
which accompanied the participants’ experience of uncertainty. It is suggested that the 
participant’s inability to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence, 
while they relentlessly waited for a transplant, meant they were unable to overcome the 
                                                 
127 See pages 123-124 for the previous discussion on Heidegger’s notion of mood.  
128 In the inauthentic mode of existence, Dasein absorbs itself in everyday activities to avoid reflecting on 
its death and finitude. In the authentic mode of existence, Dasein is aware of the finitude of its existence, 
but still projects forward into possibilities in the originary future. In both modes of existence the threefold 
structure of originary temporality remains unified.  
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experience of enduring.  Consequently, while they remained held back or trapped within 
the experience of enduring, these distressing moods continued to intensify.  
 
As mentioned previously, the threefold structure of originary temporality remained 
connected when the person lived in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. 
However, the failure of the participants to live in either mode of existence created a 
disconnection in the unified structure of originary temporality. This disconnection in 
originary temporality was depicted within the participants’ experience of being on hold, 
while they waited for a kidney transplant.  
 
For instance, the participants’ experience of uncertainty prevented them from 
contemplating possibilities for the future. In addition, the disruptions in lifestyle created 
by the dialysis treatment regime, meant they were unable to participate fully in the 
lifestyle they took for granted in the past. Consequently, the participants described their 
experience of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant.  
 
The experience of being on hold was described as being held back in a time that was 
separated from the narrative of their lives. The time spent on hold was not related to 
their past and future. Instead, it was almost completely engulfed by the relentless 
treatment regime of haemodialysis therapy. The moods of hopelessness and despair 
were palpable throughout the participants’ accounts of being on hold. 
 
These characteristics of the participants’ experience of being on hold symbolised 
specific features of the concept of enduring, advanced by Morse (2001). As mentioned 
previously, Morse (2001) contended that individuals who were enduring focused on the 
present and this enabled them to get through the difficult situation. However, when the 
person predominantly focused on the present, s/he essentially blocked out the past and 
future. According to Morse (2001), in extreme forms, enduring disconnected the person 
from his/her life. These qualities of enduring seemed to correspond with the 
participants’ experience of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant.  
 
However, as previously mentioned, Morse’s (2001) concept of enduring was based on a 
psychological framework. Therefore, the interpretation of time embedded within the 
concept referred to the person’s cognitive or subjective experience of time. In contrast, 
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the disconnection in time depicted in the participants’ experience of being on hold, did 
not symbolise this psychological perspective of time. Rather, the interpretation of time 
embedded within the participants’ experience of waiting for a kidney transplant was the 
threefold structure of originary temporality (Heidegger, 1962). Therefore, to make 
Morse’s concept of enduring more apposite to the participants’ experience of waiting, 
there was a requirement to replace the psychological interpretation of time entrenched 
within the concept, with Heidegger’s (1962) description of temporality.  
 
The integration of Heidegger’s account of temporality with Morse’s concept of 
enduring facilitated a more in-depth understanding of the disconnection in temporality 
illustrated in the participants’ experience of being on hold. For instance, the uncertainty 
of waiting indefinitely for a kidney transplant meant the participants were unable to 
contemplate possibilities for the future. The failure to contemplate possibilities for the 
future implied that the originary future had lost its projective characteristics.129 Without 
the projection of the originary future, the ecstatical unity of originary temporality was 
disconnected.  
 
Furthermore, the restrictive treatment regime of dialysis prevented several participants 
from engaging fully in their normal everyday activities. This conveyed that world-time 
was also disrupted. Since world-time constituted the originary present, it was embedded 
within originary temporality. Therefore, a disruption in world-time subsequently 
culminated in a disruption to originary temporality.  
 
The disconnection in originary temporality, highlighted in the participants’ experience 
of being on hold was depicted in Morse’s concept of enduring. However, by addressing 
the concept in terms of Heidegger’s notion of originary temporality, it was possible to 
understand in more detail how the participants’ experience of enduring the relentless 
wait for a kidney transplant disconnected or blocked off the past and future. 
Consequently, the participants remained held back in a present that was almost entirely 
constituted by haemodialysis therapy.   
 
                                                 
129 See page 94 for previous discussion on the originary future.  
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The disconnection in originary temporality combined with the distressing moods, 
contained in the participants’ accounts of being on hold, indicated that they were unable 
to live in either mode of existence when confronted with anxiety. These features of the 
participants’ descriptions subsequently implied that they were unable to escape the 
experience of enduring while they waited for a transplant (see Figure 2, p232).  
 
In particular, the disconnection in originary temporality symbolised Heidegger’s (1995) 
description of boredom. Like anxiety, Heidegger (1995) described boredom as a 
fundamental existential mood.130 There were three forms of boredom, which ranged 
from the most superficial to the most profound. The third form of boredom was the 
origin of the other two, because it disclosed the person’s finite existence. Therefore, the 
person tried to flee or escape from the first and second forms of boredom to avoid being 
drawn into the third and most profound form of boredom.  
 
As previously discussed, the participants’ descriptions of waiting, described in the 
themes Lost Time and Waiting for Kidney Transplant epitomised the defining features 
of the three forms of boredom, presented by Heidegger (1995). Similarly, the features of 
boredom contained within the participants’ accounts corresponded with specific aspects 
of Morse’s (2001) concept of enduring. In the discussion that follows, the defining 
characteristics of Heidegger’s (1995) analysis of boredom, contained within the 
participants’ accounts of waiting, will be discussed in relation to Morse’s concept of 
enduring.  
 
In the first form of boredom, the person was forced to wait in a particular situation 
(Heidegger, 1995). The participants’ accounts of waiting, presented in the themes Lost 
Time and Waiting for a Kidney Transplant indicated that they were unable to escape 
from the experience of waiting. Therefore, they had no option except to get through the 
experience of waiting. To re-iterate, enduring was described as a response, which 
occurred when one had no choice but to get through a difficult situation (Morse & 
Carter, 1995, 1996; Morse, 2001). The person focused predominantly on the present, 
and this focus allowed them to get through the situation. Various strategies were used to 
concentrate on the present, such as watching the clock, or counting (Morse, 2001).  
                                                 
130 See page 158 for a more in-depth discussion on Heidegger’s perspective of boredom. 
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The participants’ accounts of living in hope while they waited for a kidney transplant 
highlighted their predominant focus on clock/calendar time. Embedded in their accounts 
was the experience of “counting down” the days, weeks, months, and years until they 
received a kidney transplant. Likewise their descriptions of waiting, presented in the 
theme Lost Time also illustrated their predominant concentration on clock time. For 
instance, in the sub theme Killing Time, the participants conveyed their experience of 
watching the clock, while they waited for the treatment to end. Similarly, their 
predominant focus on clock time was also emphasised in their descriptions of wasting 
time.  
 
According to Heidegger (1995) when the person watched the clock, they were merely 
trying to gauge how long it would be until the wait was over. This was indicative of the 
description of enduring, advanced by Morse (2001). Morse claimed that by watching 
the clock and focusing on clock time, the person was merely trying to get through or 
endure the time until the unbearable situation was over. There were various strategies, 
which allowed the person to temporarily escape from enduring, such as sleeping, doing 
puzzles, and watching TV. The participants’ accounts in the sub theme Killing Time 
signified that the time dragged, while they waited for haemodialysis to end. 
Consequently, they tried to kill time by performing various activities, such as reading, 
doing puzzles, and watching television and DVDs.  
 
From Heidegger’s (1995) perspective, time became long in the first form of boredom. 
Therefore, the person performed activities in an effort to pass the time and drive away 
the boredom. The strategies used by the participants to kill time corresponded with the 
first form of boredom. Moreover, these strategies indicated that the participants were 
enduring, while they waited for haemodialysis to end. It seemed that the strategies used 
to kill time were also strategies to escape from enduring.  
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The themes Waiting for a Kidney Transplant and Lost Time conveyed the relentless 
nature of the participants’ experience of waiting. Because of the persistent waiting, they 
were unable to flee from the first form of boredom. Therefore, they progressed into the 
second form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995). According to Heidegger 
(1995), in the second form of boredom, the person’s efforts or strategies to pass the time 
were repressed. The participants’ accounts of waiting, presented in the sub theme 
Killing Time emphasised that their efforts to kill time were suppressed during 
haemodialysis therapy. The suppression of the participants’ efforts to kill time 
corresponded with the second form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995).   
 
As mentioned previously, Morse (2001) and Morse & Carter (1996) described various 
strategies used by the person to escape from enduring. These strategies were similar to 
the strategies used by the participants to kill time during haemodialysis therapy. It 
appeared that the suppression of the participants’ efforts to kill time also resulted in the 
suppression of the strategies used to escape from enduring.  Hence, this implied that the 
participants were unable to escape from the experience of enduring, while they waited 
for dialysis to end.  
 
Because the participants’ efforts to kill time were suppressed during dialysis, they 
essentially had nothing to do except wait for the treatment to end.  Consequently, the 
time spent waiting during haemodialysis therapy prevented them from performing their 
everyday activities.  Similarly, the relentless experience of waiting, described within the 
sub themes Wasting Time and Being on Hold prevented the participants from engaging 
in their normal everyday activities. This subsequently created a disruption in the 
characteristic features of world-time.  
  
If we recall, world-time was the time that contained the activities performed by the 
person in his/ her everyday involvements in the world. It referred to the irreversible, 
sequence or flow of times called “nows”, where the world-time present was the “now”, 
the world-time past was the “no-longer-now”, and the world-time future was the “not-
yet-now”. The activities performed by the person in his/her everyday involvements in 
the world provided world time with its irreversible sequence or flow.131 However, when 
                                                 
131 See page 97 for the discussion of world-time.  
 239
these activities stopped, the flowing of world-time also stopped, which brought world-
time to a stand.  
 
Heidegger (1995) emphasised that when world-time was brought to a stand, the person 
experienced the second form of boredom. It has already been proposed that the 
disruption to world-time portrayed in the participants’ accounts of waiting, expressed in 
the sub themes Killing Time, Wasting Time, and Being on Hold, brought world-time to a 
stand.132 When world-time came to a stand, the “now” was not eliminated. Rather, it did 
not have the possibility of a transition from a “not-yet-now” (world-time future) to a 
“no-longer-now” (world-time past). Hence, for the duration of time that the person was 
unable to engage in his/her everyday activities, the present “now” was merely static. 
The person was forced to endure the present “now” of world-time, cut off or unbounded 
from the “not-yet-now” and the “no-longer-now”. 
 
These features of the second form of boredom, which appeared in the participants’ 
accounts of Killing Time, Wasting Time, and Being on Hold, symbolised Morse’s (2001) 
concept of enduring. According to Morse (2001), the person who was enduring 
concentrated on the present in order to get through the unpleasant situation. Within this 
present-oriented state, the past and future were essentially blocked out. To re-iterate, 
Morse’s concept of enduring primarily referred to the cognitive or subjective experience 
of time. Therefore, there was a need to replace this psychological interpretation of time 
with Heidegger’s (1962) perspective of world-time in order to appropriately address the 
participants’ experience of waiting. By expanding Morse’s (2001) concept of enduring 
in this way, the features of the second form of boredom, which were expressed in the 
participants’ accounts of waiting, seemed indicative of enduring.    
 
Heidegger (1995) signified that the second form of boredom was usually transient. Once 
the person re-engaged in his/her everyday activities, the irreversible flow of world-time 
was subsequently recommenced.  In other words, the standing of world-time would be 
overcome and the person would flee from the second form of boredom. In contrast, the 
participants’ accounts in my study signified that their experience of waiting was 
                                                 
132 See page 158 and 198 for the previous discussion on boredom in relation to the themes Lost Time and 
Waiting for a Kidney Transplant.    
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persistent and ongoing. As a result, they were unable to flee or escape from the second 
form of boredom and were drawn into profound boredom.  
 
The participants’ failure to escape from the relentless experience of waiting meant they 
were unable to overcome the standing of world-time, which was presented in the sub 
themes Killing Time, Wasting Time, and Being on Hold. If we recall, world-time 
constituted the originary present and was embedded within the threefold structure of 
originary temporality. The person acted in world-time or the originary present based on 
his/her affectedness from the past, to project forward into possibilities in the future. 
Hence, it was the originary present or world-time that highlighted the spannedness of 
originary temporality, described by Heidegger (1962).  
 
This spanned character demonstrated that originary temporality was not three separate 
dimensions of time. Rather, it was a unified whole, with a projective or purposeful 
character based on the originary future (Blattner, 1999). However, when world-time was 
disrupted, as a result of the participants’ experience of waiting, it came to a stand.  This 
subsequently caused the originary present to come to a stand. The participants’ inability 
to overcome the experience of waiting meant they were unable to overcome the 
disruption/standing of the originary present. Consequently, the threefold structure of 
originary temporality was disconnected.   
 
Furthermore, the participants’ experience of being on hold signified that the uncertainty 
of waiting indefinitely for a kidney transplant prevented them from contemplating 
possibilities for the future. This conveyed that the originary future had lost its projective 
characteristics. Without the projection of the originary future, the ecstatical unity of 
originary temporality was disrupted. Therefore, this feature of the participants’ 
experience of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant, also 
demonstrated a disconnection in the unified structure of originary temporality.  
 
The disconnection in the threefold structure of originary temporality created by the 
participants’ experience of waiting, depicted the third and most profound form of 
boredom, described by Heidegger (1995). In the third form of boredom, originary 
temporality was suspended or stopped. This created a disconnection in the threefold 
structure of originary temporality.  
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Heidegger stated that the time that was suspended in profound boredom was different 
than our normal, everyday understanding of time, as ordinary (clock) time, or world-
time (Blattner, 1999). Instead, it was the threefold structure of originary temporality, 
which was suspended in the third form of boredom. When originary temporality was 
suspended, the past and future became separated from the originary present. This meant 
the ecstatic unity of originary temporality was disintegrated.  
 
The disintegration of the ecstatic unity of originary temporality forced the present 
ecstases to stretch and lengthen itself to fill the entire time horizon. However, without 
the defining features of the originary past and future, the originary present also lost its 
defining features. In other words, the person was not acting in the originary present, 
based on his/her affectedness from the past to project forward into possibilities in the 
future. Rather, the present was characterised by inaction and the person was compelled 
to endure the empty time of profound boredom.  
 
The empty time of profound boredom was not related to the person’s past and future. 
Therefore, while the person experienced the empty time of profound boredom, 
everything seemed to be without value and indifferent (Haar, 1999). The participants’ 
accounts of waiting, contained in the sub themes Killing Time, Wasting Time, and Being 
on Hold, conveyed the empty time of profound boredom. The relentless experience of 
waiting meant the participants had no option but to get through the empty time of 
profound boredom.  
 
Again, these features of the participants’ accounts were characteristic of Morse’s (2001) 
concept of enduring. The experience of being forced to get through an untenable 
situation, combined with the disconnection in originary temporality, was indicative of 
the concept of enduring. Morse (2001) pointed out that when enduring, the past and 
future were essentially blocked off, and the person was left in a present oriented state. In 
its most extreme form, enduring disconnected the person from life (Morse, 2001). These 
defining characteristics of Morse’s (2001) concept of enduring were indicative of the 
experience of profound boredom, highlighted in the participants’ experience of waiting. 
However, as previously mentioned, the psychological perspective of time retained in 
Morse’s concept, meant that time was interpreted as something cognitively or 
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subjectively conceived by the person. Therefore, there was a requirement to replace this 
predominantly psychological perspective of time, with Heidegger’s (1962) notion of 
originary temporality. By making this alteration to the concept of enduring, it was 
possible to provide a more fitting account of the profound boredom portrayed in the 
participants’ experience of waiting.  
 
From Heidegger’s (1962) perspective of originary temporality, time was understood as 
more than just a consciously retained phenomenon. On the contrary, time as originary 
temporality was based on the care-structure of one’s existence and was grounded in 
one’s being-in-the-world. Thus, the disconnection in originary temporality created by 
boredom did not just disrupt the person’s cognitive or subjective perception of time. It 
actually created a disruption in the person’s life or existence.  
 
Like anxiety, Heidegger (1995) described boredom as a fundamental existential mood. 
In other words, it illuminated the possibility of death to the individual and prompted 
them to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. The accounts of 
several participants signified that they were unable to live in either mode of existence in 
response to profound boredom. Consequently, they were drawn deeper and deeper into 
profound boredom. As previously mentioned, the inability to live in either mode of 
existence produced the discomforting moods experienced by the person on a daily basis 
(Heidegger, 1962, 1995).   
 
The participants’ accounts characterised the distressing moods, which accompanied 
their experience of waiting. For instance, the distressing moods of uneasiness, irritation, 
frustration, anger, and despair were described within their experience of waiting, 
presented in the theme Lost Time. Furthermore, the unpleasant moods of sadness, 
disappointment, depression, hopelessness, and despair were described in the theme 
Waiting for a Kidney Transplant. The ongoing nature of the participants’ experience of 
waiting meant they were unable to flee or escape from profound boredom. Moreover, 
they were unable to live in either mode of existence when faced with the finitude of 
their existence. Therefore, the distressing moods accelerated, as the wait continued 
relentlessly.    
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According to Morse (2001), the intensification of emotions resulted in a “failure to 
endure” causing the person to progress into the state of emotional suffering. In contrast, 
the findings of my study implied that the acceleration of the distressing moods, 
experienced by the participants, did not result in a failure to endure. Rather, these 
unpleasant moods intensified because the participants “failed to escape from enduring”. 
The persistent nature of the participants’ experience of waiting meant they had no 
choice except to get through or tolerate this unpleasant experience.  
 
As mentioned previously, Morse’s work did not address what occurred when the person 
was essentially trapped within the state of enduring.  Indeed, Morse & Penrod (1999) 
highlighted the inability to address this issue, as a shortcoming in their work on 
suffering.  Based on the findings of their study, the authors claimed that enduring might 
be prominent within the experience of waiting.  Therefore, they recommended the need 
to qualitatively investigate the role of waiting, in an effort to fill this conceptual gap in 
their model of suffering.   
 
It is suggested that the findings of my study went some way to addressing this 
conceptual gap. By combining elements of Morse’s (2001) concept of enduring with 
elements of Heidegger’s (1962, 1995) existential philosophy, a model was formulated to 
provide a more comprehensive description of the participants’ experience of waiting 
(see Figure 2, p232). In summary, the participants’ ongoing experience of waiting 
meant they were unable to escape from enduring. This culminated in the existential 
moods of anxiety and boredom, which highlighted the possibility of death to the 
participants. When confronted with this grim possibility, the participants were prompted 
to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. However, the relentless 
nature of their experience of waiting meant they were unable to live in either mode of 
existence. This culminated in a disconnection in temporality and the intensification of 
distressing moods.  
 
These features of the participants’ accounts depicted Morse’s (2001) concept of 
enduring. They implied that the participants’ failure to live in either mode of existence 
in response to anxiety and boredom effectively prevented them from overcoming the 
experience of enduring. As a result of the participants’ ongoing experience of waiting, 
they remained essentially stuck or trapped within enduring.  
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From Morse’s (2001) perspective, the intensification of distressing emotions caused the 
person to move out of enduring into a separate state of emotional suffering. However, 
using Heidegger’s existential perspective, we were able to recognise the acceleration of 
the distressing moods, contained within the participants’ accounts of waiting, as an 
integral characteristic of enduring. The participants’ ongoing inability to live in either 
mode of existence in response to anxiety and boredom caused their distressing moods to 
accelerate to the level of utter hopelessness and despair. These distressing moods were 
explicitly and implicitly contained in the participants’ accounts of waiting. In addition, 
they were unable to reconnect the unified structure of originary temporality.  
 
Alternatively, a small number of the participants described their ability to live in an 
inauthentic mode of existence in response to profound boredom. By choosing to live in 
an inauthentic mode of existence, these participants were able to alleviate the distressing 
moods, and reconnect the threefold structure of originary temporality, which culminated 
from their experience of waiting. By reconnecting the unified structure of originary 
temporality and developing a more positive mood, the participants’ accounts suggested 
they had overcome the experience of enduring (see Figure 2, p232).  
 
From Morse’s (2001) perspective, the only way for the nurse to help and support the 
person who was enduring was through patient-centred care. However, to achieve 
patient-centred care, the nurse had to spend sufficient time communicating with 
patients, in order to recognise their specific needs (Morse, 2001).  The participants’ 
accounts contained in the theme Communicating with the Nurses: Myth versus Reality 
demonstrated that the nurses rarely spent time communicating with them when they 
attended haemodialysis therapy. Instead, the nurses predominantly focused on the 
technical and physiological aspects of patient care. It is suggested that the 
technologically focused context of care on the haemodialysis unit effectively hindered 
the provision of patient-centred care. This issue will now be discussed in further detail 
in the third and final section of this chapter.  
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5.2 THE CONTEXT OF CARE ON THE HAEMODIALYSIS UNIT 
 
There were a number of issues within the context of care on the haemodialysis unit at 
the study hospital, which may have contributed to a deficit in patient-centred care.  For 
instance, in the Republic of Ireland, the increasing number of patients requiring 
treatment has placed additional demands on the nurse’s role in the haemodialysis 
unit.133 The excessive number of patients requiring treatment at the study hospital 
resulted in the unit functioning on a 24-hour basis. Consequently, the nurses’ primary 
responsibility was to continuously process patients through the treatment in the shortest 
time possible. However, this predominant focus on throughput created a barrier to 
effective nurse-patient communication, which was expressed by the participants.134  
 
It is proposed that the impetus on efficiency, which existed on the haemodialysis unit, 
ensured that clock or ordinary time dominated the nurses’ role. However, this temporal 
pattern was not congruent with the threefold structure of originary temporality, which 
formed the basis of the participants’ experience of waiting. Therefore, it was possible 
that a conflict of temporal patterns may have ensued, which contributed to the 
inadequate levels of communication between the nurses and the participants.  
 
Various authors showed that a clash in temporal reference frameworks created a barrier 
to effective nurse-patient communication and interaction (Gibson, 1994; Young, 2002; 
Agich, 2003; Waterworth, 2003). According to Agich (2003), patients wanted to share 
their experience of illness with others, and this was the reason they sought attention 
from caregivers. However, if caregivers were unable to establish a common and shared 
perspective of time with the patient, then genuine communication was not possible. 
Agich (2003) contended that “care necessarily requires engagement and engagement 
involves people tuning into one another’s temporal stream” (p145). Therefore, if the 
caregiver was unable to relate to the patient’s temporal pattern, the service s/he provided 
did not have a concerned presence for the person receiving it (Agich, 2003). 
 
 
 
                                                 
133 See page 7 for the number of patients with ESRD on dialysis in Ireland.  
134 See page 205 for the participants’ accounts of communicating with nurses.   
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It is suggested, that because of the conflict in temporal patterns, the nurses’ 
communication with the participants did not have a concerned presence. Indeed, the 
participants’ accounts highlighted that the degree of nurse-patient communication rarely 
progressed beyond the level of superficial dialogue.135 The deficit in meaningful 
communication meant the participants’ experience of waiting, described in the themes 
Lost Time and Waiting for a Kidney Transplant was neither recognised nor addressed by 
the nurses on the haemodialysis unit. Instead, they primarily concentrated on the 
technical and physical aspects of care.  
 
According to Perry, Roberts & Kelly (2004), the technological orientation of many 
healthcare professionals working in the area of dialysis therapy reflected an “acute” 
model of patient care delivery. Within this model, patients had minimal input into their 
care and relied on the healthcare professionals to “cure” their illness (Perry, Roberts & 
Kelly, 2004).   
 
Based on the findings of my study, it seemed that the context of care on the 
haemodialysis unit might also have epitomised this acute model of care delivery.  
Indeed, this was illustrated within the participants’ accounts of waiting for a kidney 
transplant because they seemed to interpret ESRD to be an acute rather than a chronic 
illness. The participants viewed ESRD as a temporary problem, which would be fully 
alleviated with a kidney transplant. By receiving a kidney transplant, the participants 
understood that they would return to a normal life free of ESRD and dialysis therapy. 
Consequently, from the participants’ perspective, a kidney transplant was deemed 
synonymous with “recovery” or “cure”.  
 
In particular, the information the participants received from the healthcare team about 
the average waiting time for a kidney transplant encouraged this inaccurate perspective 
of illness.136 Most of the participants received this numerical information at the time of 
their diagnosis with ESRD. However, they misunderstood the information to mean that 
they would receive a kidney transplant in a relatively short duration of time. Hence, this 
contributed to the participants’ belief that ESRD and dialysis was a temporary setback. 
                                                 
135 For example, see the accounts of Nancy (p209), Ali (p206), Elena (p208-209), Danny (p207-208).  
136 See page 173 and 178 for the participants’ accounts of living in hope, and uncertainty while they 
waited for a transplant.  
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Thorne et al (2006) signified that when healthcare providers incorporated a numerical 
claim in their prognostic information, it was retained more sharply by the patient than 
the contextual information about the illness. The authors conducted a large qualitative 
study (n =200) to explore the patient’s perspective of the meaning of numerical 
information in cancer communication. For many participants, statistical information 
allowed them to cope with the uncertainties of their illness, manage their emotional 
distress, and find a basis for hope. However, there were also disparities between the 
healthcare professionals’ understanding of statistical probabilities, and the participants’ 
interpretations of this numerical information. In particular, this created distress for the 
participants when their experience was less positive than that suggested by the statistical 
probabilities (Thorne et al., 2006).  
 
Like the participants in the study by Thorne et al, the participants in my study also 
reported the uncertainty and distress they experienced when they passed their expected 
date for a transplant.137 As mentioned previously, the nurses on the haemodialysis unit 
were the primary care giver for these participants. However, the nurses’ predominant 
orientation toward the technical and physiological aspects of care meant they did not 
recognise or respond to the participants’ needs for ongoing information and support. 
Therefore, the participants’ inaccurate perspective of ESRD, as an acute or short-term 
problem was not corrected.   
 
According to Charmaz (1991), perceptions of acute illness frequently influenced 
healthcare providers’ assumptions about chronic illness. Moreover, the author suggested 
that patients with a chronic illness tended to adopt the same perspective of illness as 
portrayed by healthcare professionals. Therefore, many chronically ill patients adopted 
the assumptions, expectations, and time perspectives of those with an acute rather than a 
chronic illness.   
 
 
 
                                                 
137 See page 178 for the participants’ accounts of uncertainty, while waiting for a transplant.  
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By failing to address the participants’ misapprehensions about kidney transplantation, it 
is proposed that the nurses on the haemodialysis unit essentially reinforced a 
perspective of ESRD as an acute illness, specifically acute renal failure (ARF). 
Regrettably, this acute perspective is disappointingly inadequate in the care of patients 
with ESRD. In ARF, the illness trajectory occurs as a linear series of stages, which 
progresses from diagnosis with ARF, to an established treatment plan, to recovery. In 
recovery, the person’s renal function returns, allowing him/her to resume a normal life.  
 
Unlike ARF, the course of ESRD is cyclical in its progression. The patient progresses 
from a diagnosis with ESRD, to dialysis therapy, to kidney transplantation (if there are 
no contraindications), and eventually the patient returns to dialysis when the kidney 
transplant fails. Therefore, kidney transplantation is merely a treatment and not a cure 
for ESRD. There is no recovery in the course of ESRD, just a series of treatments to 
manage the physiological symptoms of the chronic, progressive disease.  
 
According to Kierans (2005), new medical technologies have been revolutionary in their 
ability to maintain and extend life. However, these technologies have moulded the 
person’s experience of illness and healing by performing medical interventions and 
procedures “around a linear drive towards progress and outcome” (p345). This has 
culminated in a perspective of kidney transplantation as an “end game” or final point in 
the trajectory of ESRD (Kierans, 2005; p345).    
 
By failing to address the participants’ misperceptions about the chronic nature of their 
illness, it is suggested the nurses on the haemodialysis unit at the study hospital were 
reinforcing the perspective of transplantation as the end of ESRD. They subsequently 
ignored the participants’ needs for ongoing information and support throughout the 
illness trajectory. As a result, the participants adapted the belief that ESRD and 
haemodialysis therapy was a short-term problem. They had no idea about the realities of 
chronic illness and subsequently remained hopeful of recovery with a transplant.    
 
According to Oliffe et al (2007), the absence of effective communication resulted in 
healthcare professionals making assumptions about the patients’ information needs. 
These assumptions were related to the concept of autonomy. The authors implied that 
healthcare professionals in Western society, tended to associate the notion of autonomy 
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with individual freedom and self-determination. From this perspective, the person was 
deemed ultimately responsible for his/her actions and decisions.  
 
By adapting this Western ideal of autonomy, Oliffe et al (2007) emphasised that 
healthcare professionals made various assumptions about the information needs of their 
patients.  Firstly, these clinicians assumed that the responsibility for seeking information 
and making decisions, rested solely with the individual. Thus, if the patient required 
information, s/he was ultimately responsible for signifying this need. Secondly, they 
assumed that the responsibility for misinterpretations and misunderstandings in 
information were also placed with the patient (Oliffe et al., 2007).  
 
The absence of effective nurse-patient communication, highlighted by the participants 
in my study, may have occurred because the nurses adapted the Western ideal of 
autonomy, advanced by Oliffe et al (2007). These nurses did not provide the necessary 
follow-up information and support required by the participants. They also placed the 
responsibility for seeking out information entirely with the participants. Consequently, 
the participants’ misapprehensions about the average waiting time for a kidney 
transplant were not rectified.  
 
A qualitative study by Wellard (1992) highlighted how the dilemmas faced by nurses 
(n=8) employed in dialysis units in Australia, affected their communication with 
patients. The nurses reported situations where the medical team had not incorporated 
their nursing expertise in treatment decisions regarding patient care. In particular, the 
nurses were excluded from decisions regarding the acceptance of patients onto the 
dialysis programme, and the selection of patients for transplantation.   
 
The nurses indicated that the medical team provided superficial information to patients 
about the chronic nature of their condition. As a result, the patients were ill informed 
about the consequences of life with ESRD and dialysis therapy. This created a dilemma 
for the nurses, because the patients would eventually seek confirmation and clarification 
of the information they had received from the medical team. However, the nurses felt 
powerless to disclose information that was different to that provided by the doctors. 
They were concerned that they might diminish the trust that existed between the patient 
and the doctors if they contradicted the medical advice.  
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It seemed that the dilemma articulated by Wellard (1992) might have contributed to the 
absence of nurse-patient communication, reported by the participants in my study. 
Based on the numerical information the participants had received from the medical team 
at the time of their diagnosis with ESRD, they believed they would receive a kidney 
transplant quite quickly. This allowed the participants to remain hopeful of recovery. 
Consequently, if the nurses addressed these misconceptions, they would have 
contradicted the medical team, and potentially destroyed the participants’ hope.  
 
From Thorne et al’s (2006) perspective, ongoing dialogue was required to inform 
patients about the significance of numerical information, and to sustain realistic hope. 
The authors emphasised the need for a positive relationship between the patient and the 
healthcare professional to ensure this ongoing communication with patients. However, 
if we recall, the participants’ accounts in my study highlighted how the lack of nurse-
patient communication, subsequently prevented the development of a positive nurse-
patient relationship.138  
 
Thorne & Robinson (1989) found three distinct stages in the patient-healthcare provider 
relationship: the naive trust stage, the disenchantment stage, and the guarded alliance 
stage.139 As the chronic illness progressed, the patient’s relationship with the healthcare 
provider also progressed until it reached the guarded alliance stage. Thorne (2006) 
emphasised that it was imperative for healthcare professionals to recognise these stages 
as a necessary and natural process. This allowed them to deal with the difficulties that 
arose in the early stages of their relationship with patients. It also allowed healthcare 
providers to adapt their approach to communication, to ensure it was more conducive to 
the progression of a long-term relationship with the patient. From Thorne’s (2006) 
perspective, it was primarily the healthcare professionals’ responsibility to recognise 
and manage the communication tensions that arose in their interactions with the patient.  
 
The participants in my study repeatedly attended haemodialysis therapy three times 
each week. Based on the repetitive and ongoing nature of the treatment, it seemed 
reasonable to suggest that the nurses should have been able to recognise and respond to 
                                                 
138 See page 205 for the participant’s accounts of communicating with nurses.   
139 See page 220-221 for the previous discussion on the work of Thorne & Robinson (1989).  
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communication tensions within their interactions with patients. However, the 
participants’ accounts implied that the nurses did not address these communication 
tensions. Hence, the nurse-patient relationship did not progress beyond the 
disenchantment stage, presented by Thorne & Robinson (1989).140  
 
The authors pointed out, that the disenchantment stage culminated in feelings of 
dissatisfaction and animosity amongst patients. The participants’ descriptions of 
communicating with the nurses signified that they were dissatisfied with the nurses’ 
level of engagement. Indeed, the distressing moods of disappointment, frustration, 
hostility, and anger were embedded within their accounts.  
 
Thorne (2006) insisted that the willingness of healthcare professionals to communicate 
effectively, ensured the patient’s “shattered cure expectations” were addressed (p8). 
Moreover, the patient was facilitated and supported to embark on the journey of chronic 
illness. However, where communication tensions went unresolved, a struggle for control 
often ensued with regard to who was ultimately in charge of managing the illness. A 
frequent manifestation of this tension involved the patient failing to comply with their 
prescribed treatment (Thorne, 2006). If we recall, the failure of the nurses to 
communicate openly with David resulted in his refusal to comply with the prescribed 
treatment regime.141   
 
Like Thorne & Robinson (1989), a qualitative study by Morse (1991) provided a model 
for understanding the relationships negotiated between the nurse and the patient. There 
were four types of mutual relationship, which developed from a superficial clinical type, 
to a more involved type, which the nurse and patient mutually agreed upon over time 
(Morse, 1991).   
 
The “clinical” relationship occurred when the patient was being treated for a minor 
issue. The length of time the nurse and patient spent together was brief, with the nurse 
simply making an assessment and applying a treatment. The nurse-patient interaction 
was superficial. It involved the nurse making statements such as “How are you today? 
                                                 
140 See page 221 for the discussion on the disenchantment stage of the nurse-patient relationship in 
relation to the participants’ accounts. 
141 See page 210 for David’s account.  
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Nice day out”. This superficial level of involvement was deemed satisfactory by the 
patient because s/he had no expectation of the nurse beyond the care required (Morse, 
1991).  
 
The “therapeutic” relationship was also of short duration, and the patient’s needs were 
not extensive. The nurse provided the care quickly and effectively, as the treatments 
provided were not serious or life threatening. The nurse met the patient’s psychosocial 
needs, which usually included the provision of routine reassurance prior to minor 
procedures.  In both the clinical and therapeutic relationship, the nurse viewed the 
patient, first as a patient, and second as a person (Morse, 1991).   
 
Conversely, in the “connected” and the “over-involved” relationships, the nurse viewed 
the patient, first as a person, and second as a patient. For instance, in the connected 
relationship, the patient and the nurse had been together for a long time. Therefore, the 
relationship had evolved beyond a clinical and a therapeutic level. The extreme needs of 
the patient particularly accelerated this process. In this relationship, the patient decided 
to trust the nurse, and the nurse decided to meet the patient’s needs. The nurse acted as 
the patient’s advocate, mediating on behalf of the patient with family and medical staff 
(Morse, 1991).  
 
An over-involved relationship occurred when the patient and the nurse had spent an 
extensive length of time together, and had developed mutual respect, trust, and care for 
each other. It also occurred when the patient had extraordinary needs and the nurse 
chose to meet them. The nurse was so committed to the patient, that at times s/he 
overlooked the treatment regime, the physician, the institution, and her responsibilities 
toward other patients. The nurse was a complete confidant of the patient and was treated 
as a member of the patient’s family. Therefore, the patient relinquished the patient role, 
and the nurse relinquished the professional relationship (Morse, 1991).  
 
Drawing on the findings of Morse (1991), it seemed reasonable to suggest that the 
relationship between the nurse and participants on the haemodialysis unit should have 
developed to the level of the connected type. The long-term nature of the interaction, 
combined with the patients’ needs, demanded this level of nurse-patient relationship. 
Morse (1991) considered the over-involved relationship as dysfunctional because the 
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nurse tended to ignore the needs of other patients, staff, and the institution. Nonetheless, 
the sheer length of time that the nurses spent with the patients on haemodialysis therapy, 
and the excessive needs of some of these patients implied that the nurse-patient 
relationship could potentially have progressed to the over-involved type.       
 
In contrast, the participants’ accounts of communicating with nurses illustrated that the 
nurse-patient relationship seemed to be at the level of clinical relationship. The nurse 
merely performed a physical assessment of the patient prior to the treatment (e.g. 
calculated weight gain, measured blood pressure, reviewed blood levels) and applied the 
dialysis treatment. The interaction between the nurse and the patient was superficial and 
consisted of minimal personal involvement.142 However, unlike the clinical relationship, 
the participants in my study were dissatisfied with the level of interaction they had with 
the nurses. They had expectations of the nurse beyond the care requested and received. 
They also clearly required more personal involvement from the nurses. These findings 
indicated that the nurse-patient relationship was not mutual but rather unilateral.  
 
From Morse’s (1991) perspective, involvement and interaction required mutual 
connection between the nurse and patient. However, when one person decided not to 
develop a connected relationship with the other, a mutual relationship was not achieved. 
In unilateral relationships, one person was unwilling or unable to develop the 
relationship to the level desired by the other. Therefore, the relationship did not 
represent mutual commitment, and was considered unilateral (Morse, 1991).  
 
Based on the participants’ accounts of communicating with the nurses, it is suggested 
the nurses were either unwilling or unable to develop the relationship to the desired 
level of the participants. Hence, the relationship between the nurse and the participants 
on haemodialysis therapy was unilateral. As mentioned previously, the sheer length of 
time the nurses spent with the patients each week implied that the nurse-patient 
relationship should have evolved to the level of the connected type. However, the 
participants’ accounts clearly illustrated that this was not the case. Instead, it seemed 
that the nurses were using strategies to inhibit their interactions with patients, which 
subsequently hindered the development of a positive nurse-patient relationship.  
                                                 
142 For example, see the account of Nancy (p209), Ali (p206), Elena (p208-209), Danny (p207-208).  
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According to Morse (1991), nurses tended to use blocking strategies if they were not 
committed to the patient as a person, or were “burnt out” and did not have the energy to 
invest in the relationship. There were various strategies described by Morse (1991), 
which inhibited the development of a connected relationship. For instance, the author 
described the deliberate depersonalisation of the patient as an inhibiting strategy. It 
involved the nurse refusing to talk or chat to the patient, and avoiding eye contact. 
Another strategy involved the nurse maintaining an efficient attitude, which gave the 
patient the impression of busyness. This allowed the nurse to focus on physical tasks 
and avoid the more humanistic elements of care, such as providing counsel and 
information to patients (Morse, 1991).  
 
These strategies used by the nurse to decrease involvement in the nurse-patient 
relationship were expressed within the participants’ descriptions of communicating with 
the nurses.143 For example, the participants indicated that the nurses on the 
haemodialysis unit appeared to be excessively busy all the time. They rarely spoke to 
them during haemodialysis therapy, and predominantly focused their attention on the 
technical and physical elements of care. This narrow scope of practice meant the 
participants’ concerns and need for information about their illness and treatment were 
not acknowledged or addressed.   
 
As mentioned previously, the nurses’ assessment of the patient prior to, and during each 
dialysis treatment was also structured around the technical and physical elements of 
care. It is proposed that this narrow approach to assessment may also have served as a 
blocking strategy, which limited the development of a connected nurse-patient 
relationship.  
 
A study by Bryans (2000) highlighted how the nurse’s approach to the assessment of a 
patient effectively encouraged or hindered the development of a collaborative nurse-
patient relationship. The author identified two approaches to patient assessment within 
the context of community nursing: (1) the patient-focused approach, and (2) the nurse-
                                                 
143 See page 205 for the participants’ descriptions of communicating with the nurses.  
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agenda-led approach. Each approach generated various behaviours in both the nurse and 
the patient.   
 
The patient–focused approach to assessment was collaborative and involved a reciprocal 
and conversational style. Both parties had some control over events and the nurse 
acknowledged the patient’s concerns, questions, needs, and feelings. Therefore, advice 
and information given to the patient by the nurse was patient-specific rather than 
generalised. The nurse tailored her information to the patient’s needs and/or specific 
context of the visit. The patient responded positively to this assessment approach, and to 
the suggestions, advice, and information of the nurse. The patient also initiated topics, 
asked questions, and freely volunteered information (Bryans, 2000).   
 
The superficial level of nurse-patient communication, which occurred in my study, 
meant the nurses’ approach to the assessment of the participants was not at a patient-
focused or collaborative level. Instead, it seemed that the nurses structured their 
assessment of patients specifically around the physical and technical aspects of 
haemodialysis therapy. By using this narrow approach to the assessment of patients, the 
nurses essentially failed to attend to the individual concerns and needs of the 
participants. Therefore, it seemed that the nurses’ approach to the assessment of patients 
depicted the nurse-agenda-led approach, described by Bryans (2000).  
 
Within the nurse-agenda-led approach, the assessment was rigidly structured by a ‘nurse 
question-patient response’ strategy (Bryans, 2000). Thus, the topics deemed important 
to the nurse dominated, while the patient-initiated topics and concerns were constrained. 
The nurse did not acknowledge the patient’s feelings, and even interrupted patient 
statements and responses in order to adhere rigidly to the nurse’s agenda. Advice and 
information given to the patient by the nurse was impersonal and generalised, rather 
than patient-centred. This approach to assessment created conflict between the nurse 
and patient. For example, the patients stopped offering cues and information, and only 
answered the specific questions asked by the nurse. In addition, the patients responded 
negatively to the nurse’s advice and suggestions, by either rejecting suggestions, 
asserting their own competence, or giving neutral responses.  
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These negative responses were also expressed in the participants’ accounts of 
communicating with the nurses during haemodialysis therapy. They conveyed their 
dissatisfaction with the shallow level of the nurse-patient relationship. Hence, beneath 
their accounts was the desire for a more involved relationship with the nurses on the 
haemodialysis unit. Morse (1991) stated that if patients required more than a unilateral 
relationship with nurses, they might resort to coercive or manipulative behaviours. 
These behaviours included offering gifts or bribes, cajoling, nagging, and demanding. 
The patient used these behaviours to entice the nurse to become more involved and to 
ensure nursing care and attention was received (Morse, 1991).   
 
These coercive behaviours were depicted in the narratives of David and Chris.144 For 
instance, David’s narrative conveyed the hostility and anger he felt towards some nurses 
for failing to recognise his needs and concerns. As a result of his experience of being 
ignored by these nurses, David simply “demanded” that the nurses provide the care and 
treatment he required. Similarly, it appeared that Chris’s continuous “nagging” of the 
nurses might have been a way to coerce them into engaging with him during his 
treatment. Even when the nurses tried to ignore him, he indirectly got their attention by 
creating arguments with other patients.  
 
Unfortunately, many of the strategies used by patients to coerce or manipulate nurses 
into engagement, had the opposite effect and actually increased the distance between the 
nurse and patient (Morse, 1991). Indeed, this was demonstrated in the follow-up 
interview with Chris. Because of his coercive behaviours, the nurses had labelled him a 
disruptive patient, and subsequently isolated him on the haemodialysis unit.  
  
Other authors referred to the potentially negative outcomes of the nurse’s use of 
blocking strategies in their involvement with patients. For instance, Rowe (2003) 
indicated that some nurses responded to the person’s suffering, by avoiding his/her 
suffering altogether. They achieved this avoidance by concentrating on their tasks and 
by viewing their work with patients as “just a job”. Similarly, a qualitative study by 
Hobson (2002) found that nurses deliberately used distancing strategies, to allow them 
to detach from the overwhelming suffering of patients. The study explored the ethical 
                                                 
144 See page 210-211 for the accounts of David and Chris.  
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decision making of nurses working with cancer patients. From Hobson’s (2002) 
perspective, the acute model of care delivery on the cancer unit at the study hospital, 
specifically prevented the nurses from acknowledging dying as a significant issue for 
patients.  
 
The ward was designated an acute treatment unit, yet the nurses were caring for patients 
with cancer. This created a clash between “acute” and “chronic/palliative” cultures of 
care. While care of the dying was a large proportion of the nurses’ work, the acute 
model of care on the unit was so strongly pro treatment, that the provision of palliative 
care was neither encouraged nor supported. This was highlighted in the communication 
patterns of the nurses, because they avoided talking about death and dying, either 
amongst themselves or with patients (Hobson, 2002). Instead, the nurses concentrated 
on the completion of tasks in an effort to avoid engaging in deeper existential 
discussions with patients. From Hobson’s perspective, this task-oriented approach to 
care, acted as a distancing strategy, which allowed the nurses to emotionally detach 
from the overwhelming suffering of the patients.   
 
If we recall, the findings of my study signified how the moods of anxiety and boredom, 
which culminated from the participants’ experience of waiting, confronted them with 
the possibility of imminent death. Furthermore, the persistent nature of their experience 
of waiting meant they were unable to overcome these existential moods. Consequently, 
they were continuously faced with the grim reality of death.  
 
However, like the findings of the study by Hobson, the nurses on the haemodialysis unit 
failed to communicate beyond a superficial level with the participants in my study. 
Therefore, these nurses did not engage in discussions with the participants about their 
prognosis or existential issues.  Rather they focused specifically on the completion of 
the physical and technical acts of care. These findings seemed to suggest that the nurses 
on the haemodialysis unit were using distancing strategies, in order to avoid 
engagement in existential discussions with patients. However, by avoiding this depth of 
dialogue, the participants retained unrealistic views of their illness as a temporary 
problem, which would be solved with a transplant.  
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Davison & Simpson (2006) emphasised that the avoidance by healthcare professionals 
to enter discussions about prognosis and end of life issues, resulted in patients with 
ESRD having unrealistic expectations about their treatment. The study explored hope 
and advance care planning in nineteen patients with ESRD. A qualitative, in-depth 
approach was employed incorporating open-ended interviews and inductive qualitative 
data analysis. The researchers did not provide a connection to any methodological or 
philosophical framework in the study. The findings indicated that many healthcare 
professionals believed that end of life discussions destroyed the patient’s hope, and 
interfered with the development of a trusting patient-healthcare provider relationship.   
 
In contrast to these views, the participants in the study described the process of advance 
care planning, as a means of enhancing hope. These participants indicated how the 
provision of information and support by healthcare professionals early in the illness 
trajectory, had a positive effect on their experience of ESRD. This information 
empowered the participants, prepared them for the long-term impact of the illness, and 
enhanced their relationship with staff and significant others. The authors concluded that 
while advance care planning may identify new concerns for the patient, it did not 
destroy hope. Instead, advance care planning provided an opportunity for people to 
reformulate their hope, making it more realistic with their future (Davison & Simpson, 
2006).  
 
The participants in the study by Davison & Simpson (2006) expected healthcare 
professionals to initiate discussions about advance care planning and end of life issues. 
They did not feel that it was their responsibility to ask or seek out this information and 
support. However, the failure of healthcare professionals to initiate advance care 
planning discussions meant that some participants were ill prepared for their future with 
chronic illness. This created potential barriers to hope.  
 
The findings of my study showed how the lack of communication between the nurses 
and the participants created a barrier to discussions about prognosis, advanced care, and 
end of life issues. Therefore, the nurses did not respond to the existential concerns 
generated by the participants’ experience of waiting. It is suggested that the use of 
distancing strategies by the nurses on the haemodialysis unit meant the participants’ 
existential concerns were not addressed. Therefore, this contributed to the 
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intensification of distressing moods, and the disconnection in originary temporality, 
endured by the participants.  
 
Drawing on the work of Iris Murdoch, Scott (2006) emphasised that as human beings, 
we responded to each situation by either pushing ourselves to grow, or by protecting 
ourselves from distress. However, by repeatedly protecting ourselves from challenge 
and distress, we developed a self-protective wall, or shell around ourselves, which led to 
the desiccation of one as a human being (Scott, 2006). From Scott’s perspective, such 
self-protection in nurses ultimately resulted in emotional and psychological withdrawal 
from the patient. This withdrawal from the patient subsequently dulled, suppressed, or 
even prevented the development of moral sensitivity within the nurse (Scott, 2006). The 
study by Hobson (2002) depicted this loss of moral sensitivity in the nurses’ accounts. 
The author claimed that when the distancing process in the nurse-patient relationship 
became more entrenched, the nurses became less motivated to act on their moral 
instincts. As a result, they experienced an “eroded sense of moral agency”.   
 
Various authors have elucidated the moral dimensions of nursing practice (Griffin, 
1980, 1983; Scott, 1995; Niven & Scott, 2003; Scott, 2006).  Niven & Scott (2003) 
specifically highlighted “respect for persons” as a fundamental moral value required in 
the caring practices between healthcare professionals and patients. Drawing on the work 
of Carson (1995), the authors called for a more extensive interpretation of the current 
principle of “respect for persons” to be incorporated into the care of patients.  
 
Carson (1995) declared that the principle of respect in healthcare was largely 
understood from the perspective of biomedical ethics. From this viewpoint, respect 
meant respect for the autonomy and self-determination of the individual. Carson (1995) 
claimed that this narrow viewpoint of respect served as a reminder “to mind our own 
business [and] leave each other alone” (p105). However, this was not appropriate in the 
care of the person who was chronically ill or disabled. Rather, the adherence to this 
interpretation of respect merely culminated in this patient group being abandoned and 
left alone to deal with their illness (Carson, 1995).   
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Carson (1995) appealed for the extension of our interpretation of the principle of 
respect. He based his appeal on the premise that people who were chronically ill 
required more than just respect. They needed the healthcare provider to recognise the 
person behind the illness. However, from Carson’s perspective, many healthcare 
providers overlooked the human significance of the person’s experience, and instead 
concentrated on the medical/physiological facts of the case. Consequently, there was a 
need to broaden the care of the chronically ill to include not only the principle of 
respect, but also the principle of regard (Carson, 1995).  
 
Carson (1995) claimed that healthcare providers needed to have due regard for the 
recipients of their care. His notion of regard implied that healthcare providers should 
communicate effectively with patients. They needed to be attentive and considerate, and 
engage in conversation that went beyond the level of superficial familiarity. More 
importantly, the notion of due regard referred to a way of being with the patient, where 
the healthcare provider was able to recognise and affirm the patient as a person, with a 
unique experience. This unique experience subsequently formed the basis of the 
patient’s care. The participants’ narratives in my study illustrated that the nurses on the 
haemodialysis unit did not engage in acceptable levels of interaction and 
communication with patients. As a result, it is suggested that the nurses were unable to 
express due regard for these patients.  
 
In a more recent publication, Scott (2006) indicated that in order for healthcare 
professionals to provide morally sensitive care, they needed to attend to more than just 
the physical elements of patient care.  This broader sensitivity called on healthcare 
professionals to recognise the patient, as a fellow human being with unique and specific 
needs. As mentioned previously in the literature review, Scott (2006) contended that 
illness was influenced by a range of background or contextual factors, such as the 
patient’s lifestyle, future, family, and loved ones. The author emphasised that these 
factors must be recognised and acknowledged by healthcare professionals, to ensure that 
patient care was morally sensitive and person-centred (Scott, 2006).  
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The participants in my study emphasised an urgent need for morally sensitive and 
patient centred care, which gave due regard to their unique experience of ESRD and 
dialysis. They desired and expected a level of nursing care that extended beyond the 
mere completion of technical and physical tasks. However, the lack of nurse-patient 
communication meant the nurses failed to recognise the important contextual and 
background factors, which formed the basis of the participants’ experience of illness. 
Instead, they concentrated primarily on the physical and technical elements of patient 
care.   
 
It is suggested that the nurses on the haemodialysis unit at the study hospital need to 
develop their role to ensure the provision of morally sensitive and patient-centred care. 
However, to achieve this objective, there is a requirement to alter the technologically 
focused approach to patient care, which currently exists on the haemodialysis unit.  
 
5.2.1 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This chapter provided an overall discussion of the findings in relation to the existing 
literature. The findings illustrated that the experience of waiting was significant for the 
participants in the study. In particular, the participants’ experience of waiting 
culminated in the existential moods of anxiety and boredom, presented by Heidegger 
(1962, 1995). These moods highlighted the threefold structure of originary temporality 
to the participants, which confronted them with the possibility of death. When faced 
with the possibility of death, the participants were pressed to live in either an authentic 
or inauthentic mode of existence.145 However, the participants’ relentless experience of 
waiting meant they were unable to live in either mode of existence. The inability to live 
in either mode of existence culminated in a range of distressing moods, and a disruption 
in the threefold structure of originary temporality.  
 
 
 
                                                 
145 In the inauthentic mode of existence, Dasein absorbs itself in everyday activities to avoid reflecting on 
its death and finitude. In the authentic mode of existence, Dasein is aware of the finitude of its existence, 
but still projects forward into possibilities in the originary future. In both modes of existence the threefold 
structure of originary temporality remains unified.  
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The unpleasant moods, and the disruption in originary temporality, which characterised 
the participants’ experience of waiting, epitomised certain features of the concept of 
enduring, advanced by Morse (2001). However, the psychological perspective retained 
within this concept had to be supplemented with the existential philosophy of Heidegger 
to make it more characteristic of the participants’ experience. Therefore, a new “model 
of enduring” was developed, which combined specific features of Morse’s concept of 
enduring with Heidegger’s (1962, 1995) existential interpretation of mood and 
temporality.  
 
According to Morse (2001), in order to assist and support the person who was enduring, 
nursing care had to be patient-centred. The nurse must take time to interact and 
communicate with patients, in an effort to recognise and respond to their unique care 
needs. In contrast, the findings of my study signified that the nurses on the 
haemodialysis unit spent very little time communicating with the participants. As a 
result, the nurses failed to recognise or address the participants’ relentless experience of 
waiting. Moreover, the participants’ experience of enduring was subsequently 
overlooked. Instead, the technologically focused context of care on the haemodialysis 
unit meant the nurses concentrated almost entirely on the technical and physiological 
acts of care.  
 
These findings emphasised the need to alter the current context of care on the 
haemodialysis unit in an effort to foster a more person-centred approach to care.146 The 
next chapter addresses this issue and recommends an alternative approach to the care of 
patients on the haemodialysis unit at the study hospital.  
                                                 
146 The use of the term ‘person’ in person-centred approach to care refers to ‘Dasein’, the temporally 
situated human being who is constituted by his/her past, present, and future.   
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CHAPTER 6 : RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter discusses the recommendations of the study for nursing and healthcare. 
Recommendations based on comparatively small-scale studies should always be 
cautious, and this approach will be adapted within the recommendations section of this 
thesis. Also, in the spirit of hermeneutical dialogue, recommendations are not “orders” 
but suggestions and proposals that invite further discussion, dialogue, proposals, 
critique, and clinical innovation. The recommendations of the study are followed by a 
discussion on the limitations of the study, and the overall conclusion to the study.  
 
The participants’ accounts in my study highlighted the predominantly technological 
context of care, which existed on the haemodialysis unit at the study hospital.147 This 
approach to care created a barrier to effective communication, which hindered the 
provision of ongoing information and support to patients. It is proposed that there is a 
need to change the culture and context of care on the haemodialysis unit at the study 
hospital to overcome this narrow scope of practice. Therefore, a progression toward a 
model of supportive care for patients on the haemodialysis unit is proposed as one way 
to achieve this objective. It is suggested that this shift in paradigms of care might enable 
healthcare professionals to acknowledge and attend to the person’s unique experience of 
illness and treatment.  
 
In the following discussion, the concept of supportive care for patients with a 
progressive, chronic illness, such as ESRD will be addressed. The participants’ 
experiences of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy, presented in my study, will be used to 
highlight the potential benefits of supportive care within this patient group. This will be 
followed by a discussion on the use of a continuous quality improvement (CQI) 
framework to implement the elements of supportive care on the haemodialysis unit at 
the study hospital.   
 
                                                 
147 See page 205 for the theme “Communicating with Nurses: Myth versus Reality” for examples of this 
technical/physiological focus of care.   
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6.1 TOWARD THE SUPPORTIVE CARE OF THE HAEMODIALYSIS 
PATIENT    
 
The World Health Organisation (2004) European Report on Palliative Care identifies 
that people with a progressive chronic illness might benefit from palliative care 
services. The report emphasises that most research on palliative care seems to have 
focused on people living with cancer. However, it continues to point out that there is 
growing evidence that patients with progressive, chronic illness have similar concerns, 
and sometimes, greater needs than those experiencing cancer.    
 
While the literature illustrates that renal patients have a shortened life expectancy, and 
experience a high symptom burden (Saini et al., 2006; Brown, Chambers & Eggeling, 
2007), the involvement of palliative care teams are rarely included in the care of these 
patients throughout the illness trajectory. Instead, palliative care is limited to patients 
who decide to refuse, or withdraw from dialysis therapy.  
 
This narrow view of palliative care is emphasised in the unpublished National Renal 
Strategy Review (2006). This review indicates that patients in the Republic of Ireland 
who decide not to avail of dialysis therapy for ESRD “should continue under the care of 
the renal unit, with continued conservative management. As events evolve, there may be 
a need for palliative care services for such patients” (p33).  
 
Some authors indicate that the term palliative care contributes to the reluctance of 
healthcare professionals to incorporate these services into the care of patients with a 
chronic illness (Main et al., 2006; Noble et al., 2007). In particular, it seems the 
associations the term has with imminent death, makes it difficult for healthcare 
professionals to broach with the chronically ill (Main et al., 2006; Noble et al., 2007). 
Therefore, the use of the term “supportive care” has evolved in an effort to incorporate 
the principles and practice of palliative care into the care of patients with renal disease. 
It appears that the term supportive care is more readily accepted by healthcare 
professionals, since it suggests an approach to care directed towards helping patients 
and carers to manage the illness (Main et al., 2006; Noble et al., 2007). 
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Reiter & Chambers (2004) have published a textbook, which specifically sets out 
various issues involved in the supportive care of the renal patient. The authors describe 
supportive care, as an approach that incorporates both restorative care and palliative 
care. Restorative care refers to the application of the disease-specific treatment, such as 
dialysis. Palliative care refers to any additional treatment, which alleviates unpleasant 
symptoms, but is not deemed to be curative. It includes all types of medical, nursing, 
and psychosocial care, used to enhance the quality of life of the patient (Reiter & 
Chambers, 2004).  
 
The authors emphasise that “patients should not have to have a terminal illness, or be in 
the terminal phase of an illness, to benefit from excellent pain and symptom 
management or to have psychosocial issues addressed” (p18). Other authors subscribe 
to this view, insisting that through supportive care, disease control and quality of life 
can be maximised for patients at all stages of renal disease (Levy, Chambers & Brown, 
2004; Reiter & Chambers, 2004; Noble et al., 2007).  
 
It is recommended that by adapting this supportive approach to care on the 
haemodialysis unit at the study hospital, the shortcomings of the current technologically 
focused approach to care delivery might potentially be reduced. By providing renal 
supportive care to the patients, the restorative functions would overlap seamlessly with 
the palliative care functions, ensuring the holistic care of the patient. In other words, the 
application of the technical treatment of haemodialysis therapy would occur 
simultaneously with effective patient-centred care. 
 
There were four overarching components of supportive care for the renal patient 
identified in the existing literature: holistic care throughout all stages of the illness 
trajectory; an interdisciplinary approach to care; open and honest communication; and 
the support of family and carers. Based on the findings of my study, it is recommended 
that two additional components need to be added to this list to ensure the supportive 
care of the patients on haemodialysis at the study hospital. These include: a structured 
approach to the allocation of dialysis spaces, and a patient-friendly treatment 
environment. Each of the six components of supportive care will now be addressed in 
relation to the findings of my study.  
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6.1.1 HOLISTIC CARE THROUGHOUT ALL STAGES OF THE ILLNESS TRAJECTORY  
According to Noble et al (2007), the goal of supportive care for the renal patient is to 
provide holistic care from diagnosis to death. However, healthcare professionals tend to 
focus more specifically on the scientific and technical characteristics of renal disease 
(Perry, Roberts & Kelly, 2004; Noble et al., 2007). As a result, the need for supportive 
care throughout the illness trajectory is poorly recognised.   
 
The participants in my study emphasised how the technical and physiological focus of 
patient care created a barrier to effective communication. The superficial level of nurse-
patient communication and interaction meant the participants did not receive the 
necessary levels of support and information to enable them to come to terms with their 
illness and treatment. Therefore, it is suggested that a holistic approach to patient care is 
required, to help overcome this narrow scope of practice.    
 
6.1.2 AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO CARE  
Supportive care requires an interdisciplinary team approach (Levy, Chambers & Brown, 
2004; Reiter & Chambers, 2004; Noble et al., 2007). While ESRD is a life-limiting 
illness, the focus of supportive care both acknowledges and responds to how patients 
can live their lives to the optimum, with social and psychological support from the 
interdisciplinary team as required (Chambers, Germain & Brown, 2004). 
 
According to Reiter & Chambers (2004), the nephrology team usually address medical, 
psychosocial, and existential problems associated with renal disease and dialysis 
treatment.  However, within the supportive care model, healthcare professionals are 
educated in palliative care philosophies (Reiter & Chambers, 2004; Noble et al., 2007). 
By interpreting supportive care from this interdisciplinary perspective, there is scope for 
collaboration with a multitude of excellent services. Based on the work of various 
authors, an extensive list of these services has been drawn up, which include palliative 
care nurses and physicians, pain specialists, rehabilitation specialists, physiotherapists, 
psychologists, renal counsellors, social workers, complementary therapists, and clergy 
(Ahmedzai & Walsh, 2000; Reiter & Chambers, 2004; Noble et al., 2007).  
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The aim is to complement the management of the patients’ illness and treatment by 
providing exceptional symptom control and reinforcing their psychosocial and spiritual 
support (Levy, Chambers & Brown, 2004). As the disease progresses and complications 
accumulate, smooth referral to a hospice or palliative care service is possible due to the 
existing holistic approach to patient care (Noble et al., 2007). This avoids the 
unfortunate situation where healthcare professionals fail to recognise dying, until it is 
too late for the patient and family to benefit from a palliative care approach.    
 
The need for an interdisciplinary approach to care, calls for a change in the context of 
the renal unit, which in previous times has been self-contained (Noble et al., 2007). 
While the renal literature emphasises the need for a multidisciplinary approach to care, 
supportive care requires an interdisciplinary approach, which extends beyond the renal 
team (Noble et al., 2007). 
 
During the process of conducting this study, it was identified that the haemodialysis unit 
at the study hospital had not yet achieved an effective multidisciplinary approach to 
care. The unpublished National Renal Strategy Review (2006) verifies that 
multidisciplinary team staffing varies greatly between renal services throughout Ireland. 
Within the unit at the study hospital, there is one member of staff assigned to take on 
the role of social worker, counsellor, and anaemia coordinator for patients from the pre-
dialysis stage throughout all stages of the illness trajectory. It seems reasonable to 
suggest, that despite the nurse’s best efforts, it was not possible for one person to 
perform these roles effectively. More importantly, it clearly highlighted the significance 
awarded to the psychosocial aspects of patient care on the haemodialysis unit at the 
study hospital. 
 
Based on the participants’ accounts, there seemed to be inadequate levels of 
collaboration between the nurses and the medical team caring for the patients. The 
nurses on the dialysis unit seemed to be excluded from medical decisions about the 
selection of patients for dialysis and kidney transplantation. They had no input into the 
medical information the participants received about their diagnosis and kidney 
transplantation. Consequently, from the information received from the medical team, 
several participants understood that haemodialysis was a temporary setback, alleviated 
by a transplant.  
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The lack of collaboration between the nurses and the medical team caring for these 
patients meant this issue was not addressed. Instead, the nurses seemed to restrict their 
communication with patients to a superficial level, to avoid engaging in discussions 
about the realities of ESRD.   
 
There also appeared to be insufficient collaboration between healthcare professionals on 
the haemodialysis unit, and the Department of Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
in Ireland. As mentioned previously, this department stipulates that the Body Mass 
Index (BMI) of the person must to be below 32 before s/he was considered for 
transplantation. Yet, two participants in my study described being sent for pre-transplant 
assessments, despite being well above this BMI level.  
 
If close collaboration between healthcare professionals on the haemodialysis unit and 
the transplant unit occurred, these patients should have been provided with this 
information. In addition, they should have been commenced on a weight loss 
programme before they ever attended the transplant unit. Unfortunately, the absence of 
active collaboration between both units means these strategies are not in place. 
Therefore, the participants experienced the disappointment of making wasted journey(s) 
to the transplant department merely to be told they were too overweight to be 
considered for transplantation.  
 
These findings illustrate that there are limitations in the multidisciplinary approach to 
patient care on the haemodialysis unit, which need to be addressed. After this deficit is 
addressed, it would be beneficial to progress towards the level of interdisciplinary 
collaboration required for renal supportive care.    
 
6.1.3 OPEN AND HONEST COMMUNICATION  
Noble at al (2007) identified effective and clear communication as an attribute of renal 
supportive care. Open and honest communication is imperative from diagnosis 
throughout all stages of the illness trajectory (Levy, Chambers & Brown, 2004; Reiter 
& Chambers, 2004; Noble et al., 2007). This ensures that the provision of care focuses 
on the desires and goals of the person (Reiter & Chambers, 2004). Open communication 
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facilitates the process of shared decision-making between healthcare professionals, the 
patient, and family/carers (Levy, Chambers & Brown, 2004; Reiter & Chambers, 2004). 
 
As the findings of my study indicated, there was a lack of open communication between 
the nurses and the participants.148 The nurses were the primary healthcare providers for 
the patients while they were on haemodialysis therapy. Therefore, they had the most 
opportunities to interact and communicate with these patients. However, it seemed that 
the technologically focused context of care on the haemodialysis unit effectively 
prevented open and honest nurse-patient communication.149 
 
The participants’ accounts highlighted how the lack of communication with nurses on 
the haemodialysis unit hindered the continuity of patient care. The absence of clear 
communication procedures between patients, nurses, and the multidisciplinary team 
resulted in patient care that was fragmented and uncoordinated. Instead of emphasising 
patients’ needs, it seemed the nurses’ attention was placed specifically on the 
technological and physical features of the haemodialysis treatment.  
  
The absence of appropriate levels of communication meant the nurses did not discuss 
the extent of the participants’ prognosis and treatment. They essentially overlooked the 
participants’ experience of relentless waiting, described in the themes Lost Time and 
Waiting for a Kidney Transplant. Moreover, they failed to attend to the participants’ 
ongoing needs for information and support to enable them to come to terms with the 
long-term and progressive characteristics of their illness.  
 
Supportive care of the renal patient requires open dialogue about advance care planning, 
and depending on the stage of the illness, the patient’s preferred place of death (Cohen 
et al., 2001; Holley, 2004). Reiter & Chambers (2004) contend that “while the only 
certainty is that all people will die, and therefore should engage in advance care 
planning, the reality of a limited life expectancy is present for patients with ESRD” 
(p21). 
 
                                                 
148 See page 205 for the participants’ accounts of communicating with the nurses.  
149 See page 245 for the discussion on the context of care in the haemodialysis unit.  
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According to Holley (2004), advance care planning is a process of supportive care that 
occurs throughout the course of ESRD. It involves forward planning for supportive care 
i.e. planning for the restorative and palliative care needs of the patient throughout the 
course of the illness.  It also allows patients the opportunity to achieve control over their 
care, strengthen relationships with those close to them, and prepare for death (Holley, 
2004).  
 
The findings of my study showed how the participants’ experience of waiting 
culminated in the existential moods of anxiety and boredom. These moods confronted 
the participants with the possibility of imminent death. Indeed, the persistent nature of 
their experience of waiting meant they were unable to overcome these moods. Thus, the 
participants were continuously faced with the close proximity of death.  
 
As mentioned previously, the shallow communication between the nurses and the 
participants created a barrier to discussions about prognosis and end of life issues. 
Therefore, the nurses did not respond to the participants’ existential concerns. Perhaps if 
the nurses had intervened, they may have been able to assist the participants to 
overcome the distressing moods of anxiety and boredom. Instead, by overlooking these 
issues, the nurses were not providing patient centred care.150 More importantly, they 
were failing to recognise and respond to the participants’ need for counselling and 
supportive care. This might signify why the critical need for a qualified counsellor on 
the haemodialysis unit was not recognised.   
 
It is suggested that a patient support group might also provide a channel of 
communication, which would contribute to renal supportive care. This service is 
currently not provided for patients on the haemodialysis unit. A support group would 
allow common concerns and experiences to be identified and shared amongst patients. 
The mutual support received from this type of group might serve to reinforce to patients 
that they are not alone on the journey through chronic illness.  
 
                                                 
150 For example, see the accounts of Danny (p207-208), Nancy (p209), David and Chris (p210-211).  
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Based on the findings of the study, it is suggested that the open and honest 
communication, which is integral to supportive care, would be extremely beneficial 
within the care of the patients on haemodialysis at the study hospital.  
 
6.1.4 THE SUPPORT OF FAMILY AND CARERS 
The support of family and carers is essential in renal supportive care situations (Levy, 
Chambers & Brown, 2004; Reiter & Chambers, 2004; Noble et al., 2007). The people 
caring for patients with ESRD are confronted with a number of concerns, including the 
demands of the treatment regime on their lives, the loss of income incurred if the patient 
is unable to work, and ultimately the fear of losing their loved one (Noble et al., 2007). 
Moreover, the family and carers witness the patient’s response to his/her illness and 
treatment including the unpleasant physiological symptoms and distressing moods. 
Since families also live through the trauma of renal disease with the patient, they also 
require support (Noble et al., 2007).   
 
The findings of my study implied that there was a deficiency in person-centred care. 
Therefore, the need to involve family and carers within decisions about the patients’ 
care was subsequently lacking. The participants’ accounts illustrated that the threefold 
structure of originary temporality formed the basis of their experience of ESRD and 
haemodialysis therapy. In other words, their past, and future formed an essential part of 
their current experience of illness and treatment.  
 
As previously mentioned, the past contains the significant set of relationships we have 
because of being born into a particular situation. This means that relationships with 
family and carers are an integral feature of the patient’s past. As such, these 
relationships must be incorporated into decisions about the patient’s care. However, it 
seemed that the technologically focused approach to care delivery adapted on the 
haemodialysis unit meant the nurses essentially overlooked the vital role of the patient’s 
family and carers. Indeed, throughout my time interviewing patients on the 
haemodialysis unit, I never encountered a family member attending a dialysis session 
with a patient.  
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According to Noble et al (2007), the financial pressures in many hospitals means the 
support of family and carers is often lacking. Instead, the tendency is to focus on the 
needs of the patient. Based on the findings of my study, it is suggested that the current 
context of patient care on the haemodialysis unit resulted in healthcare professionals 
failing to pay due regard to the participants’ needs.  In turn, this culminated in a failure 
to recognise the important role of the family and carers in the participants’ care. 
Therefore, the need for renal supportive care with its emphasis on the support of family 
and carers is a priority on the haemodialysis unit at the study hospital.  
 
6.1.5 A STRUCTURED APPROACH TO THE ALLOCATION OF DIALYSIS SPACES 
The participants’ accounts highlighted that they wasted a substantial amount of time 
waiting for haemodialysis machines to become available. This prevented them from 
engaging in many of their everyday activities, which created unnecessary distress. In 
particular, the absence of a well-organised and structured approach to the allocation of 
haemodialysis spaces on the unit was responsible for the participants’ delays.  
 
It seemed that if dialysis machines were available, nurses allocated patients to these 
machines, even if they arrived outside of their allocated dialysis time. However, this 
technical focus of care created major upheaval and upset for the patients who arrived at 
their allocated time, and were left waiting needlessly for a space to become available.  
 
It is recommended that a well-organised and structured approach to the allocation of 
dialysis spaces on the haemodialysis unit be developed and maintained. By planning the 
allocation of dialysis spaces more effectively, and adhering to this plan, the nurses 
would potentially contribute to the supportive care of the patients.  
 
Once a structured approach to the allocation of dialysis spaces is drawn up, there is also 
a need to develop a structured timetable for the hospital taxi service. This timetable 
would inform taxi drivers of the time they are required to collect patients. Some 
participants’ accounts indicated that they were forced to wait excessive amounts of time 
because taxi drivers arrived either too early or late to take them to and from their 
treatment.  The hospital taxi service is simply a local taxi company that has an account 
with the hospital. The hospital pays substantial sums of money for taxis for patients on 
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haemodialysis therapy. Therefore, the hospital should try to ensure that the service is 
meeting the needs of the patients.  
  
6.1.6 A PATIENT-FRIENDLY TREATMENT ENVIRONMENT 
The participants’ accounts of killing time emphasised that the treatment environment of 
the haemodialysis unit was not patient-focused. Therefore, they had nothing to do 
during treatment except wait for the treatment to end.  
 
The only potential diversions available for the patients on the haemodialysis unit were 
televisions, and conversation with fellow patients and nurses. However, the televisions 
had to be shared amongst patients, which meant the participants could rarely choose 
what they wanted to watch during haemodialysis therapy. In addition, the headphones 
occasionally did not work, which limited the possibility of using television as a way to 
kill time.  
 
There was a haemodialysis machine placed between patients during treatment, which 
created a barrier to communication. Furthermore, patients were rotated to alternate 
dialysis spaces each time they attended for treatment. Consequently, they found it 
difficult to develop a rapport with other patients. As mentioned previously, there was 
very little communication between the nurses and participants. The absence of nurse-
patient communication meant the participants were unable to use conversation with 
nurses as a way to pass the time during dialysis therapy.  
 
These findings demonstrated that there was essentially nothing provided in the 
treatment environment to make the patients’ time during haemodialysis more pleasant, 
comfortable, or entertaining. Instead, it seemed that the treatment environment reflected 
the perspective of the nurses working there, and as such was entirely established around 
the technical and physiological aspects of patient care.  
 
As mentioned previously, the superficial level of nurse-patient communication meant 
the nurses did not recognise or respond to the participants’ experience of killing time 
during haemodialysis therapy. It seemed the nurses did not recognise the participants’ 
need for a more patient-friendly treatment environment.  
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6.2 USING CONTINUOUS QUALITY IMPROVEMENT TO IMPLEMENT 
THE ELEMENTS OF SUPPORTIVE CARE  
 
It is anticipated that the elements of supportive care will be introduced using a 
continuous quality improvement (CQI) framework. Many healthcare organisations have 
used a continuous quality improvement (CQI) framework to ensure the highest quality 
of care is delivered to patients (Arya & Callaly, 2005). CQI is a change management 
tool, which allows healthcare teams to re-design whole systems of care through small 
changes (Knight, 2007).  
  
CQI takes a ‘bottom-up’ approach, which means that quality improvement is 
encouraged at all levels. This avoids the ‘top-down’ approach, which involves the 
introduction of a quality framework that is led by managers and imposed on the service. 
This strategy is often seen as inappropriate to healthcare practitioners and will 
subsequently be unsupported (Arya & Callaly, 2005). Commitment from the healthcare 
team is essential from the beginning to ensure that CQI becomes part of everyday 
practice. 
 
In order to gain the commitment of the healthcare team to the process of CQI, it will 
first be necessary to highlight the need for changes in practice. This will initially 
involve the dissemination of the findings of my study to practitioners on the 
haemodialysis unit. Dissemination of the findings will occur through formal meetings 
with the consultants on the haemodialysis unit, and both formal and informal meetings 
with the nursing management and staff. It is anticipated that scheduled presentations of 
the findings will also be organised and provided for all practitioners working on the 
haemodialysis unit. 
 
These meetings/presentations will serve to inform practitioners about the key findings 
of the research. However, it is suggested that in order for healthcare practitioners to 
recognise the need for change through CQI, it will be necessary to encourage them to 
reflect on current practice. It is anticipated that this will be achieved through clinical 
supervision. Clinical supervision provides a structure for reflective practice and acts as a 
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catalyst for practice development (Rolfe, Freshwater & Jasper, 2001). Although 
reflection can be undertaken alone, the process of guided reflection through clinical 
supervision enables the practitioner to expand his/her personal interpretations to 
incorporate other perspectives (Rolfe, Freshwater & Jasper, 2001).  
 
A study by Kilcullen (2007) highlighted that clinical supervision was a new concept in 
nursing in the Republic of Ireland. The study explored the experiences of clinical 
supervision for nurses involved in an MSc/Graduate Diploma programme in renal and 
urological nursing at Dublin City University. Qualitative interviews were conducted 
with both supervisors (n=5) and supervisees (n=5). The findings indicated that both 
groups viewed clinical supervision as a positive approach to enhance professional 
development in nursing through reflection.  
 
I was one of the clinical supervisors who participated in this study and emphasised the 
beneficial effects of clinical supervision in facilitating positive change in nursing 
practice. I also participated with other colleagues at Dublin City University to provide 
workshops to prepare healthcare practitioners to take on the role of clinical supervisor 
for this programme. Therefore, it is anticipated that I would initially take on the role of 
clinical supervisor at the study hospital to assist practitioners to reflect on their practice. 
However, as the healthcare team begin to take ownership of the CQI process, I would 
provide workshops to enable these practitioners to take on this role.  
 
Due to a lack of time and resources, it is anticipated that the practitioners on the 
haemodialysis unit may be unable to engage in individual supervision sessions.  Rolfe, 
Freshwater & Jasper (2001) emphasise that when individual supervision sessions are not 
practically feasible, group clinical supervision sessions should be employed. Therefore, 
it is my intention to have group supervision sessions with staff on the haemodialysis 
unit to facilitate reflection. I intend to draw on my past experience and skills developed 
while supervising renal and urological nurses. I will also incorporate the information 
and advice provided by Rolfe, Freshwater & Jasper (2001; p108-126) on how to plan, 
organise, and competently facilitate a clinical supervision group.  
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The objective of the clinical supervision sessions will be to allow healthcare 
practitioners to discuss their thoughts, feelings, and actions in everyday practice. This 
process will enable the practitioners’ personal beliefs, assumptions, and knowledge to 
be illuminated. Heidegger’s existential-phenomenological concepts will provide a 
framework for clinical supervision sessions with healthcare practitioners. Jones (1998) 
has highlighted the beneficial contribution of Heidegger’s existential-phenomenological 
perspective within clinical supervision in palliative care nursing. According to Jones 
(1998), anxiety, the finitude of existence, and the certainty of death are issues that 
health professionals are confronted with repeatedly. This is why a method of clinical 
supervision based on Heidegger’s work is so appropriate for these professionals (Jones, 
1998).    
 
It is anticipated that the existential-phenomenological approach of Heidegger will offer 
a useful framework for enabling healthcare practitioners on the haemodialysis unit to 
reflect on themselves as temporal and finite beings. The narratives of the participants 
gleaned from my study will be used as a basis to enable practitioners to identify the 
distress caused by the experience of waiting. The narratives will also be used to provoke 
practitioners to recognise that the person’s current experience of illness is based on 
his/her past and future. Since death is part of the person’s future, practitioners will be 
encouraged to recognise the existential concerns of patients with ESRD on 
haemodialysis therapy. As the clinical supervision sessions progress, the existential 
moods of anxiety and boredom will be introduced to discussions, along with the model 
of enduring, developed within this study.  
 
According to Rolfe, Freshwater & Jasper (2001), an essential part of the clinical 
supervisor’s role is to facilitate practitioners to reflect on how this new knowledge and 
understanding can lead to actions in the practice setting. Based on the new knowledge 
and understanding developed within the clinical supervision sessions, the practitioners 
will be facilitated to recognise the technologically focused context of care that exists on 
the haemodialysis unit. They will also be facilitated to identify the potential 
shortcomings of this context of care and the need to implement the elements of 
supportive care within the unit. This will involve discussions around the six elements of 
supportive care already addressed earlier in this section.  
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Patient involvement is also a central element of CQI, as services must be re-designed 
according to their needs, choices, and experiences (Knight, 2007). Therefore, the aim is 
to disseminate the findings of this study to all patients on the haemodialysis unit. I will 
spend time on the haemodialysis unit discussing the findings of the study with patients. 
In addition, a summary of the findings will be developed into a patient-friendly leaflet 
and will be given to all patients on the haemodialysis unit. This leaflet will include my 
contact details and will advise patients who would like further information to contact 
me.   
 
As mentioned previously, a patient support group is not currently available for patients 
on the haemodialysis unit at the study hospital. It is anticipated that a support group 
would be organised for patients, families, and carers. This group would provide a forum 
to disseminate the findings of my study. The narratives of the participants would be 
used to provide topics for discussion amongst members of the support group. It is hoped 
that these narratives would facilitate conversation amongst patients, families, and carers 
and allow their common concerns and experiences to be identified and discussed. 
 
By sharing experiences with other patients, the members of the support group would 
realise they are not alone with their illness. The support group would also provide a 
forum for sharing information amongst members. The discussion of experiences, 
thoughts, feelings, and moods within the group would provide the peer support that is 
desperately needed by the patients on haemodialysis at the study hospital.   
 
It is intended that the planning, organisation, and facilitation of this support group 
would be undertaken with the assistance of the Irish Kidney Association (IKA). The 
IKA was formed in 1978, by patients for patients and their families. The Association 
provides help and support to newly diagnosed renal failure patients and to patients who 
are already receiving renal replacement therapies. One of the aims of the IKA is to 
disseminate information about kidney disease to patients and their families. It is 
important to reiterate that many patients travel long distances to get to the dialysis unit 
at the study hospital. Therefore, organising the support group near the dialysis unit 
would make it difficult for these patients to attend. However, there are currently twenty-
five branches of the IKA in the Republic of Ireland. Therefore, through collaboration 
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with the Association, I would be able to target branches that are near the areas where the 
patients live. This would enhance the patients’ ability to attend the group(s) and ensure 
the findings of the study were disseminated widely.  
 
The IKA publishes ‘Support’, a quarterly newsletter that is posted free to each patient 
with renal failure. The Association has requested a report on the overall findings of my 
study with the intention of publishing it in this newsletter. This newsletter would be an 
excellent medium to inform patients, families, and carers about the findings of the 
study. It would also provide a way to advertise the support groups. The Association also 
provides free patient manuals and informative booklets relating to renal disease and 
renal replacement therapy. Therefore, I intend to seek their advice and assistance in the 
development of a patient information leaflet highlighting the findings of my study.  
6.2.1 THE QUALITY CYCLE 
 
Once the need for change is emphasised and the practitioners and patients are aware that 
the process of change will commence, there is a need to begin the ‘quality cycle’. The 
concept of the ‘quality cycle’ is a fundamental component of CQI, and consists of 
repeated successions of the ‘plan, do, study, act’ (PDSA) cycles (Langley et al, 1996). 
In the ‘plan’ stage, an objective is set and a plan to achieve the objective is developed. 
In the ‘do’ stage of the quality cycle, the plan is carried out. During the ‘study’ stage, 
the outcomes of the quality cycle are studied or analysed and a summary of what was 
learned is developed. In the ‘act’ stage of the framework, decisions are made about the 
subsequent changes required for CQI. It will only be feasible to move onto the next 
stage (i.e. plan stage) if there is sufficient support for the need to implement change. 
 
Ayra & Callaly (2005) recommend that a lead person should be selected and assisted to 
develop a team of enthusiasts to initiate and support the CQI framework.  It is suggested 
that a lead person from the medical team and the nursing team on the haemodialysis unit 
at the study hospital will be selected to achieve this objective. It is proposed that in the 
long-term, the aim is to change the technological context of care on the haemodialysis 
unit to the supportive care approach discussed earlier. It is acknowledged that some of 
the elements of supportive care will take a substantial amount of time to implement. 
However, the ‘plan, do, study, act’ (PDSA) cycles of CQI relies on small-scale changes, 
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which are informed by feedback. This cyclical approach means that change proceeds on 
a relentless basis, eventually influencing organisational culture (Arya & Callaly, 2005).  
 
It is anticipated that there are small-scale changes that could be planned and 
implemented immediately on the haemodialysis unit. For instance, the need to 
communicate and interact with patients on an ongoing basis should be emphasised by 
the lead nurse as a high priority objective on the haemodialysis unit. In particular, the 
need to provide patients with open and honest information about their illness and 
treatment is urgently required. Patients need to be provided with realistic information 
about kidney transplantation. They need to know what the waiting process for a 
transplant involves and should be supported to get on with their lives while they wait. 
They also need information and support from nursing and medical staff on an ongoing 
basis to enable them to manage the long-term and progressive nature of their illness and 
treatment. For some patients in the advanced stages of illness, this should incorporate 
discussions about prognosis and end of life issues.  
 
There is an urgent requirement for active collaboration between the members of the 
multidisciplinary team. In particular, this includes the nurses, medical team, and the 
practitioners at the transplant centre. An active level of collaboration is essential to 
ensure all practitioners provide the same information and advice to patients. Otherwise, 
patients receive different messages and misinterpret the information received. If 
collaboration and communication between members of the multidisciplinary team were 
enhanced, there would be less risk of patients becoming increasingly distressed. It 
would also help to overcome the fragmented and uncoordinated approach to care 
described by the participants in this study.  
 
It is also anticipated that the service managers on the renal unit could facilitate rapid 
changes, which would improve the quality of patient care. As mentioned previously, the 
renal nurse specialist on the haemodialysis unit held a recognised qualification in 
counselling. However, the numerous other tasks, which were part of her role as nurse 
specialist, meant she never had enough time to spend counselling patients. The hospital 
did not seem to have difficulties recruiting nurses to work on the haemodialysis unit. 
Therefore, if a senior nurse on the haemodialysis unit were transferred into the role of 
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renal nurse specialist, this would allow the renal nurse specialist to move into the role of 
counsellor.  
 
By having a full-time counsellor on the haemodialysis unit, the patients’ concerns 
would be identified and managed more proactively. In collaboration with the nursing 
staff on the haemodialysis unit, the counsellor would provide the psychosocial support 
the person needs to navigate their way through their illness. The use of counselling 
therapies would facilitate patients to overcome the distressing moods and emotions 
culminating from their illness. Moreover, if patients required help engaging in daily 
activities or returning to work, they could be assisted with these goals. In this way, the 
counsellor could act as the lead person for the patients within the CQI framework, 
summarising their key concerns and difficulties in an effort to inform the change 
process.  
 
There are other changes, which could be implemented immediately and would enhance 
the quality of patient care on the haemodialysis unit. For instance, the designated lead 
nurse should collaborate with the nurses on the unit to develop a structured timetable for 
the allocation of dialysis machines. All nurses should agree to adhere to this timetable to 
avoid patients having to wait unnecessarily for machines. Similarly, a structured 
timetable should be drawn up for the taxi drivers to inform them of the exact times they 
have to collect patients. It should be made clear that the hospital will not pay for fares if 
the patients are not collected on time. Nurses should also strive to ensure that patients 
who travel together in a hospital taxi start and finish dialysis at the same time. This 
would also help patients to overcome the experience of waiting needlessly after dialysis 
therapy.  
 
There are also immediate changes, which would make the treatment environment more 
patient-friendly. The dialysis machines should be re-arranged to ensure they are not 
blocking patients from engaging in conversation. Likewise, by communicating and 
interacting with patients during dialysis, the nurses would assist the patients to pass the 
time during treatment. Moreover, they would be able to identify the shared interests of 
specific patients and have them situated near each other during treatment. As this study 
illustrated, the participants with ESRD on haemodialysis therapy were confronted with 
unique and complex problems. These problems are often best understood by patients 
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with the same illness and treatment. Therefore, placing patients with similar experiences 
beside each other during dialysis therapy would enhance peer support and interaction 
between patients.  
 
Family, friends, and carers should be encouraged to accompany patients to dialysis if 
possible. This would provide a useful way for the patient to leisurely pass the time 
during treatment. It would also allow healthcare practitioners to interact with these 
people and provide support, which is an element of supportive care.   
 
On a more long-term basis, other developments should be introduced including the 
provision of individual televisions at each dialysis station with fully functioning 
headsets and a high quality sound system. Internet access should be made available for 
patients who would like to work, or play computer games on laptops during treatment. 
Portable DVD players should also be made available, so that patients could watch 
movies as a way to pass the time.  It would be ideal to offer a range of complementary 
therapies for patients during haemodialysis therapy, such as relaxation therapy, 
aromatherapy, reflexology, and music therapy. Exercise therapy is also provided for 
patients during haemodialysis therapy in some hospitals in Europe and the USA and 
would provide a beneficial and healthy way to pass the time for patients.  
 
The Irish Kidney Association might be willing to fund the introduction of some of these 
services on the haemodialysis unit. The Punchestown Kidney Research Fund has also 
raised substantial funds since 1990 to support research projects that improve the life of 
patients with kidney disease. The funds have been used to sponsor an Art Therapy 
Programme for dialysis patients in two dialysis centres in the Republic of Ireland. 
Through funding from the Punchestown Kidney Research Fund, it is hoped that some of 
the services outlined above would be introduced to the dialysis unit at the study 
hospital. It is also hoped that the possibility of creating an Art Therapy Programme 
would be considered.   
  
It is anticipated that an interdisciplinary approach to patient care would be gradually 
implemented on the haemodialysis unit. It seemed that the technological context of care 
on the dialysis unit meant the need for an interdisciplinary approach to patient care was 
not recognised. Because of this technological context of care, practitioners on the 
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haemodialysis unit simply overlooked the chronic nature of ESRD and dialysis. 
Consequently, the physical and psychosocial concerns experienced by patients 
regarding the long-term outcomes of their illness and treatment were not addressed.  
 
It is important to point out that many of the interdisciplinary professionals required to 
provide supportive care for the renal patient are already available at the study hospital 
e.g. psychologists, social workers, physiotherapists, pain specialists, occupational 
therapists, palliative care physicians and nurses, and clergy. Therefore, it would simply 
involve a designated member of the CQI team on the haemodialysis unit 
communicating and collaborating with these professionals to ensure their services are 
extended to include patients on the haemodialysis unit. By incorporating a collaborative 
interdisciplinary approach, the healthcare practitioners on the haemodialysis unit could 
work together with these professionals to ensure the holistic needs of the patients are 
met.  
 
6.2.2 EVALUATION OF THE CONTINUOUS QUALITY IMPROVEMENT PROCESS 
 
The evaluation and analysis of outcomes are a core component of the quality cycle of 
CQI and occur during the ‘study’ stage of the PDSA cycle. The absence of evaluation 
can allow people to assume that their practice does not need to change. Therefore, 
continuous monitoring assists the service to recognise problems and deficits and ensures 
that these gaps are addressed leading to improvement in the entire system (Ayra & 
Callely, 2005; Knight, 2007).  It is anticipated that the evaluation of the quality cycles 
will be performed using various research approaches. There is a need to produce 
feedback information from patients to staff, which will inform staff of the areas of care 
that have improved and areas that need further improvement.  
 
A study by Hyrkäs & Lehti (2003) reported on the use of systematic patient feedback as 
a way to evaluate a continuous quality improvement process on three hospital wards. 
The researchers developed a questionnaire to evaluate patients’ satisfaction with 
healthcare. They based the questionnaire on previous work related to patient satisfaction 
surveys. The questionnaire was piloted and improved before inclusion in the study. The 
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findings indicated that systematic patient feedback during the CQI process improved the 
quality of care on the ward.  
 
With some minor additions, the questionnaire developed by Hyrkäs & Lehti (2003) 
would be appropriate to assess patients’ satisfaction with care on the haemodialysis unit 
at the study hospital. The following broad issues were included in the questionnaire (1) 
overall satisfaction with care (2) satisfaction with treatment, (3) adequacy of 
information, (4) guidance and patient counselling, (5) consideration for patients’ 
opinions and wishes, (6) staff competence, (7) assistance in addressing the patient’s 
current health problem, (8) staff collaboration, and (9) satisfaction with the 
layout/environment of the ward/unit. In addition to these questions, the following two 
questions would also be included (10) satisfaction with the hospital transport service 
(11) satisfaction with the waiting time for a dialysis machine to become available. The 
question (i.e. question 9) that assesses satisfaction with the layout/environment of the 
ward/unit would address the patient’s satisfaction with the diversionary activities 
provided on the unit. 
 
The primary aim of using this questionnaire is to produce information for staff, which 
would serve to evaluate the implementation of immediate changes in practice during the 
quality cycles of the CQI process. It is anticipated that these questionnaires would be 
administered monthly to patients. There is a full-time research nurse on the renal unit at 
the study hospital that would be available to participate in this task. The feedback from 
these questionnaires would be reported to managerial staff and to practitioners attending 
the group clinical supervision sessions. It is hoped that this feedback would act as a 
catalyst for continuous improvement in practice.  
 
The hermeneutic phenomenological approach used in my study was a suitable approach 
to identify patients’ experiences of their illness and treatment. Therefore, it is 
recommended that research to evaluate the CQI process should incorporate this 
methodology to develop an in-depth account of the positive and negative experiences of 
the patients at the study hospital. In particular, the insights gained from the follow-up 
interviews with the participants in my study suggest that it would be worthwhile to 
follow the person’s experience over time. The existing research related to the person’s 
experience of ESRD has not employed longitudinal studies. Therefore, a 
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phenomenological methodology incorporating a longitudinal approach would allow the 
changes in the participants’ experience to be documented over time. A longitudinal 
approach would also allow the outcomes of the quality cycles to be evaluated on an 
ongoing basis.   
 
It is recommended that the findings of this hermeneutical study would also serve to 
evaluate the robustness of the “model of enduring” developed within this study. This 
would allow the model of enduring to be developed and refined over time. The 
development of the model would allow its applicability to be assessed within other 
groups of renal patients (peritoneal dialysis and kidney transplant patients) and within 
patients with other chronic illnesses.  
 
There is also a need to evaluate the outcomes of the CQI process using an observational 
study. In particular, there is a need to analyse the daily activities of practitioners in their 
care of patients on the haemodialysis unit. A study of this nature would serve to 
evaluate whether the planned objectives of the quality cycles were being achieved. 
Various researchers have used observational studies to assess nursing activities and 
have provided interesting insights into why nurses do not engage in direct patient care 
activities, such as communication and interaction.  
 
For instance, an observational survey of the activities of nurses by Jinks  & Hope (2000) 
suggested that the majority of activities performed by nurses did not involve direct 
contact with patients. The researchers conducted over sixty hours of observations with 
ten registered nurses of various grades on an acute surgical ward at a District General 
Hospital (DGH) and a Community Hospital (CH) in Wales. The findings demonstrated 
high numbers of activities related to the management and co-ordination of care and high 
frequencies of indirect care. Jinks & Hope (2000) indicated that these findings 
represented the ‘glue function’ of nursing, described by McCloskey et al (1996). The 
‘glue function’ referred to the coordinating function of the nurses’ role. Instead of being 
involved in direct patient care, nurses were viewed as the co-ordinators of care. In other 
words, the nurses maintained the holistic overview of care given by all members of the 
healthcare team, rather than be caregivers to patients.  
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Oliver & Refern (1991) explored the interpersonal communication between nurses and 
elderly patients using patient-focused observations of nurse-patient interactions. Five 
elderly patients were observed individually over two days for each patient. The findings 
indicated that out of a total 137 nurse-patient interactions, 99 (72%) were concerned 
with the physical aspects of care. The findings also indicated that very little expressive 
touch took place between nurses and patients. Expressive touch is a non-verbal form of 
communication, which conveys a person’s feelings, personality, and attitudes to the 
other person. Out of the 726 touches given, 23% were expressive while the remainder 
were instrumental touches i.e. touch that occurs during physical acts of care.  
 
It is anticipated that the use of observational studies, such as the ones outlined above 
would be useful to evaluate whether the elements of supportive care are being 
implemented. The findings of these studies would also identify further changes, which 
need to be made within the CQI process. These findings would be discussed during 
group clinical supervision sessions to facilitate practitioners to reflect on what they have 
learned during the quality cycles and decide what further changes need to be 
implemented. It is expected that the clinical supervision sessions would enable 
practitioners to identify their own training and education needs to ensure they are able to 
actively contribute to the CQI process. Thus, the PDSA quality cycle would continue on 
an ongoing basis.  Through the continuous cycles of CQI, it is hoped that over time a 
model of supportive care could be implemented and developed on the haemodialysis 
unit at the study hospital, which is evolutionary and meets the needs of patients. 
 
6.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The sample size, and the qualitative methodology employed in this study, preclude 
broad generalisation of the findings to the larger population of patients on 
haemodialysis therapy. Nonetheless, the findings of the study yielded rich, in-depth 
information about the participants’ experience of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy.  
 
As mentioned previously, the participants requested to be interviewed during 
haemodialysis therapy. However, there may have been some limitations with 
conducting interviews in the treatment environment. While measures were taken to 
reduce the noise during interviews, the dialysis machine alarms meant this was not 
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always possible. Overall, this noise did not appear to affect the flow of conversation 
during interviews.  
 
Privacy was maintained as much as possible during the interviews. However, collecting 
data during haemodialysis therapy may have prevented disclosure in some participants. 
Thus, their ability to openly discuss their experience of the illness and treatment may 
have been inhibited. Alternatively, responses may have been given in a socially 
acceptable manner to avoid potentially negative impacts on their care.  
 
The lengthy dialysis process often creates tiredness and fatigue. These complications 
may have potentially impeded the participants’ ability to respond and recall experiences 
during the interviews.  
 
Because of the potential limitations outlined above, it is suggested that it would be 
beneficial to conduct interviews with participants in a more suitable environment. 
Indeed, I conducted the follow-up interviews with two participants in their own homes. 
These participants had received kidney transplants and were no longer attending the 
haemodialysis unit. The privacy and reduced noise levels meant these interviews were 
more relaxed, and free flowing. It seemed that being in the comfort and privacy of their 
own homes, enabled the participants to disclose their experiences in a more open 
manner. In future studies, I would try to conduct interviews in the patient’s home or in 
an environment, which was more comfortable, quiet, and private.  
 
This research specifically used qualitative interviews as a data collection technique. The 
use of other data collection methods, such as group interviews, observations, and 
personal journals may have enhanced the richness of the data. Finally, additional 
follow-up interviews over time would also have potentially enhanced the depth and 
richness of the data, and provided more contextual information about the participants’ 
experience of ESRD and haemodialysis.    
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6.4 CONCLUSION TO THE STUDY 
 
This study provided a detailed, in-depth, and accurate description of the experiences of 
ESRD for sixteen participants on hospital-based haemodialysis therapy in Ireland. The 
experience of waiting was developed as a constitutive or overarching pattern within the 
study. This pattern consisted of three themes: Lost Time; Waiting for a Kidney 
Transplant, and Communicating with Nurses: Myth versus Reality.  
 
The experience of waiting had not previously been identified as a significant feature in 
the existing research related to the person’s experience of ESRD. Therefore, it is 
anticipated that the findings of this study will supplement and contribute to the existing 
body of literature on this topic. This is important, because the more informed healthcare 
practitioners are about patients’ experiences of ESRD, the better equipped they will be 
to provide care that meets their specific needs.   
 
In particular, the Heideggerian phenomenological methodology employed in the study 
allowed this alternative perspective of the person’s experience of ESRD to be 
illuminated. While other studies have used this methodology to explore the person’s 
experience of ESRD (Rittman et al., 1993; Sloan, 1996; Sloan, 2002), these studies did 
not emphasise Heidegger’s perspective of time or temporality. In contrast, Heidegger’s 
(1962) philosophical analysis of time specifically formed the basis of my study into the 
person’s experience of ESRD and haemodialysis therapy. Indeed, it is proposed that the 
temporal characteristics of Heidegger’s philosophy facilitated the participants’ 
experience of waiting, to be identified as a constitutive pattern within the study.   
 
To re-iterate, the participants’ experience of waiting, illustrated in the themes Lost Time 
and Waiting for a Kidney Transplant, culminated in the existential moods of anxiety 
and boredom, presented by Heidegger (1962, 1995). According to Heidegger (1962, 
1995), these existential moods highlighted the possibility of death to the person and 
prompted them to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. The 
relentless experience of waiting meant the participants were unable to live in either 
mode of existence. This culminated in the intensification of distressing moods, and the 
disruption of originary temporality.   
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The existing literature highlighted the lifestyle disruptions created by the “time-
consuming” nature of haemodialysis therapy (Nagle, 1998; Hagren et al., 2001; Heiwe, 
Clyne & Dahlgren, 2003; Hagren et al., 2005). However, in contrast to this literature, it 
was not linear or clock time that was significant in the participants’ experience of 
waiting, described in my study. Instead it was the threefold structure of originary 
temporality, portrayed by Heidegger (1962) that formed the basis of the participants’ 
experience of waiting. 
 
In addition, the existential interpretation of anxiety and boredom, which culminated 
from the participants’ experience of waiting, was also dramatically different to the 
psychological interpretation of these concepts, presented in the existing literature. This 
literature described anxiety and boredom as distressing psychological, emotional, and 
cognitive responses occurring within the individual. While anxiety was discussed as a 
prevalent response in the person with ESRD, boredom was not identified as a 
significant factor within this literature. However, a review of the literature specifically 
related to boredom, highlighted that the concept was also primarily interpreted as a 
psychological or cognitive response (Hill & Perkins, 1985; Perkins & Hill, 1985; 
Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Vodanovich & Kass, 1990; Vodanovich, 2003; Lee & 
Mittelstaedt, 2004).  
 
The alternative perspective of anxiety and boredom as existential moods presented in 
this thesis will contribute to our knowledge and awareness of these moods. It is 
anticipated that this new knowledge will assist nurses and other healthcare practitioners 
to recognise anxiety and boredom, and respond more appropriately to the person’s 
experience of these moods.   
 
In particular, certain features of the concept of “enduring”, formulated by Morse (2001) 
also encapsulated the intensification of the unpleasant moods and the disconnection in 
temporality, depicted in the participants’ experience of waiting. However, Morse’s 
concept of enduring was specifically based on a psychological or cognitive perspective 
of emotion and time. Therefore, there was a need to substitute this psychological 
perspective with Heidegger’s existential account of mood and temporality, in order to 
incorporate the participants’ experience of waiting. Based on this merger, a new “model 
of enduring” was proposed, which comprehensively described the participants’ 
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experience of waiting, presented in the study. The Model of Enduring proposed within 
this thesis would provide a useful framework for understanding and recognising the 
experience of waiting, illustrated by the participants.      
 
Morse (2001) claimed that nurses needed to communicate and interact regularly with 
patients in order to recognise and respond to their experience of enduring. However, the 
participants’ accounts in my study signified that the nurses on the haemodialysis unit 
spent very little time communicating with them during their treatment. The participants’ 
experience of communicating with the nurses was discussed in the third and final theme 
in the study, titled Communicating with Nurses: Myth versus Reality.  Because of the 
deficit in nurse-patient communication, the nurses disregarded the relentless experience 
of waiting endured by the participants.  
 
Effective nurse-patient communication is largely accepted as an essential component of 
“good” nursing care. In contrast, the findings of my study showed that the level of 
nurse-patient communication and interaction on the haemodialysis unit was inadequate. 
Indeed, the technologically focused context of care on the haemodialysis unit meant the 
nurses concentrated almost entirely on the technical and physiological acts of care.  
 
Based on these findings, a model of supportive care was recommended as one way to 
address the shortcomings of the current context of care on the haemodialysis unit at the 
study hospital. It is anticipated that the elements of supportive care would be introduced 
using a continuous quality improvement (CQI) framework. Overall, it is hoped that the 
findings of this research will inform nursing and healthcare practice and ultimately 
contribute to care that is effective and person-centred.151   
                                                 
151 To re-iterate, the use of the term ‘person’ in person-centred care refers to ‘Dasein’, the temporally 
situated human being who is constituted by his/her past, present, and future.   
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APPENDIX A: PHYSIOLOGICAL COMPLICATIONS OF ESRD 
 
There are various co-morbid conditions, which accompany ESRD. These conditions 
include diabetes, hypertension, cardiac disease, peripheral vascular disease, 
cerebrovascular disease, autoimmune diseases, renal carcinoma, haematological 
malignancies (e.g. myeloma, amyloidosis), and familial disease (e.g. polycystic kidney 
disease). Moreover, there are various disease-specific complications, which are also 
associated with the illness.  
 
For instance, anaemia is present in many individuals with renal disease, which results in 
a loss of energy, fatigue, and breathlessness. The retention of water and sodium caused 
by renal disease induces breathlessness, pulmonary oedema, and generalised oedema of 
the feet, ankles, and around the eye area.  
 
Uraemia disturbs gastrointestinal motility, which leads to poor appetite, inadequate 
nutritional intake, and nausea and vomiting. Renal osteodystrophy is the term used in 
the literature to describe the various forms of bone disease that occur as a consequence 
of renal disease. Renal bone disease is caused by altered calcium and phosphate 
regulation and results in pain and poor mobility. Pruritis or intense itching of the skin is 
also a common complaint for many patients.   
 
Peripheral neuropathy is another symptom of ESRD and is deemed more common in 
men. The symptoms of peripheral neuropathy include severe pain and burning sensation 
in lower extremities, and restless leg syndrome. Restless leg syndrome is reported be a 
very uncomfortable sensation that is relieved only through movement of the legs. It is 
more prominent at night and subsequently creates sleep disturbance for the person.  
 
Pain is cited as a very common problem for ESRD patients and occurs because of their 
primary disease, concurrent co-morbid diseases, or the diseases caused by ESRD (e.g. 
renal bone disease). Pain is also specifically related to treatment with dialysis therapy.  
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Sleep disturbance is considered to affect up to half of dialysis patients. Insomnia is 
associated with pain, restless legs, and cramps. Both men and women with renal disease 
experience sexual disorders and dysfunction. These problems are caused both by the 
hormonal changes associated with renal disease and underlying diseases, such as 
diabetes and peripheral vascular disease.152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
152 This list of physiological complications is based on information by Brown, Chambers & Eggeling 
(2007), Ballinger & Patchett (2000), Ferro, Chambers & Davison (2004).   
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APPENDIX B: ACUTE COMPLICATIONS OF ESRD AND 
DIALYSIS 
 
 
The acute physiological complications of ESRD arise from the excessive accumulation 
of fluid and harmful substances in the person’s blood. These complications precipitate 
serious and sometimes life-threatening consequences for the person, including 
pulmonary overload, cardiac arrhythmia, and cardiac arrest. Furthermore, there are 
acute physiological complications specifically associated with dialysis therapy itself. 
The most common complications associated with peritoneal dialysis are peritonitis 
(infection of the peritoneum), infection of the peritoneal dialysis catheter (both exit site 
and catheter tunnel infection), and blockage of the catheter.  
 
The acute complications associated with haemodialysis therapy include vascular access 
problems, such as poor blood flow, infection, thrombosis, and the pain of having 
needles inserted into arteriovenous fistulas and arteriovenous grafts. There are also 
complications that occur during the haemodialysis procedure itself. These commonly 
include hypotension, cramps, nausea, and vomiting. Hypotension and cramps occur due 
to the excessive removal of fluid and sodium during haemodialysis therapy. 
Hypotension can lead to nausea and vomiting.153    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153 This list of acute complications associated with ESRD and dialysis therapy are based on information 
by Challinor (1998), Turner (1998), and Kotanko & Levin (2008). 
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APPENDIX C: OUTLINE OF CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 
 
 
2008: Lost Time: The patients’ experience of waiting during haemodialysis 
therapy presented at the International Nursing Research Conference of the 
Royal College of Nursing (RCN).  
 
 
2007: Waiting: The experience of patients on haemodialysis therapy 
presented at the 8th Annual Interdisciplinary Research Conference at Trinity 
College Dublin. 
 
 
2007: Waiting: The experience of being a patient on haemodialysis therapy 
presented at the International Nursing Research Conference of the Royal 
College of Nursing (RCN). 
 
 
2006: Waiting for a kidney transplant: The experience of being a patient on 
haemodialysis therapy presented at the Health Research Board (HRB) 
Research Communication Awards. I was a finalist in the area of health 
services/systems research and population health.  
 
 
2006: Temporality and the experience of being a patient on haemodialysis 
therapy presented at the 7th Annual Interdisciplinary Research Conference 
at Trinity College Dublin. 
 
 
2006: The experience of boredom for patients on haemodialysis therapy 
presented at the International Nursing Research Conference of the Royal 
College of Nursing (RCN). 
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APPENDIX D: INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
STUDY TITLE: An exploration of the illness experience of the patient with ESRD 
undergoing haemodialysis therapy.    
 
RESEARCHER:    Ms Aoife Moran  
SUPERVISING CONSULTANT:  Dr __________ 
 
CONTACT: 
Work: (01) 7007706 
Mobile: 087-9374711 
Email Address: aoife.moran@dcu.ie 
 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this research is to explore your views and experience of being a patient 
on haemodialysis. The research is qualitative, which means that the researcher will 
gather information about your experience using interviews. The interviews will 
resemble a normal conversation and will be carried out, with your permission, on two 
occasions. During these interviews, you will be asked to talk about your experience of 
living with renal failure and haemodialysis. However, you are free to withhold any 
information you prefer not to discuss. If you decide during the study that you do not 
want to participate, you can withdraw at any time. This decision will not affect your 
treatment in any way. 
 
The interviews, which will last for approximately an hour, will be recorded using a tape 
recorder to ensure that the researcher remembers everything that is discussed during the 
interview. The researcher will then transcribe (type) the interview. The information you 
provide during the interviews will be confidential. No information that identifies you 
will be included in the typed copy of your interview. Your name, and the name of others 
you mention, will be replaced by a code. The researcher does not need to look at your 
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medical records for this study. The taped interviews will be stored until the end of the 
study and then erased  
 
It is hoped that the information from this study may help to determine the most useful 
ways for nurses to provide care to meet the needs of patients on haemodialysis. The 
final report, without any identifying information, may be presented or published with 
your permission.   
 
AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY 
 
This is to certify that I agree to participate in the above study. I am satisfied that there 
will be no risks to me resulting from participation in the study. 
 
I hereby grant permission to be interviewed on two occasions and for these interviews 
to be recorded using a tape recorder. I understand that these interviews will be 
confidential, and that I will remain anonymous. I understand that I can withdraw from 
the study at any time, and my treatment will not be affected by this decision. I also grant 
permission for the final research report to be presented / published at the end of the 
study.  
 
I am satisfied with the information I have received about the study. I have also had the 
opportunity to ask questions of the researcher, and all questions have been answered to 
my satisfaction. 
 
_____________________________ 
Signature of Participant 
 
____________________________ 
Signature of Witness 
 
____________________________ 
Date 
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APPENDIX E: INSIGHTS FROM EXISTENTIAL LITERATURE 
 
In hermeneutics, the spoken word is a powerful analytical and interpretive tool. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to bring insights from existential literature to bear on the 
findings of this study. This literature provides a complementary interpretive “lens” 
through which to view the participants’ experiences. Within this appendix, the 
participants’ experience of waiting will be discussed in relation to Franz Kafka’s (1999) 
novel The Castle and Samuel Beckett’s (1956) play Waiting for Godot. These literary 
works symbolised various characteristics of the participants’ experience of waiting, 
illustrated in the study.  
 
Like the participants’ accounts of waiting, the fundamental existential moods of anxiety 
and boredom also formed the basis of the experience of waiting, presented by both 
writers. These moods highlighted the finitude of existence to the characters in the 
novel/play, and prompted them to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of 
existence. However, the experience of waiting meant the characters failed to live in 
either mode of existence.  
 
If we recall, the inability to live in either mode of existence in response to anxiety and 
boredom created a disconnection in temporality. Moreover, it culminated in distressing 
moods for the person. Like the participants, the experience of waiting indefinitely meant 
the distressing moods intensified for the characters in the novel/play. The gradual 
progression of these distressing moods was conveyed in Kafka’s (1999) novel The 
Castle. However, the sense of fragmentation and series of incomplete narratives, which 
were threaded throughout the novel, never allowed these moods to intensify to an 
extreme level. In contrast, the acceleration of distressing moods was torturously 
palpable within Beckett’s (1956) play Waiting for Godot. Hence, it complemented 
Kafka’s work in providing a compelling insight into the participants’ experience of 
waiting, described in the study.  
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The Castle 
 
It is suggested that the notion of waiting appeared to be both implicitly and explicitly 
revealed in Kafka’s discourse throughout the novel The Castle (Kafka, 1999). The novel 
was based around a character called K. It began with K arriving in a village to start a job 
as a land surveyor in a castle that was situated in the village. K made his way to a 
nearby inn and sought accommodation for the night. However, when he arrived at the 
inn, it was clear that no one was expecting him. The landlord said he was unable to 
provide him with a room, and K was confined to the public bar where the peasants sat.  
 
The landlord of the inn told K that the village belonged to the castle, and whoever 
stayed in the village must have a permit from the castle. As K did not have a permit, he 
began enquiries as to how he should get one. The rest of the novel was centred on K’s 
endless wait for the castle to recognise his status as an official land surveyor.  
 
In particular, K’s experience of waiting for recognition from the castle seemed to mirror 
the participants’ experience of waiting for a kidney transplant. When K arrived to the 
village, he was hopeful and looked forward to commencing a job as a land surveyor at 
the castle. However, regardless of his attempts to reach the castle, he never achieved 
this goal. Consequently, as K’s wait to get to the castle continued indefinitely, his 
experience of hope turned to uncertainty.  
 
The experience of uncertainty was threaded throughout the novel. Indeed, in the 
opening passage, we were immediately confronted with doubts as to whether the castle 
actually existed:  
It was late in the evening when K. arrived. The village was deep in 
snow. The Castle hill was hidden, veiled in a mist and darkness, nor was 
there even a glimmer of light to show that a castle was there.   
                                                                              (Kafka, 1999, p277) 
 
Kafka’s repeated use of the words “certain” and “certainly” throughout the novel, 
completely contradicted the uncertainty, which infiltrated K’s experience of waiting. 
Passages that began with certainty and hope frequently ended in uncertainty and doubt. 
Like the participants’ experience of waiting for a transplant, there were many examples 
throughout the novel where K’s hopes of getting to the castle were continuously 
undermined by uncertainty. 
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For instance, the arrival of Barnabas, with a message from the castle, provided K with 
some hope.154 It informed K to meet the superintendent of the village who would give 
him the details of his employment. However, when K met the superintendent, he was 
advised that there had been a miscommunication between the official departments of the 
castle. Therefore, the castle did not require a land surveyor after all. At this point, K’s 
experience of uncertainty was expressed. After making the long journey to take on the 
job as land surveyor in the castle, K questioned the superintendent, as to why this 
injustice had occurred: “But how is this possible?” cried K. “Surely I haven’t made this 
endless journey just to be sent back again” (Kafka, 1999, p309). 
 
When the superintendent responded by providing K with a long-winded and ambiguous 
account of why the confusion had occurred, K replied: “So the only remaining 
conclusion…is that everything is very uncertain and insoluble, including my being 
thrown out” (Kafka, 1999, p317).  
 
The uncertainty, which was illustrated in K’s experience of waiting, was characteristic 
of the participants’ experience of uncertainty, while they waited for a kidney transplant. 
If we recall, the participants understood that they would receive a kidney transplant 
within a specific duration of time. However, when they exceeded this time frame, they 
became uncertain. Their experience of uncertainty turned their hope of receiving a 
kidney transplant, to disappointment and despair. Without a definite possibility of 
receiving a transplant, the participants began to speculate whether the wait would ever 
end.  
 
As mentioned previously, the participants’ experience of uncertainty represented 
Heidegger’s (1962) description of anxiety.155 It highlighted the threefold structure of 
originary temporality to the participants, and subsequently disclosed the possibility of 
death. Thus, the participants were prompted to live in either an authentic or inauthentic 
mode of existence.  
 
                                                 
154 Barnabas was a messenger for the castle.  
155 See page 195 for the discussion on anxiety in relation to the theme Waiting for a Kidney Transplant.   
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It is suggested, that like the participants, the experience of uncertainty, also disclosed 
the finitude of existence to K. This prompted him to live in either an authentic or 
inauthentic mode of existence. However, K’s possibilities for the future seemed to 
depend entirely on his status being recognised by the castle. Since this recognition did 
not occur throughout the entire novel, K was unable to live in the authentic mode of 
existence. Moreover, the failure of the castle to recognise K’s status meant he was 
unable to engage in his everyday activities as a land surveyor. These features of K’s 
experience implied that while he waited for recognition by the castle, he was unable to 
absorb himself in the everydayness of the inauthentic mode of existence.  
 
Similarly, the participants’ accounts of waiting for a kidney transplant suggested they 
were unable to live in either the authentic or inauthentic mode of existence, when 
confronted with their finite existence.  The uncertainty of waiting indefinitely for a 
kidney transplant meant they were unable to visualise possibilities in the future. 
Furthermore, the restrictions of haemodialysis therapy meant they were unable to 
participate in the everyday activities, which they took for granted in the past. Therefore, 
they described their experience of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney 
transplant. The participants’ experience of being on hold represented a disconnection in 
originary temporality, which culminated in profound boredom.156  
 
It is proposed, that K’s inability to live in either mode of existence when faced with the 
possibility of death, also created a disruption to originary temporality, which led to 
profound boredom. To briefly summarise, Heidegger (1995) described boredom as a 
fundamental existential mood. Like anxiety, it disclosed the person’s finite existence.157 
There were three forms of boredom, which ranged from the most superficial to the most 
profound. The third form of boredom was the origin of the other two, because it 
disclosed the person’s finite existence. Therefore, the person tried to flee or escape from 
the first and second forms of boredom to avoid being drawn into the third and most 
profound form of boredom (Heidegger, 1995).  
 
                                                 
156 See page 200 for the discussion on the disconnection in originary temporality/profound boredom 
represented in the participants’ experience of being on hold.  
157 See pages 125 for a more in-depth discussion on Heidegger’s perspective of boredom. 
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As previously mentioned, the participants’ descriptions of waiting, described in the 
themes Lost Time and Waiting for Kidney Transplant suggested they were unable to flee 
from the first and the second forms of boredom.158 Hence, they oscillated into profound 
boredom. Like the participants in the study, it seemed that K was also unable to flee 
from the first and second forms of boredom, while he waited for recognition of his 
status from the castle. As a result, it seemed he progressed into the third and most 
profound form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995).  
 
According to Heidegger (1995), the first form of boredom involved becoming bored by 
something. Heidegger claimed that this form of boredom occurred if we were forced to 
wait in a particular situation. K was forced to wait in the village until the castle decided 
to recognise his status. The experience of being forced to wait in the village implied that 
K might have experienced the first form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995). 
Likewise, the participants in my study had no option except to wait for a kidney 
transplant. As a result, they also experienced the first form of boredom.  
 
The first form of boredom was accompanied by impatience and uneasiness (Heidegger, 
1995). The experience of impatience, uneasiness, frustration, and anger were contained 
within the participants’ accounts of waiting. Correspondingly, the impatience, 
uneasiness, and frustration caused by K’s experience of waiting were also portrayed 
within the novel.  
 
For instance, in the following passage, K found out that Barnabas, the messenger had 
not delivered his previous message to the castle. Instead, Barnabas had been working as 
an assistant to his father, the cobbler in the village. K’s impatience and frustration were 
palpable in his following dialogue with Barnabas:   
K. bit his lip with impatience. “Sir,” replied Barnabas…I’ll certainly see 
to it, and I’ll certainly see to the message you gave me last time as well.” 
“What!” cried K., “haven’t you seen to that [message] yet then? Weren’t 
you at the Castle next day?” “No,”replied Barnabas, “my father is old, 
you’ve seen him yourself, and there happened to be a great deal of work 
just then, I had to help him, but now I’ll be going to the Castle again 
soon.” “But what are you thinking of, you incomprehensible fellow?” 
cried K., beating his brow with his fist… “You’re in an important 
                                                 
158 See pages 158 and 198 for the discussion on the participants’ experience of waiting in relation to the 
three forms of boredom.  
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position, you’re a messenger, and yet you fail me in this wretched 
manner! What does your father’s work matter?…And who can need 
boots here in these eternally empty streets?” (Kafka, 1999, p343-344).159 
 
It is proposed, that while K waited for recognition from the castle, he was left empty by 
the village. This was implicitly expressed in the passage above when K referred to the 
“eternally empty streets” of the village. According to Heidegger (1995), being left 
empty by things was a feature of the first form of boredom. He stated that being left 
empty occurred when we exceeded the appropriate time for a particular thing. From 
Heidegger’s (1962) perspective, everything we engaged with in world-time lasted for a 
particular duration of time. However, if we exceeded the duration of time, which was 
appropriate for a specific thing, it left us empty.  The castle’s delay in recognising K’s 
status meant he was forced to wait in the village much longer than he had initially 
anticipated. Therefore, while K waited relentlessly for the castle’s recognition, the 
village left him empty. K’s experience of being left empty by the village depicted the 
first form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995).  
 
In a similar way, the participants’ accounts of waiting, presented in the sub theme 
Wasting Time illustrated that they spent a significant duration of time waiting 
unnecessarily before and after dialysis therapy. The time spent waiting prevented the 
participants from engaging in their everyday lives and activities. Therefore, while they 
waited needlessly, the haemodialysis unit essentially offered them nothing and left them 
empty.  
 
Based on Heidegger’s interpretation, the first form of boredom was transitory (Aho, 
2007). In other words, when persons escaped from the thing that was boring them, they 
were also able to flee from the first form of boredom. The participants’ accounts of 
waiting, described in the themes Lost Time and Waiting for a Kidney Transplant 
conveyed that they experienced the first form of boredom, described by Heidegger 
(1995).160 The ongoing nature of their experience of waiting meant they were unable to 
flee from the first form of boredom. Hence, they progressed into the second form of 
boredom, described by Heidegger (1995).   
                                                 
159 The use of three spaced ellipsis points (…) within this block quotation indicates that some material has 
been omitted from the original source.  
160 See pages 158 and 198 for the discussion on the participants’ experience of boredom in relation to both 
themes. 
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Correspondingly, K’s story indicated that he had to continuously wait in the village, 
since the castle persistently failed to recognise his status. This signified that he was also 
unable to flee from the first form of boredom. Like the participants in my study, it is 
proposed that K advanced into the second form of boredom, described by Heidegger 
(1995).  
 
According to Heidegger (1995), the second form of boredom involved being bored with 
something that was unfamiliar and indeterminate. The “something” unfamiliar and 
indeterminate, which bored the person in the second form of boredom, was the standing 
of world-time. Based on Heidegger’s (1995) account, world-time was normally 
understood as something that flowed. Therefore, when world-time came to a stand, it 
became something unfamiliar and indeterminate. It was the standing of world-time, as 
distinct from flowing, that bored one in the second form of boredom. 
 
While K waited for recognition from the castle, he was unable to participate in his 
everyday occupation as a land surveyor. As mentioned previously, world-time was the 
time, which contained our everyday activities and involvements in the world. Hence, 
when these activities were suspended or stopped, world-time subsequently came to a 
stand. It seemed that K’s inability to participate in his everyday work as a land surveyor 
brought world-time to a stand. This standing of world-time was indicative of the second 
form of boredom, presented by Heidegger (1995). 
If we recall, the participants’ accounts of waiting, described in the sub themes Killing 
Time, Wasting Time, and Being on Hold also epitomised the standing of world-time, 
which was characteristic of the second form of boredom.161 The participants’ 
descriptions of waiting, illustrated within these sub themes implied that they were held 
back from their everyday lives and activities. Thus, world-time was brought to a stand 
by their experience of waiting, which subsequently culminated in the second form of 
boredom, advanced by Heidegger (1995).  The continuous nature of the participants’ 
experience of waiting meant they were unable to flee from the second form of boredom. 
Therefore, they were drawn into the third and most profound form of boredom, 
described by Heidegger (1995).  
                                                 
161 See pages 158 and 198 for the discussion of these sub themes in relation to boredom.   
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Like the participants in the study, K’s experience of waiting indefinitely for recognition 
from the castle confirmed that he was unable to flee or overcome the second form of 
boredom. This suggested that K may have progressed into the third and most profound 
form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995).  
 
If we recall, in the third form of boredom, originary temporality was suspended 
(Heidegger, 1995). Therefore, the unified structure of originary temporality was 
dissolved, and the present was disconnected from the future. In profound boredom, the 
person was held in limbo by the suspension of originary temporality. When held in 
limbo by the suspension of originary temporality, individuals were held back from their 
own possibilities in life, and were subsequently held back from their past and future 
(Haar, 1999). 
 
Throughout the novel, we were given the impression that the unified structure of 
originary temporality may be disconnected for K. For instance, we were given no solid 
or reliable information about K’s past life experience. While we were told he was a land 
surveyor, there was no information as to how he came to acquire these skills, or where 
he had previously worked.  
 
There were times within the novel when K made fleeting statements about his native 
town, and his days as a soldier (Kafka, 1999, p286). However, there was no contextual 
or supplementary information about these elements of his past life. Furthermore, until K 
attained recognition of his status as a land surveyor from the castle, he appeared to have 
no future possibilities either. For the most part, we were given the impression that K’s 
current experience of life in the village was entirely severed from his past and future. 
This was emphasised in the following passage of the novel: 
K. was haunted by the feeling that he was losing himself or wandering 
into a strange country, farther than ever man had wandered before, a 
country so strange that not even the air had anything in common with his 
native air, where one might die of strangeness, and yet whose 
enchantment was such that one could only go on and lose oneself further 
(Kafka, 1999, p299). 
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The passage implied that K’s past experience of life in his native homeland was so 
disconnected from his current experience of living in the village, that both places did 
not share the same air. In addition, he could not contemplate future possibilities until the 
castle recognised his status as land surveyor. These characteristics of K’s experience 
conveyed that he was held in limbo by the suspension of originary temporality.  
 
According to Heidegger (1962), when the unified structure of originary temporality was 
disconnected, it illuminated the threefold structure of originary temporality to the 
person. This highlighted death as one possibility of the person’s existence.162 The 
reference to death in the above passage from the novel (p299) symbolised how the 
disconnection in originary temporality disclosed the possibility of death to K.  
  
The disruption in originary temporality created by K’s experience of waiting was 
characteristic of the participants’ descriptions of being on hold, while they waited for a 
kidney transplant. The unrelenting wait for a kidney transplant meant the participants 
were unable to contemplate possibilities for the future. In addition, the restrictions of 
haemodialysis therapy prevented them from engaging fully in the everyday life they 
took for granted in the past. Therefore, the participants’ described their experience of 
being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant. It was suggested that their 
experience of being on hold represented a disconnection in the unified structure of 
originary temporality.163  
 
The participants’ experience of being on hold while they waited for a kidney transplant 
conveyed that they were not acting in world-time to project forward into possibilities in 
the future. Instead, they were held back in a time that was essentially separated from the 
narrative of their lives. This corresponded with Heidegger’s (1995) description of 
profound boredom. The suspension of originary temporality, which occurred in 
profound boredom held the person back from world-time (Haar, 1999, p299).  
 
Similarly, the suspension of originary temporality caused by K’s experience of waiting 
also seemed to prevent him from acting in world-time. For instance, after much 
                                                 
162 See pages 164 and 200 for the discussion of profound boredom in relation to the participants’ 
experience of waiting.  
163 See page 200 for discussion of experience of being on hold in relation to the third form of boredom, 
described by Heidegger (1995).  
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consideration, and encouragement from his fiancée Frieda, K decided to take the job of 
janitor in the village school.164 This meant that K, Frieda, and two assistants had to live 
and work in the school. On the first night in the school, they were cold and decided to 
light a fire. However, to get wood for the fire, K had to break into the school shed. The 
following morning, the head teacher arrived and was furious that K had broken into the 
shed. In his anger, the teacher gave K notice to leave the job.  
K replied:  
You’re my superior, but not the person who engaged me for this post; it 
was the Superintendent who did that, and I’ll only accept notice from 
him. And he certainly never gave me this post so that I and my 
dependents should freeze here, but – as you told me yourself – to keep 
me from doing anything thoughtless or desperate (Kafka, 1999, p351). 
 
K’s decision to commence the job as school janitor gave us the impression that he was 
attempting to engage in world-time, while he waited for recognition from the castle. By 
engaging in world-time, K would be able to live in the inauthentic mode of existence. 
He would have been able to act in world-time (originary present) in order to project 
forward into possibilities in the originary future. Consequently, this would have allowed 
him to reconnect the threefold structure of originary temporality, and in turn overcome 
profound boredom. 
 
However, the above excerpt from the novel highlighted that K was not acting in world-
time, to project forward into possibilities in the future. He was a land surveyor and came 
to the village to work for the castle in this capacity. The job of school janitor was 
neither related to K’s originary past nor his originary future.165 This implied that 
originary temporality was suspended or frozen for K, while he was forced to work as 
janitor in the school. Therefore, the word “freeze” in the above passage could be taken 
literally to mean freeze with the cold. However, in light of the current interpretation, the 
word freeze may have also implied that originary temporality was frozen or suspended 
for K, while he waited for recognition by the castle.  
 
                                                 
164 Frieda was a barmaid at an inn in the village. She had become K’s fiancée since his arrival to the 
village. Frieda had connections with Klamm, an authoritative figure in the castle. Therefore, throughout 
the novel, we were left wondering if this was the reason why K was so quick to develop a close 
relationship with Frieda.   
165 See page 93 for the previous discussion on originary temporality.  
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The notion of time being frozen or suspended symbolised the participants’ experience 
of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant. The participants’ experience 
of being on hold was portrayed as being held back or suspended in a time that was 
effectively severed from the narrative of their lives.  
 
According to Heidegger (1995), when originary temporality was suspended, as was the 
case in profound boredom, the person was no longer acting in the present to project 
forward into possibilities in the future. Instead, the present was characterised by 
inaction, and the person was compelled to endure empty time. This was the empty time 
of profound boredom. The empty time of boredom did not imply that the person ceased 
to act. Rather, the person was no longer acting in the originary present to project 
forward into possibilities in the future.  Consequently, the lack of purposeful action in 
the originary present (world-time) signified that the originary present was empty. 
Heidegger described this empty present, as the empty time of profound boredom (Haar, 
1999).  
 
If we recall, the participants’ descriptions of waiting, provided in the sub themes Being 
on Hold, Killing Time, and Wasting Time highlighted that they were not acting in world-
time (originary present) to project forward into possibilities in the future. Thus, they 
endured the empty time of profound boredom.166 Similarly, it seemed from the previous 
passage from the novel The Castle that K was enduring the empty time of profound 
boredom, while he stayed in the job as school janitor.  He was not acting in world-time 
to project forward into possibilities in the future. Indeed, there was very little evidence 
that K performed any tasks or activities in his job as school janitor. Even after the head 
teacher threatened to dismiss K, he still failed to perform any activities: “Work 
completely stopped, the breakfast lingered on unconsciously” (p356).  
 
Nevertheless, K’s ultimate possibility was to be recognised as land surveyor by the 
castle. Until then, he was compelled to endure the empty time of profound boredom, 
while he remained in the job as school janitor. From K’s perspective, this was the only 
way to bring his ultimate possibility to fruition.    
 
 
                                                 
166 See pages 133, 144, and 185 for the discussion of these themes in relation to boredom.   
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For this reason he [K] must try to keep his post which gave Frieda a 
certain degree of security, and he must not complain if for this end he 
were made to endure more at the teacher’s hands than he would have 
had to endure in the ordinary course. All that sort of thing could be put 
up with, it belonged to the ordinary continual petty annoyances of life, it 
was nothing compared with what K was striving for, and he had not 
come here simply to lead an honoured and comfortable life (Kafka, 
1999, p361). 
 
 
Like K, the participants’ accounts of waiting, described in my study illustrated they had 
no choice but to endure the empty time of profound boredom. For example, their 
accounts of being on hold signified that they were unable to visualise possibilities in the 
future until they received a kidney transplant. They were subsequently unable to engage 
fully in an everyday life due to the restrictions of the dialysis treatment regime. 
Therefore, the participants were not acting in the present to project forward into 
possibilities in the future. Instead, they were held back in the empty time of profound 
boredom.  
 
Moreover, the participants descriptions of waiting, presented in the theme Lost Time 
also conveyed the empty time of profound boredom. The participants had to repeatedly 
endure the experience of waiting each time they attended haemodialysis therapy. This 
created a disruption to world-time, which meant they were unable to act in the present in 
order to project forward into possibilities in the future. Consequently, the experience of 
incessantly waiting meant they were forced to endure the empty time of profound 
boredom.   
 
The follow-up interview highlighted that some participants eventually managed to live 
in the inauthentic mode of existence, which enabled them reconnect the threefold 
structure of originary temporality. These participants were able to overcome the 
profound boredom caused by their experience of waiting. Conversely, several 
participants’ expressed their inability to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode 
of existence in response to boredom. If we recall, the inability to live in either mode of 
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existence resulted in unpleasant and distressing moods.167 These distressing moods were 
threaded throughout the participants’ accounts of waiting, and included uneasiness, 
irritation, frustration, disappointment, depression, and despair. The ongoing nature of 
the experience of waiting meant that some participants were persistently unable to live 
in either mode of existence in response to boredom. As a result, the unpleasant and 
distressing moods developed and intensified over time.  
  
Similarly, K never received recognition of his status from the castle and had to 
relentlessly endure the experience of waiting, throughout the novel. K’s story 
exemplified how the relentless wait made it impossible for him to live in either an 
authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. Thus, K’s distressing moods gradually 
heightened as the wait continued. However, the series of fragmented and incomplete 
narratives, which formed the basic style of the novel, meant the unpleasant moods 
experienced by K were never allowed to intensify to an extreme level.  
 
In contrast, the accelerating distress, which occurred when the person was persistently 
unable to live in either mode of existence was captured vividly by Beckett (1956) in his 
play Waiting for Godot. Furthermore, the existential moods of anxiety and boredom, 
which were embedded within the participants’ experience of waiting, were also 
exemplified within the play. In the following account, the participants’ experience of 
waiting will be discussed in relation to Beckett’s play Waiting for Godot.  
 
Waiting for Godot 
“Have you not done tormenting me with your time!” (Pozzo, Act 11, p 82) 
 
 
There are two acts in Beckett’s (1956) play Waiting for Godot. Act 1 begins in the 
evening on a country road, where two men named Vladimir and Estragon wait by a tree 
for the arrival of someone called Godot. Estragon is an old man sitting on a low mound 
trying to remove his boot, and Vladimir is another old man who chats to him. Estragon 
appears to have been beaten. The two men are homeless and debilitated. They 
apparently know each other for years and were possibly respectable in the past. While 
they wait and engage in conversation to pass the time, two strangers arrive: a landowner 
                                                 
167 See page 125 for the previous discussion on Heidegger’s account of the fundamental existential mood 
of boredom.   
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called Pozzo, and at the end of a rope, a slave called Lucky. When commanded by 
Pozzo, the slave dances and thinks aloud to entertain the others. After Pozzo and Lucky 
move on, a messenger boy enters and announces that Godot will not arrive this evening, 
but “surely tomorrow”. When the messenger boy leaves, Estragon suggests to Vladimir 
that they should commit suicide. Although the two characters debate whether they 
should give up the wait for Godot and leave, they do not go anywhere.  
 
In Act 11, Vladimir and Estragon resume their wait by the tree. The action is almost the 
same as in the first act of the play. The men continue to pass the time, while they wait 
for Godot. The tree has sprouted leaves. Pozzo and Lucky return, except this time the 
landowner Pozzo is blind and helpless, and Lucky is mute. After Pozzo and Lucky 
depart, the messenger boy arrives with the same message as before. Estragon and 
Vladimir again consider suicide, but when they test Estragon’s belt as a suicide 
instrument, it breaks. Therefore, the two characters again decide to continue the wait for 
Godot.  
 
It is proposed, that Vladimir and Estragon’s experience of waiting for Godot, depicted 
certain characteristics of the participants’ experience of waiting, described in my study. 
For instance, in the play Waiting for Godot, Godot acted as a concept or idea of hope 
and expectation for Vladimir and Estragon (Graver, 2004). We were given the 
impression that the arrival of Godot would provide the two characters with the 
possibility of a better future. Therefore, the play revolved around Vladimir and 
Estragon’s relentless wait for this hope to arrive. Similarly, the participants in my study 
described their experience of living in hope, while they waited for a kidney 
transplant.168 The hope of receiving a kidney transplant provided them with the 
possibility of returning to a normal life in the future.  
 
As the wait for Godot continued indefinitely, Vladimir and Estragon experienced 
uncertainty. Indeed, the experience of uncertainty was threaded throughout the play. 
The following dialogue between the two characters provided one example of this 
uncertainty, as Estragon began to question Vladimir as to whether they were waiting at 
the right place: 
                                                 
168 See page 173 for the theme Living in Hope.  
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Vladimir: We’re waiting for Godot. 
Estragon: [Despairingly] Ah! [Pause.] You’re sure it was here? 
Vladimir: What? 
Estragon: That we were to wait.  
Vladimir: He said by the tree. [They look at the tree.] Do you see any others? 
Estragon: What is it?  
Vladimir: I don’t know. A willow. 
Estragon: Where are the leaves? 
Vladimir: It must be dead. 
Estragon: No more weeping.  
Vladimir: Or perhaps it’s not the season.  
Estragon: Looks to me more like a bush. 
Vladimir: A shrub. 
Estragon: A bush. 
Vladimir: A - . What are you insinuating? That we’ve come to the wrong place? 
Estragon: He [Godot] should be here. 
Vladimir: He didn’t say for sure he’d come. 
Estragon: And if he doesn’t come? 
Vladimir: We’ll come back tomorrow. 
Estragon: And then the day after tomorrow. 
Vladimir: Possibly (Beckett, 1956, p6). 
 
The uncertainty experienced by Vladimir and Estragon, while they waited for Godot 
seemed to characterise the uncertainty experienced by the participants, while they 
waited for a kidney transplant. If we recall, the participants’ experience of uncertainty 
represented Heidegger’s (1962) description of anxiety.169 From Heidegger’s 
perspective, anxiety was a fundamental existential mood.170 It illuminated the threefold 
structure of originary temporality to the participants. This subsequently disclosed the 
possibility of death to the participants and prompted them to live in either an authentic 
or inauthentic mode of existence.171  
 
Correspondingly, Heidegger’s interpretation of anxiety and boredom as fundamental 
existential moods was also conveyed throughout the play Waiting for Godot  (Beckett, 
1956).  For example, Vladimir’s statement “One isn’t master of one’s moods” (p50) 
implied that moods were not subjective, private mental states. Instead, throughout the 
play, moods arose out of the character’s being-in-the-world i.e. their everyday relating 
                                                 
169 See page 195 for the previous discussion of the participants’ experience of uncertainty/anxiety. 
170 See pages 123-124 for the previous discussion on Heidegger’s perspective of moods.  
171 By existing authentically, I am aware of the finitude of my existence, but still project forward into 
possibilities in the originary future. In the inauthentic mode of existence, I do not acknowledge my finite 
nature. Instead, I allow myself to be absorbed in the everyday tasks and activities, which occur in world-
time to avoid this realisation. The threefold structure of originary temporality remains unified in both 
modes of existence. 
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or comportment with the things, and people in the world. Thus, common everyday 
activities such as putting on boots and hats, engaging in idle talk, eating, and 
eliminating occurred at the same time as moods such as hope, uncertainty, 
disappointment, and despair.   
 
Like the participants in the study, it is suggested that the experience of uncertainty 
disclosed the possibility of death to Vladimir and Estragon. When the possibility of 
death was disclosed to the two characters they were prompted to live in either an 
inauthentic or authentic mode of existence. However, Vladimir and Estragon’s 
experience of waiting signified that they were unable to live in either mode of existence, 
when confronted with the reality of death. Their future possibilities seemed to depend 
entirely on the arrival of Godot. Thus, until he arrived, they had no possibilities for the 
future, and were unable to live in the authentic mode of existence.  
 
Furthermore, their experience of waiting suggested they were also unable to live in the 
inauthentic mode of existence. In the inauthentic mode of existence, the person was 
absorbed in the everyday tasks and activities performed in world-time. These activities 
were performed in order to project forward into possibilities in the future. Therefore, the 
activities were productive and had an outcome.  
 
Vladimir and Estragon’s experience of waiting for Godot signified that they were not 
acting in world-time to project forward into possibilities in the future. Instead, they were 
held back from engaging in an everyday life, while they waited for Godot. The time 
spent waiting appeared to be empty and unproductive for the two characters. Therefore, 
Estragon’s statement “nothing to be done” in the opening passage set the scene for the 
entire play. It suggested that while the two characters waited for Godot, nothing 
productive would be accomplished.   
 
It is proposed, that Vladimir and Estragon’s inability to live in either an authentic or 
inauthentic mode of existence culminated in a disruption to the unified structure of 
originary temporality. Indeed, throughout the play, there was verification that the 
threefold structure of originary temporality was disconnected for the two characters. 
Their future possibilities seemed to depend entirely on the arrival of Godot. Therefore, 
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they were not projecting forward into possibilities in the future, while they waited 
indefinitely for his arrival.  
 
In addition, there was a great deal of doubt surrounding the characters’ past. For 
instance, when the play began, we assumed that the two characters had just met. 
However, as the play progressed, we were led to suspect that the characters had waited 
for Godot many times in the past with little results. The degree of familiarity between 
the characters was highlighted when they suddenly began to call each other Didi and 
Gogo. However, apart from these hints, we were given no concrete information in 
relation to the characters’ past. Therefore, while they waited for Godot’s arrival, the 
threefold structure of originary temporality seemed to be held back or disconnected for 
Vladimir and Estragon. 
 
Similarly, the narratives of the participants in my study illustrated that they were unable 
to live in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of existence, while they waited for a 
kidney transplant. The uncertainty of waiting indefinitely for a transplant meant the 
participants were unable to project forward into possibilities in the future. In addition, 
the restrictions of haemodialysis therapy prevented them from performing the everyday 
activities they took for granted in the past. As a result, they described their experience 
of being on hold, while they waited for a kidney transplant. The participants’ experience 
of being on hold represented a disconnection in the threefold structure of originary 
temporality.172 This disconnection in originary temporality culminated in profound 
boredom, as described by Heidegger (1995).173  
 
As previously mentioned, Heidegger (1962) described boredom as a fundamental 
existential mood, which highlighted the finitude of our existence.174 There were three 
forms of boredom, ranging from the most superficial to the most profound. If the person 
were able to escape or flee from the first and second forms of boredom, s/he would not 
progress into the third and most profound form of boredom (Heidegger, 1962).  
 
                                                 
172 See page 200 for the previous discussion on the disconnection of originary temporality represented in 
the participants’ experience of being on hold.   
173 See page 158 for the previous discussion on Heidegger’s description of boredom.  
174 See page 125 for Heidegger’s discussion of boredom as a fundamental existential mood.  
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The participants’ accounts of waiting, illustrated in the themes Lost Time and Waiting 
for Kidney Transplant implied they were unable to flee from the first and the second 
forms of boredom. Hence, they oscillated into the third form of boredom.175 Like the 
participants in the study, Vladimir and Estragon’s experience of waiting for Godot 
seemed to convey certain features of the first and second forms of boredom, advanced 
by Heidegger (1995). Their experience of “time dragging” and “killing time” signified 
that they experienced the first form of boredom.  
 
While Vladimir and Estragon waited indefinitely for Godot, the time seemed to drag. 
Therefore, throughout the play, the characters used various strategies to kill time while 
they waited. They talked to each other, sang, shared stories, ate and slept. When Pozzo 
and Lucky arrived, they entertained the two characters, which also enabled them to kill 
time.  However, as the play progressed, there was evidence that the strategies used by 
the two characters to kill time, were less successful. This was highlighted in the 
following section of the play, which appeared in Act 1 after Pozzo and Lucky departed:   
Vladimir: That passed the time. 
Estragon: It would have passed in any case. 
Vladimir: Yes, but not so rapidly. [Pause.] 
Estragon: What do we do now? 
Vladimir: I don’t know. 
Estragon: Let’s go 
Vladimir: We can’t. 
Estragon: Why not? 
Vladimir: We’re waiting for Godot. 
Estragon: [Despairingly] Ah! [Pause.] (Beckett, 1956, p41). 
 
Vladimir and Estragon’s experience of killing time, while they waited for Godot 
appeared to characterise the participants’ experience of killing time during 
haemodialysis therapy.176 The activities used by the participants did not enable them to 
effectively kill time for the entire duration of haemodialysis therapy. Hence, they spent 
a lot of time merely waiting for the treatment to end. The impatience, uneasiness, 
irritation and frustration were depicted within their accounts of killing time. These 
distressing moods were also portrayed as a feature of the first form of boredom, 
advanced by Heidegger (1995).  
 
                                                 
175 See pages 158 and 198 for the discussion on the participants’ experience of waiting in relation to the 
three forms of boredom.  
176 See page 133 for sub theme Killing Time.  
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Likewise, Vladimir and Estragon’s inability to kill time meant they were unable to flee 
from the distressing experience of waiting indefinitely for Godot. Consequently, the 
uneasiness, irritability, frustration, and anger were also contained within their 
experience of waiting. For instance, in the following dialogue, Estragon expressed the 
feelings of frustration and anger caused by the experience of prolonged waiting. The 
dialogue appeared in Act 1, when the messenger boy entered to tell the two characters 
that Godot would not arrive until tomorrow.    
Estragon: [Violently.] Will you approach! [The boy advances timidly.] 
What kept you so late? 
Vladimir: You have a message from Mr Godot? 
Boy: Yes, sir. 
Vladimir: Well, what is it? 
Estragon: What kept you so late? [The boy looks at them in turn, not 
knowing to which he should reply.] 
Vladimir: [To Estragon.] Let him alone. 
Estragon: [Violently.] You let me alone! [Advancing, to the boy.] Do you 
know what time it is? 
Boy: [Recoiling.] It’s not my fault, sir. 
Estragon: And whose is it? Mine? 
Boy: I was afraid, sir. 
Estragon: Afraid of what? Of us? [Pause.] Answer me! 
 (Beckett, 1956, p42-3). 
 
The participants in my study had no option but to wait for a kidney transplant. Hence, 
the experience of persistently waiting meant they unable to flee from the first form of 
boredom. Correspondingly, it is proposed that Vladimir and Estragon’s ongoing 
experience of waiting for Godot also hindered their ability to escape from the first form 
of boredom. Thus, like the participants in the study, the two characters in the play were 
drawn into the second form of boredom, described by Heidegger (1995).  
 
According to Heidegger (1995), in the second form of boredom we were held in limbo 
by the standing of world-time. As mentioned earlier, Vladimir and Estragon’s 
experience of waiting for Godot prevented them from engaging in everyday activities. 
The activities they performed to kill time, were not the same as the absorbed everyday 
activities one normally performed in world-time. They did not have a specific outcome 
or purpose. These aspects of the characters’ experience of waiting indicated that world-
time had come to a stand for the two characters. It subsequently implied that while they 
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waited for Godot, they endured the second form of boredom, described by Heidegger 
(1995).177   
 
In the same way, the sub themes Killing Time, Wasting Time and Being on Hold 
highlighted that the participants were essentially held back from engaging in everyday 
activities, as a result of their experience of waiting.178 This signified that world-time had 
come to a stand for the participants. In addition, the relentless and repetitive nature of 
their experience of waiting made it difficult to overcome the standing of world-time. 
Hence, the participants were unable to flee from the second form of boredom, and 
proceeded into the third and most profound form of boredom, presented by Heidegger 
(1995).  
 
Vladimir and Estragon’s incessant wait for Godot meant they were also unable to 
overcome the standing of world-time. Therefore, like the participants in the study, the 
two characters were unable to escape from the second form of boredom, and progressed 
into profound boredom.  
 
The third and most profound form of boredom, advanced by Heidegger (Heidegger, 
1995) was represented in the play Waiting for Godot. If we recall, in Heidegger’s 
description of profound boredom, the person was held in limbo by the suspension of 
originary temporality. Therefore, originary temporality was suspended or stopped. 
There were various passages in the play, which suggested that originary temporality was 
stopped for Vladimir and Estragon.  
 
The following section appeared in Act 2, when Pozzo and Lucky returned. Pozzo was 
no longer the powerful landowner with Lucky as his slave. Instead, Pozzo was blind and 
was led by Lucky, who was now dumb, and on a shorter rope. Lucky fell to the ground 
and brought Pozzo with him. Pozzo lay pleading to Vladimir and Estragon to help him 
to get up after his fall:  
 
 
 
                                                 
177 In the second form of boredom, world-time comes to a stand.   
178 See these sub themes on pages 133, 144, and 185.  
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Pozzo: Help! 
Vladimir: Do you hear him? 
Estragon: We are no longer alone, waiting for the night, waiting for Godot, 
waiting for…waiting. All evening we have struggled, unassisted. Now it’s over. 
It’s already tomorrow. 
Pozzo: Help! 
Vladimir: Time flows again already. The sun will set, the moon will rise, and we 
away…from here (Beckett, 1956, p69).179 
 
Vladimir’s description of “time flowing again”, confirmed that time was previously 
held back or suspended for the two characters, while they waited for Godot. As 
mentioned previously, the future had priority in originary temporality because it gave 
the threefold structure of originary temporality its projective features.180 Therefore, 
Vladimir’s predominant focus on the future in the section above implied that he was 
referring to originary temporality.  
 
The passage suggested that Vladimir possibly viewed the return of Pozzo and Lucky as 
a way to overcome the empty time of profound boredom. By assisting Pozzo and Lucky 
up after their fall, the two characters would have temporarily absorbed themselves in the 
inauthentic mode of existence. In turn, this would have allowed the threefold structure 
of originary temporality to be reconnected and time would “flow again”.  Consequently, 
Vladimir eagerly invited Estragon to do something to help Pozzo instead of wasting 
time engaging in idle conversation.  
Let us not waste our time in idle discourse! [Pause. Vehemently.] Let us 
do something, while we have the chance! It is not everyday that we are 
needed (Beckett, 1956, p71). 
 
According to Heidegger, the third form of boredom gave one the disheartening feeling 
of wasting time (Haar, 1999). The experience of wasting time emerged from the 
realisation that the person was ultimately wasting the finite time allotted to his/her 
existence (Heidegger, 1995).  Like the two characters in the play, the participants’ 
experience of wasting time was implicitly and explicitly contained in the sub themes 
Wasting Time and Killing Time.   
 
                                                 
179 The use of three spaced ellipsis points (…) within the quotations taken from the play Waiting for 
Godot, were contained in the original source.  
180 See page 94 for the previous discussion on the originary future.  
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When the threefold structure of originary temporality was suspended, the person was 
not acting in the originary present in order to project forward into possibilities in the 
originary future. Rather the present was characterised by inaction, and the person 
endured the empty time of profound boredom. The empty time of profound boredom led 
to nothing but a repetition of the same present (Haar, 1999). The participants’ 
descriptions of waiting, in the themes Lost Time and Waiting for a Kidney Transplant 
indicated that they were compelled to endure the empty time of profound boredom.181  
 
Similarly, Vladimir and Estragon’s experience of waiting for Godot characterised the 
empty time of profound boredom. Throughout the play, it seemed apparent that the 
characters were not acting in the present to project forward into possibilities in the 
future. Indeed, this was emphasised by Estragon in Act 1, when he exclaimed, “Nothing 
happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, it’s awful!” (Beckett, 1956, p34). Furthermore, 
the series of repetitive routines or rituals, which constituted the basic structure the play 
(Graver, 2004), were indicative of the repetitive empty present, which was synonymous 
with profound boredom. 
 
As previously mentioned, Heidegger (1995) contended that profound boredom 
disclosed the finitude of our existence.182 Throughout the play Waiting for Godot, we 
were regularly confronted with the stark reality that existence was finite. This was 
implicitly contained in the speech by Lucky (Beckett, 1956, p36-38).  
 
Lucky appeared to be a pitiful creature who was incapable of talking, never mind 
making a speech. However, his speech, which at first seemed like unintelligible 
ramblings, served to confront us with a central idea of the play - that we were all finite 
beings. The use of phrases such as “labours abandoned”, “labours left unfinished”, 
“man in short”, “man in brief”, “waste and pine”, “shrink and dwindle”, left us with no 
doubt that Lucky’s ambiguous rant was providing a clear message about the finitude of 
our existence.   
 
Moreover, the entire play consisted of Vladimir and Estragon’s desperate attempts to 
continuously engage in conversation and pastimes, in an effort to avoid reflecting on the 
                                                 
181 See pages 164 and 200 for the discussion of profound boredom in relation to both themes.  
182 See page 125 for previous discussion on profound boredom as a fundamental existential mood. 
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finitude of their existence. However, as depicted in the following section of the play, it 
was impossible for the two characters to maintain the incessant conversation, while the 
wait for Godot continued indefinitely. Thus, they were unable to block out the grim 
reality of the finitude of existence, disclosed by profound boredom.  
 
Vladimir: To every man his little cross. [He sighs]. Till he dies [Afterthought]. 
And is forgotten.  
Estragon: In the meantime let us try to converse calmly, since we are incapable 
of keeping silent. 
Vladimir: You’re right, we’re inexhaustible. 
Estragon: It’s so we won’t think. 
Vladimir: We have that excuse. 
Estragon: It’s so we won’t hear. 
Vladimir: We have our reasons. 
Estragon: All the dead voices.   
Vladimir: They make a noise like wings. 
Estragon: Like leaves. 
Vladimir: Like sand. 
Estragon: Like leaves. [Silence.]   
Vladimir: They all speak together. 
Estragon: Each one to itself. [Silence.]  
Vladimir: Rather they whisper.  
Estragon: They rustle. 
Vladimir: They murmur. 
Estragon: They rustle. [Silence.] 
Vladimir: What do they say? 
Estragon: They talk about their lives.  
Vladimir: To have lived is not enough for them. 
Estragon: They have to talk about it.  
Vladimir: To be dead is not enough for them.  
Estragon: It is not sufficient.  [Silence.]  
Vladimir: They make a noise like feathers. 
Estragon: Like leaves. 
Vladimir: Like ashes.  
Estragon: Like leaves. [Long silence.] 
Vladimir: Say something! 
Estragon: I’m trying  [Long silence] 
Vladimir: [In anguish] Say anything at all! (Beckett, 1956, p53-54). 
 
When profound boredom confronted the person with the grim reality of death, s/he was 
prompted to live in the authentic or inauthentic mode of existence. Vladimir and 
Estragon’s description of waiting for Godot signified that they were unable to live in  
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either mode of existence. As mentioned previously, the inability to live in either mode 
of existence in response to boredom resulted in the unpleasant and distressing moods we 
encountered on an everyday basis.183  
 
The narratives of several participants in my study highlighted how their experience of 
waiting prevented them from living in either an authentic or inauthentic mode of 
existence. Consequently, the distressing feelings of uneasiness, irritation, frustration, 
anger, sadness, disappointment, depression, hopelessness, and despair were threaded 
throughout their accounts. The ongoing nature of the experience of waiting meant the 
inability to live in either mode of existence continued on a long-term basis for some 
participants. As a result, these unpleasant and distressing moods developed and 
intensified over time.  
 
This was highlighted in the follow-up interview with the participants. The participants’ 
accounts illustrated how their distress accelerated while they waited indefinitely for a 
kidney transplant. They described how their experience of uncertainty, eventually led to 
disappointment, depression, and finally hopelessness and despair. The participants also 
indicated that their experience of waiting, described in the theme Lost Time ranged from 
uneasiness and irritation to sheer frustration, anger, and eventually despair.  
 
This intensification of moods was palpable within Beckett’s play Waiting for Godot. 
Like the participants in the study, throughout the play Vladimir and Estragon were 
unable to live in the authentic or inauthentic existence in response to profound boredom. 
Hence, their experience of distress accelerated to a level of sheer hopelessness and 
despair.  This was emphasised in Act 2, where the characters’ discussion about suicide 
was at a more advanced stage than it had been in Act 1 (Graver, 2004).  
 
Toward the end of Act 1, Estragon had contemplated suicide, and asked Vladimir to 
remind him to bring a rope tomorrow. However, in Act 2, Estragon actually insisted that 
they hang themselves and offered his belt to perform the act. Vladimir’s increased 
desperation was also notable, because unlike in Act 1, he agreed with Estragon’s 
proposition to commit suicide. When the two men tested the strength of the belt as a 
                                                 
183 See page 125 for the previous discussion on Heidegger’s account of the fundamental existential mood 
of boredom.   
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suicide instrument, it broke and they fell to the ground. While this scene was 
humorously articulated within the play, the utter hopelessness and despair experienced 
by the characters was apparent.  
 
In contrast to Vladimir and Estragon’s experience of waiting for Godot, the follow-up 
interview highlighted that some participants in my study were able to live in the 
inauthentic mode of existence in response to profound boredom. They described their 
efforts to re-engage in everyday tasks and activities in world-time. By choosing to live 
in the inauthentic mode of existence, these participants were able to reconnect the 
threefold structure of originary temporality, and overcome the experience of profound 
boredom. This subsequently enabled them to overcome the experience of waiting, 
described in the themes Lost Time and Waiting for a Kidney Transplant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
